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dc.contributor.authorElqayam, Shiraen
dc.contributor.authorOver, D. E.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-13T16:17:47Z
dc.date.available2012-06-13T16:17:47Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationElqayam, S. and Over, D. (2012) Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: The paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning. Mind and Society, 11 (1), pp. 27-40.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2086/6178
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of analysis. Moreover, we propose that, within the new paradigm, these levels of analysis reflect on each other. Bayesianism suggests a specific theoretical understanding of dual processing. Just as importantly, the duality in processing carries over to duality in function; although both types of processes compute degrees of belief, they generate different functions.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.subjectAlgorithmic and computational levels of explanationen
dc.subjectBayesianismen
dc.subjectbinary logicen
dc.subjectdegrees of beliefen
dc.subjectdual processingen
dc.subjectnew paradigmen
dc.subjectprobabilitiesen
dc.subjectuncertaintyen
dc.titleProbabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: The paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoningen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-012-0102-4
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.explorer.multimediaNoen
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Psychological Scienceen


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