Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China's anti-bribery blacklist
This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.
Original Open Access Repository: https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:13057
Citation : Zhou, l., Jin, Z. and Wang, Z. (2017) Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist. Applied Economics Letters, 24 (4), pp. 258-263
Research Institute : Institute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)
Peer Reviewed : Yes