Sport and Canadian Anti-Apartheid Policy: a political and diplomatic history c.1968 - c.1980

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De Montfort University
Leicester, England
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Abstract

In the 1970s the Canadian government took a strong stand against apartheid sport policies. Despite Canada’s limited sporting links with South Africa, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his Liberal government took on a leading Commonwealth position in promoting the isolation of South African sport. The catalyst for this leadership was Canada as host of two ‘mega’ sporting events during the 1970s - the 1976 Montréal Olympics and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games. This thesis focuses on the progression and adoption of new policies and initiatives which looked to strengthen Canada’s foreign policies dealing with apartheid sport while promoting these initiatives within the Commonwealth. Canada, a senior member of the association, had proved itself to be a key ally of newly independent Commonwealth nations throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. These nations looked to Canada for guidance. Along with taking on a stronger Commonwealth position during the Trudeau era, Canada also looked to increase its international presence by focusing less on its traditional ties with the United States and more on forging relationships with a variety of newer nations. As Canada looked outside its borders to assert itself, within the country regionalism was on the rise with the advent of Québec separatism. All these factors played a major role in the development of Canadian foreign policy during the 1970s. This thesis focuses on the balance between internal and external pressures for change and how changes unfolded in light of Canada holding two mega sporting events in quick progression. From 1968 to 1980, Trudeau dominated Canadian politics. An engaging figure, he came to power promoting his notion of a ‘Just Society’ and looking to expand Canada’s international prestige. Newly opened archives of the External Affairs Department at the Library and Archives Canada show that Trudeau played a key role in the development of Canada’s new policies, especially during the period of 1975 to 1978. The wide range of primary sources consulted, many recently opened through Access to Information and Privacy requests, alongside a variety of sources from voluntary associations, analysed in this thesis provide a fulsome, chronological narrative of how Canada moved to the forefront of the Commonwealth and the association’s movement to isolate South African apartheid sport.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Scope and argument

This thesis is a critical analysis of the Canadian government’s anti-apartheid sport policies in the 1970s. It focuses on the progression of these policies through the first incarnation of the Liberal Party government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau from 1968 to 1979 - a decade which witnessed a marked international strengthening of anti-apartheid sentiment, especially amongst newly independent African states. Unlike in Britain, Australia or New Zealand, South Africa’s two main white sports - rugby union and cricket - were not popular in Canada. Consequently, Canada’s direct sporting contact with South Africa was relatively limited and primarily in the field of athletics and other more marginal sports. Canada, however, was a leading member of the Commonwealth and necessarily implicated in the wider post-colonial politics of the former British empire. Moreover, under Trudeau, Canada increasingly aspired to play a distinctive and progressive role in world affairs. It was against this background that Canada acted as host to two of the world’s largest sporting events: the Montréal Olympic Games of 1976 and the Edmonton Commonwealth Games of 1978. This tension is central to the thesis, the argument of which is reciprocal: that Canada’s international interests impacted upon its holding of ‘mega’ sporting events and that these events also directly influenced the conduct of foreign policy. Hence, in its broadest sense this is a case study of the role of politics in sport and of sport in politics.

In addressing the evolution of Canada’s anti-apartheid sports policies in the 1970s, this thesis examines the balance between internal and external pressures for change. What was the role of moral pressure exerted by Churches, trade unions and other progressive bodies and individuals in the formulation of an anti-apartheid sports policy? Did Canadian economic and trading interests effect this? What role did Canadian regionalism, notably the growing ‘problem’ of Québec separatism, play? Or was it rather external factors - Canada’s desire to increase its ‘middle-power’ status or the relations with emergent African nations, for example - which were the crucial catalysts for changes to Canada’s sports policy in relation to South Africa?

The hosting of major international sporting events is often seen as an honour. But the Canadian government soon discovered it could be a burden. The staging of these
events, especially the modern Olympic Games, of course, had frequently been subject to political intrigue and international diplomacy. In the year Trudeau came to power, this kind of politicisation of sport was apparent to all. The 1968 Mexico City Olympics was preceded by a massacre of protesters 10 days before the start of the Games whilst the Black Power salute by American 200-meter medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos during the playing of the Star Spangled Banner was a hugely controversial political gesture. As Montréal began to prepare for the 1976 Olympics, the Trudeau government had to come to terms with the new phenomenon of political terrorism. During the Munich Olympics of 1972, 11 members of the Israeli Olympic contingent were killed by members of the Palestinian terrorist group Black September. Despite the aspirations and efforts of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to keep international political conflict out of the Games, clashes of Cold War ideology and new forms of extremism were never far away. Heading off or containing such conflicts could not be managed at the level of the host city, which did not hold political power. Reluctantly or otherwise, the host state was drawn in.

In the Canadian case the key factor was the coincidence of a leading Commonwealth nation hosting the Olympics at the same time as an international movement for cutting all sporting links with South Africa gathered momentum. The African Commonwealth nations had, on several previous occasions, including 1970 and 1974, threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games because of continuing sporting ties between white Commonwealth nations and South Africa. This campaign was backed by powerful protest movements, especially in Britain and in New Zealand, designed to stop tours of white South African rugby or cricket teams selected on a racial basis. This in turn raised the political stakes and temperature across the Commonwealth. The coincidence of the 1976 Olympic Games and the 1978 Commonwealth Games, being held in a leading Commonwealth country, which proclaimed itself as progressive and multicultural, provided African Commonwealth nations with the opportunity to isolate South Africa even further. Central to the thesis is the period 1975 - 1978, during which the threat of boycott, first of the Olympics and then the Commonwealth Games, became a reality. How did this come about and how was it dealt with? This leads directly to consideration of the key role of Canada in the framing of the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement, which governed Commonwealth sporting policy with South Africa until the collapse of the white supremacist regime. Thus this thesis, whilst
primarily concerned with specifically Canadian internal policy issues, throws new light on wider questions of international and Commonwealth relations with South Africa.

**Method and Structure**

Why did Canada’s anti-apartheid sport policy become much stricter when Canada had such limited direct sporting contact with South Africa? In order to answer this question and to evaluate carefully the changes, nuances and development of Canada’s foreign policy dealing with South African sport, this thesis is set out as a chronological analytic narrative. Why was this approach taken? There were, of course, other potential ways to approach the question and structure of the thesis. For example, a thematic approach could have been taken based upon the different ‘actors’ involved: the sporting federations, the host cities, the IOC, the Commonwealth, the activists and pressure groups and, most importantly, the Canadian state itself. Such an approach would have made it difficult to determine patterns of influence over time. As the activity of the state in response to external pressure turned out to be of prime importance and the role of internal ‘actors’ much less significant, a structure which gave each equal importance would not have served the wider explanatory purpose.

The intensification of Canada’s anti-apartheid policies can best be explained historically, that is part of an evolving narrative of change where one event or action led to an initiative, which in turn produced a further reaction. Such an approach also allows full scope for the key role of certain individuals, the most important of whom was Trudeau. Hence the chapter structure of the thesis is based upon an unfolding sequence of events in which the Canadian government was drawn into responding to the changing demands of the international situation, notably the increasing stridency of the African nations of the Commonwealth and their boycott threats. Hence the bulk of the thesis is devoted to the immediate build-up to the Montréal Games, the consequences of the boycott and the formation of the Gleneagles Agreement.

By examining the evolution of policy over time rather than taking a snapshot of it at a particular moment, it is possible to see the variety and interplay of forces influencing the Canadian government at any one time. Foreign and diplomatic policies are formed through complex interactions of interests, events and personalities. Only a nuanced diplomatic history can provide a satisfactory account of the rapid succession of events
from the boycott of the Montréal Olympics to the politics of avoiding another boycott in 1978 at the Commonwealth Games. This involved a series of intense exchanges and high political maneuvering on the part of Canada and other senior members of the Commonwealth.

A chronological narrative tracks the progression and development of the process of change whilst recognising the importance of contingent factors such as the force of personality. Here the recent availability of new primary archive sources, the nature and extent of which are set out in full in the following section, turned out to be of critical importance. A key element of this thesis, and an important aspect of its originality, lies in the presentation of previously unavailable or restricted material which casts new light on the nature and level of Canadian government activity behind the scenes. For example, we can now see how concerned Canada and Britain were at the prospect of an African boycott of Edmonton, which threatened the unity and legitimacy of the Commonwealth itself. How could a multicultural Commonwealth of nations continue if the majority of its members felt alienated and marginalised due to race? Canada, as a senior member of the Commonwealth and as the nation often seen as the confidant of non-white Commonwealth nations, wanted to avoid, at all costs, any division of the association along racial lines.

There are many ways a thesis such as this could have been written. History is a discipline with a wide variety of approaches ranging from Marxist based class analysis to viewing the past through the lens of gender, which has been especially important in social and cultural history in recent years. This in turn has been the object of a postmodernist critique which rejects ‘grand narratives’ or theory-led accounts and focuses on the assumptions that the historian brings to the task derived from personal experience or inclination. This post-modern approach stresses the ‘linguistic turn’, paying greater attention to the way language itself constructs the past and how the language of the historian also impacts on what is written.

My own approach has been determined by my education, reading and the nature of the subject I have chosen. My training has been in political science and diplomatic history with a special emphasis on decision making by elites. The focus of my earlier Master’s research on Commonwealth politics reevaluated the role of Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker at the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. My choice
of doctoral subject and my approach to it followed from this; I look at how key decisions were made at the highest level of government rather than trying to conduct a grassroots analysis of public opinion through the press or pressure groups. Whilst I acknowledge the significance of these influences on policy-making, my object was primarily to interrogate the way national politicians and administrators respond to international political pressure at the very highest level of government. This forms the intellectual framework for my study of the changing nature of Canada’s anti-apartheid policy in sport.

My stress on a close reading of diplomatic texts means that my broad position is one of critical empiricism. By this I mean that I have not treated my primary sources as ‘sacred texts’ or from what Douglas Booth has labeled a simple ‘reconstructionist’ position. In other words, I do not believe the historian can simply take a text or ‘fact’ at face value and assume that by accumulating a number of such documents or data in chronological sequence the ‘truth’ will emerge in a simple fashion. Whilst this thesis is a primarily a study in policy-making based mainly on government sources, at each stage I have considered the specific historical context in which the text was produced and the purposes of the author in writing it. According to E.H. Carr, the modern historian ‘...has the dual task of discovering the few significant facts and turning them into facts of history, and of discarding the many insignificant facts as unhistorical.’ To further illustrate this point, Carr explains:

No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought - what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought. None of this means anything until the historian has got to work on it and deciphered it. The facts, whether found in documents or not, have still to be processed by the historian before he can make any use of them: the use he makes of them is, if I may put it that way, the processing process.

Many of the primary archival sources in this thesis are from newly opened files; this allows for new interpretations on how the government of Canada consciously advanced the anti-apartheid sport movement in the 1970s. Granted, the documents could have been analyzed via other, important historical theories. Marxist analysis could have been applied, highlighting the role capitalist nations like Canada and Britain played in

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2 Ibid, p. 16.
progressing South Africa’s international sport isolation at the behest of developing nations - thereby imposing a solution, the Gleneagles Agreement, that best met their needs while toning down the anti-apartheid rhetoric. Or, a postcolonial analysis would have revealed that former African colonies successfully progressed the anti-apartheid sport movement through consistent calls for sports boycotts of South Africa and actually following through on its boycott threat at the 1976 Olympic Games. But, an empirical analysis of the facts, extracted from the specific sources noted below, was deemed the best way of portraying this particular historical topic because the progressive and intricate series of events that unravelled from 1968 through to 1980 required a methodical, clear analysis of the steps involved in the development of Canada’s anti-apartheid sport policies.

This thesis begins by examining the period which preceded the Trudeau years beginning in 1961, the year in which South Africa was declared a republic and ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth. The increasing isolation of South Africa, including its expulsion from the Olympic movement, forms the backdrop to Canada’s relationship with South Africa up to 1968 under the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker and the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson. Chapter Two also examines the development of a grassroots anti-apartheid sports movement in Canada.

Chapter Three focuses, primarily, on the political climate in Canada in the late 1960s. In 1968, young Liberal Pierre Elliott Trudeau was voted into the Prime Minister’s office on a wave of hope for change. This chapter assesses the significance of the rise of the separatist movement in Québec and Trudeau’s key role in foreign policy, especially his interaction with other Commonwealth countries and his desire to increase Canada’s international influence.

In Chapter Four, Canada’s foreign policy towards South African sport begins to change. It is in the early 1970s that Trudeau and his government, mainly the Department of External Affairs, start to evaluate Canada’s policies and diplomacy towards South Africa. By 1975 Canada had further distanced itself from South Africa. But, how effective were the new policies that were approved? Would Canada legitimately be able to claim they were doing all they could do to oppose apartheid through sport? This chapter examines how the changes progressed, how they were approved and how they were received by other nations and by the Canadian public.
Chapter Five sets the stage for the Montréal Olympics, explaining exactly where South Africa stood in international sport in 1975 and 1976. During these years, the international movement to isolate South African sport really gained momentum and groups such as the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) were actively working to isolate all aspects of South Africa’s international sport contacts. This chapter also tracks the anti-apartheid sport movement in Canada, small as it may be, and the Canadian government’s moves to enforce its new anti-apartheid policies in the run-up to the Olympics. It was critical that Canada did not appear to be in sporting contact with South Africa, even indirectly, through New Zealand’s continuing rugby contact with South Africa. Even the invitation of a non-racially selected team of disabled South African athletes to the Toronto Paralympiad, taking place in August 1976, proved highly contentious.

Chapter Six covers the period immediately preceding and up to the Montréal Olympics along with the actual boycott of the Games. During this time, the preparation of the Olympics in Montréal were plagued with problems - over-spending, strikes, and allegations of corruption. Both the Canadian federal government and the Québec provincial government were under pressure to ensure Montréal was ready to host the events. However, South Africa was not the only political problem. The Canadian government was also concerned with its burgeoning relationship with China and how that relationship may be damaged should Taiwan be allowed to enter Canada to participate in the Olympic Games. A key advantage of choosing a chronological historical structure for the thesis is evident here. Statesmen and their advisors rarely have the luxury of concentrating on one thing at one time. Decisions are made under the pressure of multiple and simultaneous challenges and problems. Hence, by looking beyond the narrow anti-apartheid issue to the wider field of diplomacy, we can explain why the Canadian government was caught by surprise when the African nations finally put their boycott threat into action. Trudeau, his officials, the IOC and the press had been so focused on the China-Taiwan problem, they had overlooked the obvious threat from the African states.

Chapter Seven analyses the legacy of the 1976 Olympic Games. Despite delivering a successful spectacle in sporting terms, the Montréal Olympics proved a financial disaster with the city and the Québec government left to pick up a heavy price tag. The Games were also a failure in terms of Canadian foreign affairs. This failure, however,
had major international consequences in bringing about further changes in Canada’s anti-apartheid sport policies and the effort of Trudeau and his government to ensure that the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games did not fall victim to another boycott. An ‘all white’ Commonwealth Games would have been a disaster and the chapter examines how Trudeau, closely supported by British Prime Minister James Callaghan and Commonwealth Secretary Shridath Ramphal, worked together to develop the Gleneagles Agreement to avoid future boycotts.

In Chapter Eight, the focus is the Gleneagles Agreement in action. Was the agreement effective? How was it implemented? This chapter also tracks the run-up to the Commonwealth Games from the Gleneagles perspective, but also from the point of view of the Canadian government. As before the Montréal Games, Canada made additional changes to its anti-apartheid sport policies. Ensuring the success of the Edmonton Commonwealth Games became a major goal of Trudeau. He did not want to see a repeat of the Montréal boycott and another stain on Canada’s international reputation.

Overall, the historical narrative moves from the late 1960s where Canada was relatively peripheral to the wider anti-apartheid movement to a position nine years later where Trudeau was at the heart of negotiating the agreement which would determine the conduct of Commonwealth policy as a whole until the fall of the apartheid regime. Close historical analysis year by year, month by month - even week by week or day by day - reveals how the Canadian government itself as a leading Commonwealth power, rather than the IOC or the city of Montréal, became the key player in the continuing drama of sporting relations with South Africa.

Sources
The key role of central government in the story explains the extensive use of state archives in this thesis. Here the recent release of a significant body of hitherto unavailable government papers of successive Liberal governments is critical. Without the declassifying of material through specific requests for access to restricted material, which were mostly successful, this study probably could not have been written and certainly would not have been able to reveal the inner workings of government policy.

3 A Timeline of Key Events can be found in Appendix A.
These records, supplemented by British holdings at the National Archives, turned out to be far more revealing than the archives of the IOC itself or other public bodies.

A key resource for this thesis were the fonds of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Department of External Affairs and Sport Canada at the Library and Archives of Canada (LAC) in Ottawa. The Trudeau archives were cross-referenced to the Department of External Affairs archives for the same time-period. Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests were made to the Canadian government for a wide range of materials dealing with South Africa, Canadian diplomacy and sport. Access was granted to the vast majority of these files. The newly opened Department of External Affairs files provided a treasure-trove of information. External Affairs meticulously documented events within South Africa and how these events impacted other African nations. These documents also showed the urgent need for change expressed in memorandums from External Affairs, and cables between External Affairs Ottawa and its offices in South Africa as well as those between Canada and key African Commonwealth members. The British National Archives at Kew provided key information surrounding Britain’s anti-apartheid sport policy and its relationship with Commonwealth countries, specifically Canada, during this time period. British government documents showed how the head of the Commonwealth developed its own anti-apartheid sport policies and how these policies influenced Britain’s interaction with other Commonwealth countries.

The Historical Archives of the International Olympic Committee were also consulted and proved more limited, but they did provide key information surrounding the post-Montréal boycott reaction of the IOC and the repercussions of the boycott. Importantly, the IOC archives included evidence from the nations that boycotted the Montréal Games. The information gathered from these three archival holdings laid the foundation of the thesis and provided an outline to base subsequent research. Given the specificity of the topic, other policies concerning Canada’s foreign policy towards South Africa were not investigated in depth, but any wider policies referenced in sport-related documents were researched further and developed in the thesis.

Although the archival research undertaken proved fruitful and the documents revealing, a critical approach to these sources is required. Richard Evans notes that historians are used to eliciting meaning from documents and comparing them to other documents, ‘...in this way a document can indeed be made to reveal more than its
author thought’ and what the document does not mention allows an author to bring their own thoughts into interpreting a document.\(^4\) This interpretation allows for documents to be analysed from a multitude of views, with a variety of supporting documentation - that’s why there are so many varying accounts of histories dealing with specific topics. But, when tackling archival research, it is necessary to look at biases and gaps in the interpreted story the documents are telling. Firstly, the documents consulted at LAC were those of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Canadian governmental departments. They focus almost solely on Canada’s point of view and the development of Canadian policies and are skewed towards Trudeau and Canada’s point of view. Some insight is provided into the policies and actions of other Commonwealth governments through correspondence. Whilst useful, these exchanges inevitably offer a rather one-dimensional view of the policies of other countries and how they may have been developed. Secondly, although most of the ATIP requests were approved, some documents remained closed to the public with no specific reason provided. Occasionally, information was withheld from portions of specific documents in the Department of External Affairs files, significant instances of this are discussed in the thesis. In particular, there was one file in the Trudeau fonds which, upon donation of the files by Trudeau’s estate, was deemed restricted. The file: ‘Secret - Denial of Entry to Canada to South African Sportsman 23 June 1978’ is closed at least until 2014, when it is due to be reviewed. Importantly, this file is dated approximately 6 weeks before the beginning of the 1978 Commonwealth Games; Canada would have been extra vigilant in ensuring that any and all potential contact with South African sport was avoided. Thirdly, the documents provide varying points of view depending on the writer, the audience, contemporary events, the type of document, the security of the document or the writer’s desire to convey a certain message or discourse for future use or legacy.\(^5\) While reading and evaluating the archival documents used in this thesis, deep analysis and cross-referencing to other types of resources was necessary to fully capture the events surrounding the 1976 Olympics and the 1978 Commonwealth Games and Canada’s role in isolating South African sport. And, finally, fourthly, the External Affairs documents do not provide information surrounding the points of view of either the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) nor the organizing committee of the


Montréal Games. There are three main potential reasons for this lack of documentation. One, the type of negotiations surrounding boycotts and anti-apartheid sport relations were going on at a high level within the federal government and were mostly done secretly. This means that the COC and the Olympic organizing committee may not have been aware of how dire the situation had become in regards to the boycott threat. Two, the COC and organizing committee may have been too preoccupied with mitigating the disastrous planning situation unravelling in Montréal, which is discussed further below. Three, the documents may be housed in other archival holdings not consulted here. Despite these potential gaps, the External Affairs documents prove illuminating in shedding light on the historical events discussed in this thesis - providing new information on how events unfolded.

Documents at the National Archives provided insight into how the British government viewed Canada’s policies and also the development of their own policies dealing with apartheid sport. The documents consulted both at the National Archives and at LAC dealt mainly with high politics and diplomacy, various other primary sources and documents were consulted in an effort to provide context and public reaction to the policies adopted by the Canadian government.

In an effort to understand the non-governmental side of anti-apartheid activity in Canada during this time period, other archival holdings reviewed at the LAC include the fonds of the following grassroots organisations: Communist Party of Canada, Voices of Women (VOW) Canada, OXFAM Canada, Canadian University Service Overseas-Volunteer Service Overseas Canada (CUSO-VSO), YMCA Canada, and YWCA Canada. VOW seemed to be actively involved in the anti-apartheid movement in Canada in its infancy, but kept no records past the early 1970s, while the YWCA Canada were mainly concerned with cutting economic ties with South Africa. Both the YMCA and YWCA Canada were concerned with humanitarian issues and often wrote letters to Prime Minister Trudeau regarding arrests by South African authorities, political prisoners and the treatment of non-white South Africans. The archives of CUSO-VSO, OXFAM and the YMCA focused mainly on their groups’ work on the ground in Southern Africa. CUSO-VSO and OXFAM’s archives, in particular, were only moderately useful as they did not provide information on specific policies, but instead focused on the projects they were helping fund. Most of the information found in the archival holdings of these non-governmental organizations focused solely on the organization’s
individual work, with very little personal correspondence of staff members retained. The documentation focused on each group’s individual policies and mission, rather than the individual opinions of staff, volunteers or other participants. Therefore, these holdings trace the history and documentation of the collective rather than individual members. This fact reinforced the discourse of the groups listed above, while, in comparison, the archival holdings of the Canadian and British governments and their departments explored a variety of opinions, depending on varying circumstances, including the individual writer of a document, the type of document (memo versus telegram versus formal letter, etc), the audience, and other individuals who may read a document by happenstance.

At LAC, research was also conducted in the archives of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), United Auto-workers Archives and the Communist Party of Canada. These groups were mainly concerned with the treatment of workers in South Africa. Although useful for shedding light on the labour movement’s efforts in promoting anti-apartheid causes in Canada, the documents proved fragmented with no dedicated file dealing solely with anti-apartheid policies. Additional independent archival holdings were audited for anti-apartheid activity, specifically: Canadian Federation of Students at McMaster University, United Church of Canada Archives and the Anglican Church of Canada Archives. Most of these organisations kept partial records of documents they deemed valuable when submitting them for archives at their respective locations. Although the documents consulted were useful, it proved difficult to track the progression and development of these groups and their support of the various anti-apartheid organisations within Canada. With all archival holdings, what is submitted and/or kept for archiving depends on the individual(s) charged with retaining files from any department or organization and the individual(s) responsible for handing over documents to the archive-holding institutions consulted for this thesis. Richard Evans explains: ‘Archives are the product of the chance survival of some documents and the corresponding chance loss or deliberate destruction of others. They are also the products of the professional activities of archivists, which therefore shape the record of the past and with it the interpretations of historians.’ Also along the way, documents may be destroyed, misplaced, retained for personal reasons or deemed unnecessary to an historical legacy or story. The raw documentation consulted and listed in the thesis was

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6 Evans. *In Defence*, p. 87.
illuminating, for the most part, but deeper research needed to be conducted in order to contextualise and analyze the documents found. This research included a survey of secondary sources, a review of key newspapers, interviews and consultation of other important media like magazines and digital archives.

Unfortunately, after the fall of the South African apartheid regime, no formal archival holdings were established by grassroots anti-apartheid groups working in Canada. The works of groups like Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa (CCSA) and the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) can be traced through the formal archives of other organisations such as YMCA Canada and VOW Canada. In an effort to find out additional, non-documented information, face-to-face interviews were conducted with Linda Lemberg of the CCSA and prominent Canadian anti-apartheid activist, former Canadian Olympian and well-known academic, Bruce Kidd. Kidd provided insight both from the perspective of an athlete and an activist; he was also able to provide context and leads for a variety of events which took place within Canada. Questioning via email also took place with John Saul of TCLSAC. Interviews as a research tool are useful, but are subject to the validity of the memory of the interviewees, along with the biases that they hold. These individuals were chosen due to their close connections to the anti-apartheid movement across several decades and their willingness to share information. The information from Kidd proved reliable - the information provided could be cross-referenced to existing secondary and primary sources written by himself and others, and traces of his active participation in the movement were found in the archival holdings at LAC. Kidd did provide the name of one individual who may have provided personal memories of the government’s role - Eric Morse, former employee of External Affairs. Unfortunately, Morse could not be found via general search of local phone books nor internet search. Both Lemberg and Saul were helpful, but focused, mainly, on their individual contributions rather than the roles of their respective organizations or the role of the actual movement. Lemberg seemed preoccupied with the role she felt the government played in repressing the CCSA, while Saul only provided limited information via email, mentioning that he was working on his own memoirs. The grassroots movement’s history proved difficult to track on paper, the interviews did provide insight into the movement’s actions and provided useful leads in the pursuit of additional information and resources.
Newspapers were key primary sources for the assessment of the changing state of Canadian opinion. The newspapers consulted were established Canadian dailies: *Toronto Star*, *Globe and Mail*, left-leaning and historically supporters of the Liberal Party; and the *Ottawa Citizen*, in the main Conservative Party supporters, although for many years, including those covered by this paper, sympathetic to the Liberal Party.

Coverage, especially editorials, in these papers provided ongoing coverage of key events discussed in this thesis, including Commonwealth meetings and declarations, the Montréal Olympics and the Edmonton Commonwealth Games. The papers also closely followed the development of the Trudeau government and its role in international politics. For the specific period of the Montréal Games the *Montréal Star*, the highest circulation English language daily newspaper available in Québec at the time, was consulted. Although this paper shut down in the late 1970s, it was an important source in tracking the fast-moving developments surrounding the boycott of the Montréal Games in July 1976. Although inevitably limited in range - this thesis is not a study of the Canadian press and the anti-apartheid movement - these papers were carefully selected to provide a cross-section of ideas and opinions circulating in Canada.

Other primary sources included debates of the Canadian House of Commons, CBC archived news reports, magazines and documents published by the United Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat. These sources were used to cross-reference and clarify the information found in the various archives. Most documents consulted focused on the development and advancement of Canada’s official diplomacy. The most succinct way to track these policies was through a chronological political narrative, which permits the reader to see how the policies developed over time, and how members of the government reacted to both external and internal events and pressures.

**Literature Review and Historiography**

Whilst the thesis relies primarily on an extensive range of primary sources, secondary sources in the form of books and articles on politics and sport in general, notably around Olympic issues, as well as specific studies of Canadian diplomacy, domestic politics and sports policy, were consulted. Three key texts deal, in some significant aspect, with the relationship between apartheid sport and the development of Canadian
foreign policy. First, Linda Freeman’s *Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years* is a general history focusing on Canada’s anti-apartheid activities during the 1970s and 1980s.\(^7\) Importantly, Freeman discusses the sporting boycott, but her book glosses over the role that the Trudeau government played in isolating South African sport. To Freeman, despite appearing to be the champion of non-white nations of the Commonwealth, Canada’s anti-apartheid policies developed under Trudeau were not as supportive as claimed. Second, according to Donald Macintosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black, Canada played a leadership role in the Commonwealth by helping negotiate the Gleneagles Agreement, especially since ‘...sport was a convenient vehicle with which Canada could show its resolve against apartheid without doing either harm to the economy or running into any significant opposition from special interest groups.’\(^8\) Although Canada chose, for various internal and external reasons, to be strict on eliminating any sport contact with apartheid South Africa, it did so because it was an easy target - there was very little to lose for Canada as the nation did not hold strong sporting ties with South Africa and it allowed the federal government to appear tough on apartheid while continuing its economic and trade development with South Africa. Third, in *Sport and Canadian Diplomacy*, Macintosh and Michael Hawes reiterate the fact that strong anti-apartheid sport policies were an easy way for the Canadian government to show it was against apartheid and that the country was doing all it could to isolate South African sport.\(^9\) Macintosh and Hawes’s main sources for the chapters in the book dealing with apartheid sport were interviews, personal correspondence with key players and archival holdings from the Department of External Affairs. When produced, this book was ground-breaking as it was the first real examination of the role of sport in the development of Canadian diplomatic policy. However, in light of newly available archival materials, the chapters devoted to the development of Canada’s foreign policy dealing with South African sport do not heavily evaluate how the policies developed nor the intricacies of the development process.

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\(^7\) Linda Freeman. *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

\(^8\) Donald Macintosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black. ‘Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games’ *Journal of Sport History*, Spring 1992, p. 54.

A review of publications dealing with the general Canadian anti-apartheid movement is limited. Canadian anti-apartheid policies are often discussed in publications on Canadian diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. The main reason for this, as argued in the thesis, is that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement, during this time period, was not a major force either in Canadian domestic politics nor internationally.

In his autobiography, Memoirs, Pierre Elliott Trudeau makes no mention of either the 1976 Montréal Olympics boycott nor the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games and the adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement.10 Although the reason remains unclear, it may be because his autobiography tends to focus on the events which were more positive in nature - perhaps the contentious issues, negotiations and events surrounding the 1976 Olympics and the 1978 Commonwealth Games were not how Trudeau wanted his story to be remembered. The Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Department of External Affairs fonds provide a unique perspective not included in Trudeau’s autobiography. Through these primary sources new light is shed on how Trudeau, and key government ministers, reacted to the 1976 boycott threat, the actual boycott as it unfolded on the ground in 1976, and the actions the Prime Minister took to avoid a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Where Trudeau fails to address the 1976 boycott issue and the 1978 Commonwealth Games in his own writing, new archival sources can provide some insight into how the Canadian policy developed and the amount of effort that Trudeau personally exerted in ensuring the success of the 1978 Games by supporting the development of the Gleneagles Agreement and ensuring, once developed, that the agreement was adopted. The second part of John English’s biography of Trudeau, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 1968-2000, also provides ample information regarding Canada-Québec relations throughout the period covered in this thesis. It does not, however, cover either the Montréal Olympic boycott nor the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games and Gleneagles Agreement. The book does provide limited information regarding the disastrous funding and financial situation which plagued the Montréal Games, but does not address the international relations and foreign policies which affected how the Games unfolded.11 English’s book portrays Trudeau as a strong leader and tends to


limit highlighting the deficiencies in his tenure, which may be one reason for these exclusions. Other reasons include the limited interest from the Canadian public in Trudeau’s anti-apartheid policies and the fact that South Africa is no longer an apartheid state, so the issue seems less relevant.

Existing publications mainly deal with general themes of the anti-apartheid movement in Canada rather than looking closely at the sporting dimension. Economic and trade ties with the apartheid regime were always a focal point for anti-apartheid activists within the country. A large and significant target, it was easy to criticise Canada’s ties with South Africa’s economy. In Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic History, Brian Douglas Tennyson points out that ‘the history of Canadian relations with South Africa reveals a general and understandable lack of interest due to distance and the absence of meaningful connections. ... Trade is the only remaining common interest and it has always been insignificant in its magnitude, if not its composition.’

Consistently criticised for its trading and economic ties with South Africa, Canada maintained these relationships with the apartheid regime.

Clarence G. Redekop’s article ‘Commerce Over Conscience: The Trudeau Government and South Africa, 1968-84’ echoes Tennyson’s sentiment. According to Redekop, there were four basic elements that drove Canada’s relationship with South Africa during the Trudeau era ‘...a commitment to the use of quiet mediatory diplomacy to bring about change in the racial policies of the minority regime; a desire to maintain normal bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations; an opposition to the use of violence as a mechanism for bringing about change; and a strong preference for the maintenance of normal bilateral economic relations.’

These themes repeat themselves across Trudeau’s Prime Ministerial terms. The desire to maintain friendly relations with South Africa to solidify and support economic ties was a key aspect of Canada’s diplomatic and economic policies during this time period. Even after the government made strict ‘changes’ to its South African trade policies in 1977, including closing commercial offices in the country, the policies were largely cosmetic. T.A. Keenleyside notes that changes in Canada’s policies made no appreciable difference and Canada’s imports

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from South Africa actually expanded after the changes were made.\textsuperscript{14} Despite the public rhetoric and the diplomatic concerns about Commonwealth unity explored in this thesis, the Trudeau government was unwilling to impose economic sanctions or boycotts against the apartheid regime and, in fact, promoted trade with South Africa. This fact is consistently repeated across the numerous Canadian histories dealing with Canada-South Africa relations during the apartheid regime consulted here.

Trudeau drove Canadian foreign policy; this fact is reiterated in all the foreign policy literature consulted which focus on the Trudeau era. It was his goal to make Canada an important middle-power. He established this trend during the first Commonwealth crisis he faced over British arms sales to South Africa, which came to a head at the 1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. Trudeau was able to finesse the Singapore Agreement through quiet diplomacy and appeasing both sides of the argument, deploying ‘...the voluntarist tendency in Canadian foreign policy with its emphasis on diplomatic mediation.’\textsuperscript{15} It was Trudeau’s hope that Canada’s foreign policy and diplomatic efforts would carve out a new niche for the nation - one of ‘honest broker’ amongst power nations.

