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dc.contributor.authorDouven, Igoren
dc.contributor.authorElqayam, Shiraen
dc.contributor.authorSingmann, Henriken
dc.contributor.authorvan Wijnbergen-Huitink, Jannekeen
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-10T09:48:48Z
dc.date.available2017-10-10T09:48:48Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationDouven, I.E., Elqayam, S. Singmann, H. and van Wijnbergen-Huitink, J. (in press) Conditionals and inferential connections: A hypothetical inferential theory. Cognitive Psychology, 101, pp.50-81.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2086/14590
dc.descriptionThe file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link
dc.description.abstractIntuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind of connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new psychological theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and psychological theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven, satisficing-bounded inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test our theory, we created a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were presented with a soritical series of objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and spheres (Experiment 2), or both (Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related conditionals embodying non-causal inferential connections (such as “If patch number 5 is blue, then so is patch number 4”). All four experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in which (largely determinate) responses were sensitive to parameters determining inference strength, as well as to consequent position in the series, in a way analogous to belief bias. Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can be suppressed, with participants reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that this pattern can be partly explained by a measure of inference strength. is pattern supports our theory’s “principle of relevant inference” and “principle of bounded inference,” highlighting the dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectbelief biasen
dc.subjectconditionalsen
dc.subjectdual processingen
dc.subjectinferential semanticsen
dc.subjectrelevanceen
dc.subjectsatisficingen
dc.titleConditionals and inferential connections: A hypothetical inferential theoryen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.09.002
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.funderN/Aen
dc.projectidN/Aen
dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NC-NDen
dc.date.acceptance2017-09-25en
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Psychological Scienceen


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