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dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.contributor.authorSingh, Thomasen
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-06T10:24:13Z
dc.date.available2018-06-06T10:24:13Z
dc.date.issued2018-04-13
dc.identifier.citationCartwright, E. and Singh, T.B. (2018) Observation and contagion effects in cooperation: An experimental investigation. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 74, pp.151-160en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2086/16252
dc.descriptionThe file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.en
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally disentangle two potential sources for endogenous social interactions effects. By comparing groups where the aggregate behavior is publicly observable with those where it is not we can measure the size of any endogenous observation effect. By comparing connected with disconnected groups we can measure the size of any endogenous contagion effect. Results are provided for both a coordination game and social dilemma. We find strong evidence of an endogenous observation effect in the coordination game but not social dilemma. We find no evidence of an endogenous contagion effect in either game. While our results point towards a conformity effect we argue that information on group behavior primarily acts as a coordinating device which may be reflected in changes in beliefs.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.subjectSocial interactions effectsen
dc.subjectsocial normsen
dc.subjectminimum effort gameen
dc.subjectcontagionen
dc.subjectprisoners dilemmaen
dc.titleObservation and contagion effects in cooperation: An experimental investigationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doihttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.006
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.funderBritish Commonwealth Academic Fellowshipen
dc.projectidN/Aen
dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NC-NDen
dc.date.acceptance2018-04-12en
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)en


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