Rhoda E. Howard concurs that changes that were made to Canadian policies towards South Africa were mostly symbolic in nature: Canada did not recognise bantustans, banned entry of South African athletes into Canada starting in 1977, and in 1978 Canada introduced a voluntary code of conduct for companies doing business and operating within South Africa. Howard notes, ‘It is argued that insofar as Canada is reluctant to deploy the full range of economic, as well as moral, weapons at its command to persuade South Africa to be more accommodating, it is, by omission if not commission, aiding in the perpetuation of apartheid.’\textsuperscript{16} These small changes made Canada appear tougher on apartheid than most other senior Commonwealth nations; however, in reality, they made very little difference to the anti-apartheid movement or


Canada’s formal ties with South Africa. It was easier - and cheaper - to strike a pose through sport than business.

For Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Canada’s South African foreign policies and diplomatic relations focused on ‘...a concern to maintain a liberal image, a very great reluctance to intervene to lessen trade and investment linkages and a willingness to act on behalf of or in conjunction with Britain and the United States.” Echoing previous analysis cited, Matthews and Pratt believe that economic policy and Canada’s relations with other countries drove the development of policy during this era, with humanitarian issues taking a back seat to solidifying the country’s middle-power status.

Where do sport policies stand within Canada’s general South African foreign policies and diplomacy? Previous studies, though often perceptive, lacked depth and access to key government archives as well as giving little attention to wider opinion. It is here that Bruce Kidd has been the most significant contributor to understanding Canada and the apartheid sports boycott. A lobbyist, academic and former athlete, Kidd wrote several articles about the international boycott of apartheid sport. Kidd’s work is generally written in the voice of the activist - highlighting the plight of the anti-apartheid movement, while attempting to highlight the detrimental effects of ongoing direct and indirect contact with South Africa. In ‘The campaign against sport in South Africa’ Kidd contends that the sports boycott was more significantly effective than any other international campaign to isolate South Africa. By the late 1980s, exchanges in popular sports between South Africa and other countries had been virtually eliminated. Canada’s role in supporting African Commonwealth nations made a huge difference in the boycott’s success - Canada acted to help prevent and stop the boycott threat by solidifying Commonwealth policies regarding apartheid and sport and its own foreign policies which dealt with preventing contact with South African athletes and sports bodies. Here Kidd extends the earlier general discussion of the politics of Canadian participation in the Commonwealth by Rich Baka and David Hoy who, in 1978, analysed the Canadian government’s active role in preventing a boycott of the 1978

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Commonwealth Games and solidifying the Commonwealth’s stance against sporting contact with South Africa through the Gleneagles Agreement.\(^{19}\)

According to Eric Morse, formerly of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), Fitness and Amateur Sport Canada (Sport Canada) did not have an international policy and operations unit. Though mainly a granting agency, it became a major source of national sport policy.\(^{20}\) However, Sport Canada depended heavily upon the DEA to convey official Canadian policies regarding interacting with South African sporting groups and athletes. The DEA itself had a sports relations section as part of the Public Affairs Bureau which provided ‘support and advice to Fitness and Amateur Sport and to Canadian teams abroad’ and provided ‘a watching brief on political development in sport that might affect Canadian foreign policy interests. It briefed senior management and ministers when appropriate, and, when an issue did arise, it became the nucleus of whatever formal or informal departmental task force was set up to handle the immediate problem.’\(^{21}\)

Several key Canadian histories cover the period explored in this thesis. Much remains contentious due to the nature of the topic and the fact that it is still so recent. Ongoing internal strife between Québec and the rest of Canada remains a major area of dispute and continues to be at the heart of Canadian history and internal politics, often overshadowing Canada’s role internationally and its other important successes in fields like medicine, technology and the arts. *Canadian History: A Reader’s Guide*, edited by Doug Owram, provides a comprehensive historiography, under a number of different themes and categories, including foreign relations, and the Trudeau years.\(^{22}\)

Robert Bothwell’s *Canada and Québec: One Country Two Histories, Revised Edition*, explores the relationship between Québec and the rest of Canada. The book analyses Anglo-French relations in Canada through to the 1995 Québec nationalist referendum and includes a wide range of opinion including: Jean Chrétien, former Prime Minister of

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21 Morse, ‘Sport and Canadian Foreign Policy’, pp. 270-1.

Canada; Stephen Harper, current Canadian Prime Minister; Marc Lalonde, former Liberal minister; and Mitchell Sharp, former Liberal minister and senior bureaucrat. Much of the content is focused on the separatist debate that gripped Canada from the 1960s through to the 1990s and provides valuable context for the narrower debate over external sports policy in the 1970s. Ron Graham’s *The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the Gang of Eight and the Fight for Canada* provides a detailed history of Trudeau’s keen interest in constitutional reform which began while he was Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s Minister of Justice, and continued with his quest once he became Prime Minister in 1968. Outlining why Trudeau felt that it was imperative to patriate the constitution - to help cease the call for Québec separatism and to strengthen Canadian federalism - the book goes behind the scenes of negotiations and clearly plots the events which formalised the Canadian constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is complemented by *Contemporary Canadian Federalism: Foundations, Transitions, Institutions*, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, which contains a series of essays from a federalist and separatist perspective by prominent Québec scholars.

Turning from Canadian history in general to the wider historiography of the anti-apartheid movement, there is a large and varied literature, including Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid: A History of the Movement in Britain, 1959-1994* and Trevor Richard, *Dancing on Our Bones*, focusing on Britain and New Zealand respectively, key battlegrounds in the Commonwealth for the anti-apartheid movement. There is, however, very little specifically focusing on the movement in Canada. Fieldhouse’s book is a detailed survey of the British anti-apartheid movement from its beginnings to the end of apartheid. Richards’s book focuses on the anti-apartheid movement and sport in New Zealand, with specific focus on the anti-apartheid group he helped form - Halt All Racist Tours (HALT). Cited often in this thesis, these two books provided

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contextual and background information to the key anti-apartheid movements in Britain and New Zealand.

Don’t Play with Apartheid: the background to the Stop The Seventy Tour Campaign by Peter Hain, The Politics of Race and International Sport: the case of South Africa by Richard E. Lapchick and Apartheid: The Real Hurdle by Sam Ramsamy are important contemporary books written by anti-apartheid activists. Hain focuses on a very specific moment in the anti-apartheid sports movement - the campaign to stop the 1970 Springboks rugby tour of Britain. Hain aptly points out that the campaign’s ‘...importance rests essentially in its timing: on the fact that it was in many respects a watershed in attitudes, in political policies, and in the British treatment of the issues of race and apartheid.’

The Stop the Seventy Tour was a key turning point in the movement to isolate South African sport; the attention the movement garnered and its successes inspired the worldwide anti-apartheid sports movement which picked up steam throughout the 1970s. Lapchick, a leader of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States and author of many works on international politics and South African sport, focuses on the progression of South Africa’s isolation from the Olympic movement and sport up to 1975 in his book The Politics of Race and International Sport: the case of South Africa.

Lapchick highlights key successes and tries to negotiate how these successes affected South Africa while Sam Ramsamy outlines key events in the anti-apartheid sports movement and provides excerpts from documents that deal with the sports boycott, like announcements by the South African government, Commonwealth statements and declarations, and United Nations declarations. These three books provide in-depth information into the movement from the activists’ points of view, though they are inevitably partial and written ‘in the heat of battle’.

In The South African Game: Sport and Racism Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon discuss the role of sport in South Africa through Marxist theories and analysis. Archer and Bouillon theorise that ‘The links between sporting rights and other social rights … which make sport an inherently political problem only become apparent when the


sports issue is seen as a part of a socio-political credo, of an anti-apartheid or non-racial programme.\textsuperscript{31} Although this book highlights the problems the sports boycott movement faced, it does also concede that the movement was the most successful boycott that the apartheid regime faced and that there was a moral obligation to support the boycott as it was being promoted by anti-apartheid activists both internationally and, especially, in South Africa.

In \textit{Onward to the Olympics: Historical Perspectives on the Olympic Games} a chapter by Courtney W. Mason is devoted to the 1976 Olympics and the boycott paradigm. In it, Mason chronicles how the movement against apartheid sport brought political and social issues and problems into the realm of international sport. Mason also argues that the 1976 Olympic boycott succeeded mainly because boycott threats had worked in the past. Citing previous threats from African nations, Mason notes that the 1976 boycott did not succeed in its ultimate goal of having New Zealand removed from the Games. Yet, it did succeed in polarising public opinion in New Zealand and increased international public awareness of apartheid and the anti-apartheid movement.\textsuperscript{32}

In \textit{The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa}, Douglas Booth analyses the role of sport in South African society and captures the developments in South Africa’s movement away from sports isolation after the fall of apartheid, this includes documenting the development of the anti-apartheid movement in sport as a catalyst for political change in South Africa.\textsuperscript{33} For Booth, the sports boycott was an integral part of the anti-apartheid movement and sport played a key role in helping bring about change in South Africa.

John Nauright has written extensively on South African sport. In \textit{Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa}, he discusses the role that sport has historically played in the development of South African society. He emphasises the importance of sport to Afrikaners and the nationalistic nature of sport in South Africa. He provides a history of


sport in South Africa, for white and non-white South Africans. Nauright points out that although the anti-apartheid sports movement was successful internationally and brought keen interest and awareness to the plight of non-white South Africans, within South Africa the movement itself was poorly coordinated and was not able to garner great change to sport models within the country. A focus on the international sports boycott provided an opportunity to affect change through the isolation of South Africa, but sport also provided an outlet for nation-building after the fall of apartheid through events like South Africa’s 1995 Rugby World Cup championship. Nauright is apt to point out that there were problems and challenges with sport - the movement did not create much change within South Africa and after the fall of apartheid race continued to plague South African sport, particularly rugby. According to Nauright, sport plays an integral role in South African society and both positively and negatively affected the development of the anti-apartheid movement and the development of the new South Africa.

Allen Guttmann and Barrie Houlihan provided insight into how sport and politics collide in a variety of ways. However, both have similar points of view on the boycott of the Montréal Olympics. In *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games*, Guttmann provides a review of Olympic boycotts and whether or not they were successful. With particular reference to the boycott of the 1976 Olympics as an example, Guttmann feels that Olympic boycotts are ineffectual. Houlihan points out that, for various reasons discussed in Chapter Six of this study, the IOC did not give in to the boycott demands. ‘The IOC’s resistance on this occasion was due in part to the feeling that it was morally in a stronger position, due to the lack of support for the boycott from the communist bloc states.’ Both Guttmann and Houlihan point out that the lack of support from the Communist bloc was detrimental to the success of the 1976 Olympic boycott. Houlihan also delves into the role of politics in Commonwealth sport in *Sport and International Politics*. Particular emphasis is placed on South Africa in this chapter.

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of the book, including how New Zealand’s sporting contact with South Africa brought about the boycott of the 1976 Olympics and the African threat of boycotting the 1978 Commonwealth Games. In regard to Canada’s reaction to the boycott, Houlihan notes ‘Canada, although not particularly active on Third World issues in the 1970s, was motivated by a general antipathy to racism, and also by a concern to maintain both the role of the Commonwealth in protecting western interests during the Cold War and Canada’s reputation as an international peacebroker (Macintosh and Black 1994). The fact that Canada was scheduled to host the Commonwealth Games in 1978 was an additional factor of considerable importance.’38 This thesis based on the new archival material now available is able to develop, nuance and broadly justify this judgment.

The historiography covered here shows that Canadian anti-apartheid policy has already attracted scholarly attention, but that there is a striking gap between the cluster of books and articles which appeared around the end of apartheid and the lack of subsequent work. This gap provides an excellent opportunity to look again at the phenomenon in the light of newly available evidence, in particular newly opened archival documents. To date, interpretation of Canada’s role in the anti-apartheid movement has, for the most part, been minimal. Some of the works, for example the works of Kidd, Morse and Freeman, are written by activists or those with a strong political interest in the outcome and must inevitably be rather self-justificatory or present-centred. This includes administrators and diplomats who were involved, along with anti-apartheid activists. It is in the the best interest of the personal legacies, and the legacies of their grassroots groups in the case of activists, to portray their role as one of superior importance. However, a broader historical view shows that several factors were at play in the development of anti-apartheid policies in the 1970s, with only a limited number of non-elite leaders able to effect significant change.

To date there has been no specific monograph study of either the 1976 Olympics or 1978 Commonwealth Games written from a purely political point of view. Montréal has been analysed in terms of the economic and corruption problems that plagued the Games. Importantly, Canada was in an extremely unique position, acting as host of both the Olympic and Commonwealth Games, a mere two years apart - the first time that these two international events have ever been held in the same country in such a short period of time. This made Canada, in an era of increasing politicisation of sporting

38 Houlihan, Sport and International Politics, p. 140.
events, vulnerable to the boycott threat. Freeman’s book, *Ambiguous Champion*, glosses over the Trudeau government’s work in isolating South African sport and focuses on the its failures in distancing Canada from South Africa economically. Although historians Macintosh and Hawes do delve directly into Canada’s role in isolating South African sport, the subsequent availability of additional documents shows a fuller picture of Canada’s direct role in trying to avoid a boycott of the 1976 Olympic Games through the tightening of restrictions on Canada’s contact with South African sport, and Canada’s role in the Commonwealth adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement in an effort to avoid a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

Additionally, general histories regarding the anti-apartheid movement in other countries, like Fieldhouse and Richards’ books, do not provide a significant amount of information regarding the movement in Canada; Canada always appears to be on the periphery of the movement and anti-apartheid sentiment, generally. There was a very specific set of circumstances in Canada in the 1970s which justifies an in-depth historical approach to the events examined, rather than an international relations or comparative politics global overview. The purpose of the present study is to examine Canada’s role in the anti-apartheid movement and the development of strict anti-apartheid policies in light of the fact that Canada was host to two major international sporting events in the 1970s. This reexamination and fuller portrait is supported by newly available archival sources which assist in redefining Canada’s role.
CHAPTER 2: The 1960s

The Beginnings of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Canada

The grassroots anti-apartheid movement in Canada, on the whole, did not become a successful driving force for change; few grassroots anti-apartheid groups ever had the capacity to work at a national level, unlike groups in other Commonwealth countries such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Traditionally, these countries, especially Britain, had close trade, cultural and sporting ties with South Africa. In Britain, the grassroots anti-apartheid movement can be traced back to the 1950s. It began with a focus on the boycotting South African goods.\(^1\) It quickly morphed into a cohesive group with various tactics and aims, including calling for both an end to Britain’s trade relationship with South Africa and an end to the two countries’ sporting relationship. Through the 1960s, the movement gained power and popularity across Britain. At the same time, the anti-apartheid movement was gaining momentum in Australia and New Zealand, two countries with long-lasting, close sporting ties with South Africa. In all three countries, trade union activism, the leadership of the church, and the students’ movement would all prove to be useful in increasing the capacity of each country’s respective anti-apartheid groups.

In Canada, anti-apartheid advocacy and campaigning often worked at local, municipal levels. The first rumblings of anti-apartheid activism started in the mid-1960s in Toronto through the set-up of the Canadian Alexander Defence Committee (ADC). According to a pamphlet from the ADC they were in solidarity with other committees in Britain, West Germany, and the United States.

Their aims are simply stated: to publicise as widely as possible the case of young Dr. Neville Alexander, a Coloured teacher and his ten companions condemned under the “Sabotage Act” to long terms of imprisonment, though no act of sabotage was proven against them. Secondly, to provide funds for the defence of political prisoners and aid to their dependents - prisoners whose crime is their claim to democratic rights and human dignity.\(^2\)


\(^2\) Communist Party of Canada Fonds. MG28 IV, Volume 11, File 39-12 - No date.
From the Communist Party of Canada archival holdings, it is clear that the ADC was active in Toronto from 1964 through to 1969. Smaller ADCs popped up in Canadian cities, but the main office remained in Toronto. They raised money through various types of fundraising: poetry and folk-singing performances, movie screenings, and other social functions. The ADC also sponsored nation-wide speaking engagements for prominent South African freedom fighters, including I.B. Tabata, President of the Unity Movement of South Africa, in December 1965 through January 1966. And Franz J.T. Lee toured during the summer of 1966; Lee was the Secretary of the ADC in Germany. The ADC in Canada used newsletters and letter-writing campaigns to spread their message and to solicit funds for the families of political prisoners. Finally, the ADC also undertook a sponsorship campaign in which they recruited prominent Canadians to publicly support their cause. Some notable names included novelist Farley Mowat, journalist Pierre Burton, and literary critic and theorist Northrop Frye. Mowat sent a letter and donation to the ADC secretary Regula Modlich in 1965: ‘Apartheid is a hideous denial of mankind’s pretensions to be both rational and just. ... This denial lies not alone with South African proponents of this barbaric concept; every man, the world over, who fails to raise his voice against apartheid is also guilty of it, by default.’ Mowat touches upon a key aspect of the worldwide anti-apartheid movement, by not speaking out against apartheid governments and individuals were guilty of implicit support of the South African government’s policy of racial segregation. Most Alexander Defence Committees throughout the world slowly began to phase out in 1968.

Another group working in Canada during the 1960s was the Canadian Anti-Apartheid Movement (CAAM). Again, this group was based in Toronto in the late 1960s through to the early 1970s. The group did not keep formal records nor were there any formal archives created upon its dissolution. Other anti-apartheid groups in Canada kept newsletters, fliers, and other correspondence from the CAAM, including the Alexander Defence Committee, Voices of Women, and the Canadian Federation of Students; some of the CAAM's history can be tracked through the archives of these groups.

According to a pamphlet from the CAAM, in honour of 1969’s South African Freedom Day, the movement sought to influence the Canadian people and government to begin

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4 Communist Party of Canada Fonds. MG28 IV, Volume 11, File 39-12 - No date.

demonstrating their hatred for South African apartheid through a total boycott of the country. The CAAM believed that boycotts and sanctions would help promote and create change within South Africa. This included boycotts of food, wine and other products, and economic and trade sanctions. Their goals were myriad and included the release of South African political prisoners, a ban on arms trades with South Africa, economic sanctions, and sport, cultural and academic boycotts.⁶

In the spring of 1970 the CAAM newsletter included a form-letter of petition that the organisation wanted members to sign and return to the CAAM for mailing to the government of New Zealand. The letter was written to protest New Zealand’s continuing sporting ties with South Africa. Specifically, it was in reaction to New Zealand’s upcoming rugby tour of South Africa. The letter stated:

First, far from improving the situation in South Africa or even remaining a neutral element in it, the tour is actively making conditions worse. Second, New Zealand has once again become internationally notorious for denying its own supposed policy of racial harmony and is now in the appalling position of supporting a totally unjust and repressive position. Third, the world will judge all New Zealanders as being responsible for this failure to live up to the country’s ideals.⁷

This letter is one of the few examples of Canadians mobilising behind the anti-apartheid movement in sport. The CAAM continued to work through the early 1970s. Similar to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, they did not focus on one particular type of boycott or protest; most campaigns and letters were directly related to what the situation was in South Africa at any given time. Their membership appears to have always remained quite limited, with a small number of dedicated individuals working on newsletters, letter writing, and planning small protests and gatherings. Letter writing campaigns and newsletters were a vital form of communication for the various anti-apartheid groups working within Canada during the 1960s; letter writing would prove to be a key tool for Canadian anti-apartheid activists.⁸ It was the most effective way for groups to get their messages out across the expansive country, to fellow organisations, and to individuals who supported their cause.

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⁶ Communist Party of Canada Fonds. MG28 IV, Volume 11, File 40-6 - Pamphlet, no date.

⁷ Voices of Women Fonds, MG28 II218, Volume 10, File 4 - March 1970.

⁸ Author’s interview with Bruce Kidd interview October 28, 2009.
Between 1970 and 1975, there were few anti-apartheid groups in Canada. The groups were small in nature and focused on the boycott of South African goods and letter-writing campaigns. Around this time period, churches in Canada were becoming increasingly involved in the movement. In December 1975, the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) was officially established; its goals were ‘to stem the inflow of foreign capital and ... expose, and seek to prevent, the provision of foreign technology and military equipment for South Africa’s security apparatus.’\(^9\) The founding churches, organisations and religious orders were: Anglican Church of Canada, Baptist Federation of Canada, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Canadian Council of Churches (observers only), Lutheran Church of America Canada Section, Presbyterian Church of Canada, United Church of Canada, Canadian Religious Conference of Ontario, Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada, Redemptorist Fathers, Scarborough Foreign Mission Society, Sisters of Charity of Mount St. Vincent Halifax, and Sisterhood of St. John the Divine.\(^10\) According to Linda Freeman, ‘In its campaign against corporate and bank involvement, the taskforce met with senior corporate executives, conducted spirited questioning at corporate annual general meetings, and submitted shareholder resolutions to stop business dealings with South Africa.’\(^11\)

Compared to smaller, grassroots organisations working in cities across the country, the Taskforce was heavily engaged in Canada, especially around the movement for South African economic and trade sanctions. In comparison to grassroots organisations in the early 1970s, churches had more ability and the resources to coordinate and disseminate information on a larger scale. Churches had the funds, resources and networks to communicate on a national level - key to the success of any social movement in as large a country as Canada during the 1970s. Money also afforded churches with the opportunity to purchase shares in banks and corporations that continued to work with South African banks and companies and, churches, therefore, were able to participate in shareholders meetings. For example, in April 1975, the Anglican, and Roman Catholic churches met with representatives and officers from

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10 Ibid.

Alcan Aluminum Limited, Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited, and began talks with the Bank of Montréal (BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and the Toronto Dominion Bank (TD Bank). The churches are concerned that Canadian companies are doing business with South Africa without working for social change there."12 The churches hoped that they could convince banks and companies to work towards bringing social change to South Africa. Some progress was made with one bank in regards to evaluating moral or social considerations when granting loans: ‘Fred McNeil, Bank of Montréal deputy chairman, said the Bank of Montréal did so - it will not grant loans for arms production - but officials of the other two banks said their basic criterion was “economic good sense.”’13 And, in December 1975 clergy and representatives from the Young Women’s Christian Association attended the annual meeting of CIBC and called on all three of Canada’s largest banks to stop providing loans to South Africa. CIBC bank chairman Page Wardsworth noted the division of clerical, political and public opinion concerning solutions to the South African question and added that the bank’s view is that an economic blockade eventually would be detrimental to the people the religious groups say they are trying to help.”14

These are but two examples of Canadian churches and non-governmental organisations at work in the 1970s. Renate Pratt notes that ‘Church shareholders knew that the issues they were raising were current and important. To make any impact, they needed to be discussed in the presence of directors and fellow shareholders during the one annual occasion permitting public discussion.’15 During the annual general meetings the Taskforce members, as shareholders of the companies, continued to work at lobbying Canadian companies and banks to cease business transactions with South Africa. Yet, these tactics were largely unsuccessful; Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt explain:

Canada is a trading nation, as our government is fond of reminding us. Canadians are also heavily dependent on foreign investment while also being themselves important investors in foreign countries. Our governments for a long time have therefore felt that an open system of


13 Ibid.


international trade and investment was of great importance to Canada. For an equally long time they have been convinced that Canadian trade and investment are as much in the interests of the recipient countries as they are in Canada’s interests. Thus Canadian officials and government leaders are able with an easy conscience, to oppose adverse foreign limitations to Canadian trade and investment and to ignore Canadians who argue that trade and investment in specific countries be limited by Canada in the interests of the peoples of those countries. Because of these essentially ideological beliefs, Canadian officials not only see such limitations as damaging to Canada but also as not being in the interest of the peoples of the other countries that would be affected.\textsuperscript{16}

Calls for trade, investment and other economic sanctions were prominent in western and Commonwealth countries. However, these calls largely went ignored as South Africa was a strong and important trading partner for many western nations. The Anglican Church of Canada, a member of the Taskforce, took up the South African cause with great vehemence. In 1971, the General Synod of the church recommended four key points: ‘assistance to families whose breadwinner is held without charge under the Terrorism Act; assistance with legal fees to support the Dean of Johannesburg in his pending court case; statements to our own government about preferential trading; a boycott on South African products as one way of telling the world that an injustice is being done against people who are suffering because they want the ordinary rights that should go with being human.’\textsuperscript{17} Here, the Church makes a variety of requests of its constituents; the focus is on humanitarian needs, the cessation of trade, and the boycott of South African goods. For the most part, however, the Church focused on trade and investment, with the boycott of South African goods being key to their campaigns. In 1975 the General Synod passed the following resolution:

\textbf{That this General Synod re-affirms the 1971 resolutions of General Synod urging the Government of Canada to make credible its professed policies (abhorrence of apartheid); to refrain from encouraging business, trade and investment in South Africa; to foster the goal of social justice for black peoples as the major theme for negotiations with the Republic of South Africa.}


\textsuperscript{17} Anglican Church of Canada Archives. Anglican Youth Ministry. GS 87-16, Box 4 - Pamphlet, no date. In 1971 the Dean of of the Anglican Church Johannesburg, Gonville Aubie French-Beytagh, was charged under the Suppression of Communism Act for participating in activities of groups deemed unlawful aka - terrorism charges.
Africa; to end preferential tariffs with the Republic of South Africa; and calling for individual economic boycott of all South African products.¹⁸

For the Anglican Church, involvement in the anti-apartheid movement meant pressuring the government in regards to trade and investment. By ceasing trade and investment with South Africa they hoped to undermine the South African economy which would force the government to abandon apartheid.

Throughout most of the 1970s, Canadian churches focused on stopping Canadian corporations and banks from doing business with and in South Africa; mainly because the Churches felt that isolating South Africa economically would affect the most change within the country. Towards the end of the 1970s, as anti-apartheid feeling was spreading across Canada and became a more hotly debated topic, Churches began to increase the championing of humanitarian efforts.

For many years the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) had been passing resolutions, issuing press releases, and undertaking letter writing campaigns to the government as forms of protest against apartheid and the government of South Africa. In 1973, the CLC took part in the International Conference on Apartheid held by the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU). This was a major step in trade union support of the anti-apartheid movement. At the conference a resolution was passed which called on governments around the globe to cease cultural, commercial and diplomatic contact with South Africa and discourage public and private investment with South Africa. It also called for the discouragement of emigration of South African nationals. The resolution urged trade unions to put pressure on governments and employers to follow resolutions of the United Nations, draw the attention of their workers to apartheid and the need for trade union solidarity, and, finally, it called for direct action against import and export of South African goods and against sport, economic, trade and cultural contact with South Africa.¹⁹ As members of ICFTU, the CLC were bound by the resolution and took steps to educate its members through media releases and other forms of communication. They supported boycotts of goods from South Africa and wrote to the Trudeau government regarding a variety of South African topics, including sporting ties, and labour conditions.

¹⁸ Anglican Church of Canada Archives. World Mission: Africa Files. GS 81-19, Box 3 - June 1975.

As part of their commitment to the ICFTU resolution to promote effective, direct action against trade with South Africa, the CLC issued a press release, protesting Ontario’s trade missions, supported by the federal government, to the apartheid state. In 1970 a trade delegation from the province travelled to South Africa without hassle; the 1973 delegation’s trip ‘caused furore in the Ontario legislature, the press, among anti-apartheid groups, and especially in the black community.’ The CLC’s press release criticised the Ontario government for sponsoring the trade mission ‘suggesting that no increase in trade with that country should be sought until it respects the basic human rights of the ‘majority of its citizens.’”

The attack inside the Ontario legislature was led by provincial National Democratic Party (NDP) leader, Stephen Lewis. He told the legislature “It ill behooves Ontario, for the few dollars involved, to prop up white racism in South Africa.” The NDP, strong union supporters, were also supporters of the anti-apartheid movement, but were ineffective in subverting the mission - it went ahead as planned. Yet, ‘no similar missions to South Africa were planned in subsequent years.’

In the 1970s, Canadian unions were not as openly active in the anti-apartheid movement as unions in other Commonwealth countries. This appears to be for several reasons, including, generally, more union activism in countries like England and the lack of sporting ties between Canada and South Africa. Much of the union activity by Commonwealth countries surrounded support for the sports boycott. Things would change in the 1980s when the labour movement in Canada took a more active and prominent role in the struggle, including organising rallies and increasing media outreach.

Specific events in South African history moved groups, churches and trade unions to speak out against specific atrocities taking place within South Africa, using letter-writing campaigns to Canadian government officials, including Prime Ministers, and press releases to express their opinions. On March 21, 1960 the Sharpeville Massacre occurred - during a non-violent protest against pass laws, Sharpeville police fired on a group of unarmed African students. In total, 69 Africans were killed and 180 injured.

20 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 71.
The Canadian public were outraged, Canada officially condemned the attack. The Rivonia Trial, the arrest and trial of Nelson Mandela and other leading African National Congress (ANC) members for treason and sabotage was another event which moved Canadian public opinion. At the denouement of the trial in 1964, after the sentencing of Mandela and seven others, a *Toronto Star* editorial noted ‘Mandela’s guilt is the guilt of South Africa, the guilt of a system that drives rational men to sabotage and treason because there is no peaceful way left for blacks to seek human and political rights.’

The 1960s saw some organisation around the anti-apartheid cause, through newsletters, rallies, and other small gatherings. According to Pierre François, anti-apartheid activist, what the early Canadian movement failed to do was build a strategy. He writes ‘Identifying short and long term battlefronts, isolating enemies, winning friends, changing the political culture, in brief waging the ‘war of position,’ as our Italian comrade Gramsci says, ‘the exhausting and patient task of building hegemony.’

These groups were not as effectual as anti-apartheid groups in other Commonwealth countries. Brian Douglas Tennyson explains that none of the groups was able to make the South African apartheid issue a matter of ‘widespread public concern’ as businesses trading with or investing in South Africa had ‘easier access to senior government officials’ than anti-apartheid groups. Therefore, the banks and corporations were more influential than the small, disparate groups of anti-apartheid activists, NGOs, unions, and churches working across Canada. The Canadian movement was not organised or unified and, generally, the different groups did not communicate regularly. It centered around events in Toronto, with limited outreach to other Canadian cities. Through much of 1970s, grassroots anti-apartheid groups focused on certain aspects of the humanitarian crisis in South Africa, such as trials and aid to liberation groups; this appeal had more impact on the Canadian general public than economic sanctions and boycotts. By the 1980s the anti-apartheid movement moved into mainstream Canadian consciousness and became a popular social movement.

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27 Matthews and Pratt. ‘Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa’, p.175.

South Africa and the Olympics

There has been great discussion and many publications about South Africa’s history in the Olympic Movement. In this section, you will find a general progression of events, brought together through a variety of sources in an attempt to see the broader picture of how the demise of South Africa’s relationship with the IOC devolved over 15 years. In his book Reflections on a Life in Sport, Sam Ramsamy points out that the nature of history allows for many points of view on any given topic. He notes ‘If four people gather in one place and talk for an hour, and each of them is then asked to outline what was said, the result will be four different accounts.’ This is a summarised history of events; an opportunity to unpick the facts regarding a difficult topic, for which a great many points of view and histories exist.

Challenges to racial sport in South Africa began soon after the official adoption of apartheid. The first, most notable case, was that of table tennis. Dennis Brutus explains that in 1956, after six years of negotiation, ‘...the non-racial table Table Tennis Board was granted membership of the International Table Tennis Federation [ITTF], and the Europeans-Only Table Tennis Union was expelled.’ By accepting the non-racial Table Tennis Board as the rightful representative of South Africa, the ITTF was well ahead of its time. The Federation set a groundbreaking precedent amongst international sport bodies and federations. Reacting to the Federation’s decision, the Minister of the Interior for South Africa, Dr. Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges, outlined South Africa’s policy of racial separation in sport in Die Burger: “...Whites and non-Whites should organise their sporting activities separately; that there should be no inter-racial competitions within our borders; and that the mixing of races in teams to take part in competitions within the Union and abroad should be avoided.” The South African government wanted to prevent all forms of inter-racial and mixed sport from international through to club level.

In 1958, the South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed. Douglas Booth explains its origins:


...weightlifters and body builders invited other black federations to a conference to discuss the sports situation. They had formed their own federation in 1956 and applied to the IOC [International Olympic Committee] to partake in the Olympic Games in Melbourne. The IOC instructed them to affiliate to the white Weightlifting Union which refused to recognize the black Federation on the grounds that it has “grossly exaggerated” its membership and had not provided a constitution. The white Union also claimed to have received a letter from a rival group of black weightlifters expressing dissatisfaction with the “political motives” of the Federation and signaling their intentions to create a new non-European association. ... Frustrated by the IOC and the white Union, black weightlifters, led by Dennis Brutus and the white liberal Alan Paton, called a conference of black federations at which they formed the South Africa Sports Association (SASA) - the first nonracial sports organization.\(^{32}\)

The white Union tried to undermine the weightlifters’ campaign; by doing so, they cast doubt on the unity of the non-racial sports movement with the IOC. Realising a united front, with increased non-white membership would be more successful, the group organised the conference in which SASA was born. The power was in their numbers, according to Richard Thompson, as SASA represented 70,000 non-white athletes from a variety of sports, including soccer, cycling and softball.\(^{33}\)

In the beginning, SASA’s main goal was ‘...pressuring merely for recognition and representation in South African teams. The demand for full integration was to come later.’\(^{34}\) They wanted to convince sports bodies to reject racial discrimination in sport. Paton and Brutus were ‘Prominent in this body’s lobbying, petitioning and appeals.’\(^{35}\) SASA started out at local level with protests against racial discrimination in sport, but were unsuccessful. They then went ‘directly to international bodies in attempts to win recognition of the right for black South African sportspeople [sic] to compete internationally.’\(^{36}\) Its international recognition by sports federations and bodies would help boost the cause of SASA in South Africa; if these organisations had chosen to

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\(^{34}\) Hain, *Don’t Play with Apartheid*, p. 53.


support the non-white athletes it is possible that changes and amendments would have occurred within apartheid sport.

