The Spatiality of Being Autonomous
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Living things are conditioned by their spatiality. Organised by purposeful activity a subject’s niche is a habitual condition effected at one scale by differences across boundaries and scales of composition (Hoffmeyer 2008, 1998) and at another by differences to which a subject reacts and has intention towards (Uexküll 1934). A subject’s intentionality transcends through meaning to define organisation, creating a pattern encompassing bodily structure and behaviour. This ‘lived-space’ (its niche) is comprehensible: it is ordered. Conceived to be the embodiment of intellect (Kirsch 1995) this ordered space is a pattern (or form) of inhabitation and articulates what may be termed the subject’s ‘spatial intelligence’ (van Schaik 2008).

The semiotics of Charles Peirce, coupled with the triadic spatial code of Henri Lefebvre defines an aid through which to analyse habits of action (Määttänen 2007). It is proposed that by considering a subjects spatiality biosemiotically we can not only analyse habits of action, but we can test and evaluate spatial scenarios. In so doing we may establish a spatial model which enables designerly thought the capacity to configure space in a manner which embraces the spatial intelligence of the subject. All living things dwell, and in so doing affect their environment in some way. Various organisms have developed the capacity to modify their environment in such a way that they construct artefacts. These structures embody the subjects intelligence, and whilst human beings may be understood to create artefacts 'par excellence' their constructs are ingrained by patterns of inhabitation. Concerned with the problem of spatial configuration in architecture (and thereby human activity), it is argued that 'human-space' maybe comprehended by “extending the problem downwards to the pattern recognition and control processes of simpler organisms” (Pattee 2005, p281), on the premise that “the very simple mechanisms we see at play in single celled organisms lead to higher and higher degrees of what we call sign processing” in human beings (Favareau 2010).