Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities?
We disentangle the effects of choice (give vs. take) and externality (positive vs. negative) framing of decisions in isomorphic and payoff-equivalent experimental public good games. We find that, at the aggregate level, neither frame affects group contributions. At the individual level, the Take choice frame leads to greater free-riding, and also to somewhat higher contributions, i.e., to more extreme contribution behaviour.
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Citation : Cartwright, E. and Ramalingam, A. (2019) Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities?. Economics Letters
Research Institute : Institute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)
Peer Reviewed : Yes