Allen Guttmann points out that in 1958, Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen, of the Norwegian Olympic Committee, told Avery Brundage that Norway was ‘prepared to exclude South Africa from the games.’ The following year, 1959, the issue of South Africa’s membership in the IOC was first officially raised at the session in Munich. According to Marc Keech, ‘Nikolai Romanov, the Soviet delegate, accused SANOC [South African National Olympic Committee] of never having done anything to prevent apartheid and that, he argued, was an infringement of the Olympic charter.’ SASA also approached the IOC with hope that the Committee would decide that all South Africans had a right to compete in the Olympic Games. Despite protests from the Soviet delegate, South Africa remained a member of the IOC, mainly due to a promise made by Reg Honey, South Africa’s IOC member. Honey reported that he had a guarantee from his government that all South African athletes entered by SANOC would be issued with passports. This implied that all eligible, qualified athletes, of any colour, would be given passports to travel and participate in the Olympic Games.

By the time the IOC met in Rome, 1960, Brundage was facing increased pressure regarding the South African issue. The Reverend Michael Scott wrote to the IOC requesting permission to address the committee on behalf of SASA and his own organisation - Campaign Against Race Discrimination (CARD). He noted to Brundage that he was there on behalf of Brutus, the President of SASA, who was not able to travel as the South African government would not issue him with a passport. According to David Maranis, Scott was granted an audience with the committee, but only in accompaniment with Honey. Scott pleaded the anti-apartheid case, ‘...urging the IOC to live up to its Olympic Creed and expel the apartheid delegation from South


Africa, while Brundage took South African leaders at their word that they were letting all citizens compete for roster spots, but colored natives simply were not talented enough.'42 This was typical of Brundage; publicly, he took much of what Honey said at face value. He was strongly against the politicisation of the Olympics and attempted, at every possible juncture, to remove politics from the Games. Honey met with the committee and, in the end, a statement was issued by IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, indicating that SANOC had made reasonable efforts to ensure that all eligible competitors had been included in the South African team.43 The IOC was unwilling to accept the arguments against apartheid sport and chose, yet again, to side with SANOC. Lord Killanin aptly points out, however, ‘It did not go unnoticed ... when the Games of the XVIIth Olympiad were staged in Rome that the entire South African team was white.’44

In the face of constant adversity and harassment SASA chose to expand; the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) was formed in 1962 as a sub-committee of SASA. Brutus became the president of SAN-ROC and the group fought to eradicate racism in international sport. Its main goals were: SANOC’s expulsion from the Olympic movement, an international boycott of South African sport, and South Africa’s expulsion from international sport federations.45 Within South Africa itself, the leaders of SASA and SAN-ROC were harassed and issued with banning orders. Nelson Mandela explains:

Banning was a legal order by the government, and generally entailed forced resignation from indicated organisations, and restriction from attending gatherings of any kind. It was a kind of walking imprisonment. To ban a person, the government required no proof, offered no charges; the minister of justice simply declared it so. It was a strategy designed to remove the individual from the struggle, allowing him to live a narrowly defined life outside politics.46

42 Ibid, pp. 53-4.
43 Ibid, pp. 87-8.
44 Killanin, My Olympic Years, p. 34.
45 Booth, The Race Game, p. 78.
Brutus’s story is well known: once banned he was arrested, shot, imprisoned on Robben Island, and eventually forced into exile.\textsuperscript{47} SAN-ROC virtually disappeared in South Africa. But, in 1966, once in exile in London, they regrouped and became a major player in the anti-apartheid movement.

The 1963 IOC meeting took place in Baden Baden. It was scheduled to be held in Kenya, but the Kenyan government refused visas for Honey and other South African officials.\textsuperscript{48} At the meeting, SANOC was told that ‘it must abide by Principle 1 and Rule 24 of the Olympic Charter which outlawed racial, political and religious discrimination and required national Olympic committees to resist governmental pressure.’\textsuperscript{49} SANOC would have to follow the Olympic Charter if it hoped to remain a member of the movement. SANOC was given until December 31 to obtain ‘a modification of its policy of discrimination in sport matters and in competitions in its country.’\textsuperscript{50} This ultimatum was issued by a vote of 30 to 20, against a backdrop of the Rivonia trials, taking place in South Africa.\textsuperscript{51} The IOC wanted assurances from SANOC that they would comply with the Olympic Charter and field a mixed race team. The IOC wanted to ensure that the internal politics of South Africa did not interfere with the Olympic movement’s apolitical policies. The government of South Africa announced that a mixed team representing South Africa was impossible.\textsuperscript{52} Frank Braun, President of SANOC, noted that his government refused to see the IOC’s point of view.\textsuperscript{53} As the government refused to comply with the IOC’s resolution they were banned from participating in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.

Here it is important to note that there were no South African laws which specifically prohibited mixed sport. Donald Woods explains that ‘Before the introduction of formal

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{47} See Nauright, Sport, Cultures and Identities, p. 129; Thompson, Race and Sport, p. 22; Hain, Don’t Play with Apartheid, pp. 55-9. \\
\textsuperscript{48} Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, p. 234. \\
\textsuperscript{50} Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, p. 234. \\
\textsuperscript{51} Booth, The Race Game, p. 88. \\
\textsuperscript{52} Merrett, “In Nothing Else are the Deprivers so Deprived”, p. 153. \\
\textsuperscript{53} Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, p. 235. 
\end{tabular}
apartheid in 1948 there had for many years been an informal but effective bar against black participation against white in sport.54 By the time Malan’s National Party came to power in 1948, segregated sport was ‘normal’ in South Africa. Douglas Booth points out ‘...custom and “tradition” kept sport segregated.’55 It was by 1960 that ‘...the government officially discouraged black and white contact in sport, though no official legislation existed that specifically banned mixed or non-racial sport.’56 There was, however, legislation which prevented mixed sport opportunities. For example, Peter Hain explains: ‘the Urban Areas Act of 1945 controls black sports facilities and restricts their use by permit.’57 Other examples include:

The Population Registration Act of 1950 provided for a rigid system of racial classification in terms of white, coloured, Indian or native groups. ... The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 permitted owners of property to evict or exclude members of certain racial groups from the premises or amenities, including sporting amenities. ... The Group Area’s Act of 1966 divided South Africa into areas of occupancy and residential segregation on the basis of race. The consequence of this for the majority of black South African sportsmen and women was that it hindered the travel to and from matches and competitions which were outside an individual’s designated residential area.58

The South African government did not make mixed sport illegal because they did not have to - apartheid laws prevented the mixing of races; every level of human social interaction was legislated through these laws. And, the South African government used sport as a way to reinforce apartheid policies. Jon Gemmell explains that ‘Sport, as a means of transmitting the values of the ruling group, is a component of the dominant hegemony.’59 In the 1960s in South Africa, petty apartheid was enforced as strongly as political apartheid; it helped reinforce apartheid at every level of society. In the April 1964 volume of Liberal Opinion, published by the Liberal Party of South Africa, it is noted:

55 Booth, The Race Game, p. 58.
56 Nauright, Sport, Cultures and Identities, p. 127.
...multiracial sport IS legal in South Africa and it is a lie to say it is not. What most people do is to confuse POLICY with LAW, so that while it is against Government policy to play multiracial sport, it is not against the law. Bodies such as the South African Olympic Council (S.A.O.C.) play upon this confusion to create the impression overseas that they are powerless against the Government’s dictates.60

By misleading international sporting organisations, the South African sports administrators gave into the pressure from their government to keep sport racialised. Going by what organisations like SANOC said, international sport organisations and federations were misled and did not have the facts regarding the current laws surrounding mixed sport in South Africa.

In 1968 an IOC fact-finding group was dispatched to South Africa to report on the state of sport. The group was sent by IOC President, Brundage. ‘Brundage did not regard racial discrimination as a sufficient reason to exclude a nation from the Olympics.’61 But, due to the continuing international pressure within the Olympic movement, Brundage had to act; he needed to show that the movement was beyond reproach and had performed due diligence in terms of the South African Olympic team. The commission found that there had been changes in the South African sport policy:

It reported favourably on the change in South African policy, which entailed a commitment to sending a single team that would live together, wear the same uniform, march together under the same flag, and include members of different racial groups competing in the same event. While the commission was critical of the segregated character of South African sport and the prohibition on mixed trials for the Games, it stressed the desire of Black sportsmen to take part in the Games.62

In his autobiography, My Olympic Years, Lord Killanin, who led the fact-finding mission, describes what the group discovered:

In our report to the IOC we said that the Government was strong and determined in its policy of separate development and, where necessary, imposed restrictions in sport by applications of its laws. We found that the South African NOC had made serious, though unavailing, representations to the South African Government, but the NOC took the view that it could


61 Booth, The Race Game, p. 87.

not operate in open defiance of the policy of its Government. ... While the Killanin Commission report fairly indicated that South Africa was not subscribing to Olympic rules and principles, the vote was in favour of keeping them in, provided their next team was multiracial with all their athletes enjoying equality of treatment.\(^{63}\)

Killanin’s expedition found that South African sport was, in fact, not integrated; sport continued to develop along racial lines. SANOC continued to follow the rules laid out by the government regarding no mixed sport but, according to Christopher Hill:

The Commission seems to have been not much concerned with the composition of SANOC, since there was no discrimination in its statutes, which they had examined. The commissioners had also examined the various federations’ rules and found that, although several had no non-white members, none had restrictive rules. The control of South African sport appeared to be largely in white hands, because of general, rather than specific, legislation; for example non-whites might not carry arms, and therefore could not compete in shooting.\(^{64}\)

It was naive and disingenuous for Killanin’s group to suggest that SANOC was doing all it could to integrate sport in the country. Despite knowing that South Africa was not adhering to the stipulations set out in the Baden Baden resolution they supported SANOC’s continued membership in the Olympic Movement.

In 1967, in a remarkable move, South African Prime Minister BJ (Balthazar Johannes) Vorster announced that ‘One team would represent the Republic and all members would travel together, live together, wear the same uniform and march together under one flag.’\(^{65}\) Each racial sporting body would choose their own representatives who would then represent South Africa; there would be no mixed trials.\(^{66}\) At the 1967 IOC meeting in Tehran Frank Braun reiterated South Africa’s new policy and announced that the country was able to meet the requirements set out by the IOC.

At the 1967 meeting, Jean-Claude Ganga, Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa (SCSA), appealed to Brundage not to turn his back on the Africans.\(^{67}\) Taking into account the information provided by Braun, the changes

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\(^{63}\) Killanin, My Olympic Years, p. 43.


\(^{65}\) Booth, The Race Game, p. 96.


\(^{67}\) Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, p. 237.
implemented by the Vorster government and the Killanin Report of 1968, a resolution was put to vote by the IOC. It read that the IOC:

notated with concern the racially discriminatory sports policies of the South African government that prevent the SAOC [South African Olympic Committee] from completely adhering to fundamental Principle One of the Olympic Code;

was nevertheless encouraged by the intention of the SAOC to select on merit a multiracial team;

resolved that the SAOC could enter a team which conformed with fundamental Principle One of the Olympic Code provided that it vigorously continued to have all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport removed;

would consider the question by the end of 1970 (SARIS, pp. 18-19).68

The IOC approved South Africa’s participation in the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City. The vote was held by mail and resulted in 37 voting in favour of South Africa, 28 against and six abstentions.69 The members of the IOC accepted at face value the promise of a multiracial team from South Africa. The IOC believed that, given the announcement by Vorster, change was beginning to occur within sport. Reconsidering the question in 1970 showed appeasement to the African nations - this would allow South Africa to participate in Mexico City in 1968, but left open future participation in the Olympics, based on an evaluation of South Africa’s progress in two years.

According to a paper called ‘The Role of Sport in the International System’ by David B. Kanin, presented to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association at the University of Toronto, international propaganda plays an important role in politicising the Olympic Games: ‘Each state attempts to demonstrate to other states and peoples the strength of its human resources.’70 By showing its natural affinity and dominance in sport, South Africa wanted to prove its legitimacy as a state to the international community; the Olympics was key to showing South African pride, legitimacy, and nationalism. These feelings and ideas pushed the South African government to start bending the rules regulating apartheid in sport. Acceptance of South Africa at international sporting events was tantamount to acceptance of their

69 Ibid.
policy of apartheid. For South Africa its sport policy was legitimised by the fact that the IOC approved the country’s participation in the 1968 Games.

Within two weeks of the IOC’s decision, the SCSA called on its member nations to boycott the 1968 Games. The SCSA was formed in 1965 and passed as resolution in 1966, the main goal of which was the expulsion of South African sports organisations from the Olympic Movement and international sports federations until the country complied with IOC rules.71 The SCSA wanted to see South Africa completely isolated from international sport; the organisation knew that South Africa’s isolation in sport would be difficult for the government to justify to its sports mad white population. Once the boycott was called, socialist and other third world countries threatened to join the boycott, along with black American athletes.72 Time magazine reports that the 32 nations of the SCSA voted unanimously to skip the Games and were joined by Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Somalia. India and the Soviet Union also threatened to pull out.73

Mexico, the host of the 1968 Games, became concerned by the boycott threat. According to the Canadian ambassador in Mexico ‘They placed great value on holding the Games and were greatly concerned that they would lose their international character, involve normally neutral Mexico in contentious international politics, and leave Mexico hosting an all-white Olympics.’74 Hain contended that ‘It became clear that Mexico was not prepared to stage the Games without the presence of African and Asian countries, and they had said they would not participate if South Africa was admitted. To this extent, the pressure of the Third World was decisive.’75 The threat of an all-white Olympics looming, Brundage, under increasing international pressure, flew to South Africa, under the auspices of visiting a game park; while there he appealed to Braun and SANOC.76 His appeal failed, however, and a special meeting of the IOC

71 Booth, The Race Game, p. 97.
75 Hain, Don’t Play with Apartheid, p. 67.
76 Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, p. 238.
Executive was called for April 1968. The decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation was unanimous and

Brundage stressed that the invitation had been withdrawn not because of its racial policies, political pressure, or threat of boycott, but out of concern for the safety of the team, given the “international climate” at the time, which included disturbances, destructive demonstrations, and even assassinations.\(^77\)

Gail-Maryse Cockram indicates that ‘Brundage explained that there has been threats of physical violence all over the world, that Martin Luther King had been assassinated in the USA, and that if the Springboks went to Mexico there might be actual physical violence attempted against them...’\(^78\) Blaming worldwide racial tension and ongoing protests due to Vietnam, and the assassination of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy was misleading. Yes, this created a hostile atmosphere for the apartheid government of South Africa, but the boycott threat was the major reason the South African team’s invitation was withdrawn. The fact that the decision to exclude them was unanimous shows that the threat of an all-white Olympics, due to a boycott, was top of mind for IOC officials. Racialisation of the Olympics could have led to the destruction of the Olympic Movement. James Worrell, the Canadian representative on the IOC, felt that:

“it is possible that the IOC has been forced to yield to pressure, but if there is a precedent, it is a dangerous one. It means that anytime somebody doesn’t like something, he can force a change by threatening a boycott. I think the South African Committee should be given credit for getting as far as it did in a difficult situation. They had been proceeding in good faith under what they considered were the required conditions.”\(^79\)

Worrell, a former Canadian athlete, worried about the continuing use of the boycott threat; its efficacy was clear.

In Canada, Olympic team members also considered boycotting the 1968 Games in support of the SCSA. Allan MacEachen, Minister of Health and Welfare at the time, said it was up to individual athletes to decide whether or not they would participate in

\(^77\) Department of External Affairs Fonds RG25, Volume 3054, File 22 - August 1975; see also Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, p. 239.


\(^79\) Sport Canada Fonds. RG29, Volume 3234, File 7070-6, Part 5 - April 25, 1968.
the Olympics. In February 1968, several Canadian Olympic track and field athletes were interviewed for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's (CBC) television show *The Way It Is*. According to track and field athlete, Abby Hoffman ‘I'm not sure what the effect, at this point, of white nations withdrawing from the Games would be. ... I think it might almost be a more powerful weapon if the Games were held, all the white nations participated and the African nations did not.’ Here, Hoffman plays on the international fear of an all-white Games; growing discontent pointed to the possibility that the African nations would boycott any Games in which South Africa participated, with many other non-white nations following suit. Hoffman’s analysis is thought-provoking: how would an all-white Games affect the Olympic Movement? What would the repercussions be? She implies that an all-white Games could be the event that would propel the IOC into doing something about the South African situation.

Other athletes were more concerned with Canada’s role in the IOC decision to readmit South Africa into the Olympics. The Canadian representative to the IOC, Worrell, would not disclose how he voted. Former Canadian Olympian and track and field superstar, Harry Jerome, felt that athletes should have been consulted before the vote as they were the ones who had to compete and, therefore, should have been given the opportunity to voice their opinion. Although fellow athlete Bruce Kidd agreed with Jerome, he focused on what actions Canada could take to prompt the IOC to reverse its decision:

I think that although in other spheres the Western countries have been pretty hypocritical in their attitude towards South Africa, i.e. condemning them in legislative bodies, such as the UN, and then simultaneously investing heavily in their country, I think that in sport we shouldn’t allow this type of thing to go on. And, I think that if Canada supported the African nations who are presently boycotting, who sought support from other Commonwealth countries, I think that the politically sensitive IOC would ... change its mind and tell South Africa that the Olympics is no place for token integration.83

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81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.
The international furore surrounding participation in the 1968 boycott was the first time that the sports boycott made waves within Canada. In the end, Canada did participate in the 1968 Olympics as South Africa’s invitation to the Games was withdrawn under the boycott threat.

Richard E. Lapchick writes that in March 1970, the SCSA met in Cairo ‘the result being a list of charges against South Africa and a resolution demanding that South Africa be expelled from the Olympic Movement entirely rather than merely suspended from individual Games.’ Charges against SANOC indicated that South Africa contravened Olympic rule 25 as its sports policies were tied up with the government’s apartheid policies; they contravened rule 24 as the national sports federations did not guarantee membership to non-whites; they contravened rule 1 because they did not allow non-whites ‘full and equal participation in the competitive and administrative activities of the committee’, they practiced racial discrimination by not allowing multiracial competitions, by not providing equal facilities and training opportunities as whites; and they had not complied with the Baden-Baden resolution. African countries made a forceful, logical argument for the expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. South Africa was obligated to follow IOC rules; they continued to flout these rules by practicing and promoting segregated sport.

After the African nations brought their concerns forward to the IOC at the 1970 Amsterdam meeting, South Africa was given the opportunity to respond to the claims. It is well documented that Frank Braun, head of SANOC, gave an inflammatory speech which dwindled support for the South Africans. According to a Canadian External Affairs brief:

How the decision was arrived at, what types of cases were proposed, how the resolution was worded, what the conditions for re-admission are, and whether the motivation behind the expulsion was based on concern with the status of sports in South Africa, or on more general political considerations with respect to South Africa is not known.

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86 Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, pp. 247; Killanin, My Olympic Years, p. 46.

South Africa was expelled from the IOC by a vote of 35 to 28 with three abstentions.\textsuperscript{88} Honey, the white South African representative, remained a full IOC member.\textsuperscript{89} Lord Killanin explains that Honey had offered to resign, but ‘...there was no reason for him to do so; he had broken no rules or regulations as a member of the club and I felt we needed the thin link to South Africa which he could provide.’\textsuperscript{90} By keeping Honey, and by extension a South African representative, as a member of the IOC there was hope that South Africa would eventually acquiesce and follow IOC rules in order to be readmitted into the Olympic movement. South Africa was not completely isolated from the IOC and, as a voting member, Honey would retain some influence on the committee and help South Africa’s voice to be heard.

**Canada-South Africa Relations 1960-1968**

As long-time members of the Commonwealth, Canada and South Africa had much in common. Both countries were colonised by white Europeans and both struggled with finding solutions on how best to deal with native populations; each country undertook policies of segregation in order to control native inhabitants. By the turn of the twentieth century Canada had established a complex reservation system and ensured its maintenance through the Indian Act of 1876. In 1948 the National Party of Daniel Francois Malan officially adopted the policy of apartheid in South Africa; this policy ensured the formalisation of legal racial segregation in all aspects of South African society.

By 1960 Canada had become a country with an increasing immigrant population and, as one of the oldest members of the British empire, it hoped to pursue a leadership role in the ever-expanding Commonwealth of nations. Worldwide reaction to the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 was quick and condemnatory, especially in Canada where fairness, and a dedication to diversity and international relations, was an important aspect of Canadian foreign policy. Conservative Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, believed that the Commonwealth should be ‘colour blind’ and was


\textsuperscript{89} Hain, ‘The politics of apartheid and sport’, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{90} Killanin, *My Olympic Years*, p. 46.
vehemently opposed to apartheid.\textsuperscript{91} At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1960, the situation in South Africa was discussed; Diefenbaker reiterated that Canada abhorred apartheid, indicating that such a policy could not be justified and that ‘...the equality of every human being ‘whatever colour or race must be a basic principle of the Commonwealth.’’\textsuperscript{92} At this Conference Eric Louw, the South African Minister of External Affair, attending in place of the Prime Minister, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who was recovering from an assassination attempt, let it be known that in October 1960 South Africa would hold a referendum in which those who were eligible to vote would decide whether or not South Africa would remain a constitutional monarchy or make the move to republicanism. Louw requested that the conference consider whether South Africa would be allowed to remain a member of the association; the Conference put off its decision until the actual referendum was completed. The referendum yielded a pro-republic vote.

Therefore, the decision on whether to allow South Africa to remain a member of the Commonwealth was not dealt with until the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference of 1961. During the Conference in London, Canada supported the Afro-Asian Commonwealth members in their opposition to South Africa’s request to remain a member of the Commonwealth once it declared itself a republic in May 1961. The conference ended with South Africa withdrawing its request for Commonwealth membership. Diefenbaker did not want Canada to be implicitly condoning apartheid and, therefore, spoke out against the regime’s continued membership in the Commonwealth.

Diefenbaker set a precedent in Commonwealth relations - by siding with the non-white nations he showed that Canada was a useful ally to the junior members of the Commonwealth. Canada also made clear that it did not approve of apartheid. Canada also set itself up to take on a middle power and mediator role in international and Commonwealth relations. In the end, however, external pressure and a desire to ensure the appeasement of the newer, non-white Commonwealth states forced


Canada to step-up in support of these countries, by speaking out against South Africa. Canada endeared itself to the non-white countries within the Commonwealth. Canada, as the older, supportive state showed these countries that it would provide them with much needed senior-level support within the Commonwealth.

Diefenbaker was followed by Liberal Lester B. Pearson as Prime Minister. Pearson’s government supported United Nations resolutions condemning apartheid and South Africa’s refusal to come to terms with South West Africa. During most of the 1960s, the Canadian government refused to subject South Africa to any sort of economic or financial sanctions.93 Pearson’s government made no significant changes to Canada’s diplomatic relationship with South Africa throughout his Prime Ministerial term.

93 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa, p. 179.
CHAPTER 3: Trudeau and Canada’s New Path

The Liberal Government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau

Canadian Confederation occurred in 1867, bringing together Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; Confederation was completed in 1949 when Newfoundland joined. This federation is made up unique provinces and regions, English and French speaking citizens. Under the British North America Act, the act which formalised Canada’s union, provinces were given jurisdiction over powers related to social institutions, education, family and the legal system; the federal government was given powers not specifically assigned to provinces like the power to tax, postal service, banking, communications, and criminal law.¹ Canada is made up of an uneasy balance of powers between the provincial and federal governments, English and French speakers, and even regions such as the east (Maritimes) versus central Canada versus west (the Prairies) versus British Columbia. Canadians have developed separate loyalties - loyalties to Canada, to their province, to their region or city. To be Canadian is to embrace all of these separate identities.

In 1960, there was a major shift in the federation. Québec, which had always maintained the language and culture brought over by French settlers, elected the Liberal Party government of Jean Lesage to its Legislative Assembly. The previous Québec premiere had been Maurice Duplessis of the conservative Union Nationale party. The election of Lesage’s government marked the beginning of the Révolution tranquille (Quiet Revolution) within the province. According to Mary K. Flowers, Québécois had witnessed the domination of their economy and diminution of their culture by Anglo-Canadians and Americans. What Lesage’s Liberals did was take up the theme of provincial autonomy, ‘they believed that the provincial government should no longer perform only the role of an obstacle to the extension of federal powers, but should actively command the social and economic development of Québec.’² This government wanted to ensure the continuation of French culture and education within the province; they wanted to stop the tide of Anglicisation and solidify French


autonomy. Samuel LaSelva notes that most French Canadians supported Confederation as it allowed them to maintain their own culture, develop their own society and control their destiny.\textsuperscript{3} The Quiet Revolution marked the beginnings of the nationalist and separatist movements in Québec. The Union Nationale were voted back into power in 1966; although nationalist in nature they ‘adopted a more emphatically autonomiste position when dealing with the federal government, by demanding greater provincial powers in international affairs, social welfare, and broadcasting.’\textsuperscript{4} To gain power in Québec after 1960, provincial parties reinforced the idea of French autonomy and the uniqueness of their culture and language.

French-Canadian Liberal, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, won a majority government in the June 25, 1968 federal election; with this win he brought the idea of a Just Society to the Canadian public. To Trudeau ‘Achieving such a society would require promoting equality of opportunity and giving the most help to those who were the most disadvantaged.’\textsuperscript{5} The notion of ‘just’ became an important aspect of Trudeau politics and, as such, Liberal Party policy well into the 1980s. Trudeau came to power at a key time in Canada’s evolution. In the same year Trudeau was elected, the Parti Québécois, led by René Lévesque, was formed; its main goal was independence for Québec. It was against this political backdrop that Trudeau came to power with an important goal - to make Canada more cohesive by patriating the Canadian constitution. When Trudeau came to power, the Canadian constitution could only be changed by Act of the British Parliament; Trudeau wanted to bring Canada’s constitution home, under the jurisdiction of Canadians. The patriation of the constitution would allow Canada to amend its own constitution without going through Britain and would also allow the country to assert its sovereignty.

In foreign policy terms, Trudeau wanted to hone Canada’s image and position as a strong middle power, reaching out and befriending a variety of nations in the hopes of solidifying Canada’s position as a trusted force on the world stage. Tom Keating notes that when Trudeau took office in April 1968, ‘...he had no experience in hands-on

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\textsuperscript{4} Flowers, ‘Canada and Québec’, p. 20 and p. 25.

management of foreign policy and little contact with foreign service officers." So, the Trudeau government took active steps to reevaluate Canada's foreign policies. In 1970 the white paper *Foreign Policy for Canadians* was published by authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp. Six policy themes were identified:

*Fostering Economic Growth* is primarily a matter of developing the Canadian economy, seeking to ensure its sustained and balanced growth.

*Safeguarding Sovereignty and Independence* is largely a matter of protecting Canada's territorial integrity, its constitutional authority, its national identity and freedom of action.

*Working for Peace and Security* means seeking to prevent war or at least contain it.

*Promoting Social Justice* includes policies of a political, economic and social nature pursued in a broad area of international groupings (the United Nations, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie).

*Enhancing the Quality of Life* implies policies that add dimension to economic growth and social reform so as to produce richer life and human fulfilment for all Canadians.

*Ensuring a Harmonious Natural Environment* is closely linked with quality of life and includes policies to deal not only with the deterioration in the natural environment but with risks of wasteful utilization of natural resources.

Sharp writes in his memoirs that the clarification of Canada's foreign policy and the publication of these policies were a major step in Canadian politics:

Never before 1968 had any Canadian government tried to express Canadian foreign policy in a single set of public documents. Until then, the content of Canadian foreign policy was to be found in ministerial speeches, in occasional documents, in the annual reports of the Department of External Affairs, and in papers and books written by academics. Nor, until then, had any Canadian government tried to place foreign policy within a consistent framework of Canadian interests and objectives.

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The Trudeau government had a clear vision on how they saw Canada as a nation; the government felt that Canada had the opportunity to become a powerful country. Trudeau and his colleagues started to develop policies which would promote Canada as a nation, both in world politics and in the economy. By making Canada strong within, they believed this would help strengthen its international reputation as well. The solidification of consistent foreign policies was an important development in Canada. However, applying consistency in these policies would prove difficult and, at times, impossible. Most of these policies would not affect the day-to-day transactions of the Canadian public. But, the publication did include specific sections on foreign relationships that were important to lobby groups within Canada, including relations with the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and major trading partners.

According to Keating, one of the main reasons for Trudeau’s reevaluation of foreign policy was his desire to exert power over the Department of External Affairs. Keating notes:

...the review informed members of the Department of External Affairs that a new leader was in charge, one with very different ideas about how policy should be made and carried out. Trudeau entered office with reservations about the department, suspicions about its tendency to control policy making, and dislike of its apparent resistance to change and innovation. The review, alongside the appointment of Ivan Head as Trudeau’s principal foreign policy adviser, sent a clear message that external affairs officials would be relegated to a supporting role in the making of Canadian foreign policy. The review led to a fundamental and permanent restructuring of the foreign policy-making process in Canada.9

Trudeau wanted External Affairs to see that he was serious about foreign affairs and that decisions relating to foreign and external relations would be made by himself and the Cabinet. Thomas Axworthy points out that under Pearson’s government, Canada’s foreign policy was largely decided by Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and that, generally, Cabinet ministers ran their departments with a large amount of autonomy, with little deference to the Cabinet as a whole.10 Despite his limited experience in foreign relations, Trudeau took control and pushed through changes that


allowed the Cabinet, led by Trudeau, to make decisions as a collective rather than each Minister being solely responsible for the decisions in their own departments.

On his first visit to Washington in March 1969, Trudeau infamously told the Washington Press Club: "Living with you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant: no matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."\(^{11}\) The statement hinted at Trudeau’s larger concerns regarding America’s influence on Canada and the dynamics of the long-standing relationship. It was under Trudeau’s leadership that Canada began to reevaluate its strong ties with the United States of America. For decades Canada and the United States had maintained a special relationship, mainly due to their close physical proximity to each other and their close economic ties. Interestingly, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* did not include a section devoted to America, Canada’s closest neighbour, a dominant nation, and a main Cold War protagonist. Instead, reference to the US is weaved throughout the document. One important section of *Foreign Policy for Canadians* explains that in order for Canada to develop freely ‘...according to its own perceptions will be the judicious use of Canadian sovereignty whenever Canada’s aims and interests are placed in jeopardy - whether in relation to territorial claims, foreign ownership, cultural distinction, or energy and resource management.’\(^{12}\) Early on in the Trudeau era, External Affairs hints at a change in Canadian policy dealing with the US. Additionally, by not devoting an entire section of the White Paper to the US, Canada sends an important message - the Canadian relationship with the United States will not hinder Canada’s ability to increase its international capacity and that Canada intends on developing relationships and economic and diplomatic ties with other countries, thereby, decreasing American influence on both Canadian society and the Canadian economy.

By 1970, Canada was the main trading partner of the United States. According to Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head, US exports to Canada exceeded US exports to Japan,


\(^{12}\) *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, p. 39.
France, United Kingdom, and West Germany combined. During and immediately following World War II,

...Canada transformed itself from a predominantly agricultural and resource-extractive society into a modern, industrialized power, overwhelmingly due to the sizable transfers of capital, technology and skills from American sources. These transfers continued and increased in the postwar period, and were complemented by the attractiveness and availability of the burgeoning US domestic market.

American-Canadian economic ties were well-established and deep. Despite this, in August 1971, President Richard Nixon announced that he would be implementing practices to protect the US dollar - the practices were aimed at countries that were capturing markets which traditionally imported from America, but were now open to other imports. Often referred to as Nixonomics, the changes came about due to the increasing costs of the Vietnam War and inflation within the US. The changes included surcharges on Canadian exports to the US, and would have a huge impact on the Canadian economy. Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau’s office, led by Head, and members of External Affairs moved quickly to reach out to Nixon and his government in order to mitigate damage to the Canadian economy. By December 1971, the two sides met and it was decided that the surcharge would be lifted and no demands would be made in respect to the value of the Canadian dollar. Canada walked away from the implementation of Nixonomics bruised and weary.

Importantly, in 1972, Peter C. Dobell wrote: ‘It is difficult to think of any major area of Canadian domestic policy - trade, finance, transport, communication, energy sources, defence, water, fisheries, agriculture - where the impact of the US are not of vital importance.’ Canada was so connected to the US, especially through cultural and economic influences, there was a general fear of American dominance. So, the government adopted its Third Option in 1972. The goals of which were ‘...strengthening Canadian ownership of the economy, diversifying Canada’s trade abroad and


15 Ibid, p. 188.

protection of Canadian culture.”\textsuperscript{17} The Third Option allowed Canada to assert its sovereignty and decrease American influence on Canada. But, as J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell point out, the US-Canada relationship during the 1970s mainly focused on bilateral relations, never had a sense of urgency and, finally, Canada’s opinion on global politics mattered little.\textsuperscript{18} The relationship was fairly one-sided, with Canada often demurring to its strong neighbour to the south in order to ensure the stability of the Canadian economy.

Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, Canada butted heads with the US over a variety of issues. In 1973, Canada, at the request of the US, joined the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), alongside Indonesia, Hungary and Poland. The ICCS was formed to help bring an end to American involvement in Vietnam. The credibility of the ICCS was called into question and Canada did not remain a member for long.\textsuperscript{19} Nixon was followed by Gerald Ford in 1973 and Ford by Jimmy Carter in 1977. Under the Ford and Carter administrations, the US-Canadian relationship continued to focus on economic issues, including fisheries and gas pipelines, along with issues of territory and culture, including disputes over the Arctic waters. In 1975, the Trudeau government started to focus its attention inward due to increases in domestic inflation, increases in unemployment and the rise of Québec nationalism. Importantly, Canadian and American social movements during this time period had little contact with each other. Interestingly, Canadians had participated in activism surrounding the Civil Rights movement, including Bruce Kidd. But, in the 1970s, contact was limited and mainly focused on the Vietnam War - Canada became home to many American ‘draft-dodgers.’\textsuperscript{1} The anti-apartheid movements in each country had communication with each other but no meaningful, tangible coordination. Although it is debatable whether the Third Option significantly allowed Canada to decrease American influence within the country, especially in terms of ongoing economic ties, it did allow Canada to develop important relationships with other nations, including China and many Commonwealth countries.

As the Trudeau government evaluated and developed external policies through the end of the 1960s, domestically the Prime Minister faced serious problems in Québec. The

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\item \textsuperscript{17} Axworthy, “To Stand Not so High”, p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Granatstein and Bothwell, 	extit{Pirouette}, p. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 60.
\end{itemize}
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Parti Québécois and its separatist agenda was growing in popularity within the province. Violent demonstrations were increasing throughout the province, led by separatists, Maoists and Trotskyites.\textsuperscript{20} The Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), a socialist separatist group, had been wreaking havoc on the province with bombs and violence since its founding in 1963. In 1969 they had bombed the Montréal Stock Exchange - a symbol of Anglo-Canadian and American economic dominance. In May 1970 the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa was elected. By October 1970, the province had reached an unbelievable breaking point - British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, was kidnapped on October 5 by an FLQ cell and then Québécois Labour Minister, Pierre Laporte, was kidnapped by another FLQ cell on October 10. It soon became clear that the province could not handle this situation on its own; Trudeau reported that Premier Bourassa called him on the day Laporte was kidnapped and asked the Prime Minister to send in the army and consider invoking the \textit{War Measures Act}.\textsuperscript{21} Trudeau did send in the army, but put off invoking the Act.

After a long debate in Cabinet and after a formal request by Bourassa and Montréal Mayor Jean Drapeau, for the first and only time during peace, the Trudeau government invoked the Act, thereby suspending civil liberties on October 16.\textsuperscript{22} Laporte was murdered on October 17. According to Peter Desbarats, although there had been opposition in the way the federal and provincial governments were handling the situation, Laporte's murder changed things: "Public opinion polls showed that the ratio of support for the governments' action was from 70 to 90 per cent."\textsuperscript{23} Cross continued to be held until December. The federal government always maintained it would not negotiate with terrorists, but on December 2 a federal negotiator reached an agreement with FLQ cell members. They were provided safe passage to Cuba and Cross was freed.\textsuperscript{24}

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\textsuperscript{20} Trudeau, \textit{Memoirs}, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, pp. 137-8.
\textsuperscript{24} English, \textit{Just Watch Me}, p. 90.
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Domestically, this was a terrible time for Canada. The country was at a tipping point. Anglo-French relations were at their lowest point since Confederation. Not an ideal situation considering Montréal had been awarded the 1976 Olympic Games at the IOC meeting in Amsterdam on May 12, 1970. This should have been a unifying time in Canadian history, yet the call for separatism was growing in Québec. The October Crisis did help settle things for a while; the province had to recuperate from the shock of the events. A series of constitutional conferences had begun in 1968, under the Pearson government. Constitutional reform and the patriation of the constitution had been a Pearson priority, one which Trudeau inherited, and promoted, as the new leader of the Liberal party.

In 1971, the Victoria Conference took place and the Victoria Charter was drafted. According to Trudeau the charter could have been good for all Canadians as it would have patriated the constitution, provided an amending formula, and enshrined official languages for the legislative, judiciary and executive branches of the federal government. Québec would be given veto powers along with Ontario ‘there would have been formal recognition that three judges of the Supreme Court would be members of the Québec bar; provincial paramountcy would have been recognised over family, youth, and occupational training allowances; and the federal government would have given up the powers of reservation and disallowance.’ Québécois was not satisfied with the proposals at the Conference and other provinces were concerned that the country was being separated into first and second class provinces - those with the veto rights and those without. The Conference and its Charter failed. Rather than cause further regional and Anglo-Franco schisms, Trudeau put constitutional politics to one side for a few years. His government focused on quieting the separatist movement in Québec, increasing policies surrounding the Just Society, and increasing Canada’s international reputation. By the beginning of the 1970s, foreign relations was one of the Trudeau government’s main priorities.

25 Trudeau, Memoirs, p. 231.
Canada’s policies towards South Africa

Under Trudeau, Canada’s foreign policy with Southern Africa was explicitly defined under the section dealing with the United Nations in Foreign Policy for Canadians. It addressed Canada’s abhorrence of apartheid and indicated that Canada continued to support UN resolutions that called for a voluntary arms embargo and another resolution supporting the termination of South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa.27

In addition to condemning apartheid and indicating Canada’s ongoing support for UN resolutions, the white paper outlined Canada’s current policy pertaining to Southern Africa. The Canadian government policy highlighted two divergent themes: social justice and economic growth -

The first theme has been pursued in Canadian policy statements and in its actions against the illegal regime in Rhodesia, as well as the embargo on the shipment of significant military equipment to South Africa and Portugal. The second reflects Canada’s basic approach, which is to trade in peaceful goods with all countries and territories regardless of political considerations. This principle has motivated Canadian trade with China and Cuba, as well as with authoritarian regimes of the right and left with whose policies Canada does not agree.28

South Africa was an important trading partner and, therefore, the Canadian government would not terminate the favourable trade relationship. When South Africa departed the Commonwealth, Canada retained its preferential trade agreement with the new republic. According to Yves Forest, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Privy Council, in 1969 the value of imports from South Africa was $45.9 million and were subject to the preferential tariff if shipped directly to Canada. Canadian exports to South Africa totalled $78.5 million, of which, $10.2 million was eligible for the preferential tariff.29 Canada continued its lucrative trading with South Africa. But, in an attempt to demonstrate their abhorrence of apartheid and their support for freedom and equality in Southern Africa, Canada would also ‘...make available further economic assistance to black African states of the area to assist them to develop their own


institutions. In addition, the federal government indicated that it would also increase its contribution to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and open a new diplomatic mission in the area.

Many historians and researchers contend that Canada’s trade and investment with South Africa was, in fact, insignificant. Some critics cited that, as of the early 1970s, Canadian exports to South Africa made up a small fraction of a percent of Canada’s total trade export. According to The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa, South African exports accounted for 1/50 of one per cent of Canadian trade. Analysts and activists agreed that Canada’s main focus continued to be economic stimulus and trade growth; social justice was not the government’s main priority. As mentioned above, this became increasingly clear when, in 1972, Canada developed its Third Option. Linda Freeman contends that with the adoption of the Third Option, South Africa became even more important to Canada as a trading partner. Through the Third Option Canada hoped to increase its autonomy and decrease its dependence on the Canadian-American relationship. As such, maintaining trade with a variety of nations, including South Africa, would continue to be a priority.

OXFAM Canada submitted a rebuttal document, in regards to Foreign Policy for Canadians, to the Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs. The document addresses the inconsistencies in Canada’s policy for southern Africa:

We are glad to note that the White Paper makes clear the Government’s distaste for Southern African regimes which are governed by a white minority whose prosperity and power are based on the subordination of a black majority. We agree that “the Canadian Government’s attitude can be seen as reflecting two policy themes which are divergent” but we dissent most strongly from the conclusion of the White Paper, that Canadian


31 Ibid.


interests would be best served by maintaining the current policy, which is to support the principle of freedom but to continue trading with the present regimes. We are especially concerned when such trading is actively promoted by Canadian Government publications, and at the continued extension of Commonwealth preferences to South Africa, which has the effect of denying access to the Canadian market to products of other countries. We believe that this is an issue on which the stance taken by Canada will affect for good or ill this country’s relationship with other African nations. The position outlined in the White Paper is ambiguous and morally indefensible. We urge the Government to review this question again and give greater emphasis to the claims of justice and freedom.

OXFAM’s stance reflects the point of view of many Canadian NGOs at the time. The 1973 YWCA report *Investment in Oppression* was heavily funded by many of the founding members of the Taskforce. Like other international NGOs, the YWCA was active in the anti-apartheid movement in Canada. They published several pamphlets, and local and regional YWCA offices often wrote to the federal government to protest Canadian policy and to lobby the government to speak out on a variety of issues affecting South Africa at any given time. The publication focused on South African homelands, black working conditions, contract labour, and corporate and government policies for investment and trade. Renate Pratt notes:

...the study found that the apartheid system and foreign investors served each other’s interests. Investors contributed to the growth of the white economy while repression, to the degree that it was successful, provided the “stability” that attracted foreign investors. *Investment in Oppression* also warned that foreign investors served South Africa in yet another way: they strengthened the pro-South African lobby abroad, inviting tolerance for South Africa’s apartheid system.

*Investment in Oppression* was a key source for the anti-apartheid movement’s argument against Canadian trade and investment in South Africa. Its main conclusion was that, in contradiction to what was written in *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, repressive South African policies such as the denial of civil and political liberties to Africans, exclusive white control of political institutions and the confinement of Africans to less than 14 percent of the land in South Africa would continue in South Africa and that increasing Canadian investment would only strengthen the country’s economy and

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the apartheid regime. The report gave Canadians a challenging view of where their money was going when they supported investment in South Africa. The fact that Canada’s trade with South Africa accounted for such a small portion of Canadian exports reinforced this fact. Yet, South Africa had been a long-time white Commonwealth dominion alongside Canada and long-time trading partner with Canada. The partnership was deemed lucrative and important by Canadian government and businesses and, therefore, would not be severed easily.

The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa also published a rebuttal to the white paper: The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada towards Southern Africa. In it they accuse the government of placing a price tag ‘...on the basic social and political values which Canadians might expect their foreign policy to reflect. That price tag is pitifully small and almost inconsequential to the broad economic welfare of this nation.’ The Committee, made up of a cross section of society - church leaders, officials of voluntary organisations, trade unionists, businessmen, academics, and members from Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) - proposed an alternative policy. The paper called for changes to Canada’s South African foreign policy, including limiting Canadian economic involvement in Southern Africa and achieving a foreign policy which reflected the value of human dignity, both of which were fundamental to Canadians. Policies which reduced Canada’s investment in Southern Africa would, in turn, decrease Canada’s indirect support of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Anti-apartheid organisations and lobbyists continued to lobby the Canadian government to cut economic and investment links with South Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Organisations like OXFAM Canada, YWCA and other committees dedicated to reducing Canadian relations with South Africa provided the government with alternative solutions. However, these alternatives were not considered by the new Trudeau government, despite the recognition that Canada’s policy with South Africa was based on two opposing goals: increasing economic ties and promoting Canada’s abhorrence of apartheid.

The 1971 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
Prior to 1970, Trudeau had little experience in dealing with the Commonwealth and, generally, a limited interest in the association. However, a key event in Commonwealth history would push Trudeau to the forefront of Commonwealth diplomacy and leadership. In the late 1960s, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson had ceased selling arms to South Africa. In July 1970 the new British Conservative government of Edward Heath announced that Britain would resume selling maritime arms, including planes and helicopters, to South Africa under the Simonstown agreement. The Ottawa Citizen points out that ‘...the provision of such material would almost certainly be interpreted as a violation of the British government’s pledge that no weapons would be provided which could be used against blacks either inside or outside South Africa.’\(^40\) African nations feared the white South African majority would use the weapons, purchased from Britain, to suppress the black majority. What ensued was a dispute between African Commonwealth nations and Britain over the latter’s resumption of arms sale to the apartheid government. According to Charles Redekop reaction to Britain’s decision was swift:

Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone all threatened either to leave the Commonwealth or to press for the expulsion of Britain. The government in London in turn charged that the attempt by African countries to veto its decisions was at variance with the Commonwealth principle of foreign policy autonomy and was, furthermore, something which these countries would not tolerate if the situation were reversed.\(^41\)

Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Ivan Head in The Canadian Way ask, in regards to the African reaction to the resumption of arms sales to South Africa ‘Why should they remain in an association that included as a member a country so willing to offer military assistance to a mortal enemy?’\(^42\) Trudeau and his foreign policy advisor, Head, realised the detrimental effect the British arms sales would have on the Commonwealth. This


\(^42\) Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, p. 106.
was reiterated to Head when Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal, Attorney General and Foreign Minister of Guyana, warned Head that African nations were serious about leaving the Commonwealth should Heath’s government proceed with the sales. Head worried about a domino effect: once African nations started to leave it was possible that other non-white Commonwealth nations would follow.43

As mentioned previously, part of Canada’s new foreign policy initiative was to pursue middle-power, mediator roles in international relations; this Commonwealth situation was an ideal moment for Canada to step forward and act as a mediator. Trudeau felt that

...it was the duty of a middle power like Canada, which could not sway the world with the force of its armies, to at least try to sway the world with the force of its ideals. I wanted to run Canada by applying the principles of justice and equality, and I wanted our foreign policy to reflect similar values.44

To Trudeau, Canada’s middle power status played on important role in the development of its new foreign policy. In this particular case, the Toronto Star notes: ‘A mediating position is logical for Canada as the senior white member which has cultivated close and friendly relations with the non-white nations of the club, including black African countries that are threatening to walk out if Britain goes ahead with the arms deal.’45 Being able to work towards peaceful and civilised solutions to difficult diplomatic situations allowed Canada the opportunity to influence world politics. Axworthy writes that ‘...Canada took the lead in suggesting ideas based on different assumptions than those of our larger, more powerful allies. Trudeau knew that one of the essential strengths of a middle power is that it can afford to fail.’46 By choosing to wade into Commonwealth politics and work in finding a solution to the South African arms crisis, Trudeau hoped to increase his international political capital and prove that Canada was a supportive, useful middle power.

In July 1970 Trudeau wrote to Heath and expressed his main fear was the ‘...consequence for the future of the Commonwealth if Britain went ahead with arms

43 Ibid, p. 108.
44 Trudeau, Memoirs, p. 224.
46 Axworthy, “To Stand Not so High”, p. 20.
sale to South Africa.'\(^{47}\) Also, Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp, met with Alec Douglas-Home, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, at the United Nations in September 1970, to discuss Britain’s position. In the run up to the 1971 London conference, Trudeau and his ministers and staff undertook various meetings with British representatives ‘to press actively for some compromise which would enable the Commonwealth to survive.'\(^{48}\)

During Heath’s visit to Ottawa in December of the same year he discussed Britain’s position with Trudeau. A memorandum dated December, 18 1970 indicates that Heath ‘...has emphasised that there must be recognition within the Commonwealth that each member has the right to pursue its own national interests, and that this applied to British policy on arms sales to South Africa.'\(^{49}\) The memorandum goes on to state that Heath was willing to leave the conference if the meeting developed ‘into a protracted debate on the arms sales issue’,\(^{50}\) By the end of 1970 Britain was determined to resume arms sales with South Africa through the Simonstown agreement; they were unwilling to be bullied by other Commonwealth nations to reverse their decision.

Head undertook trips to key African states in 1970 to see what could be done to resolve the issue with Britain. He met with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. According to Head ‘Both presidents regard the supply of arms to South Africa and the conclusion of a defence treaty with that country as equally repugnant for each lends legitimacy to a white supremacist regime.'\(^{51}\) Trudeau trusted Head to nurture the Prime Minister’s burgeoning relationships with Nyerere and Kaunda. A proposal for a Commonwealth Declaration was made by President Kaunda and Head indicated to Trudeau, in a memorandum, that a declaration may be the best way to avoid a Commonwealth showdown and, at worst, the break-up of the Commonwealth.\(^{52}\) For Trudeau it was important to retain close, personal relationships with key Commonwealth leaders, which included these two men.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{47}\) Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds. MG26 O11, Volume 70, File 70-14 - December 18, 1970.


\(^{49}\) Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds. MG26 O11, Volume 70, File 70-14 - December 18, 1970.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.


\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Trudeau, Memoirs, p. 224; Sharp, Which Reminds Me, p. 201.
government often used personal relationships and friendships to help resolve issues, especially within the Commonwealth. Tom Keating points out that ‘On every occasion, he tried to develop personal relations with foreign leaders as a means of promoting his foreign policy objectives.’ In this case, quiet diplomacy and gaining the trust of both the African members of the Commonwealth and Prime Minister Heath were key components to Trudeau’s mission to see the Commonwealth through this crisis.

Trudeau was thrust into a leadership role at the conference, something which he embraced. Redekop indicates ‘Trudeau’s diplomatic efforts may be attributed to the implicit demands of other Commonwealth members that he play a mediating role.’ Yet, documents show Trudeau had always intended to embrace opportunities for Canada to act in mediation roles in international relations. At home, Canadians questioned what Trudeau and the Canadian government were doing to resolve the crisis. According to Linda Freeman ‘Generally, the Trudeau government did not support arms sales to South Africa on the grounds of Canadian support for the U.N. Security Council arms embargo. In this stance, it was supported by most of Parliament and by significant quarters of opinion in civil society.’ In the House of Commons Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, reported that Trudeau had made clear his support of the African states and had warned the British Prime Minister of the possible consequences of a resumption in arms sales and shipments. Trudeau stepped into a high profile diplomatic situation, it was an opportunity for him to act upon the new Liberal Party foreign policy of working to find solutions to international situations and showing Canada’s strength.

According to the minutes of the evening meeting on January 20, 1971 Heath indicated that Britain would take the actions which it thought necessary in order to continue its global defence policy, Britain was bound to carry out its legal obligations under the Simonstown agreement, and the British government had received assurances from South Africa that they had no aggressive intentions for the spare parts being

56 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 37.
Yet, on January 9, 1971, Val Sears of the Toronto Star explains that although the British claimed that the Cape of Good Hope was significant in the Soviet threat and that the country had contractual obligations under the Simonstown Agreement:

The Americans, who ought to know, don’t regard the Soviet threat to the Cape route as significant. Certainly, they can’t imagine a few frigates and planes making any difference in any case. ... And as far as the agreement is concerned, former prime minister Harold Wilson had law officers examine the treaty giving the British army use of the Simonstown naval base and they concluded the sale of arms was non binding.59

Heath’s main goal, at this point, was to ensure Britain could develop and apply its own foreign policy. The British government did not appreciate nor approve of interference in its foreign policy and took special exception to interference from its former colonies - the new Commonwealth nations. Roger Fieldhouse writes: ‘Despite all the problems it faced, and the very great hostility to the new policy expressed by many Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Singapore, the Government did not back down.’60 Heath made clear that Britain intended to maintain its policy of supplying South Africa with the equipment listed under the Simonstown agreement.

Heath did, however, agree to the adoption of a Commonwealth Declaration of Principles. Trudeau used his political savvy to find a solution to the arms sale problem; during meetings he made statements against racial discrimination but also pointed out that the long-term security of the area had to be considered.61 On January 21 Trudeau discussed the role of the Commonwealth in the 1970s. The minutes from the meeting credit Trudeau as ‘...glad to note that Dr. Kaunda did not conceive the Declaration as a charter or constitution since experience over the years had shown the value of flexibility of procedure based on precedents and conventions without a formal charter or rigid procedural rules. Canada supported the idea of the Declaration of Principles.’62


60 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, p. 173.


Trudeau’s support of the declaration was identified as the best compromise to settle the dispute. In addition, a study group of Commonwealth nations was established to investigate the security of the trade routes in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. Britain supported the declaration and Afro-Asian nations celebrated a defined Commonwealth policy against racial discrimination. One key component of the declaration reads:

We recognise racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness threatening the healthy development of the human race and racial discrimination as an unmitigated evil of society. Each of us will vigorously combat this evil within our own nation. No country will afford to regimes which practice [sic] racial discrimination assistance which in its own judgment directly contributes to the pursuit or consolidation of this evil policy.\(^63\)

The declaration allowed both Britain and non-white Commonwealth nations to continue their membership in the face of the Simonstown agreement crisis. It was worded to please both sides and allowed some room to manoeuvre in terms of Britain’s adherence to its existing arrangements with South Africa. Trudeau, with the help of the Australian delegation, was responsible for the last sentence in the quote above.\(^64\) By inserting this sentence the declaration became palatable for both the British and the non-white Commonwealth nations. According to the Ottawa Citizen, Trudeau’s personal intervention helped push the declaration through; he worked up to the last day of the Conference to have the leaders accept the amended wording of the declaration “...by buttonholing other leaders at a coffee break which he managed to keep going for an hour.”\(^65\) Although, both sides were able to save face, Britain went ahead with the sale of seven Wasp helicopters to South Africa in February 1971. Arms sales to South Africa remained official policy until 1974 when the Labour government of Harold Wilson came into power.\(^66\)

The policy of opposing British arms sale to South Africa whilst taking on a mediation role in order to maintain a viable Commonwealth was well received by the Canadian


\(^{66}\) Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 40.
public and anti-apartheid advocates. For example, the CLC’s President, Donald MacDonald, wrote to Trudeau indicating member support for the embargo. Support rallies also took place in Toronto and Ottawa.67 In addition to support at home, during this arms crisis, Afro-Asian Commonwealth nations trusted Canada to act as an honest broker. Head and Trudeau note that ‘No delegation was more jubilant over this outcome than the Canadian, for none had invested more of its negotiating efforts and stature. ... Chairman Lee [Kuan Yew] selected Trudeau, of all leaders present, to receive praise for his “outstanding contribution....”68 Canada, and specifically Trudeau, gained the trust of these new members and in future they turned to the Canadian government for support and advice on a variety of matters.

CHAPTER 4: Changes in Canadian Policies

Canada’s South African foreign policy in the early 1970s

Canada’s South African foreign policy as outlined in the 1970 External Affairs White Paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, changed little through the early 1970s. Canadian industries, government branches, and banks continued to trade and invest in South Africa. According to Linda Freeman, Canadian private investment in the 1970s focused on white Southern Africa; the involvement took the form of ‘...ongoing direct investment, expanded participation in consortia offering bank loans to South Africa, and the underwriting of bond issues on behalf of the South African government by Canadian investment dealers.’\(^1\) By 1972, it was estimated that trade with South Africa made up 1 percent of Canada’s total trade export.\(^2\) And, John Schlegel writes that, according to Statistics Canada, ‘by 1974, Canada imported over $117 million worth of South African goods while exporting only $91 million of Canadian products. Canadian involvement in trade and investment in South Africa continued to increase throughout the early 1970s.’\(^3\)

With this increase in investment, there was also an increase in public condemnation of Canada’s South African foreign policy. In 1973, the *Montréal Gazette* ran a series of articles by Hugh Nangle which showed that only one in six Canadian subsidiaries working in South Africa paid their black workers above the Poverty Datum Line, ‘i.e. a minimum calculated for mere existence but not a minimum living wage.’\(^4\) Internationally, this became an important argument against supporting trade with South Africa, and within Canada, it was a key fact used by anti-apartheid groups to build a case against Canada’s continuing trade with South Africa.

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4 Tennyson, ‘Canadian Policy’, p. 10.
Despite repeated requests to cease trade and investment with South Africa, it was the Liberal government’s policy to continue:

We have been urged on many occasions to break off trading with countries because people do not agree with the policies followed by these countries. ... We believe that we should encourage trade as a means of making useful contacts between peoples. We believe that this is a principle that is worth preserving and that we should follow our practice, as in the past, of breaking trade relations only when sanctions are approved by the United Nations.5

The Secretary of State for External Affairs reiterates the Canadian policy. And, at a later date, points out that the Commonwealth was never asked to abandon the preferential tariff with South Africa.6 By extending preferential tariffs to South Africa, Canada continued to support the apartheid state. New Zealand and Malaysia also extended South Africa favourable tariff agreements.7 The government claimed that these tariffs were useful to Canada and that ongoing contact with the apartheid regime was key to helping bring about the end of apartheid.

In 1973, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Ottawa, the final communiqué indicates that the heads of governments had “recognized the legitimacy of the struggle to win self-determination” in Southern Africa, and that they “agreed on the need to give every humanitarian assistance to all those engaged in such efforts.”8 As such, in 1973, the government set up a new high commission in Lusaka ‘...intended to symbolize Canadian support for countries in the front line of racial confrontation in the region.’9 In 1974, as a progression of its policy to support the struggles in southern Africa, the federal government decided ‘...to provide humanitarian assistance to African liberation groups in Southern Africa through grants by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to such non-governmental organisations like OXFAM

Canada, the International Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches.  

No direct aid would be provided to liberation groups in southern Africa as the government feared ‘...that this would imply governmental approval of the armed struggles. The aid disbursements, furthermore, were dependent upon NGO initiatives and upon their financial resources in order to qualify for CIDA matching grants.’ Providing funding to groups working with South African liberation movements was a major change in Canadian foreign policy at the time. This move also helped enhance Canada’s international standing, especially amongst African nations.

These moves were welcomed by NGOs. In April 1974, OXFAM Canada wrote to the Standing Committee for External Affairs and National Defence commending the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp’s announcement regarding funding to NGOs. They stated:

The decision to allow CIDA to contribute through Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations to projects of a humanitarian or development nature is a concrete and positive step towards the recognition of the legitimate struggle by indigenous people of Southern Africa to achieve human dignity and the right to self-determination.

The implementation of funding for liberation movements in southern Africa allowed NGOs like OXFAM Canada, YWCA Canada, YMCA Canada, and CUSO, which were already working in the region, to expand their programs and increase their outreach. Many of the projects receiving funding focused on education and training, farming, and nutrition.

Canada remained steadfast in maintaining its investment and trade ties with South Africa through the early 1970s. The federal government, however, did start to increase humanitarian aid and also made several changes to Canada’s foreign policy regarding sporting links with South Africa throughout the decade.

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Canada’s South African Sports Policy up to c. 1973

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) published a comprehensive background book called *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa*. In it UNESCO addresses how apartheid affects every aspect of life; with regards to sport, they stated:

Sport can only artificially be considered in isolation from other human activities. Even if whites and non-whites could legally play together, or even watch sports in unsegregated accommodation, bad nutrition and poor health place the non-white, and especially the African, at a disadvantage. The average white has far more leisure for sport, and money for equipment and so on. Facilities for non-whites are poor or non-existent. Whites have swimming pools, private sports clubs and facilities, the African often has a spare patch of earth. Limited finances and the travel permit system severely restrict competition between non-whites. In other words the racial inequality officially institutionalized applies to sport as much as to any other aspect of life.\(^\text{14}\)

UNESCO applauded the international sports boycott to date and called for an increase in support of the anti-apartheid sports boycott. Sport was an important part of South African society; as white South Africans held sport in such high regard, anti-apartheid movements, protesters and international bodies like the UN and the Commonwealth realised that focusing on the sports boycott and South Africa’s isolation in international sport was one of the key components in voicing opposition to the apartheid regime. This movement gained momentum in throughout the 1970s.

In 1971, Canada supported United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2775D XXVI, which focused on apartheid in sport. The Assembly ‘called upon all sports organizations to uphold the Olympic principle of non-discrimination, expressed regret that some sports organizations had continued exchanges with racially selected South African teams and commended the international campaign against apartheid in sports.’\(^\text{15}\) Canada’s support of this resolution became an important weapon in the anti-apartheid movement’s lobbying of the federal government to have the Canadian policy surrounding South Africa and sport changed. Part 5 of Resolution 2775D XXVI:

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Urges all States to promote adherence to the Olympic principle of non-discrimination and to encourage their sports organizations to withhold support from sporting events organized in violation of this principle.¹⁶

Anti-apartheid organisations and lobbyists seized upon this section to try and force a change in policy. The resolution was often quoted in anti-apartheid literature and in letters of protest to the federal government.

Up to the mid-1970s, the Canadian federal government took a hands-off approach to Canadian-South African sporting contacts. Official foreign policy in regards to sport was to allow each sporting organisation or federation to decide whether or not to continue contact with their South African counterparts. This policy was initiated in the 1960s, after South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth. When the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau came into power in 1968 it maintained the same policy as previous governments. According to a letter from R.G. Hatheway, Acting Director of the African Affairs I Division of External Affairs to E.W. Thomas, the Executive Director of the Canadian Water Ski Association in March 1973:

Although the Canadian Government takes the view that the ultimate decision regarding participation in South African-hosted sporting activities rests with individual athletes or sports governing bodies concerned, it does not encourage such participation. This is because the Canadian Government strongly disapproves of the policy of apartheid or racial segregation.¹⁷

Government policy was to openly discourage any Canadian-South African sporting relationships, yet there was no official policy towards preventing sporting contact. A very similar policy was enforced in Britain at the time. A memo from M.E. Cook of the Central and Southern African Department to E.P. Woods of the Squash Rackets Association in London, dated January 1973 states:

The Government’s policy, which I outlined in our previous correspondence about the South African squash team’s recent visit to the United Kingdom - namely that it is for sporting bodies to reach their own decision about fixtures with South African teams - applies equally to events held in South Africa.¹⁸


Both Canada and Britain took the line that they could not prevent citizens and sportsmen and women, and sport organisations and federations from traveling to South Africa to participate in sporting events, nor would they cease issuing visas to South African athletes wishing to enter their respective countries. The most they were willing to do was openly discourage any sporting contact with South Africa.

Public outcry against Canada’s South African sport policies gained momentum through the 1970s, a key period in Canada’s role in international sport. The country was gearing up to host both the 1976 Olympics in Montréal and the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. Between 1970 and 1974 the federal government faced mounting external pressure to formulate a strict policy to help prevent continued sporting contact between Canada and South Africa.

South African Sport Policies in Other Commonwealth Countries
Sports protests were becoming common in Commonwealth countries. In Wales, in 1958 the Campaign Against Race Discrimination (CARD) was created. Dennis Brutus notes that, under CARD’s leadership, ‘...more than a thousand signatories protested at the exclusion of non-Whites from the South African Team’ during the British Empire and Commonwealth Games. Anthony Steel explains that British sportsmen also called ‘...upon all sportsmen to work to persuade the international federation controlling each sport to adopt the Olympic principle.’ This anti-apartheid sport protest was an early harbinger for South Africa’s international sport contact. CARD would progress to sending a letter to the IOC at their meeting in Munich in 1959 and, as perviously mentioned, Reverend Michael Scott also made a plea on behalf of CARD and SASA at the IOC meeting in Rome in 1960. The letter outlined South Africa’s disregard for the Olympic principles and called on the IOC ‘to apply its charter sincerely.’ In his eye-opening and thought provoking analysis in 1959, Brutus notes:

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Sport dramatizes their [White South Africa] dilemma and exposes the anachronism of apartheid as few other things do: White South Africans must not only succeed in imposing their racial lunacy on the entire population of the country, they must also succeed in selling it to the entire world at international sporting events. The sporting world is, in conscience, bound to reject it eventually, and apartheid may well face its severest test then. For South Africa’s sport-mad White population will either have to conform to the principles of international sport or be doomed to dispirited games of jukskei in its own backyards.22

Sport was likened to religion in apartheid South Africa; white South Africans took sport and international competition very seriously. Brutus points out that it would sorely hurt the apartheid supporters to be excluded from international sport - denial of international sporting contact was white South Africa’s major weakness.

In 1960 there had been pressure on the New Zealand Rugby Union because they chose to exclude Maori players from an All Blacks team touring South Africa.23 Despite the adoption of the catchy slogan: ‘No Maoris, no tour’ by anti-apartheid groups, the New Zealand Rugby Union refused to cancel the tour. It has been noted above that even in the 1950s, when South Africa was still a member of the Commonwealth, member countries and citizens were trying to raise public awareness of South Africa’s racial discrimination in sport. Commonwealth protests against South Africa really began to gain momentum in the early 1960s. These early protests set the scene for mass protests which began to dominate the anti-apartheid movement in the late 1960s. As such, an All Blacks tour of South Africa in 1967 was cancelled by the New Zealand Rugby Union due to the fact that the South African government refused to admit Maoris.24

One of the early sparks to ignite the anti-apartheid sport movement was the 1968 Basil D’Oliveira controversy. D’Oliveira was considered ‘coloured’, a South African cricketer who left the country to play cricket in England.25 In 1968, the Marylebone Cricket Club


23 Thompson, Race and Sport, p. 33.


25 In 1950, the National Party government imposed specific designations on the population of South Africa. People were divided into 3 categories: White, Native, Coloured. The rights of individuals South Africans depended on the group to which they were appointed. For further details, see Muriel Horrell Race Classification in South Africa - Its Effects on Human Beings (South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1958).
(MCC) was due to send an English cricket team on tour to South Africa. It is well-documented that South Africa intended on canceling the tour if D'Oliveira was named to the English side; Prime Minister Vorster was determined to keep D'Oliveira from playing cricket for England in South Africa.26 Jack Williams notes that Vorster even sent a message, through Lord Cobham, former MCC president, to the current executives of the organisation, letting them know that a team including D'Oliveira would not be acceptable to the South African government. There was back and forth correspondence between England and South Africa in regards to D'Oliveira. Cobham did pass the message along to the MCC Secretary, Treasurer and President; however these men kept the message confidential and did not share it with others. It was revealed later that the message was not passed on because it conflicted with information provided by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. He travelled to South Africa in 1968 and during a meeting with Vorster was given the impression that no decision had been made as to whether the government would allow D'Oliveira to play; Douglas-Home gave the opinion that the odds were 5/4 that he would be allowed.27 Before the team was announced, the MCC did not push the South African government into making a decision as to whether or not a team which included D'Oliveira would be acceptable.

