The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games
We revisit the question of whether a refund increases efficiency in threshold public good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the effect of endowment size. We demonstrate that a refund increases efficiency if and only if the endowment is small relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the effect of a refund. Specifically, we argue that a refund increases efficiency only if significantly many groups converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.
Also available on KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/51216/ The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.
Citation : Cartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2015) The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters, 134, pp. 29-33
ISSN : 0165-1765
Peer Reviewed : Yes