According to the MCC, D'Oliveira was not named to the tour, but for purely cricketing reasons.28 D'Oliveira was excluded from the team, despite the fact that he played ‘...with much distinction for Worcestershire and was a regular member of the England team. It was noted that, far from D'Oliveira having lost form on the field, he played in the last test at the Oval in 1968, against Australia, and actually scored a century.29 There was outcry in Britain and D'Oliveira was eventually included on the team when an original member dropped out due to injury. However, South African Prime Minister Vorster vetoed the team, citing it had been chosen on a political basis.30 Yet, Donald Woods, a South African journalist, notes that he interviewed Vorster around the time of


28 Murray and Merrett, Caught Behind, p. 108.


30 Morgan, Callaghan, p. 313.
the D'Oliveira affair and Vorster seemed amenable to allowing D'Oliveira to tour. Woods believed that, in the end, Vorster capitulated due to South African party politics:

...the announcement of the English team including D'Oliveira coincided with the Orange Free State congress of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party and with growing unease in the Broederbond over the possible effects on apartheid if D'Oliveira toured, scored well, behaved himself and impressed the crowds. Accordingly, the Broederbond message to Vorster was a negative, Vorster hadn't the courage or the inclination to defy it, and the cheering 'delegates' to the party congress heard him declaring that the tour would not be allowed.31

It appears that elite white politicians feared what D'Oliveira's success against South African teams would mean for the country. Although the Vorster government changed its policies to allow non-whites to play in international sides within South Africa, Basil D'Oliveira was seen as unacceptable due to his status as a coloured South African.32 Seeing a non-white South African succeed could have sparked unrest amongst the non-white population. Williams hypothesises:

...more could have been made before the start of the 1968 English cricket season to establish whether a side including D'Oliveira would have been allowed to play in South Africa. Whatever Vorster's answer may have been, a blow could have been struck against apartheid in South African sport. Had Vorster agreed to accept a side including D'Oliveira, the presence of a Cape Coloured born and raised in South Africa playing cricket against white teams in South Africa would have been an open challenge to apartheid in sport. Had Vorster been forced to declare that he would not accept a team including D'Oliveira, the refusal of the MCC to send a team would have emphasized to white sport followers in South Africa that retaining apartheid in sport would lead to the exclusion of South Africa from international sport.33

It is easy to make these conclusions with hindsight, especially since the boycott of sport became so important to the anti-apartheid movement in general. At the time, the MCC would not have been concerned with the political repercussions of either situation. They wanted to field a team which would allow the tour to go ahead. Booth writes that ‘...a South African Coloured person posed an unacceptable situation’ and Vorster said he would not accept a team selection based on the political objectives of

32 Murray and Merrett, Caught Behind, p. 112.
33 Williams, Cricket and Race, p. 63.
the Anti-Apartheid Movement, SAN-ROC and others.\textsuperscript{34} South African politics played a major role in the country’s decisions on how to engage in international sport. Appeasing the Afrikaner Broederbond was key to the success of any South African prime minister; this meant ensuring apartheid in sport continued to be strictly followed, with as little concessions to international federations as possible.\textsuperscript{35}

In 1969, the Stop the Seventy Tour (STST) was formed to cease the 1970 cricket tour of Britain by South Africa. In preparation for the cricket tour of 1970, STST targeted the 1969 South African rugby tour of Britain. It was a broad based protest, which included churches, several different anti-apartheid groups, politicians and students. Peter Hain was one of the leaders of the campaign and explains:

> The campaign against the rugby tour started off as a ‘trial run’ for the cricket tour; it turned into a massive expression of anger and opposition to the all-white touring side and the system it represented, and developed in to one of the most successful and sustained protest movements seen in Britain.\textsuperscript{36}

The campaign caused chaos during the 25-match tour. According to George W. Shepherd Jr., ‘A special feature was the nonviolent direct-action campaign, participated in by students and militants, which led to the tearing up of pitches, interruptions, and picketing.’\textsuperscript{37} The campaign garnered a large amount of press. In its aftermath, ‘Thirteen African countries threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games due to be held in July [1970] in Edinburgh. Forthcoming cricket tours by India and Pakistan were also threatened.’\textsuperscript{38} The British government, after much public debate and many international meetings, asked the Cricket Council to cancel the tour. The Home Secretary, James Callaghan, agreed with Prime Minister Harold Wilson, that the following reasoning would be used in his meeting with the Cricket Council in May 1970:

> The Home Secretary said that he had in mind to take the line that on grounds of public policy, the Government considered that the tour should


\textsuperscript{36} Hain, *Don’t Play with Apartheid*, p. 126.


not go ahead. He would refer to potential damage to race relations, the Commonwealth Games, to the interests of the coloured community in the United Kingdom. He would also refer to the burden on the Police, though making it clear that they would, if necessary, be able to deal with any situation that arose. He would point out that he was not seeking to pressurise them. He would take the line that it was his duty to draw their attention to the wider considerations outside the interests of cricket.\footnote{NA/PREM 13/3499 - May 22, 1970.}

In his memoirs, Callaghan recounts that he told M.J.C. Allom and Billy Griffith, the Chairman and Secretary of the MCC:

...that while, as Home Secretary, I had no power to prohibit the tour, the Government certainly accepted responsibility for expressing a view about the consequences, and I believed that the tour would have a serious adverse impact. On the grounds of broad public policy the Government would prefer the MCC to withdraw the invitation. Messrs Allom and Griffith, who were always cooperative and helpful during our meetings, told me that the MCC would almost certainly agree to such a request, and shortly afterwards I was glad to hear that they had cancelled the tour.\footnote{James Callaghan. \textit{Time and Chance} (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd, 1987), p. 263.}

One of the main reasons to request the cancellation of the tour was to ensure the Commonwealth Games went ahead with a full Commonwealth contingent. If the 13 African nations boycotted the Games and other non-white nations followed suit, there was a genuine possibility that the Games would only be attended by white Commonwealth nations. If this had happened, it would have sorely undermined the Games and put any future editions in jeopardy. Also, according to Andre Odendaal, the demonstrations heightened international awareness about apartheid.\footnote{Andre Odendaal. ‘The hundred years’ war: Brown balls, bronzed colonials and the persistence of colonial biases in 21st century rugby cultures’ Plenary Address to the Conference on “Afrikaners, Anglos and Springboks, 1906-2006’, London, September 25, 2006, p. 13.} This, in turn, pushed the anti-apartheid movement into the mainstream media and popularised the movement. STST was a turning point, an important catalyst in the anti-apartheid movement’s momentum. It became a source of inspiration and set a an example and precedent of how a successful protest movement worked. According to Meredith Burgmann, an anti-apartheid activist in Australia in the 1970s:

\begin{quote}
We were very influenced by the Stop the Springbok Campaign in England led by the exiled South African activist Peter Hain. We used to rush home to watch the news on telly and see how the protesters climbed up the
\end{quote}
goalposts and stormed the rugby fields. We were always looking for new ways to get around the police, new ways of disrupting the sporting events.42

During the 1970s, following Britain’s example, the anti-apartheid movement would become worldwide with numerous groups and organisations calling for boycotts, sanctions and the general isolation of South Africa.

In 1971, a South African rugby team toured Australia; this tour was met with massive demonstrations across the country. Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes:

The South African team had to be transported in Australian Air Force planes as the trade unions refused to service planes or trains carrying them. Seven hundred people were arrested and many were injured in demonstrations. The State of Queensland declared a 10-day state of emergency during the tour, provoking a general strike by trade unions. The South African cricket tour for later that year was cancelled.43

Much like the 1969 rugby tour in Britain, citizens came out in force to protest the tour in Australia. Protests were consistent and well-attended. According to Christopher Merrett, Australia cancelled the tour because ‘...the cost of policing and social divisiveness was too great a price to pay for links with South Africa.’44 Jim Boyce, a former Australian rugby player who had travelled to South Africa to play the Springboks, and then became an opponent of Australian-South African sporting contacts, reiterates Merrett’s point ‘No-one in Australia was prepared to play if it meant the police had to be there to keep order; no-one was prepared to have another state of emergency declared in Queensland over a sporting event. ... The South Africans didn’t play rugby against Australia for another 22 years after that.’45

In 1970, the All Blacks rugby team undertook a tour of South Africa, despite protests from within New Zealand. In order to ensure this particular tour was not cancelled, as the 1967 tour had been, South African Prime Minister BJ Vorster reversed the decision of the previous Prime Minister, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, and allowed Maoris to tour South


Africa with the All-Blacks team. The Maoris players would be treated as ‘honorary whites’ while visiting South Africa. This ensured that the Maoris All Blacks members were not in contravention of apartheid laws; as honorary whites they were subject to all of the same allowances permitted to whites in South Africa. A relaxing of the ban on Maori players entering South Africa was a major step in amending and relaxing South Africa’s apartheid policy.

In 1973, South Africa was due to tour New Zealand with an all-white, racially selected rugby team. As the worldwide anti-apartheid movements were gaining momentum, press coverage, and membership, New Zealand became especially prominent as ‘a strategic pressure point for the anti-apartheid movement because of the importance of its rugby ties with South Africa.’ Prime Minister Norman Kirk tried to convince the New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU) to cancel the tour. ‘Numerous organizations opposed the visit and some vowed non-violent disruption of the matches. African Commonwealth countries and India announced in April 1972 that they would boycott the Commonwealth Games in Christchurch if the tour went ahead’. In the end, Kirk asked the NZRU to cancel the tour:

The prime minister gave four reasons for cancelling the tour: (a) the strains it would place on New Zealand society by exacerbating difference of attitude in racial matters; (b) the disorder and violence to which it would give rise; (c) the effect on New Zealand’s international relations; (d) the virtual certainty that the 1974 Commonwealth Games to be held in New Zealand would be a failure, or have to be cancelled.

The Commonwealth Games boycott threat posed by African nations was a major contributing factor in Kirk’s request to the NZRU, who reluctantly cancelled the tour. Threatening the Commonwealth Games became a major tool in the anti-apartheid

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49 Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Apartheid, p. 90

arsenal of African Commonwealth nations; they realised that an all-white Games was something that senior members of the Commonwealth feared due to the precedent they would set and the fact that it would ruin their reputation as a multinational, multiracial organisation.

Jon Gemmell writes that ‘Britain’s imperial links were enhanced through a cultural assimilation largely built on literature, cricket, and - in the ‘white’ colonies - rugby.’ However, unlike other white Commonwealth countries, Canada was not a major competitor in cricket nor rugby. Cricket, although played in the early twentieth century in Canada, was replaced by baseball, America’s favourite past-time, during the years between Confederation and the First World War as ‘Canada’s summer sport of choice’. Rugby was once quite popular in Canada, however, over time it morphed into Canadian football, with traditional rugby still being played only in some parts of the country. As a member of the British empire, during the late 1800s and through to the mid-1900s, Canada continued to play traditional British sports like rugby and cricket. But, as the empire diminished, Canadians began to play more American games, to the point that they were no longer competitive with white Commonwealth countries in traditional British sports and, therefore, had fewer and fewer sporting links with these nations.

Changes to Canada’s South African Sports Policies

Canada did not have the deep and long-standing sporting ties that New Zealand, Australia, and Britain shared with South Africa. And, as such, protesting against apartheid in sport in Canada was much more low-key than what was going on in other white Commonwealth nations. Most of Canada’s grassroots anti-apartheid sports boycott campaign involved letter writing and the dissemination of information.

Along with having limited links with other Commonwealth countries in regards to sporting contact, Canada was often criticised for its own policies that dealt with its native population. The reservation system, often compared to South Africa’s


53 Ibid, p. 47.
Bantustans, shuffled Aboriginal Canadians onto designated areas of land. Australian activists were also subject to such comparisons; activist Meredith Burgmann notes:

> As anti-tour protesters, we continually had to justify our arguments. We were often accused by our opponents of not doing anything to clean up our own backyard before we complained about apartheid. We took that accusation very seriously.\(^5^4\)

As relatively new nations, with complicated situations involving native populations, Canada and Australia were often criticised for their Native and Aboriginal policies and laws. More importantly, Canada was often compared to apartheid South Africa in its treatment of its Native population.

In May of 1971, the same year Canada helped finesse a resolution to the South African arms disagreement within the Commonwealth, Abraham Ordia, President of the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa, made a statement to Nigerian papers calling on Australia and Canada to stop sporting exchanges with South Africa.\(^5^5\) A cable from Lagos to Ottawa reveals:

> Statement goes on to say that Canada is a fine country and quote Canadian always sincerely support us in our struggle to eliminate all forms of discrimination in sport. This is all the more why news of impending visit of six top Canadian badminton players to racist South Africa has come as a great shock. Between now and July is enough time for Canadians to change their minds. Canada must avoid contamination with racist South Africa unquote.\(^5^6\)

The cable writer requested additional information surrounding the potential tour and questioned whether or not the tour received financial support from the Canadian government. This was a key question in development of Canada’s new foreign policy surrounding South African sporting ties.

The Canadian Ambassador to South Africa, Harry Havilland Carter, wrote to the Under Secretary of External Affairs, A. Edgar Ritchie, to inform the Secretary that he was invited by the Southern Transvaal Badminton Association to attend the badminton match between Canada and South Africa, alongside South African Prime Minister Vorster. Carter asks if he should accept the invitation, and provides some insight:

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\(^5^6\) Ibid.
...South Africans are very sensitive to pressure in the field of sport and that it is one area in which we can show our dislike of apartheid in an effective and non-violent manner. There is also the further point, it seems to me, that our badminton people would be taking a very considerable risk of international ostracism in their sport if they proceed with the visit to this country. Perhaps this could also cause a back-lash in non-White countries against other Canadian sporting bodies whose international participation is more important to us than badminton. ... On the other hand, I think that if we intervene too heavily in bringing pressure to bear on our badminton people to cancel the tour we are in danger of leaving ourselves open to precisely that same criticism that we make against South Africans, i.e. of using sport as an extension of politics.57

He highlights one of the major problems that white Commonwealth nations faced in continuing to participate in sport engagements with South Africa: the nagging and very real fear that non-white Commonwealth nations would see this participation as acceptance and support of apartheid. Like Australia, Britain and New Zealand in the early 1970s, the Canadian government started to struggle with what to do about the anti-apartheid movement and sport.

In the case of the badminton tournament, it is revealed that: one, the Canadian Badminton Association (CBA) did not receive federal funding for the tournament and two, Under Secretary of External Affairs Ritchie wrote a letter to the Association outlining the national and international implications of the tour. This included ‘the probability of adverse publicity and criticism.”58 External Affairs also met with members of the Association on June 9, 1971 and soon after, the Association announced that the tour was cancelled. In this case the government used quiet diplomacy to remind the CBA of current realities within South Africa for non-whites and persuaded them that negative repercussions may follow their participation.

Also in 1971, coinciding with South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympic Movement, Prime Minister Vorster announced changes to apartheid sport policies. A committee was appointed to find a new sporting policy; a policy that would be palatable both internationally and nationally.59 Vorster realised the importance of sport in South African society and wanted to have South Africa readmitted into associations and organisations

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
from which they had been expelled. Multinational sport was announced in April, its main concepts were threefold: firstly, mixed teams from countries with traditional sporting links with South Africa could tour the country and play against separate white and non-white teams; secondly, ‘black sportsmen affiliated to white federations would be permitted to take part, as individuals, in “multinational” competitions; within South Africa these would be strictly “national” (race against race), but internationally (in the Davis Cup or the Olympic Games etc.) might take a relatively “open” form'; no racial mixing at the provincial or club level. Multinational sport was the South African government’s first attempt at easing petty apartheid. According to Hain, ‘In essence, it meant that the different racial groups in South Africa - Whites, Africans, Coloureds and Asians - would be allowed to compete against each other as four separate “nations” within the country, but only in major “international” events with foreign participants.’ It showed the great importance which surrounded sport in South Africa; the South African government wanted it to appear as though laws affecting apartheid sport were being eased. Dennis Brutus links this new National Party ideology to the idea that mixed sport could ease racial conflict and increase social stability: ‘The new thinking was a direct result of the boycott that altered the regime and state to the importance of sporting relationships as a register of South Africa’s international standing.’ Most countries and associations saw through Vorster’s idea of multinational sport and continued to block South Africa from major sporting events, tournaments, associations, and federations.

By December 1972, the government of Canada was inundated with requests for information and inquiries surrounding upcoming sporting events in South Africa. In a memo to the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria, External Affairs explains:

Invitations have been received by several Canadian sports governing bodies to participate in competitions in South Africa during 1973. These bodies have in turn requested financial assistance from Sports Canada to help defray cost of participation. The general policy guide line that Canadian teams and athletes not be encouraged to accept invitations to

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60 Archer and Bouillon, *The South African Game*, p. 211; see also Booth, *The Race Game*, pp. 100-1.


participate in competitions in South Africa is consistent with Canada’s opposition to South African apartheid policies. By refusing to provide federal funds to assist Canadians to take part in such events, the government can effectively shut off most of Canadian participation in competitions in South Africa, especially for amateurs.63

And here is where the possibility of a change in Canadian policy becomes clear. External Affairs and Sports Canada, a part of the Ministry of National Health and Welfare, were considering the idea of ceasing funding to groups and individuals who participated in sporting events in South Africa. The telegram goes on to request specific details surrounding the current state of apartheid sport:

> Your comments on following subjects are therefore requested in order to document apartheid nature of sports in South Africa: (You should indicate what is government policy and what is policy of private organizations. Useful also would be comments on instances where policy and practice differ. On this latter point we are thinking of cases where written regulations might be liberalized for show but watered down in practice.) (1) Training and development facilities including financial assistance, coaching and technical assistance (2) participation in domestic and international events (3) attendance at events including seating and cost of tickets (4) publicity regarding both participation and attendance (5) compensation for amateurs and professionals (6) facilities for athletes at stadiums.64

The government was trying to decipher if South Africa’s policy had changed in any appreciable way. Gathering information regarding the state of sport was an important step in Canada’s reevaluation of its South African sports foreign policy.

A review of the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, and the House of Commons Parliamentary debates reveals that there was no official announcement nor press release regarding a change in Canada’s official South African foreign policy regarding sport. However, Dick Beddoes of the Toronto Star writes that in late 1972 ‘...the director of Sport Canada, Louis E. Lefaive, advised institutions governing amateur sports that “absolutely no federal assistance will be forthcoming for any Canadian athlete contemplating participation ... in any international events hosted by South Africa.”’65

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63 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - December 1, 1972.

64 Ibid.

In a telegram dated February 23, 1973, External Affairs requests additional information surrounding the upcoming South African Games. These Games were instituted after South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympics and were held as an international event. After it was excluded from the Mexico City Olympics, the government compensated its athletes by staging its own national games under the Olympic symbol; whites and black competed at separate games at different venues! The white South African Games were held in 1969 in Bloemfontein and the black Games in 1970 in Soweto.66

1973 would be the first year the Games were held since the implementation of multinational sport. The Canadian government made requests for information surrounding multinational sport, and ‘arrangement for accommodation and changing facilities for participants and seating for spectators.’67

On March 5, 1973, External Affairs received confirmation from their offices in South Africa - participants for the Games included: Rhodesia, Malawi, United States of America, Canada, England, Ireland, Wales, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Holland, Hong Kong, Israel, Australia, and Jersey. According to the telegram:

Canada is entered in skating with 2 skaters and one judge and in mens and womens [sic] bowls with six competitors. Non-white South African teams will be primarily homeland based and not integrated with whites. Difficult to ask about accommodation changing facilities seating etc but Rhodesian contingent for example will be integrated and could not very well be split up. Games are massive propaganda and organizers can be expected to stretch South African policies to limit in order give appearance of maximum integration and equal treatment. ... Agree with you Games are attempt to whitewash apartheid policies as applied to sport. Polices are being stretched however and in case of soccer broken.68

The official word on the ground from Canadian staff in South Africa indicated the Games were not truly multinational. Multinational was a misnomer, as there had been no true change in South Africa’s sporting policy.

68 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - March 5, 1973. Homelands or Bantustans were territories set aside for black South Africans. They were created by the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951 and encompassed only 13% of the land in South Africa.
As of March 6, 1973, Canada’s policy in regards to participation in sporting events in South Africa seems to have remained officially unchanged. In a letter to E.W. Thoms, Executive Director of the Canadian Water Association, R.G. Hatheway, Acting Director, African Affairs Division states ‘Although the Canadian Government takes the view that the ultimate decision regarding participation in South African-hosted sporting activities rests with the individual athletes or sports governing bodies concerned, it does not encourage such participation.’

But, by March 26, 1973 there was a shift. A cable from External Affairs to Accra reveals:

Canadian participation is by individual athletes at least some of whom are sponsored by recognized Canadian sports bodies e.g. Canadian Water Ski Association, Canadian Figure Skating Association and Canadian Squash Racquets Association. At this stage we do not know which of these bodies will be participating in Edmonton Commonwealth Games.

Canadian government quote does not encourage unquote participation in these games. Sports Canada has informed national sports governing bodies quote absolutely no federal assistance will be forthcoming for any Canadian athlete contemplating participation in these games or other international event hosted by South Africa unquote. We have instructed Cape Town not to send any official representatives from embassy or from Canadian Trade Commissioner’s Office to Games.

The shift in policy is clear, Sports Canada decided to cease funding for events being held in South Africa. It is prudent to note that this decision was taken, at some point, in March 1973. A review of the Canadian House of Commons Debates reveals no official policy change in regards to South African sporting contact was announced in Parliament in 1973.

Although the South African government tried to convince the world that the South African Games were integrated, in reality South Africans competed ‘...as for separate “nations”, in the presence of international sportsmen.’ Some Canadians did participate in the South African Games in track and field, figure skating, water skiing,

and lawn bowling.\textsuperscript{73} Through their participation these Canadian athletes disregarded government advice and traveled to South Africa to participate. By doing so, these athletes showed implicit support for sporting contact with South Africa. Following the Games, life went back to normal for black South African athletes. An article in the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} explains:

\begin{quote}
The Black sportsmen who spent two weeks as honoured guests at a Pretoria five-star hotel dare not set foot in the place again, except as menial workers; the Africans among them, in their ordinary lives, will have to produce their passes on demand or court summary arrest. Any Black person who now tries to use a “Whites only” toilet at the Rand Stadium risks a clip on the ear, or worse. Any White and Black sportsmen who set up a friendly games together are likely to have the full rigour of the law used against them.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

After the South African Games, after the international community left the country, black South Africans returned to life under apartheid. And, Dr. Piet Koomhof, Minister of Sport, reiterated South Africa’s sport policy ‘Multiracial sport at any level, but in international competition, and mixed trials were not part of the Government’s plan and would not come at any time in the future.’\textsuperscript{75} Multiracial sport was only permitted in international competitions and mixed trials remained forbidden. James Barber and John Barratt note that ‘the games only served to show the gulf between the Republic and the rest of the sporting world.’\textsuperscript{76}

In a letter from the Canadian Squash Racquets Association (CSRA) to a Canadian citizen, the Association outlined its justification for participation in a 1973 International Squash Federation Tournament being played in South Africa. J.W.S. Chapman writes that CSRA is a founding member of the International Squash Federation (ISF) and, as such, must abide by its rules. In 1971 the ISF passed a resolution that ‘...insofar as South Africa were prepared, as hosts, to accept all entries from all countries and guarantee equal treatment to all competitors, that they would be allowed to host these

\textsuperscript{73} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - March 8, 1973.

\textsuperscript{74} ‘After the Games are Over’, April 9, 1973, \textit{Rand Daily Mail} in \textit{Apartheid Sport}, a publication of SAN-ROC.

\textsuperscript{75} “Surrender in sport a fallacy”, August 25, 1973, \textit{The Star - Johannesburg} in \textit{Apartheid Sport}, a publication of SAN-ROC.

matches.’

The letter goes on to state, as such, the Canadians had entered their team and ‘such an entry is not to be considered as support for South African policies, but rather as support for the International Squash Federation.’ This particular squash tournament touched a nerve with Canadian anti-apartheid activists.

The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal’s African Colonies (TCLPAC), founded in the early 1970s, wrote a letter in June 1973 regarding the upcoming CSRA tour. The letter was addressed to the Chairman of the International Committee of the CSRA and Ritchie, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs:

The Canadian Squash Racquets Association, which last year received about $7,000 in travel grants from Sports Canada, may still send a team to South Africa to play under the official Canadian colours. No one will ask who paid their plane fare. And South Africa will be able to boast of Canada’s participation in Johannesburg. This would frustrate the intent of a good government policy and allow the Association to continue to claim public financial support in the future. ... The Association should decline the invitation to play against a team that practices racial discrimination, before audiences that are racially segregated, and in a country where there are no facilities or opportunities for black players to compete.

Copies of the letter were sent to various associations, including the CLC. Executive Vice President of the CLC, Joe Morris, wrote to Ritchie as well, showing his surprise that the CSRA planned on sending athletes to South Africa:

We hope that this is not true for this would undermine the position that Canada has taken on the question of apartheid and sport at the United Nations. ... In the name of true international sportsmanship, the Canadian Government should urge Canadian squash players to not play in South Africa and if they do that they are not representing Canada in any way, shape or form.

Why this particular event created a stir amongst anti-apartheid groups is unclear. However, it did not go unnoticed by External Affairs. Ritchie responded to Morris stating that it was the policy of the Canadian government:


78 Ibid.


No support of any kind, financial or otherwise, is given to Canadian athletes who accept invitation to take part in sport events in South Africa and this policy has been made known to all Canadian Sports Associations. On the few occasions that Canadian athletes have taken part in sports events in South Africa they have done so as individuals and not as representatives of Canada. ... In this connection, you will have noted that the Canadian Squash Racquets Federation has decided not to participate in the Championships being held in South Africa and this decision was welcomed on July 17th by the Minister of Health and Welfare Canada, the responsible ministry in the Federal Government for international athletic activities.81

On July 18th, the Member of Parliament from New Westminster, Stuart Leggatt, asked Prime Minister Trudeau about this telegram. Trudeau indicated that he would have to make himself aware of the wording of the telegram. Leggatt also asked if the ‘...telegram represents government policy regarding athletic participation in South Africa?’82 No specific answer is provided during this oral question period. It appears that not even members of parliament were aware of changes in Canadian policy surrounding sporting ties with South Africa. And, interestingly, it is noted that the CSRA chose not to participate in South Africa. The role of anti-apartheid campaigning by the CLC and other organisations in this decision remains unclear, but given the visceral, widespread reaction by these groups, it seems they were effective, in the very least, by bringing attention to the CSRA’s plans to compete in South Africa to the Canadian government and the Canadian public.

In March 1974, the President of the YWCA of Canada, F.W.D. Campbell, wrote a letter of protest in regards to Canada’s upcoming participation in the World Trampoline Championships in Johannesburg. According to her information, the government had received many letters of protest in regards to the tour and that ‘...sports federations, including the Canadian Gymnastics Federation, know that they are precluded from using federal government funds to participate in events in South Africa and that if they accept invitations from South Africa, they do so as individuals and not as representatives of Canada.’83 It appears that in regards to its sport policy, the government provided information on an as-needed basis, i.e. in reply to direct questioning.


Also in March 1974, Bruce Kidd, Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto’s School of Physical and Health Education, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of the Canadian Track and Field Association (CTFA), Harry Kerrison. In it he protests the CTFA sending athletes to the South African Games, stating:

...the regime benefits enormously from these Games. The well-publicized “integrated” competitions give the appearance that the Vorster regime is liberalizing its racial policies, thereby strengthening its reapplication for participation in the Olympic Games, which in turn would enhance its image in world markets. South African [sic] depends very much upon trade with the western world, so it must continually strive for public acceptance. We strengthen its campaign when we go along with the charade. As you well know, for these and other reasons, the Canadian Government has ordered all sports governing bodies not to use public funds to send athletes to South Africa.84

Kidd points out that support of South African sporting events is akin to condoning the policies of apartheid. In a return letter, Kerrison explains to Kidd that the board of the CTFA decided:

...that it was not their position or job, or an objective of the CTFA to become involved in politics in any way whatsoever at any level of Government, either National or International. It was further felt that what an athlete did, so long as their actions were within the rules as laid down by the International Amateur Athletic Federation and the Canadian Track and Field Association, was their own business and a matter of personal conscience. ... It should be completely understood, however, that the CTFA does not spend any money or other of its resources in order to facilitate this particular participation, nor does it take any particular stand pro or con...85

Clearly, opinion in Canada was divided on what the ‘right’ thing to do was in regards to Canada’s participation in South African sporting events. Kidd, like most of the anti-apartheid activists, advocated the complete cessation of ties and the isolation of South African sport. However, the CTFA, as a member of the IAAF, was not bound to cut ties with South Africa as it remained a member of the IAAF until 1976.

Files from the External Affairs Department show that in March 1974 a draft letter began circulating that outlined Canada’s position regarding funding for athletic events with South Africa. The letter was sent to various sport governing bodies. A review of one External Affairs file shows that several draft letters and memoranda regarding the


policy were bounced back and forth between External Affairs and Sport Canada. For the first time, the threat of an Afro-Asian boycott of either the Montréal Olympics in 1976 or the Edmonton Commonwealth Games in 1978 became a part of the argument used to cease sporting links with South Africa.

The file reveals a final form letter, indicating ‘signed May 24, 1974’ from Minister for National Health and Welfare, Marc Lalonde. It reiterates the existing Canadian policy that it is up to individual athletes and/or sport governing bodies to decide whether or not to accept invitations to events in South Africa. It goes on to state:

There is another aspect of this matter which must be of concern to the sporting public and the Canadian Government. You may recall the threat of boycott by African and Asian countries to the Christchurch Commonwealth Games over this issue. We think you will agree that we should do what we can to forestall the possibility of boycotts against either the 1976 Olympics or the 1978 Commonwealth Games. ... As you are aware, South Africans are avid sports enthusiasts, and wide coverage is given to sports in the country’s newspapers. Any international competition involving South African athletes is accorded particular attention because it is considered to be a test of the degree to which South Africa’s policies of racial discrimination are accepted by foreign athletes and governments. ... We hope that all the ramifications concerning racial difficulties, as well as the position taken by a number of International Sport Federations concerned, will be taken under consideration by the executive of your sports governing body, and also by the individual athlete invited to compete in South Africa. We can assure you that absolutely no federal assistance will be forthcoming for any Canadian athlete contemplating participation in competitions hosted by South Africa.

Lalonde’s letter was sent to sport governing bodies and federations within Canada, it was a clear reproach and warning from the Canadian government. The success of two huge international sporting events was at stake if other countries began to see Canada as a complicit partner in apartheid because of its continuing sports contact. As early as 1974, Canada elucidated its fears regarding a boycott of the two major sporting events being held within its borders between 1976 and 1978; Canada took pro-active steps in an effort to avoid any boycott threats.

A memo from External Affairs dated June 1975, reminds the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the policy was to provide no federal funding for participation in

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events in South Africa and that ‘current policy, however, only seeks to “discourage” the reciprocal travel of South Africans to compete in Canada, without making specific means of discouragement.’\textsuperscript{88} While focusing on Canada’s participation in South Africa, funding for events with participation from South African nationals in sporting events hosted by Canada were not addressed. This policy of discouragement remained unchanged and appeared to be a major loop-hole which could cause problems for Canada as the date of the Olympic Games quickly approached.

To rectify the situation, an amendment to official policy was deemed necessary. According to the writer of the memo, H.B.R., presumably H. Basil Robinson the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, officials of both his department and the Ministry of National Health and Welfare:

...now believe some modification of policy is required, because various Canadian sports bodies have continued to issue invitations to South African teams to compete in Canada. The invitations have repeatedly caused the Government considerable embarrassment, since they run counter to the position which we have taken in every international forum against the South African policy of apartheid in general and its application to sports in particular. In addition, as long as we do not actively discourage participation by South Africans athletes in events hosted in Canada, we may be viewed by other countries, particularly by African countries, as failing to live up to the spirit of decisions taken by most international sports bodies, including the International Olympic Committee itself, to bar South African teams from participation in events under their respective jurisdiction. The creation of such an impression by the Canadian Government would not enhance our relations with African states, and could lead to the belief that we are supporting attempts by the South Africans to regain respectability in international sports while South Africa continues to practise those policies of apartheid which make them ineligible to compete in, for example, the Olympics.\textsuperscript{89}

Robertson encourages the Secretary of State for External Affairs to sign a letter to the Minister of National Health and Welfare indicating that he approves of the proposed changes in policy. The change in policy prevented the use of federal funds for upcoming, scheduled events in Canada which included South African participants.

By 1975, Canada managed to amend its policies surrounding the Canadian-South African sporting relationship. On the eve of the 1976 Olympics, Canada was standing

\textsuperscript{88} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.2 - June 16, 1975.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
its ground against apartheid in sport. Clearly, the main reason for the change in policy was the prevention of an African led boycott of the upcoming Olympics and Commonwealth Games. External Affairs hoped to avoid contact between Canada and South Africa on Canadian soil by withholding funds for events held in Canada that included participants from the apartheid state. At this juncture, monetary disincentives and moral condemnation were still Canada’s main tools in discouraging sports contact between South Africa and Canada.
CHAPTER 5: Preparations for 1976


By 1975 the Canadian government had taken a stand against maintaining sporting links with South Africa. Although Canada maintained trade and economic ties with the racist regime, the Canadian government continually professed to abhor apartheid and pushed Canadian athletes to not participate in events taking place within the republic. The federal government did not enforce a mandatory cessation of sporting contact, but instead chose to withhold moral and financial support. The government would not provide funding to athletes or teams who travelled to South Africa to participate in sporting tournaments, and they would not provide funding to tournaments, held in Canada, in which South African athletes were invited and/or participated. The changes to Canada’s South African sports policies were made quietly, a simple announcement via letter was sent to Canadian sporting bodies from Marc Lalonde, Minister of National Health and Welfare.

In the run up to the 1976 Olympics, the boycott and call for sanctions against South African sporting contact increased and became one of the main foci of the worldwide anti-apartheid movement. Pressure began to mount on international sports federations, governments, athletes, and teams to cut ties with South Africa. In March 1973, 11 representatives from non-racial sports associations within South Africa met in Durban and formed the South African Council on Sport (SACOS) - an important move because SACOS was formed to apply pressure from within South Africa.¹ They became an important lobby against South Africa’s readmission into international sporting circles. Their main goal was an end to apartheid in sport as ‘this was the only way to guarantee equal access for all individual South Africans to sports facilities and training opportunities, selection for national teams on the basis of merit as determined by mixed trials, opportunities for high level sports administration and coaching, as well as the chance to witness all sports events as part of an integrated audience.’² Hassan Howa of SACOS coined the phrase “No normal sport in an abnormal society”, which, by the


late 1970s, became a common declaration used by anti-apartheid groups. As groups within South Africa began to increase pressure on the government, the movement was gaining momentum internationally with the boycott of high profile events and increased pressure by advocacy groups.

On March 21, 1975, Eric Morse of the External Affairs Department sent a cable to the Canadian foreign office in Pretoria regarding invitations to pre-Olympic events being held in Canada. External Affairs was concerned about South African athletes being invited to such events. According to the cable, the department was trying to secure lists of potential invitees. Morse noted: ‘Federations are not required to invite all members to pre-Olympic competitions, and certainly there is no reason to invite South Africa, which is not members [sic] of Olympic movement itself.’ South Africa was still a member of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and, theoretically, their athletes could have been invited to the athletic event being held in Québec as the event in question was to be held by the Federation de l’Athlétisme du Québec, a branch of the Canadian Track and Field Association (CTFA). However, Morse felt an invitation would have been unnecessary as the event was an official pre-Olympic competition and South Africa was no longer a member of the Olympic movement. Two days previous to this correspondence with Canada’s office in Pretoria, the matter had been queried by Otto Jelinek, Member of the House of Commons. Jelinek felt that there was a serious misunderstanding and controversy. He indicated that the invitations were extended to South Africa and then retracted. According to the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp:

I am informed that an essentially private letter of inquiry was sent to the South African Track and Field Federation but that no formal invitation has been extended inviting them to compete in the pre-Olympics competitions. The letter referred to was apparently sent by the Québec Athletic Federation in the name of the Canadian Track and Field Association to all member of the International Amateur Athletic Federation.

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After a meeting with the CTFA, Morse notes, representatives of Sport Canada felt assured that South Africa would not be invited to the event; writing that the invite to the South African team was sent in error as South Africa was only allowed to enter individual athletes and were forbidden to enter teams under IAAF regulations.6

The SCSA paid increasing attention to even the smallest of sports events involving South Africa. The Canadian embassy in Lagos sent a telegram to External Affairs in Ottawa on June 20, 1975 to inform the government that the SCSA’s President, Abraham Ordia, had contacted the embassy over the fact that the President of the International Federation of Body Builders, a Canadian citizen, had organised a world championship competition to be held in South Africa.7 Ordia indicates that he received many protests from Africa, Europe and the USA and, more importantly, the staging of such an event under the Canadian President, Ben Weider, ‘could prejudice African participation in the Olympics.’8 The Olympic boycott threat was plausible, considering the SCSA’s strict stance on discouraging sporting contacts with the apartheid state and their desire to completely isolate South African sport. Even sporting contact which seemed innocuous and insignificant was noted by the SCSA; they were vigilant about monitoring all of South Africa’s contact with international sport. The SCSA felt that even the smallest sports contact helped give international legitimacy to the apartheid regime.

In July 1975, African sports groups, including the SCSA and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), ‘called for boycotts and protests in an attempt to renew support for the expulsion of South Africans for international tennis competitions.’9 With India’s refusal to play against South Africa in the Davis Cup final in 1974 there was increased pressure on the International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF) to suspend or expel South Africa from international tennis. But, the ILTF remained firm in its continued support of South African participation in international tennis.

The Canadian government, however, in August 1975, began to waiver in regards to tennis and the government’s recently established anti-apartheid sports policy. An article

6 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.2 - March 21, 1975. Note: Up to 1976, South African athletes could participate in international track and field events as individual athletes, but not as a team officially representing South Africa.

7 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - June 20, 1975.

8 Ibid.

in the *Globe and Mail* reports that a South African tennis player named Lurjan Sosnoswki travelled to New York, paying his own way, and then travelled to Ottawa with the support of a soft drink company that was sponsoring a junior tennis event in the Canadian city.\(^\text{10}\) Although not formally invited to the event, Barbara Knapp, the tournament chairman, indicated that Sosnoswki would be included in the draw for the event as long as the government assured the Canadian Lawn Tennis Association (CLTA) that it was not breaking any rules. And that the government did. Dr. Tom Bedecki, Director of Sport Canada, indicated that the tournament was not directly supported by Ottawa. Although not receiving direct funding, there was some funding provided for junior team coaching clinics for the closed junior championship that was being held. According to Bedecki, the government “[could [cut funding] but we’re not going to go that far.”\(^\text{11}\) This tournament received both indirect financial funds from the federal government and indirect moral support, despite the fact that Canadian policy explicitly forbid any type of government funding and government moral support for events involving South African athletes.

At the beginning of July 1975, Don Farquharson, President of the Canadian Masters Association (CMA) and organiser of an upcoming track event in Toronto, asked the government to clarify its position around government funding and invitations to athletes from Southern Africa.\(^\text{12}\) An official at the Department of Health and Welfare told Farquharson that if athletes from South Africa take part in the event then federal support would be withdrawn.\(^\text{13}\) On August 9, 1975, the CTFA decided not to let the athletes from South Africa compete due to the Canadian government’s threat of withholding funds. ‘An aide to Health Minister Marc Lalonde was quoted as saying Ottawa “will not support apartheid morally or financially” and will cut off all financial aid to any Canadian event that invites teams from South Africa.’\(^\text{14}\)

However, on August 12, the 11 member delegation hosting the Masters tournament decided in a vote of 6-5 to allow the 13 South African and two Rhodesian athletes to

\(^{10}\) ‘Tourney not on Ottawa dole, so CLTA won’t be reprimanded’, *Globe and Mail*, August 21, 1975, p. 41.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) A track meet for athletes over 40 years old.

\(^{13}\) Arlie Keller. ‘Over 1,500 expected for Masters track’, *Toronto Star*, July 1, 1975, p. B05.

\(^{14}\) ‘South African ban could bankrupt track meeting’, *Toronto Star*, August 9, 1975, p. A06.
compete. The federal government indicated that they would not pay the $30,000 grant, however, organisers claimed that they had already received $24,000. Upon learning of the vote, the Yugoslavian team pulled out to the tournament in protest of the participation of the South African and Rhodesian athletes. The track meet went ahead, with approximately 20 people protesting the inclusion of South African and Rhodesian athletes. According to the Toronto Star, “The group of Protestant churchmen and supporters have asked the federal government to bar these athletes from the meet.” And, Peter Bunting, Chairman of Canadians Concerned about Southern African (CCSA), wrote to the Globe and Mail regarding the CCSA’s participation in the protests; he indicated that the protests also included representatives from: Canadian Council of Churches, OXFAM Canada, Development Education Centre, Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC), and the African National Congress (ANC). They were protesting because:

The fact is that multiracial teams based on merit alone are not found in South Africa, and it is the apartheid regime which introduced politics into sport in that country. Second, the South African athletes present at the meet asked for “a little time” before changes occur in that country. The present Government has had 27 years to bring about change. “Western civilisation” has been in South Africa for 300 years. Apartheid is still the dominant policy there. How much time will they need?  

Barely active in the anti-apartheid sports movement, Canadian anti-apartheid activists came out to the Etobicoke event to voice their disagreement with the organisers’ decision to allow the South African and Rhodesian athletes to compete. Although the threat was small, this example shows that some anti-apartheid activists were aware of Canada’s sports contact with South Africa and took the opportunity to protest this contact, however small the opportunity.

In August, Paul Woodstock, Assistant Deputy Minister, Fitness and Amateur Sport, followed up on a phone conversation with Don Farquharson. He confirmed, via telex, that the Canadian government does not support, morally or financially, events with

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15 There are differing accounts of exactly how much funding was 1. given to the CMA for the event by the federal government and 2. how much of that money was spent by the CMA.


18 Peter Bunting. Letters to the Editor, Globe and Mail, August 21, 1975, p. 6.
South African participants and that if the CMA did not comply with the government’s policy, he would have to refund the financial contributions provided by the Fitness and Amateur Sport Branch. On August 19, 1975 J.J. Taylor the British High Commission in Ottawa wrote to the Rhodesia Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to update the British government on the situation surrounding the Masters event. Of the event, Taylor wrote:

> Despite CMA claims to the contrary, I am told by the Department of External Affairs (DEA) that the Federal Government made clear their opposition to South African and Rhodesian participation early this year. ... Pressure from the other participants forced the CMA to ignore the Federal Government’s threat. The South Africans competed. Now the Government is demanding its money back and despite publicised offers from South African businessmen and the US team to make good the money, the CMA are not sure that they can produce the $32,000 which has already been spent. Media handling of the whole affair has not shown the Government in a favourable light despite their “liberal” stance. They have, however, been inundated with congratulations from church organizations and anti-South Africa pressure groups throughout Canada. Overall the DEA consider they could not have benefitted more had they engineered the accident themselves.

In the brief, Canada was portrayed as pleased with the fact that they were hard on apartheid sport, an important position to take in the run-up to the Olympics. The CMA event was the first event in Canada for which the federal government came out in very vocal opposition to South African participation in a Canadian sports events; opposition based on its new guidelines governing Canada-South Africa sporting relations.

The federal government, following its policy of no moral or monetary support of events where South African athletes were participating, asked the CMA to return the funds that were already distributed. Farquharson indicated that he felt that the CMA was not morally or legally obligated to repay the money because the government had taken too much time to officially notify the organisers of its decision to withhold funds if the South Africans participated in the event. By the time the CMA had received the decision the athletes were en route to Canada: ‘Farquharson said the CMA’s final decision was not based on politics but “on fairness to the South Africans who had already arrived here.”

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19 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.2 - August 1, 1975.

Therefore, he says, he is not morally responsible to refund the money.\textsuperscript{21} However, according to Bruce Kidd, the CMA did return the money to the federal government.\textsuperscript{22}

At the end of 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed another resolution on apartheid in sport. Resolution 3411 E (XXX) reinforced the previous 1971 resolution. The new resolution called on government and organisations to refrain from contact with apartheid sport bodies and racially selected teams from South Africa. It also called for countries to exert their influence to ensure implementation of the Olympic principles, especially by sport bodies which continued to have contact with apartheid sport.\textsuperscript{23}

The World Softball Championship, being held in New Zealand in January 1976, became a major catalyst in the SCSA’s call for an Olympic boycott. In January 1976 Ordia claimed that ‘if South Africa was allowed to compete in the world softball championships, African countries reserved the right to boycott any sporting event in which New Zealand participated....’\textsuperscript{24} As 1976 wore on, the SCSA and other international organisations would increasingly back the call for a boycott and as the year progressed they solidified their position through resolutions and active media engagement.

Trevor Richards of Halt All Racist Tours (HART) in New Zealand sent a telegram to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in regards to the upcoming World Softball Championships being held in New Zealand. HART had ‘launched a campaign to “write the tour off”’ and was urging people to write to the New Zealand government, newspapers, and heads of governments of countries which planned on sending a team to participate.\textsuperscript{25} In his telegram Richards stated:

Many New Zealand organisations and scores of prominent citizens have signed a personal appeal to you to take all possible measure to ensure Team Canada withdraws from World Softball Championships being held in

\textsuperscript{21} Lawrence Martin. ‘Track official not prepared to repay Government grant’, \textit{Globe and Mail}, August 21, 1975, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{22} Author’s correspondence with Bruce Kidd, December 15, 2010.


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p. 136.
New Zealand this month unless racially selected South African apartheid team withdraws. Mr Ordia of Supreme Council of African Sport has strongly condemned South African participation and those countries which are continuing plans to participate and play South Africa. Ordia says an insult to Africa and slap in the face to the Third World. Wide international attention now focusing on this tournament and those who compete. Anti-apartheid movement here along with many others determined to protest against all apartheid loving competing teams and to publicise throughout the world our disgust at this consorting with apartheid.26

Richards appeals to Trudeau to stop the Canadian team from participating in the event. Ivan Head, Trudeau’s personal foreign policy advisor, indicated that copies of the telegram should be sent to Marc Lalonde, Minister of Health and Welfare, and Allan MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs and that Richards should be given a simple acknowledgment. Head also wanted to confirm if the Canadian team was being subsidised with funds from the federal government and if Canadian rules about sponsoring athletic events in Canada extended equally to Canadian teams participating in such events with South Africans abroad (i.e. not in South Africa, but in a third party country).27 Since Canada had limited sport contact with South Africa, smaller, less popular international sporting events became the focus of anti-apartheid groups. As Canada and South Africa did not play many of the same sports, events like world softball championships, trampoline events, and squash tournaments became anti-apartheid fodder as advocates tried to engage Canadians in the movement to isolate South African sport.

On April 14, 1976, the Canadian consulate in Lagos sent a message to Ottawa regarding a press release from the Lagos Daily Times by Ordia, who was both the President SCSA and Chairman of the Nigerian Olympic Committee. In it

Canada is described as having had quote excellent record over years of refusal to participate in apartheid sport. Of late however she appears to be departing from this principle unquote. Specific mention is made of Canadian participation in recent world softball championships after having ignored all appeals to withdraw.

Press release concludes with advise that quote if Canada wants to restore the confidence of her numerous friends she must do the following (a) not admit racist South African sports teams to her country (b) not to permit Canadian sports teams to participate in racist South Africa (c) not to permit


Canadian sports teams to participate in any competitions/championships/games anywhere if racist South Africa is also participating in them (d) not to admit South Africa to participate in World Youth Sailing Championships due to be held in Canada in July 1976 [sic] (e) close down the infamous centre - South African Hospitality and Friendship Centre - being mounted by South Africa in Montréal, venue of the 1976 Olympic Games.28

Canada is indirectly threatened by Ordia. The remainder of this telegram has been excluded from an Access to Information request on the file. This leads to the question, what information was provided by the office in Lagos? Canada had implemented many of the demands listed in the press release. However, due to the upcoming Olympic Games the country was scrutinised by Ordia and his press release was a clear message to Canada - they must sever all sporting ties with apartheid South Africa.

Canadian policy regarding participation in sporting events with South Africa remained difficult to understand for the Canadian public, Canadian sports organisations, and even for members of the Canadian government. A clear cut, defined, publicly stated, widespread statement with consistent application would have gone a long way in reducing confusion and frustration. However, the Canadian government remained inconsistent and unclear on exactly what was allowed and was was not allowed.

**The Toronto Paralympiad Controversy**
Understandably, in the run up to the 1976 Montréal Olympics, the federal government became increasingly conscious of international public opinion. In an attempt to minimize the politicisation of the forthcoming Olympics, in 1975, the government undertook a review of possible political interference based on previous Olympic situations, which included: nations boosting prestige through spectacular performances, national rivalries being carried into events; threat of a boycott of the Games over the racially discriminatory policy of Rhodesia and South Africa, and domestic politics.29 In being prepared and armed with information, the government hoped to avoid any political problems which had plagued previous Olympics.

Yet, it proved impossible to avoid the politicisation of the Olympics. The first major problem the government encountered surrounded the Olympiad for the Physically

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29 Sport Canada Fonds. RG29, Volume 3234, File 7070-6, Part 5 - August 14, 1975.
Disabled, being held in Etobicoke in August 1976, less than two weeks after the closing of the Olympics. 30 As early as September 1974, Dr. Robert Jackson, Chairman of the Olympiad for the Disabled asked Minister of Health and Welfare, Lalonde, to clarify how Canada’s new policy regarding not funding travel for Canadian athletes to South Africa would affect South African participation in Canadian events. Lalonde responded on November 21, 1974 that 'because the presence of a South African team could have embarrassing repercussions for the Olympiad, he strongly suggested that the South Africans not be invited.' 31 At this point, Lalonde discouraged the Paralympiad in its desire to invite the South African team to the competition. Lalonde’s response was consistent with the government’s policy of that time - no moral support for events with South African participants being held in Canada.

In July 1975, ‘in order to bring about greater consistency in the policy on sporting contacts with South Africa, the Government formally took the position that it could not fund events in Canada to which South African participants were invited.’ 32 By the fall of 1975, Lalonde informed Canadian sports federations of the government’s new policy. Jackson wrote to Canadian officials to try and convince them that the disabled team from South Africa should be exempt from the new policy as the South Africans were sending a truly integrated team, picked on the basis of mixed trials.

According to a confidential memorandum, dated December 18, 1975, following an earlier meeting between Olympiad organisers and Lalonde on December 8, and organisers and Sport Canada on December 10, the Canadian government reiterated its current policy. 33 As per the memorandum, the Olympiad was due to receive a $500,000 federal grant, which was contingent upon the Olympiad conforming to the government’s new rules and regulations in regards to its policy on apartheid in sport.

Whereas formerly the Government merely indicated to Canadian groups that it would discourage them from inviting South African athletes to events in Canada, present policy specifies that if South Africans are invited to participate in a sporting event in Canada which is receiving Federal

30 Also known as the Toronto Paralympiad, Torontolympiad; also referred to as the Olympiad of the Paralysed.


32 Ibid.

financial support, the Canadian organizers shall forfeit all such funding, and shall be required to reimburse the Federal Government any such funds which may have already been paid out. This policy was enunciated by the Honourable Marc Lalonde, Minister responsible for sport, in a letter dated October 3, 1975 to all sport bodies.  

For more than a year up to December 1975, the government and the organisers for the Disabled Olympiad were corresponding around South African participation. At first, the Canadian government discouraged South African participation. Jackson ignored governmental warnings and extended an invitation to the South African team in July 1975. On December 18, 1975 the *Toronto Star* reported that the Etobicoke Parks Commissioner, Tom Riley, was waiting to hear from the government on whether or not the South African team would be allowed to participate in the 1976 Olympiad, 'since the country does not practice apartheid in sports for the handicapped' and had promised to have mixed trials and teams. Riley confirmed that invitations had been issued to countries belonging to the International Society of the Disabled, of which, South Africa remained a member in good standing.

In 1975, the British government investigated claims made by the President of the International Stoke Mandeville Games Federation, the organisation responsible for the Olympics of the Paralysed. According to the President, Sir Ludwig Guttmann, in a letter to Prime Minister Harold Wilson:

> I have received a message from the Chairman of the South African Sports Association for Paraplegics and other Physically Disabled that the South African Government has agreed that an official multiracial team of paralysed athletes will come to the 1975 International Stoke Mandeville Games (the Olympics of the Paralysed) next July.  

Guttmann’s letter prompted the Prime Minister’s office to confirm with foreign officials in Cape Town as to whether the information being provided was accurate. As per the cable response, the information provided by Guttmann was correct:

34 Ibid.


37 NA/FCO 45/1810 - December 18, 1974.
The Chairman and other officials of the South African Association for Paraplegics have told us that the government have agreed to the despatch of a single “multinational” team. ... If this is correct, it will be to the best of our knowledge be [sic] the first occasion on which a mixed team has represented South Africa in a team as opposed to individual sport. The government designation of the team as “multinational” would be to give the appearance of conformity with nationalist ideology. I cannot guarantee that the selection will go as planned, but we shall watch developments carefully. Meanwhile I hope that there will be no obstacles being put in the team’s way. This would create a deplorable impression here and would discourage other South African sporting bodies who have been pressing the government to agree to mixed trials.  

The British government allowed the mixed South African team to travel to England to participate in the 1975 Olympics of the Paralysed. By doing this, the British set a precedent surrounding disabled sport and South African participation. The South African team remained a member of the Stoke Mandeville Games Federation and of the International Sports Organization for Disabled (ISOD).

The Canadian government, however, did not accept the integrated team from South Africa at face value. After its change in policy, in the summer of 1975, the Canadian government threatened to withhold the promised grant of $500,000 if the Olympiad allowed South African athletes to participate. In December 1975, Jackson wrote to the federal government requesting that special consideration be made for the disabled athletes of what he believed was a truly legitimate, integrated team, but also pointed out:

The Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympiad for the Physically Disabled has been clearly informed of the government’s posture regarding its inability to financially or morally support any endeavour that involves South African participation. We accept this position and understand the reasons for adopting such a posture. We have consequently informed the leaders of the handicapped sportsmen and women of South Africa that they will not be able to participate in the Olympiad in Toronto.

While admitting that the organising committee accepted the government’s policy, Jackson also requested that an exemption be made for the South African team. He continued to fight for both the participation of the South African team in the Paralympiad and for the government’s moral and financial support.

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38 NA/FCO 45/1810 - January 22, 1975.
Allan MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote to Jackson in January 1976 in response to Jackson’s request that the government make an exemption for the mixed South African team of disabled athletes. MacEachen states:

I and the Government have reviewed on a continuing basis reports from our mission in South Africa on the practice of apartheid as applied to sport, as a result of which Canada co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly last November condemning the South African Government for its policies in this area. ... I do not believe that circumstances in South Africa have changed materially since that resolution was adopted, whatever modifications the South African Government may permit in any particular case.  

Most importantly, MacEachen notes in his letter that, based on the additional information provided by Jackson to External Affairs for review, ‘...I do not believe that Cabinet needs to re-open the issue at this time. Mr. Lalonde shares that view.’ Two senior Cabinet ministers decided there is no need for Cabinet to discuss the Paralympiad issue. They were confident that their policies were accurate and being applied appropriately. This harks back to the Pearson days, where ministers were responsible for making the decisions that affected their portfolio. Through MacEachen and Lalonde, the government stood firm in its stance that it would not provide any financial assistance to the Olympiad if South African athletes were invited and participated.

By March 1976, the Paralympiad was picked up in the newspapers. On March 1, the Globe and Mail reported that the organising committee dropped the South African team from the Games because the federal government informed them that the $500,000 grant would be withdrawn if the team participated. The organising committee was also worried they would lose matching grants from the Ontario provincial government and the Toronto municipal government if the feds withdrew its funding. And, on March 2 the Toronto Star reported, in an article entitled ‘Apartheid brings ban on crippled athletes’, that the Torontolypiad for the Physically Disabled organisers would not risk losing the $500,000, but would continue to try and change Ottawa’s mind. Major

41 Ibid.
papers picked up the story and ran with it. The language used by the press biased
readers towards the plight of the Paralympiad Committee; the press took up the
Committee’s cause, keeping the story alive for a significant amount of time. They
began to report on every detail of events and how they unfolded in regards to the
$500,000 and the participation of South African athletes.

So, with the situation prominent in major Canadian daily newspapers, the government
began to fight the tide of public opinion. Canadians wrote in to papers and, for the most
part, admonished the government for its policy. Mrs. B.E. Munro, a volunteer worker
with the Olympiad and someone who attended the Games in England in 1975, said she
was dismayed by the federal government’s threat to withdraw financial support: ‘The
verifiable fact is that, in disabled sport, South Africa has broken the apartheid barrier.’
Eileen Charters wrote that barring the South African team was senseless and shameful
and pointed out that in 1973 the South African Sports Association for Paraplegic and
Other Physically Disabled abolished apartheid in their organisation. In April, Dickson
Russell, a Toronto resident, wrote a letter in support of the federal government. He
stated that the decision to bar the integrated team was neither senseless nor shameful,
‘rather, it is part of the continuing effort to demonstrate to the government of South
Africa our abhorrence of apartheid. ... By ignoring them completely, we may one day
bring bigots of South Africa to their senses. They may learn that all men are equal.’

Public opinion was divided, but most individuals seemed to support the Paralympiad
and its efforts to ensure the Canadian government provide its $500,000 grant and allow
the South African team to participate in the Games. Despite domestic public pressure
to let South Africa participate in the Games, Canada stood firm in its decision not to
provide funds to the Paralympiad should South Africa participate. The international
consequences of South African participation far out-weighed the domestic backlash.
Canada repeatedly stated that the country deplored apartheid and ensured that their
policy in regards to South African sport was strictly applied. The Trudeau government
wanted to increase Canada’s positive international reputation - they could not allow the
Olympics to fail and ensuring that their anti-apartheid sports policies were followed was
an important part in preventing failure.

Nora McCabe of the *Globe and Mail* wrote that the government continued to promote economic trade with South Africa, stating ‘The Government tells Canadian athletes and organizations it will not finance them if they invite South Africans, while it allowed Canadian businessmen to import around $180-million in South African goods last year, mainly wines and sugar.’ McCabe pointed out that this stance was hypocritical. She advocated for the acceptance of South African participation and indicated that the Canadian organisers invited the team because they remained an active, valid member of the Stoke Mandeville Games Federation.

Sport Ontario chairman, Dr. Philip Jones, was featured in a *Toronto Star* article indicating that he and the board of Sport Ontario deplored the actions of the federal government. He also wrote to Trudeau:

> We believe a policy which discriminates against an integrated South African team conveys exactly the opposite impression to the intended viz. that all men are equal. ... Surely no-one believes that handicapped Olympic athletes in South Africa can use this cancellation to bring meaningful pressure on their Central Government. In fact, it seems to us that support of a team which follows Canadian policy strengthens rather than prejudices Canada’s international position in this matter.

In response to Jones, Trudeau explained that he understood the South African team was integrated and that this was a departure from the norm. But, he also pointed out ‘...that the South African Minister of Sport has assured the South African Parliament that his acceptance, on a selective basis, of an integrated athletic team is not intended to foreshadow any alteration in the basic principle or practice of apartheid in South Africa.’ The government defended its decision and stood firm in its belief that, although this team of athletes appeared integrated, it was an exception to apartheid laws and the South African government had no intention of altering those laws.

The Canadian Orthopaedic Association wrote to Lalonde in April 1976 condemning the government for its stand:

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48 ‘Sport Ontario boss protests to Trudeau for $500,000 holdup’, *Toronto Star*, March 26, 1976, p. C01.


In our view it would be consistent with the United Nations resolution, passed in November, 1975 and co-sponsored by Canada, if the Canadian Government were to commend the efforts of sports groups in South Africa who have made significant moves towards the elimination of apartheid. In particular, we feel that denying this group of disabled sportsmen the opportunity to compete, is morally unjust from a humanitarian viewpoint, and would adversely affect rehabilitation efforts not only in South Africa but in other parts of the world. There is no doubt that sports have contributed significantly in helping the disabled members of our population regain self-respect and self-confidence, and to become contributing citizens in our society.  

Many letters of protest were received by the Canadian government, and kept on file by Sport Canada. Leslie B Sehume, the Secretary General of the Committee for Fairness in Sport, wrote in April 1976: ‘Present day international trends to boycott, suspend and even expel South African sportsmen are clearly directed against the Government of the Republic of South Africa of which the Sportsmen are not a part of. This, clearly, is not fair play and certainly, is not in accord with the principles of natural justice.’  

Strong words were also submitted by Dr. Robert McCormack, Assistant Professor at the University of Winnipeg’s History Department:

Firstly, I cannot accept the notion that Government support for this sporting event constitutes implicit support for South Africa’s racial policies. Secondly, the South African team is a racially mixed team, a reflection of the South African Association’s (for Paraplegics and Disabled) policy since 1974. In effect, I could possibly have sympathized with your attitude two years ago, but not now. Thirdly, I and many other Canadians see the Government position and threat as a blatant attack upon the disabled, not upon apartheid. And, considering that (a) Canada recognizes South Africa diplomatically, and (b) continues to have extensive commercial and investment relations with the Republic, I find that the pettiness of your expressed threat to the organizers of the Olympiad to be incredibly hypocritical. 

Canadians had deep and solid opinions about the disabled Olympiad. They felt that the Canadian government was in jeopard of marginalising the disabled community. The Canadian public were vocal in their backlash of the government, much more vocal than they were, generally, around any anti-apartheid topics.

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52 Sport Canada Fonds. RG29, Volume 3239, File 7122/W561-5(1) - April 7, 1976.

International organisations did provide some support to the Canadian government. Peter Bunting of the CCSA wrote in to urge the government to maintain its stand and further extend the boycott to cultural activities, while Sam Ramsamy of SAN-ROC also wrote a letter of support, but also voiced concern that the disabled sport association in South Africa seemed sure that they would be able to participate in the Games in Canada. The limited support the government did receive was important, as it came from groups that supported the isolation of South Africa in international sport.

With the public push-back around the Olympiad for the Physically Disabled, the government became more consistent in its messaging and the application of its anti-apartheid sport policies. Although public opinion, for the most part, was against the government within Canada, a strong stance against apartheid sport was important in the months before the Montréal Olympics in order to avoid possible negative repercussions from African countries. This consistency in messaging was key; there could be no ambiguity in messaging and application of the policy by the government. The OAU was watching Canada and other Commonwealth countries closely in the run-up to the Olympics. Canada had developed and tweaked its new policies in regards to apartheid sport, it was now important for the government to give voice to this policy by reiterating it publicly, in newspapers and press, and in formal and informal correspondence. The Olympics are a major international event and host nations are often thrown into the spotlight in the years preceding the Games. It was imperative that Canada portray itself as a strong multiracial nation which was hard on apartheid in order to avoid the embarrassment of an unsuccessful Games due to a boycott.

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CHAPTER 6: The Montréal Olympics

Planning Disaster
It is widely believed that when Montréal was granted the Olympics in 1970, they were the winning bid for one, unique reason - they proposed that they would be completely self-fund Games; the first in IOC history. However, Kay Schiller and Christopher Young have pointed out that Montréal may have been awarded the Games for another reason - both Moscow and Los Angeles were also vying to host the 1976 Games. In the height of the Cold War, the decision to appoint the Games to either country would have been contentious and ‘In the end, either neutralized by the worldwide campaigning of the super powers or shying away from an awkward decision, the IOC opted for the compromise candidate, Montréal, a city few had given any chance before the vote.’¹ In the end, it was probably a combination of the two which led to the Montréal choice - the desire to avoid choosing between the main Cold War players and Montréal’s promise to have a modest Games that would take the Olympic Movement away from the flash, expensive Games which had been held in recent years. The man behind the Olympic bid, Montréal Mayor Jean Drapeau, had promised a modest Games. He noted that the Games would not require federal funding, apart from existing federal programs, such as those that provided funding for low-rental housing which could be used in the Olympic Village.² His estimated budget for the Games was $310 million. As the successful mastermind behind Montréal’s Expo 67, there was great confidence in Drapeau’s ability to plan large, international events. Trudeau assured the House of Commons that the federal government would not be paying for the Olympics. But, the Treasury Board, responsible for the federal budget, did offer assistance through existing programs for things like security, customs, immigration, broadcasting through the CBC, and Olympic Village construction through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation.³ The federal government also approved self-financing revenue-generators

¹ Kay Schiller and Christopher Young. The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), p. 182.


for - a lottery, minted coins and Canadian stamps. In December 1974, when questioned by Member of Parliament, Otto Jelinek, whether or not the federal government would step in to ensure taxpayers would not have to bear any extra burden due to the increasing costs of the Olympics, President of the Treasury Board, Jean Chrétien, replied ‘The agreement concluded with the City of Montréal and the Québec government is quite clear. We are helping them collect as much funds as possible through the lottery, stamps and other available means, but we do not intend to make up any deficit.’

Trudeau and high level federal government officials distanced themselves from the Games. Trudeau did not want to be seen as favouring the Montréal Olympics and providing federal funding to a Games being hosted in his home province of Québec. Due to the struggles between English and French Canada during the 1970s, it was imperative that he was not portrayed as biased towards either side.

It was obvious, as the building and preparation for the Games progressed, that Drapeau and the Organising Committee were in over their heads. The revenue being generated by commemorative Olympic stamps and coins, along with the Olympic lottery, could not cover the increasing costs due to Drapeau’s mismanagement of resources and his poor decisions in contracting builders, architects, etc. The Commissioner General of the 1976 Olympic Games, Rogers Rousseau, assured Canadians that the Games would cost only as much as they would bring in. There were real fears that Montréal would not be ready for the Games and they would have to be cancelled. By 1975, the provincial government of Bourassa was bailing out Montréal’s Organising Committee and the province took over the completion of construction. The Games, which were supposed to be the most economically austere Games to date, became the victim of out-of-control spending and poor planning. In the end, however, the city was ready to host the Olympics.

**The Politicisation of the Olympic Movement**

By 1976, the boycott threat was a well-used tactic of African nations. As mentioned above, they had previously threatened to boycott the 1968 Mexico Olympics along with

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the 1970 and 1974 Commonwealth Games. Yet, overall, the Olympics had become politically charged events. In 1968, dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, the assassination of Robert Kennedy and unhappiness with academic bureaucracy led to increased student protests in many countries. Ten days before the beginning of the Olympic Games in Mexico City, the Tlatelolco Massacre occurred. Students protesting at the Plaza of Three Cultures were fired upon by the army. More than 40 people were killed; the Olympics went ahead as planned. And, during these Olympics, American sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos, winners of the gold and bronze medals, gave the black power salute during the playing of the Star Spangled Banner. As the 1960s ended, the idea of using the spotlight of the preparing for the Olympic Games and the actual Games as a political tool was increasing. According to Schiller and Young, the Olympics are an opportunity to express social changes and political discourse: ‘In addition to their long gestation and the epiphany of the event itself, they generate concrete and emotional legacies, and in time become subject to memorialization of another age’s making.’

The Munich Games of 1972 were not immune to the sport-politics clash. African nations, having succeeded in solidifying South Africa’s removal from the Olympic Movement, set their sites on the other racist regime on that continent - Rhodesia. An IOC investigation found that Rhodesia did not have separate clubs for whites, no special facilities or separate championships, but the SCSA’s main concern was not sport but the white minority government of Ian Smith. Members of the SCSA threatened to boycott the Games should Rhodesia participate which led to an IOC resolution being passed to suspend Rhodesia. To add to the politicisation of Munich, on September 5, during the Games, 11 Israeli athletes and coaches were taken hostage by eight Palestinian members of the Black September group. The group were demanding the release of Palestinians being held in Israeli jails. The event ended in disaster, with a siege resulting in the death of all the Israeli team members and the

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7 Ibid, 130.


death of three Palestinians. Much like Mexico City, the 1972 Games continued after the massacre. It was becoming increasing clear to political groups and nations that the Olympic Games were a key platform to express political discontent. The international scope of the Olympics provided a worldwide audience; the importance and celebrity of the Olympics made the movement vulnerable to political machinations.

The Threat of a Boycott of the 1976 Olympic Games
In the wake of the protests surrounding January’s World Softball Championships, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for New Zealand, Brian Talboys, sent a letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail. In it he sets out New Zealand’s policy in regards to apartheid in sport:

New Zealand could never approve of, let alone endorse, a system under which racial discrimination is supported by the Government and is established as a basic national policy - a system in which a large part of the population is deprived of basic human rights. We believe that such a system holds great dangers, not least for those who benefit most from it, and that they would be well advised to reconsider their position before it’s too late. ... We believe that sportsmen and sporting organizations in New Zealand should be free to associate with those in other countries if they wish to do so, regardless of race, color, creed, or internal politics. Sportsmen have the same rights as other New Zealanders and this Government intends to uphold them. There will be no more political interference in sport.

Here, Talboys explains, sport had been a significant issue in New Zealand’s 1975 election campaign, with Robert Muldoon campaigning on a “no government interference in sports” (allow the South Africans to compete) playform [sic]. Muldoon’s government felt that it was its mandate to uphold this policy, even in the face of diversity and threats of boycotts. Barry Gustafson also pointed out that public opinion polls also revealed that a majority of New Zealanders supported rugby contact between the All Blacks and the Springboks. Sport, especially All Blacks-Springboks rugby

10 Ibid, p. 139.
links, were an important part of social life in both New Zealand and South Africa. According to David Black and John Nauright, rugby played a similar role in both countries - rugby's political symbolism is 'much more than a matter of simple recreation', each country took pride in and placed great emphasis on its dominance and mastery of the sport.\textsuperscript{14} New Zealand-South Africa rugby ties ran deep and neither country was willing to cease play in order to appease the international community. It was well within the interests of the South African Springboks to continue playing the New Zealand All Blacks; it gave the country a deep sense of pride and helped legitimise the apartheid regime.

As early as April 15, 1976, the \textit{Toronto Star} reported that New Zealand was receiving threats regarding an African boycott of the Olympics due to New Zealand's continuing sporting links with South Africa. President Ordia of the SCSA, had written a threatening letter to the New Zealand government. However, 'as far as New Zealand is concerned, the threats are hardening opinion against giving way to what is called African blackmail and calls are being made for an Olympic showdown and the exclusions of the Africans if they do not abide by the decisions of international sports bodies.'\textsuperscript{15} Faced with international publicity surrounding their sporting links with South Africa, New Zealand lashed out by accusing African states of blackmail. Mainly, the SCSA wanted the New Zealand government to call off the upcoming All Blacks rugby tour of South Africa, due to take place in the summer of 1976. It would be up to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to make a decision, through consensus of the African membership, regarding the boycott at its meeting in 1976.

In a cable dated March 1976, the British High Commission in Nairobi wrote to the Commission in Cape Town and indicated that the SCSA had not yet made a decision in regards to sporting relations with New Zealand.\textsuperscript{16} At a meeting in February, the organisation was considering how to proceed in highlighting New Zealand's support of apartheid through its continuing sporting ties with South Africa. The memo indicated that a possible boycott, led by the Kenyan delegation, could happen if New Zealand continued its sporting relationship with South Africa.


\textsuperscript{15} 'Africans threaten to boycott Olympics', \textit{Toronto Star}, April 15, 1975, p. C03.

\textsuperscript{16} NA/AT 60/57 - March 30, 1976.
According to the Canadian embassy in Nairobi, on April 27 through 29, 1976, the SCSA held a series of meetings. Part of the meetings’ communiqué included a call to action for countries to boycott events in which New Zealand was participating:

With special mention to New Zealand whose government supports and encourages relations with racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury, a decision has been taken that if this country persists in its attitude, boycott sanctions recommended by Kinshasa will be applied without any restriction to this country as well as its nationals.¹⁷

A British memo regarding the SCSA meeting, dated May 5, 1976, indicated that New Zealand ‘came in for heavy criticism, and African countries were called upon to “expose and condemn” the present New Zealand government’s policy.... The Committee supported an earlier call by SCSA President Abraham Ordia, to reserve the right to boycott all sporting events in which New Zealand takes part.’¹⁸ A memo from Canadian External Affairs supported the British memo and concluded ‘The issue is basically one between the parties concerned, i.e. the Africans represented by the Council, New Zealand and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) which, I understand is studying the matter closely. The President of the IOC, Lord Killanin has made clear his firm opposition to boycotts or threats of boycott and he, and the IOC, will undoubtedly wish to address the matter in that context.’¹⁹

The SCSA stopped short of actually calling for a complete boycott or passing a motion on a boycott of the Olympics by African countries. According to Trevor Richards:

At the conclusion of the meeting, a confident Ordia announced: “If the Rugby Union sends a team to South Africa in June, then that will be the last straw. In that case we have unanimously decided to call on all African countries to boycott sports events in which New Zealanders take part in the Olympic Games.’ The boycott was on.²⁰

New Zealand’s sporting links with South Africa angered African nations and forced the international sport world to take notice. Knowing their boycott threats had succeeded in the past, African nations believed the threat would be taken seriously and New Zealand

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¹⁸ NA/AT 60/54 - May 5, 1976.


would acquiesce, calling for a cessation of sporting contact between New Zealand and South Africa, with particular emphasis on breaking the rugby ties.

Coinciding with the threat of an Olympic boycott was the decision surrounding the Toronto Paralympiad and whether or not South Africa would be allowed to participate in the Games. The organising committee had still not definitively let the Canadian government know of its intentions surrounding South African’s invitation to participate in the Olympiad. A cable from External Affairs informed various Canadian embassies; Sports Canada; and Paul S. Woodstock, Assistant Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare, that on May 7, 1976 Lalonde ‘informed organizers of Olympiad that in light reaffirmation of anti-apartheid stand by SCSA at Nairobi meetings, Canadian government would require notification by May 15 that South Africa disinvented [sic] from Olympiad or federal funding would be withdrawn.’

The telegram also revealed that the organising committee passed two resolutions at a meeting on May 11: one, to accept the accreditation papers of the South African team and two, to send the Executive Director, Dick Loiselle, to an international meeting in London of the International Sports Organization for Disabled to consider ways of bringing international pressure to bear on the Canadian government.

The Canadian government put its foot down and demanded a decision from the Paralympiad’s organising committee. In light of the African boycott threat of the Olympics in Montréal, Canada had to come down hard on severing sporting ties with South Africa and had to follow its own guidelines on ceasing moral and financial support for events with South African participants.

On May 7, Jackson and Loiselle informed the government that the Torontolympiad was going on as scheduled, ‘including the participation of the integrated South African disabled sport team, in absence of any evidence that they are not integrated. In order to avoid any embarrassment [sic] we urgently request that you advise us of your re-assessed position prior to May 12.’

The committee chose to support the integrated South African team and, as such, forfeited the $500,000 grant from the federal government.


22 Ibid.

Member of Parliament for High Park-Humber Valley, Jelinek, questioned the Minister of Health and Welfare, Lalonde about Canada’s stance on the Olympiad on May 11, 1976. As the event was taking place in Etobicoke, part of Jelinek’s electoral district, he forced the issue and pointed out that the government had previously provided funds to two Canadian teams that had participated alongside South Africa’s Disabled Olympic Team in Munich in 1972 and in the previous year in England. Jelinek noted that of the 22 athletes South Africa will be sending, nine are non-white. 24

Inconsistent, unclear Canadian policy caused confusion in the House of Commons. As much of the policies affecting South African sport were not publicly announced, the government spent much of its time explaining when policies had changed and why new policies were now in place. Lalonde made a lengthy response:

The Canadian government policy denies funding any Canadian athlete or group of athletes who intend to travel to South Africa to participate in an athletic competition. While we fully recognize that the decision to participate or not rests with the individual and/or sports bodies concerned, we have pointed out that competition in South African [sic] under conditions of racial discrimination, which are universally condemned, is a matter of considerable concern. Although the government does not financially support such visits, neither is it prepared to limit the freedom of Canadians to travel abroad where they wish. ... More recently, events have been awarded to Canada in which athletes from South Africa have been invited to participate. I wish to confirm the position taken by the government in July 1975 of not providing either moral or financial support to any event in Canada in which South African athletes have been invited. ... We do not believed that circumstances in this country have changed materially, even though the South African government may allow modification in a particular case. This view has been confirmed in recent days by the reaffirmation by the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa of its continued opposition to all sports contacts with the regime in South Africa.25

Again, Lalonde and the government were forced to defend their position. By reiterating its views in Parliament, the government put on record that these policies had been in place since 1975 and the government would not make any exceptions or provide leniency in the application of these policies.

There was no feasible compromise to the Paralympiad situation. The government could not face the international repercussions of supporting an integrated South African team


at the Paralympiad and the organising committee believed it had a moral duty to accept
the integrated South African team. On May 19, 1976 the Toronto Star reported that the
disabled Games would go ahead with the participation of the South African team.
According to Jackson:

‘This is the first multiracial team to represent South Africa in international
sport. ... Their presence was accepted by European press as a significant
step towards modification of the segregationist policies of the South African
government. The government of Canada, on the other hand, dismissed this
by stating that it is mere “tokenism” employed by the South African officials
to gain acceptance.’

The Globe and Mail reported that the Olympiad committee had to raise the funds
promised by the Canadian government and were seeking public support. Jackson told
Nora McCabe: “There is an apparent double standard - promoting trade while
(enforcing) an embargo on humans. ... I really don’t think they’ve taken these games
seriously. The Government regards our handicapped people as second-class
citizens.”

Strong rhetoric and images were used by the committee to portray an
insensitive government that did not care about disabled athletes. This appealed to
Canadian public opinion and the Canadian desire for equality and accommodation for
all.

The Ontario Medical Association (OMA) came out in support of the Olympiad. The
board of the OMA passed a resolution ‘deploring the Canadian Government’s refusal to
pay its promised $500,000 grant to the Olympiad for the Physically Disabled because
an integrated South African team will be competing in the Games.’

The press and
Canadian public accepted at face value that the South African team was legitimately
integrated and that these athletes already suffered enough by being disabled and
should not be punished further by the Canadian government’s policies.

The government continued to deal with the problem behind the scenes. Marc Lalonde
wrote to Jackson on June 4:

You have now confirmed the participation of South Africa in the Olympiad
for the Physically Disabled and have, in so doing, decided not to comply

with the policy of the Government of Canada as it has been enunciated to you on repeated occasions. ... I wish to officially advise you that the Olympiad for the Physically Disabled is no longer eligible for financial assistance from the Government of Canada. 29

In the letter Lalonde also requested that the Olympiad return the advanced contribution of $50,000 which was made by the federal government in January 1975.

In addition, Minister Lalonde wrote a letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail in defence of his government’s position. Simply, he stated that since 1974, the government had outlined its policy in regards to apartheid and sport and that all sporting bodies were informed of the policy change in the summer of 1975. He also noted that in December 1975 Jackson and the organising committee acknowledged that they had been informed of the policy, as noted above. Most importantly, Lalonde explained two things. Firstly, former Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen informed Jackson in 1976 ‘that there was not sufficient evidence to justify a modification of the Government policy.’ And, secondly, ‘...the federal Government never did apply in the same way to competitions hosted by countries other than Canada or South Africa. In such cases Canada follows a policy of discouragement only. Canada’s participation in the Olympiad in Britain, although not encouraged, was not in contravention of the policy.’ 30 Lalonde had to backtrack to fully explain the Canadian government’s position. The position is confusing because it was not consistently applied nor was it clearly defined until the problem surrounding the Masters event in Toronto became public. It was up to Lalonde to appeal to the public via his letter to the editor in defence of the government’s position and policies.

Once the committee made the official decision to invite South Africa to the Paralympiad, public debate also increased. J. McQuaid of Toronto wrote ‘It is ironic that the International Sports Organization for the Disabled (ISOD) after persuading the South African team to select its competitors at fully integrated trials should now lose the federal Government’s commitment to support the Games to be held in Etobicoke in August.’ 31 Robert McCormack of the History Department at the University of Winnipeg added: ‘Canada supports extensive commercial dealing with South Africa. Canada


maintains full diplomatic relations with the Union. As well, it would appear that Canada, or more specifically Marc Lalonde and company, is less concerned with principle and more concerned to buy votes or do business.”\textsuperscript{32} The government’s justification of its anti-apartheid sport policy was hard to understand because of its continuing diplomatic and economic ties with South Africa. To the Canadian public the policy seemed hypocritical and, in this case, disrespectful towards disabled athletes. As the summer progressed, the Paralympiad dropped out of the press, for the most part, although there were some calls for financial support from the Canadian public.

While the Canadian government struggled with domestic pressures surrounding the Olympics and the Paralympiad, external, foreign pressure was also increasing. The United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid held a conference in Havana, Cuba on May 24 through 28. Ordia was invited to attend as an official observer as was Dennis Brutus, President of SAN-ROC. Richards writes: ‘The seminar was pivotal, both in the shorter and longer term, to the international campaign against apartheid in sport. It gave both Ordia and Dennis Brutus a useful international forum at which to lobby - and to reach some agreement on positions.’\textsuperscript{33} Each man was given the opportunity to address the conference. In his comments, Brutus called for support of an international convention against apartheid sport, as proposed by Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, and called for support for the SCSA’s call for action against New Zealand, ‘...the principal ally of apartheid in sport.’\textsuperscript{34} SAN-ROC came out in support of the SCSA and its call for a boycott of New Zealand. According to the \textit{Globe and Mail}, Brutus ‘told newsmen that a showdown could be avoided by a clear declaration by the New Zealand Government against racial discrimination in sports, and against the rugby team’s tour.’\textsuperscript{35} As a non-white South African in exile, Brutus fought hard for SAN-ROC’s ultimate goal of complete South African sport isolation. It was believed by anti-apartheid groups that complete isolation was the most effective tool in precipitating change within South Africa and an end to apartheid.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33} Richards, \textit{Dancing on Our Bones}, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{34} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 10934, File Part 2 - No date.

Ordia’s message was simple and more direct than Brutus. He wanted the seminar to support anti-apartheid movements, especially in New Zealand; advise the New Zealand Government of the Havana seminar’s opposition to its policies around its sporting relations with South Africa; request the government of New Zealand to persuade the rugby union to call off its upcoming tour of South Africa; and try to raise the matter in international forums.\textsuperscript{36} In regards to the Montréal Olympics he was clear:

I wish to reaffirm the position taken after our recent Executive Committee meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. We have made it clear that the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa has instructed member nations not to compete in any sporting event in which New Zealand participates if the New Zealand Rugby Team goes to South Africa from June - August, 1976, as planned. This, of course, has serious implications for this Summer Montréal Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{37}

Ordia’s message was strong and consistent: New Zealand must cut sporting ties with South Africa. A cable from Canadian representatives in Havana to External Affairs in Ottawa noted that Ordia and Brutus were seeking the seminar’s endorsement of the SCSA’s decision to instruct its members not to compete against New Zealand if the rugby union goes ahead with its tour of South Africa. The cable writer noted this would mean possible lack of participation by the countries in Olympic events which include competitors from New Zealand, specifically noting ‘They envisage that this policy would first go into operation at Olympics; Ordia and Brutus have evidently fallen back from previous position that Olympics should be boycotted entirely if NZ participates.’\textsuperscript{38} At this point, Canadian diplomats believed the boycott would be limited to only those events in which New Zealand participated. This course of action would have been less drastic and less prohibitive for African nations, if it occurred. It would mean African athletes would at least be able to participate in events that did not include any New Zealand athletes.

In regards to the possibility of a boycott of the Olympics, the seminar’s final communiqué noted:

The Seminar commends the activities and actions of Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, the South Africa Non-Racial Olympics Committee and other

\textsuperscript{36} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 10934, File Part 2 - No date.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060 File 78 - May 25, 1976.
bodies who have tried to isolate South Africa from all sporting competitions so long as South Africa practises the policy apartheid in breach of the principles enshrined in the Olympic charter. 39

The seminar closed with support for the SCSA and its call for the isolation of South Africa in the area of sport.

In addition, the seminar called on the Canadian government to prevent the establishment of a South African hospitality centre. It had been known for months that South Africa hoped to establish a Friendship House in Montréal during the Olympics as a means of national promotion. In 1975, Jean Claude Ganga, the Secretary General of the SCSA, wrote to the President of the IOC regarding the establishment of the Friendship House. A copy of the letter was cabled from the Canadian embassy in Nairobi to External Affairs in Ottawa:

We want to let you know that the planned Friendship House is but a propaganda den the political aim and provocative nature of which is well known. ... We felt it urgent to draw your attention to this affair so as to enable you take appropriate measures and avoid to throw a sad note on the next games the organization of which as we all know, is meeting with serious economic difficulties. We sincerely count upon your respect for Olympic rules to intervene in order to avoid further developments of this affair and stop all manoeuvres that might create a grave scandal and cause a general feeling of indignation. 40

This scarcely veiled threat by the SCSA - rumor of this South African Friendship House - was a further obstacle to Canada’s intention to avoid unwanted focus on its ongoing contact, outside of sport, with South Africa. International organisations were well aware of the planned South African presence in Montréal. A cable from the Canadian office in Cape Town to Ottawa notes, a similar project was undertaken during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. At the International Seminar on Apartheid in Havana, Québec anti-apartheid organisations were commended for setting up a Québec Centre Against Apartheid and Racism in Sport, in hopes to counteract the effects and propaganda of the South African Friendship House. The Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, Leslie Harriman, also wrote a letter to the President of the Québec Peace Council, commending them for the establishment of the Centre and concluding:


The Special Committee against apartheid has greatly appreciated the support of the Canadian government and people to the Olympic principle and the UN resolutions against apartheid in sport. I am confident that they will not fail to rebuff the efforts of the racists to use Canadian soil to spread their propaganda.\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060, File 78 - June 1, 1976.}

It is important to note that a draft reply to Harriman’s letter, circulated via telegram between Canadian UN officials in New York and External Affairs in Ottawa, observed that the government could not prevent the setting up of a centre as long as the organisers were not in contravention of any laws.\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060, File 78 - June 24, 1976.} The establishment of a South African Friendship House could not legally be stopped. It could, however, be counteracted by protests and information from anti-apartheid activists working within Québec.

Prime Minister Robert Muldoon responded to the seminar’s support of the African nations. According to a cable from Wellington to External Affairs in Ottawa ‘Calls for Olympic boycott of New Zealand made at Havan [sic] UN seminar received prominent press attention and prompted Prime Minister Muldoon to issue statement decrying political interference in Olympics and reaffirming that New Zealand would compete at Montréal and that if other countries wished to withdraw it was up to them.’\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 10934, File Part 1.1 - June 15, 1976.} There were also visits to New Zealand from Ordia and the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal.\footnote{Ibid. See also Richards, \textit{Dancing on Our Bones}, p. 144.} Ramphal warned Muldoon of the possibility of New Zealand’s sporting isolation; Muldoon refused to meet with Ordia altogether. Attempts were made to reach a compromise in order to avoid the boycott, but the Muldoon government would not budge in its policy not to mix politics and sport. A ‘Commonwealth Senior Officials Meeting’ was held at the end of May 1976; the summary of which was excluded and withheld from an Access to Information request on an External Affairs file dealing specifically with the Montréal Games boycott.\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060, File 78 - May 31, 1976.} To rub salt in the wounds, Muldoon’s National Party, in June 1976, gave an official farewell to the All Blacks team before it left for its South African tour, shortly after the Soweto
uprisings began. It sought only, it said, to reassure itself that there would be no danger to the New Zealand players. The New Zealand government held firm in its position that its policies were right, just, and not for international scrutiny.

In a letter to the editor of the *Globe and Mail* the New Zealand High Commissioner to Ottawa, Jack Shepherd, defended the position of his government: ‘Overseas tours by New Zealand sports teams, and visits to New Zealand by teams and individuals are arranged without the permission, sponsorship or assistance of the Government.’ Although sticking to its policy of not mixing politics and sport, the government of New Zealand began to actively defend and justify its policies. It remained firm in its stance, allowing the All Blacks rugby team to continue its tour of South Africa throughout the continuing riots in Soweto, which were quickly spreading to other parts of South Africa.

A cable to External Affairs in Ottawa indicates that New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brian Talboys, had reached out to the African foreign ministers meeting in Mauritius to explain New Zealand’s position:

“We believe that system is wrong, and we want to see it ended. But we do not see how an African boycott of the Olympic Games can help to achieve this goal... By boycotting the Games, African countries would only further undermine the Olympic principle of free competition regardless of race, creed or colour. And by introducing politics in this way they might well jeopardise the future of the Games themselves.”

Talboys appealed to the African leaders to reconsider their position and, accuses them, in an ironic twist, of contravention of the Olympic charter. Talboys’s appeal was a last minute attempt to avoid a boycott of the Montréal Olympics.

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46 The Soweto uprising began on June 16, 1976. Black students started protests against the new government policy of providing education in Afrikaans, rather than English.


The Olympic Boycott

By July 10, seven days before the opening ceremonies, Tanzania announced that they were boycotting the Games. According to the Globe and Mail, the government of Tanzania issued a statement:

“Tanzania has always maintained that political, commercial and sporting links with the South African apartheid regime strengthen and give respectability to the Fascist state. ... New Zealand’s participation in sporting events in South Africa at a time when the whole world was mourning and condemning the barbaric incidents in the apartheid state was an open approval by New Zealand of the murderous acts. ... All progressive people the world over will see reason to defend the integrity of the Olympic Games by excluding New Zealand from the current Games. ... To exclude from the Games countries which fraternize with South Africa is the greatest contribution mankind can make toward reaching a peaceful solution in South Africa.”

The Ottawa Citizen further explains why Tanzania chose to publicly announce its boycott, indicating that the OAU had passed a resolution in which they condemned New Zealand for allowing the All Blacks to tour South Africa despite the race riots which started in Soweto and spread to other townships. The resolution also called on the IOC to ban New Zealand from the Games. This was a major blow to the Olympics and Tanzania, as its star sprinter, Filbert Bayi, was due to compete against New Zealand’s star runner John Walker. On July 15, 1976, Yvon Beaulne, Director General, Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs in External Affairs, received a letter from the Tanzanian High Commissioner in Ottawa, Chief Michael Lukumbuzya indicating:

...I want to reassure the Government of Canada, through you, that the withdrawal by Tanzania from the 1976 Olympics is because New Zealand is participating in the games and not because of anything else. Tanzania’s boycott of the 1976 Olympics should not reflect on the good relationship which exists between Tanzania and Canada.

It was imperative, for most of the African countries that ended up taking part in the boycott, that they reassured Canada that the boycott had nothing to do with the Olympic host nation and was not directed at Canadians. They wanted to make clear that the boycott was directed at New Zealand. In Tanzania itself, there had been some

50 ‘Tanzania quits Olympics over New Zealand’, Globe and Mail, July 10, 1976, p. 44.

51 ‘Tanzania quits the Olympics, big race off’, Ottawa Citizen, July 10, 1976, p. 1. For full wording of the resolution, see Appendix B.

contention as to whether or not the country should participate. A cable from Dar es Salaam to Ottawa notes that the Minister of Youth and Culture, his officials and members of the Tanzanian Olympic Committee had all wanted the country to participate as they thought Bayi would bring glory to Tanzania and Africa. However, the decision to withdraw was made directly by President Nyerere.\(^53\) Even within boycotting countries, conflict arose as to whether the boycott was right. The boycotting countries and its athletes sacrificed their hard work and dedication in an attempt to send a message that New Zealand had to cut sporting ties with apartheid South Africa.

The Nigerian Chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, Leslie Harriman, issued a statement on behalf of the Special Committee in which he applauded Tanzania for its decision to withdraw. A cable from Geneva to Ottawa quotes Harriman as follows:

> It is indeed painful to take action against New Zealand, a country which has a tradition of non-racialism in sports and in which many organizations and individuals, including sportsmen, have demonstrated their opposition to apartheid and racism. But officials of New Zealand Rugby Union and other sports bodies have been utterly insensitive to all appeal to desist from collusion with South African racists. New Zealand government not only failed to exert its influence against such collusion but gave its official blessings to visit of rugby team to South Africa.\(^54\)

The support of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid gave more credence to the African call for a boycott; third party support of the boycott resonated with anti-apartheid groups and helped fuel the boycott.

On July 12, 1976, a group of Canadian anti-apartheid activists participated in a protest at the Toronto Cricket, Skating and Curling Club where a team of South African cricketers were playing a team from Toronto. The South Africans had entered Canada as tourists, but were being supported by Harry Oppenheimer, owner of Anglo-American Corporation.\(^55\) The protests, mainly made up of members of the CCSA, stormed the cricket pitch three times. The *Toronto Star* reports that there was also a lie down protest during the match.\(^56\) The traveling team of cricketers also encountered protests in other


\(^{54}\) Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060, File 78 - July 14, 1976.


\(^{56}\) James S. Lewis, 'Cricket match invaded 31 protesters charged', *Toronto Star*, July 12, 1976, p. A03.
parts of Canada. Charles Stimac, head of the protesters in Toronto, said they wanted the match stopped as it was “against the international boycott of South African participation in sport.”\footnote{Ibid.} The riot police were called in and the match was eventually allowed to proceed, without any spectators. The protest was small, yet effective in garnering press attention and bringing to light the anti-apartheid sports movement in Canada. The CCSA and other protesters took advantage of this small event by spreading their message against apartheid sport.

Even though there had been plenty of advanced warning about the prospect of a boycott, it came as a surprise to the public, the IOC and the Canadian government when African nations actually started to walk out. A key reason for this was that in the run up to the Olympics, Canada and the IOC had focused their attention on the Taiwan situation. In short:

Under the Trudeau government Canada had sought to distance itself from the United States, especially from its involvement in Vietnam. One way to do this was to support Beijing over the American-backed Taiwan. Canada was also selling quantities of wheat to the People’s Republic; consequently, our economic interests were more closely linked to Beijing than to Taipei.\footnote{Ann Hall, Trevor Slack, Garry Smit, David Whitson. \textit{Sport in Canadian Society} (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 98.}

In a show of support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Canada refused entry visas to Taiwanese athletes unless they agreed to compete under the designation of Taiwan not the Republic of China, the official name the IOC recognised for Taiwan. One of the Liberal Party’s political platform in the 1968 election was the intention of establishing diplomatic relations with China. The Chinese laid out three conditions to the Canada-China relationship: Canada had to break relations with Taiwan, Canada had to recognise PRC’s right to occupy the China seat at the United Nations, and ‘Canada must recognize the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan.’\footnote{Mitchell Sharp. \textit{Which Reminds Me: A Memoir} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 204.} Canada found the last point hardest to accept. In the end, however, Secretary of State Sharp and the External Affairs department came up with a solution: ‘Canada did not accept the assertion by the Chinese government of its sovereignty
over Taiwan, neither did we challenge it. This solution allowed Canada to officially recognise the PRC and solidified their diplomatic and trade relationships.

Diplomatic relations and official recognition of the PRC meant that Canada could not recognise Taiwan as the official China representative at the Olympics as it would have had disastrous effects on the Canada-PRC relationship. And, to add to this, in a meeting between Chinese and Canadian representatives on November 1, 1974, the Chinese government in Peking, through Kuo Lei, made clear to Canada that it

...will arrange for their participation in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montréal and for the expulsion of the ROC [Republic of China aka Taiwan]. It was suggested that Canada’s failure to do so would be “regrettable for Sino-Canadian relations”; the implication of that Sino-Canadian relations would be adversely affected. The Chinese would not believe that either the City of Montréal or the IOC were beyond the effective influence of the Canadian Government. Although it was suggested to the Chinese that the proper course would be for them to approach the IOC and apply for admission, it appeared that they were no prepared to apply but rather preferred the matter to be raised with the IOC by another power, in this case Canada.

There was tremendous pressure on Canada to protect its burgeoning relationship with China; delicate diplomacy and gentle handling of the communist state was required. Yet, the IOC was adamant that the Canadian position contradicted Olympic principles as the PRC was not a member of the IOC at the time. According to Lord Killanin:

When a city applied for the Games, the International Olympic Committee required, in terms of 1976, the support of and certain undertakings by both the city and country. In the instance of Canada an undertaking was asked for, and given, that all National Olympic Committees recognized by the IOC would be allowed to enter Canada to take part in the Games.

The IOC did not recognise the People’s Republic of China or its Olympic Committee. Taiwan, aka the Republic of China, and its NOC in Taipei, was the recognised Chinese delegation. According to Ivan Head, ‘For our part, we had no desire or interest in offending the IOC. We had considerable interest, however, in honouring the integrity of our own China policy, which included a refusal to take sides in the intense dispute

60 Ibid.
62 Hall et al, Sport in Canadian Society, p. 98. The People’s Republic of China withdrew from the Olympic movement in 1958 and was not accepted back into the IOC until 1979.
respecting the extent of Chinese territorial sovereignty.’\textsuperscript{64} Once Canada officially recognised the PRC obligations of that friendship followed, which included not challenging China’s claim to Taiwan. Since the Chinese clearly believed Canada would be in contravention of this obligation if Taiwan participated in the 1976 Olympics, the Canadian government wanted to avoid even the impression of collusion with and acceptance of Taiwan.

To the Chinese ‘The heart of the problem is the PRC’s traditional insistence that Taiwan is an integral part of China and, as such, has no other legal status. There should, therefore, be only one China recognized by the IOC and the PRC should be recognized as its government.’\textsuperscript{65} The United States weighed in and threatened to withdraw if Taiwan did not compete; the US did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC but did recognise Taiwan.\textsuperscript{66} With all of the threats and negotiations, much of the IOC’s time was devoted to finding solutions to the Taiwanese problem. According to Head and Trudeau:

Beijing opposed the entry into Canada of the Taiwan team, and encouraged the Canadian government to deny the necessary visas, an act that would clearly violate solemn undertaking to the IOC and would, moreover, destroy the balance inherent in the 1970 formula. It was a step that Trudeau would not consider. Neither, however, was he prepared to permit any government to do damage to Canada’s foreign-policy interests by utilizing Canadian territory to masquerade an entity it was not. Thus was taken the decision - after efforts at persuasion had failed - to insist that Taiwan not hold itself out to be China, something it clearly was not. Taiwan, Trudeau said, could call itself anything it wanted, so long as the name was not in flagrant violation of international comity.\textsuperscript{67}

Eventually Trudeau agreed upon a compromise allowing the Taiwanese to enter Canada: Taiwan would be allowed to fly their flag and play their national anthem, but they could not claim to be the representatives of the Republic of China, they had to compete under the name of Taiwan. The compromise satisfied both the United States


\textsuperscript{65} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3054, File 22 - August 1975.

\textsuperscript{66} Killanin, My Olympic Years, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{67} Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, p. 194.
and IOC. In the end, however, this compromise was not acceptable to the Taiwanese team and they chose not to attend the Games. A report entitled ‘US Leadership Challenged: Olympics Out of Control’ in the San Diego Union on July 21, 1976 notes:

It is clear that the International Olympic Committee lost control of the games when it yielded to blackmail from Canada. The Canadian government also yielded to blackmail from Communist China when it put politics and trade ahead of its promises and sportsmanship.

In the face of increasing international pressure and criticism, Canada protected its independent foreign policy and its relationship with China. This was an imperative step and closely followed the foreign policies being developed by the Trudeau government and its Third Option of diversifying and protecting Canadian trade and culture.

While this was happening, African nations were calling on the IOC to ban New Zealand from the Games for their continuing sports contact with South Africa. However, the Taiwan issue consumed the IOC, the Canadian government, and press headlines up to the day of the opening ceremonies. The issue of New Zealand was pushed to the back burner. ‘After spending many days discussing the Taiwan issue, the IOC attended to the African request for New Zealand’s expulsion from the Games with indecent haste. This can only have strengthened Africa’s resolve to walk out.’ Donald Macintosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black concur with Richards: ‘...the international controversy about Canada’s stand on Taiwan’s participation in the Montréal Games made it impossible for the Black African nations to get world attention focused on its cause.’ African nations and anti-apartheid groups were not taken seriously in their boycott threat. For that matter, many countries and individuals did not think that the Africans would be able to coordinate a boycott. According to Richards, there were several reasons for this belief:

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70 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p. 163.

The fault lines within Africa were numerous: Anglophone versus Francophone; less developed versus more developed. Anti-apartheid organisations were divided in terms of goals, tactics, ideological allegiances, priorities and the types of pressures to which they were subjected. Geographic separation and poor communications further fragmented unity.\(^\text{72}\)

All the African nations and anti-apartheid groups had to work as a collective in order to undertake an effective boycott that gained international attention. In his memoirs, Sam Ramsamy, who travelled to the 1976 Games as the SAN-ROC representative, ‘...was surprised to arrive and find IOC officials preoccupied’ by the Taiwan issue rather than the African one.\(^\text{73}\) Ramsamy recalls that he and Ganga met with Lane Cross, IOC member and President of the New Zealand National Olympic Committee and Lord Porritt, honorary IOC member. In an attempt to avoid the boycott, Ganga suggested that the All Blacks shorten their tour of South Africa. Cross argued that the New Zealand NOC had no jurisdiction over rugby as it was not an Olympic sport. Ganga suggested that Cross use the excuse that, according to reports, some All Blacks players had gotten too close to a demonstration and suffered the effects of tear gas. Porritt embraced this idea, Cross remained skeptical as he left the meeting. Ganga and Ramsamy did not hear from Cross or New Zealand again.\(^\text{74}\)

In the furore surrounding the Taiwan situation, the Africans request that New Zealand be removed from the Games was not considered until the IOC General Assembly meetings in Montréal which immediately preceded the opening of the Olympic Games.\(^\text{75}\) On July 16, the day before the opening ceremonies, Lord Killanin, IOC President, sent a letter to Ganga at his hotel in Montréal:

Thank you for your letter regarding Rugby - South Africa/New Zealand.

Rugby is a sport over which the International Olympic Committee has no control whatsoever. As you know, as far as the Olympic Games are concerned the International Olympic committee took action to withdraw recognition from South Africa in 1970.

\(^{72}\) Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p. 161.


\(^{74}\) Ibid, pp. 63-4.

\(^{75}\) Macintosh, Greenhorn, Black, 'Canadian Diplomacy', p. 38.
Your letter has been discussed by the full I.O.C. Session who unanimously agree this is not a matter within its competence and further confirms that the New Zealand National Olympic Committee and Team have in no way breached Olympic Principles and Rules.76

Toumany Sangaré, the President of the Guinea Olympic Committee, believed that

The IOC’s evasiveness, purposely delaying its reply the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa’s legitimate demand, was aimed at presenting the Africans with a fait accompli in the foolish hope that, already installed in the Olympic village, they would hesitate in leaving Montréal a few hours away from the opening of the Games.77

In the end, the IOC decided they would not take any action against New Zealand as rugby was not an IOC sport and it was not the place of the IOC to ban New Zealand for its rugby links with South Africa.

By July 16, the day before the opening ceremonies, a total of 3 countries had withdrawn from the Olympics: Tanzania, Mauritius, and Nigeria, and several others had threatened to leave. According to the Ottawa Citizen: ‘A letter purported to be signed by representatives of the national Olympic committees of 15 African countries asks that the International Olympic Committee bar New Zealand’s participation in the Montréal Olympics.’78 According to Richard Cleroux, the African nations did not think the IOC would expel New Zealand, but it did hope for some moral support, perhaps in the form of a statement ‘that would have shown the world the IOC didn’t go along with a rugby team touring South Africa.’79 Cleroux reiterated this fact in an interview on CBC radio: ‘the whole thing started up last minute, it snowballed by accident. These countries didn’t come here with the intention of pulling out.’80 The African nations travelled to Canada with the intention of participating in the Olympics; most of these countries


79 Richard Cleroux. ‘UN-backed anti-apartheid group was key force behind Games’ exodus by blacks, Arabs’, Globe and Mail, July 20, 1976, p. S06.

could not have fathomed the boycott would go ahead, their Olympics ending prematurely.

The High Commissioner for Zambia in Canada, W.M Chakulya, wrote to Prime Minister Trudeau on July 16. He laid bare Zambia’s decision for boycotting the Games:

As a member of the Organization of African Unity, Zambia will not participate in the 1976 Montréal Olympic Games if New Zealand is allowed to participate. ... South Africa’s policy has resulted into unnecessary loss of life, not only among the South African non-white population, but also loss of life and destruction of property in the Republic of Zambia. On the 11th July, 1976 the South African troops killed twenty two people and injured more than forty others twenty kilometer [sic] inside the Zambian territory. Zambia considered this action flagrant aggression against her independence and sovereignty [sic]. Zambia is taking this issue up with the United Nations, and has asked the Security Council to place the matter on the agenda for next week. Zambia’s action in withdrawing from the Olympics has in no way been linked to the excellent relations that prevail between Zambia and Canada.81

Chakulya pointed out to Trudeau that although Zambia valued its friendship with Canada it could not support the 1976 Games if New Zealand was allowed to continue in its participation. In hopes to bolster its point of view, Zambia pointed out that South Africa’s apartheid policies affect other countries in Southern Africa and that the apartheid state did not respect international borders and security. African nations and leaders went to great lengths to assure Trudeau and the Canadian government that their boycott was directed New Zealand, and should not reflect their relationships with Canada. They acknowledged that Canada was an important ally, especially in the Commonwealth, and that a boycott of the Olympic Games, being held in Canada, could have had negative repercussions on Canada-African relations.

The opening ceremony was held on July 17; the ceremony attended by Queen Elizabeth II, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, and Prince Andrew along with Prime Minister Trudeau and other dignitaries. Yet by the time the ceremony started, more countries had dropped out - Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, and Tanzania decided to boycott the Games. A cable from Lagos to Ottawa shows that Nigeria struggled with making the decision to boycott and hoped that the IOC would change its mind regarding New Zealand’s participation:

Nigerian government hopes that International Olympic Committee will, even at this late hour, and without any further delay, allow their better judgement to prevail, by calling for New Zealand’s withdrawal from the 1976 Olympic games. Nigerian government will make its final position known if, by Friday July 16 New Zealand has not withdrawn from Games.\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060, File 78 - July 17, 1976.}

Nigeria gave the IOC the benefit of the doubt in the hope they would reverse its decision. Interestingly, despite increased support, a cable from Lagos to Ottawa, part of which has been censored and exempted from an Access to Information request, notes that the Nigerian public was not happy with the prospect of a boycott.\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3060, File 78 - July 15, 1976.} Nigeria decided to wait until the very last minute, the day before the opening ceremony, to withdraw from the Olympics.

According to the \textit{Globe and Mail}, as of July 19, more teams had exited Montréal; in total 28 teams, 770 athletes, 10\% of participants boycotted the Montréal Olympics.\footnote{Richard Cleroux. ‘Games are disrupted as 28 nations pull out’, \textit{Globe and Mail}, July 19, 1976, p. 1.} The situation was in constant flux, it would not be clear for days which countries stayed and which had left. Even Lord Killanin, President of the IOC, pointed out that during the opening ceremonies, as he watched the athletes file into the stadium ‘...I was trying to discover which of the African and other delegations were missing or present.’\footnote{Killanin, \textit{My Olympic Years}, p. 135.} To reiterate the point, Linda Cahill of the \textit{Montréal Star} revealed ‘Embarrassed Olympic officials were still counting heads today to determine which black and Arab states intend to stay.’\footnote{Linda Cahill. ‘Boycott devastates Games’ schedule’, \textit{Montréal Star}, July 19, 1976, p. A1.} According to John Brehl the boycott ‘... is certainly downgrading the calibre of many Olympic competitions, it was touched off last week by Tanzania and mushroomed when the International Olympic Committee (IOC) voted down a move to expel New Zealand.’\footnote{John Brehl. ‘29 nations boycott, one billion people watch our Olympics’, \textit{Toronto Star}, July 19, 1976, p. A02.} Almost all the African teams withdrew before competition began, except Egypt, who withdrew several days into Olympic competition.

The Canadian government reaction was frantic, though delayed. A memo dated July 21, 1976 from Ivan Head indicated that Trudeau had approved United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal to
appeal directly to African nations to return to the Olympics. On July 18th the two men made statements after a meeting in New York. Waldheim’s statement reads:

‘I appeal to the International Olympic Committee and all parties concerned to continue their efforts to resolve the problems affecting the participation of athletes from Africa in the 21st Olympiad. In doing so I recognize the deep and genuine concerns felt by African states. At the same time I wish to point out that the Olympics Games have become an occasion of special significance in mankind’s search for brotherhood and understanding. Ensuring the success of the Olympic Games will help to advance these objectives while constructive efforts will have to be pursued to come to grips with those issues which must be faced and resolved if world brotherhood is to be a reality.’

And Ramphal’s:

‘I warmly welcome and endorse Dr. Waldheim’s timely initiative. The Olympic Games and world sport in general cannot realistically be divorced from issues of contemporary concern on which they impinge. Dr. Waldheim’s proposal for the pursuit of these questions by constructive effort following the Games is especially welcome. I suggest that these efforts should be directed to securing a comprehensive examination at the international level, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the games, of the several issues that have arisen as a source of legitimate concern to African and other states. Meanwhile, I join in Dr. Waldheim’s appeal to the IOC and all the world’s nations to ensure the success of the current games through maximum participation. I am sure that such a result can contribute greatly to the propitious resolution of the wider questions to which attention has now quite properly been drawn in the context of the current Olympics.’

These two influential men attempted to convince African nations to return to the Games. Head also points out that messages were sent to various African heads of governments ‘asking them to consider whether their goals had not now been reached following the recognition by Mr. Waldheim and Mr. Ramphal of the legitimacy of their stand asking them to consider permitting their teams to participate.’ In a personal telegram from Trudeau to President Kenyatta of Kenya, reaching out in what seems like desperate pleas:

It strikes me that your appeal to the conscience of the world has now been largely successful and I would hope that you would agree with me that no

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89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.
further immediate gains can be made by denying to your dedicated young athletes the once in a lifetime opportunity of participating in this Olympic brotherhood exercise. As Mr. Ramphal said, maximum participation in the Olympics can contribute greatly to the resolution of the wider questions to which attention quote has now quite properly been drawn unquote.91

Trudeau hoped that complimentary tones would convince African nations either to return to the Olympics or, to the ones that remained as of July 21, not to leave at all. Trudeau did not receive favourable responses. Both President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana sent telegrams to Trudeau to let him know that by the time they received his communications their teams had already left and that appeals from Trudeau, Waldheim and Ramphal would have made no difference in their choice to leave. President Kaunda puts it quite succinctly: ‘The withdrawal of our team from the Games was in compliance with the decision made by the OAUS Assembly of Head of State and Government in Port Louis (Mauritius) during their 813th ordinary session in July this year. That decision bound all African countries to withdraw their teams from competing in the Montréal Games if New Zealand was permitted to participate.’92 No Olympic team that left the Games returned, despite the outreach from the UN, the Commonwealth and Canada. This boycott was the first major boycott of the modern-day Olympics and gave great international exposure to the anti-apartheid movement and the sports boycott.

By July 22, Michel Guay, Vice President Operations - Sports of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montréal 1976, wrote to Henry R. Banks, Technical Director of the IOC to let him know that the Organizing Committee had received confirmation of withdrawal from the Games from a total of 20 countries:

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<tr>
<th>Algeria</th>
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<td>Cameroons [sic]</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>Haute-Volta</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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91 Ibid.
Countries wrote to Guay and advised they were withdrawing due to the IOC’s decision to allow New Zealand to participate in the Games. A letter from the National Olympic Committee of Ethiopia states that while the South African government murders black students in Soweto:

The world has been shocked by this act of savagery and the entire International Community has condemned it, except the Government and the sport authorities of New Zealand which maintained the rugby team tour giving the evidence by this decision of their unconditional support to Apartheid and to the Genocide of the Black people.94

Tsegaw Ayele, head of the Ethiopian delegation notes, like several other African sports leaders, that the decision is not meant to harm the Canadian people nor the organisers of the Olympic Games.

By the time the Disabled Olympiad rolled around in August 1976, several countries chose to boycott these Games as well due to South Africa’s participation. Boycotting countries included: Jamaica, India, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. David Greig writes: ‘The number of athletes on the eight teams that did not participate was far higher than that of the South African athletes that would have had to stay home had they not been invited.’95 In total, 22 athletes participated from South Africa, nine non-white athletes and 13 white.

The boycott of the Olympics was deemed a resounding success by the international anti-apartheid movement - it garnered a vast amount of international attention to the anti-apartheid movement, it made the worldwide public aware of New Zealand’s continuing sporting ties with South Africa, and, most importantly, it proved the power and influence of the African nations.


CHAPTER 7: The Making of the Gleneagles Agreement

The 1976 Olympic Legacy

Domestically, many Canadians deemed the Olympics a success, despite the financial and political difficulties the Games encountered. Even separatist politician René Lévesque felt that ‘Ce n’est pas tout: les Jeux de Montréal se sont bien passés, malgré le déficit gigantesque et les grues qui défigurent le stade pendant les épreuves sportives.’

The province filled with pride after the Games, this pride did not last long. History has been unkind to the Montréal Games, long considered one of the worst Games in Olympic history.

In the end there was a deficit of approximately $1 billion; the budget of $310-million was grossly mismanaged. The official report of the IOC notes:

The gap between the financial projections and reality was the result of a long series of body-blows, including technical difficulties that could have been foreseen. Other factors contributing to a five-fold increase in expenditure over original projections included an underestimation of costs in general, the cost of material and manpower in particular, work stoppages that were both numerous and costly, and finally the new construction of the Olympic Park installations.

In addition, there was some loss of revenue due to the boycott and the necessary rescheduling and canceling of events, however, the Games on a whole were a major monetary loss for Montréal. An official judicial inquiry, by the Parti Québécois government, found that ‘Drapeau had let costs of constructing the Olympic Park run too high but that there were no other problems of real importance.’ Mismanagement and inexperience were the financial downfall of the Games.

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1 Daniel Poliquin. René Lévesque (Montréal: Boréal, 2009), p. 130. Author’s translation: the Montréal Games went well, in spite of the gigantic deficit and the cranes which disfigured the city during the sporting tests.


Soon after the end of the Olympics there was a provincial election in Québec. Surprisingly, the Olympic debt and mismanagement of the Games was not the most important topic of the campaign. In 1973, Bourassa had defeated Parti Québécois (PQ) leader Lévesque in a provincial election. With that defeat, the PQ began to tone down its separatist rhetoric. Responding to its defeat, they indicated ‘once elected, it would hold a referendum on sovereignty, rather than leading the province immediately into independence.’\(^4\) Clearly, the appetite for separatism which had increased through the late 1960s, had faded in the wake of the October Crisis. Lévesque would have to reevaluate his tactics in order to have a chance at winning the next provincial election; separatism alone would not get him voted into power.

In 1974, Bourassa’s government passed Bill 22 which made French the official language of Québec. This alienated English-speaking citizens of the province. Things having quieted since the October Crisis and with English-speaking Québécoers feeling isolated, separatism became a non-issue. The PQ campaigned on the slogan ‘Ca ne peut plus continuer comme ca’ (Things can’t go on this way), which appealed to people fed-up with the Bourassa government, even non-separatists.\(^5\) The PQ was elected with a majority of 41%, versus 24% for the Liberals, 18% for Union Nationale. Richard Cleroux writes: ‘The election of a PQ majority Government has far-reaching implications for the future of Canada. But it places the PQ Government in a difficult position because an overwhelming majority of Québecker [sic] have clearly expressed themselves against separation in opinion poles.’\(^6\) Lévesque was given a clear mandate to lead the province. It was only a matter of time before separatism would move to the forefront of Canadian politics, once again.

Internationally, the boycott of the 1976 Montréal Olympics is considered the first major disruptive protest of the modern day Olympic movement. Despite attempts by the IOC to separate the politics and the Games, politics had a way of sneaking in. Sam Ramsamy points out that ‘The United States made the first political protest when its team refused to dip their flag to King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra at the opening


\(^5\) Jeff Simpson. ‘René Lévesque ’76: this time the separatism is played down’, *Globe and Mail* November 2, 1976, p. 2.

ceremony of the 1908 London Olympics.  

The Games, by their nature, are political; nations coming together to compete on the world stage promotes nationalism like no other world event. The Montréal Games were unique; the African teams showed up with every intention to participate but the athletes were forced to leave. The reactions and consequential repercussions of the Montréal Games were important to the development of the South African sports boycott and the anti-apartheid movement in general, international sport, Commonwealth relations, United Nations and the Special Committee Against Apartheid, the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, African countries' relations with Western countries, and the development of sport within South Africa itself. David R. Black states 'The Montréal boycott significantly widened the sanctions campaign, which henceforth targeted not only South African teams and athletes but also representatives from third countries that maintained links with South Africa.' Simply, the boycott created a massive worldwide domino effect.

As a whole, the Montréal Olympics were highly politicised. Besides the Taiwan situation and the boycott by African nations, there were other incidents of politics, including the burning of a Soviet flag outside the athletes village. N. Kurdjukov, Secretary-General of the USSR Olympic Committee, wrote a letter of protest to IOC President, Lord Killanin, in which he indicated that the IOC should interfere in these types of protests to protect 'delegations participating in the Games of the XXI Olympiade [sic] from any kind of hostile actions.' According to Killanin, these incidents were created by the 'Ukrainian émigré population' north of Montréal. The participation of the Soviet team in the Olympic Movement received a vast amount of attention from the general public. In July 1976, in the midst of the politicisation of the Games, the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry, London, England wrote to Killanin at the IOC noting:

> By refusing South Africa or Taiwan the right of participation, the Olympic Committee have fallen to political pressure. ... We fail to see how having done so, this Committee permits the Soviet Union’s participation and further

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will grant that Government the honour of hosting such an important occasion as the Olympic Games in 1980.11

A similar letter was also received from the Southport Committee for Soviet Jewry, Merseyside, England. In the same vein, one Canadian wrote to the IOC in August 1976 arguing that she finds it impossible to understand why the Soviet Union and the satellite countries are permitted to compete in the games while South Africa and Rhodesia are forbidden entry to any events. The western democracies refuse to compete with South Africa because of its repression of blacks and yet these same pillars of democracy will not only compete with countries that repress entire populations but salute one of these countries by allowing them to host the 1980 summer games. Surely we realize that the Soviet Union ignores the inalienable rights to “liberté, égalité, et fraternité” just as much if not more than Rhodesia and South Africa.12

The participation of the Soviet team at the 1976 Games created modest protests, but were overshadowed by the situation with Taiwan and the boycotting African nations. Cold War politics would lead to larger, more prominent boycotts at the next two Olympic Games - Moscow, 1980 and Los Angeles, 1984 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

A letter of protest was also received from a group called the Kansas City Businessmen, who vehemently disagreed with the IOC decisions not to allow sprinter James Gilkes of Guyana to participate in the Games independently.13 After Guyana withdrew from the Games, in solidarity with the African boycott, Gilkes had made a request to the IOC, asking to participate as an individual under the Olympic flag. The IOC insisted “…athletes could compete in the Games only when they had been certified by the appropriate NOCs. If the NOCs did not participate in the Games, no athletes from that country could compete.”14 At Montréal, athletes of the boycotting countries were victims of politics. They had trained most of their lives for their Olympic moment, only to have their opportunities dashed at the behest of their individual NOC or government.

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13 Ibid.
Montréal was a catalyst - the boycott marked the Olympics profoundly. According to Alan Tomlinson, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympics ‘was always aware that international sport could create tensions between nations quite as easily as harmony. Yet he persisted in his belief that an international athleticism could tip the balance towards peace.’\(^\text{15}\) This belief was naive, especially when viewed from the post World War II, Cold War years. During this time every cultural, sporting or, generally, international event had the opportunity to become politicised. In Canada, the Cold War drama played out on the ice, in hockey championships and tournaments with the USSR, most notably the 1972 Summit Series which Canada won four games to three, with one tie. The huge pride and intense nationalism this generated in the country is still felt today. After the African led boycott of the 1976 Games, the floodgates opened; countries saw boycotts could be effectual and followed suit. President Jimmy Carter of the United States called for an American boycott of the 1980 Winter Olympics in Moscow; many countries followed their lead and boycotted Moscow. In turn, the USSR boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. Sport boycotts provided an opportunity for nations and groups to exert power in non-violent ways. Boycotts were also beneficial due to the dialogue they created and the press and media they generated. To this day the boycott threat still looms large as a force for change. At the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Aboriginal groups in Canada called for a boycott and cancellation of the Games due to Native land claims. The African nations in 1976 showed the world how an effective boycott could work; the success of this action influenced other nations to follow suit. Nationalism and politics remain tightly linked with the Olympic Movement.

**Reaction to the Olympic Boycott**

Printed press reaction to the boycott was slow to develop, mainly because the preoccupation with Taiwan and the IOC took up much of the newspaper space at the time. However, once the Taiwan situation was resolved, and with the increasing number of African nations leaving Montréal, there was increased press coverage of the boycott. Often the coverage was straightforward narrative of events, with very little

analysis of why the boycott occurred, but the Ottawa Citizen's William Frye offered a hefty article which delves into the reasons for the boycott:

To many in the West, that boycott seems to reflect a distorted perspective. Denying talented athletes an opportunity to take part at the summit of world sport simply to protest New Zealand’s willingness to send a rugby team to South Africa seems close to unbelievable. ... The sending of athletic teams to South Africa makes a significant difference. South Africans are great fans, especially of rugby, and when opportunities to watch top performers are lost because of South Africa’s discriminatory practices there is pressure on the government to ease the discrimination. ... Continued desegregation of sport could be a major encouragement for reform of abhorrent racial practices in other areas of South African life. It could help produce the national change of heart which many moderates, both inside and outside South Africa, have long hoped for.16

Frye offers telling analysis at a time when other press outlets focused on the sequence of events and the operational aftermath for the Games. Frye tries to explain to Citizen readers why the boycott was so important to African nations. It was not taken lightly; the boycotting nations hoped to create discussion internationally and effect change.

Newspapers also focused on the immediate aftermath and ripple effects of the boycott - the story became front page news at all the major Canadian dailies. The detrimental operational effects on planned matches, especially those of soccer and boxing, and the automatic drop in revenue due to cancelled events were noted by both the Ottawa Citizen and Montréal Star.17 The already debt-laden Montréal Olympics suffered due to additional losses of revenue.

Newspapers also reported on the workings of SAN-ROC during the Games. Many sports federations were holding meetings in Montréal during the Olympics. SAN-ROC jumped on these gatherings, using the opportunity to make their case for the expulsion of South Africa from international sporting federations. Douglas Booth explains that SAN-ROC built its credibility by ‘adopting specific sports objectives’ and using strategies like diplomatic persuasion and petitioning to effect change.18 SAN-ROC’s worked tirelessly to disseminate its message and took every opportunity to attain the


goal of complete isolation of South African sport. On July 20, 1976, Richard Cleroux reported that the week before ‘...working through the Supreme Sports Council, SAN-ROC was able to get South Africa expelled from the international body of governing soccer, the Federation Internationale du Football Association [FIFA], by a convincing 78-9 vote.’ In preparation for the meetings in Montréal FIFA sent a committee of three to South Africa to observe the country’s sports policies. They met with senior officials from the non-racial South Africa Soccer Federation, led by Norman Middleton, who submitted a memorandum urging FIFA to expel the all-white Football Association of South Africa (FASA) from international soccer. In line with the pattern of the boycott and anti-apartheid movement, non-white South African athletes and administrators urged the international organisation of FIFA to exclude South Africa as a member. FIFA had previously suspended the all-white FASA in 1962 to 1963. They were reinstated when FASA ‘assured FIFA that it was doing its best for Non-White soccer - within the limits of the law.’ The suspension, however, was reinstated in 1964. In 1976, FIFA completely expelled the South African delegation. Although football was not a popular white sport in South Africa (it was mostly played by black South Africans), this was a key expulsion for SAN-ROC, the strategy of lobbying behind the scenes of the Olympics to isolate South Africa was given a boost.

Also during the Olympics, the Federation Internationale de Natation (FINA) conference in Montréal, ratified its 1973 decision to expel South Africa from the governing body of swimming. After South Africa’s official expulsions from international football and swimming, the country faced another major expulsion. On July 23 when the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), ‘which governs non-professional track and field, expelled the Amateur Athletic Union of South Africa by a vote of 227 to 145. The action makes permanent a year-to-year suspension imposed on South Africa by the federation six years ago.’ This was a major event; the IAAF was a huge

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organisation with many yearly meets and competitions. Although many of the African
delegates had arrived with their official teams, these teams had since left Montréal due
to the boycott. Behind the scenes, Sam Ramsamy worked to find accommodation for
the African IAAF delegates. Their votes were crucial and were needed to ensure that
the IAAF expelled South Africa. Their expulsion was crushing. ‘For years, South African
Athletics had been stopped from competing in international matches (as
representatives of South Africa) but could only compete as individuals. This expulsion
brought the above concession to an end.’ The Ottawa Citizen reported that Jean-
Claude Ganga was pleased with the results of the vote and would continue to press on
in the fight to have South Africa excluded from more international federations under
which they were still allowed representation. South Africa’s banning from major
international sport federations solidified their isolation, creating an inhospitable
atmosphere for South African sport teams and athletes. Their isolation from
international sport continued to grow through the late 1970s and well into the 1980s.

Another SAN-ROC success was that, through lobbying, they were able to have a South
African hospitality suite closed before the end of the Olympics. As indicated previously,
the South Africans had hoped to set-up a Friendship House during the Olympics. As an
alternative to the Friendship House, a discreet headquarters in the basement bar of the
Laurentian Hotel, called the Kittie Lounge, was set up ‘to counter the virulent anti-South
African lobby by Black African nations and organizations at this year’s Olympics.’ It
appeared that the lobby was set-up by the Association of African Travel Bureaus,
however, ‘...the white South African who operate the headquarters, using it as a
hospitality suite for journalists, athletes and Olympic sports officials say the costs are
paid for by a group of anonymous South African philanthropic sportsmen.’ Although
the lounge was rented for the duration of the Olympics, it was forced to close down
early because of lobbying from SAN-ROC and other protesters.

In terms of press coverage, there were two final important notes. First, growing fear
that an African boycott would affect the 1978 Commonwealth Games, due to be held in

24 Author unknown, ‘Sport’, p. 189.


26 Richard Cleroux. ‘South Africa sets up lobby against Blacks’ Games stand’, Globe and Mail, July 22,
1976, p. 46.

27 Ibid.
Edmonton; Ganga said that African nations would boycott the Commonwealth Games “... if competing countries do not break sports contact with South Africa.” This fear was also held by the Canadian government and other Commonwealth nations. Second, on July 21, the Toronto Star reported that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) feared a new row would be touched off as the United States gymnastic team, reportedly, planned on leaving the Olympics early to participate in a gymnastics competition in South Africa. The IOC feared more walkouts if the US team left. As the boycott movement gained momentum, coverage and popularity, South Africa was quickly becoming a sporting pariah. Going forward, fewer and fewer countries would choose to participate in sporting events which included representatives of the apartheid state.

In August 1976, the Anglican Church of Canada made a statement on the situation in South Africa, it focused on the continuing dissent in South Africa sparked by Soweto and did not touch upon the boycott of the Olympics. The statement called on ‘Canadians through our churches, governments, banks, corporations and media must now more than ever demonstrate that they support the legitimate struggle of the Blacks in South Africa for freedom and oppose the racist Vorster regime.’ The Anglican Church continued to focus on demonstrating their abhorrence of apartheid through the boycott of goods and calling on the Canadian government and companies to cease trade and investment with South Africa. The Anglican Church of Canada never took up the cause of the anti-apartheid movement in sport, they focused on humanitarian aid, working conditions, and the cessation of investment and trade. Other organisations requested that the Trudeau government make changes to Canadian foreign policy, including the termination of diplomatic and trading ties with South Africa. With the increase in violence in South Africa, letters and telegrams were sent to Trudeau from trade unions, student associations, anti-apartheid groups and churches, including: Conseil Québécois De La Paix; Graduate Students Union University of Toronto; National Association of South Africans in Canada; United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America (Toronto); Ontario Voice of Women (Ottawa); Community Party of Canada; Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto; Canadians Concerned About

Southern Africa. The groups were calling for the cessation of ties between Canada and South Africa, the hope being that Trudeau’s government would take the necessary steps to impose strict, progressive sanctions on South Africa. This included ending Canada’s diplomatic relationship with South Africa, imposing trade and economic sanctions, and ceasing every form of sport and culture contact.

In terms of IOC reaction, immediately following the Games, Lord Killanin felt that, although politics had affected in the Olympic Games, in a variety of ways since 1896, nothing compared to the scale of political interference at Montréal. He sent a message to international federations to see how they were handling the boycott of the Games. Killanin indicated that he

...would be most grateful if you could reply to me at Chateau de Vidy before September 15th on how the withdrawal of certain countries in view of the South Africa/New Zealand situation affected your competitions, whether you have or are taking any action in regard to sanctions and whether your rules permit special sanctions.

I would be grateful also for any information on how the Republic of China (Taiwan) situation affected your competitions and whether you can confirm the latest position regarding recognition of either the Peoples’ Republic of China or the Republic of China (Taiwan). Further, perhaps you could also confirm your situation in regard to South Africa and Rhodesia.

By surveying the policies of other international federations, Killanin’s aim was to establish whether or not sanctions of the Taiwanese, Guyanese and African NOCs would be useful and deemed acceptable. The question of the withdrawals were discussed at the IOC meeting in Barcelona; in a press release dated October 17, 1976, the Executive Board placed the following blame:

The unfortunate situation which arose in Montréal was predominantly caused by:

The failure of the Canadian Government to fulfill [sic] the conditions under which the Games were given to the City of Montréal by its refusal to admit a recognised National Olympic Committee;


The obligation of certain NOC delegations to withdraw from the Games in Montréal due to pressures exerted by outside authorities.34

The IOC Executive Board squarely places responsibility on the Canadian government for the Taiwan situation at the 1976 Games and the African nations’, including their NOCs, for the boycott. In both cases, outside political forces interfered in the running of the Olympic Games. The IOC did not take a strong stand against boycotting countries as it felt suspensions of NOCs would only truly effect the athletes who were, for the most part, innocent bystanders in the boycott saga.

In the wake of the boycott, the IOC attempted to decipher exactly which countries boycotted the Montréal Games. By late 1976 it was clear that 22 countries actually withdrew from the Games and eight made entries but did not arrive for no identified reason.35 After the boycott, at the behest of Killanin, NOCs provided the IOC with explanations for their actions. Toumany Sangaré, President of the Guinea Olympic Committee explained that the decision to leave Montréal:

...was received with enthusiasm and relief by our people who consider it one of the greatest sports victories that their athletes have won throughout the history of international competitions.

Through its significance and scope this victory by African sportsmen goes beyond the simple framework of sport. It enters the line of great victories which Africa continues to win in its worldwide and many-sided struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism and all forms of injustice.

The African countries’ firm and courageous attitude at Montréal was the brilliant demonstration of Africa’s resolute wish henceforth to impose the respect for its personality upon other countries and peoples.36

Sangaré notes that Guineans fully supported the boycott and embraced it with much enthusiasm. He believed that the boycott was good for all of Africa - it was a show of the continent’s strength. However, information from the IOC member for Tunisia, Mohamed Mzali, provided a contrasting point of view, he did not agree with the boycott


35 See Appendix C for the IOC list of countries and the reason they provided for withdrawing from the Olympic Games.

at all and felt that Ordia has ‘...organized the whole affair in a very high-handed manner.’ Mzali notes that he would like the IOC to discover exactly what happened and how decisions were made and, more importantly, why sport authorities received no instructions prior to landing in Montréal.37

A review of IOC archival files found a significant amount of responses to Lord Killanin’s request for additional information, the highlights of which are found here. In January 1977, W.P. Nyirènda, Chairman of the Zambia Olympic, Commonwealth and All Africa Games Association, let the IOC know that ‘As faithful members of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations, we could not adopt an ostrich-like attitude in relation to the actions of countries like New Zealand which give aid and encouragement to the perpetrators of the abominable system of apartheid.’ Abraham Ordia, acting in his role as Secretary-General of the Nigeria Olympic Committee, wrote to the IOC in September 1976 ‘We strongly object to the principle of New Zealand maintaining sporting relationship [sic] with racist South Africa in spite of the fact that the IOC has withdrawn recognition from the National Olympic Committee of that country and that nine-tenths of International Sports Federations have either suspended or expelled South Africa, all for the latter’s apartheid policies in sport.’ Uganda’s and Kenya’s Olympic Committees supported the OAU resolution and let the IOC know that is why they did not participate. Other countries that provided explanatory letters to the IOC included: Algeria and Swaziland, who both noted that their respective governments had requested that they withdraw. The Algerian Olympic Committee supported this decision; Swaziland’s Olympic Committee did not and claimed that its government’s action was a ‘blatant case of political interference in sport’.38 It is clear that each NOC, and thereby each African boycotting participant, had differing points of view on how the boycott came about and whether or not it was successful. However, the reasons for boycotting fell, generally, into two main camps - one, the NOCs who were instructed to boycott at the direction of their country’s central government and two, some NOCS felt the OAU call for a boycott of Montréal was just and withdrew from the Games in support of the boycott.


The IOC had neglected to take the boycott threat seriously. They were too focused on ensuring the viability of the Montréal Games and, once they were secure the Games would go ahead, they were then too preoccupied with the Taiwan situation. They deserve part of the blame for the failure of the Games and the success of the boycott, they were too short-sighted and preoccupied to take the African threat seriously. Although the IOC did not punish or sanction those countries involved with the 1976 boycott, they adopted a resolution that attempted to eliminate the interference of politics at Olympic Games. Lord Killanin recalls:

There was a feeling that those countries who withdrew for political reasons should be sanctioned, but it was a measure which would not affect the responsible politicians. A new rule was passed so that an NOC which had entered athletes for competitions could not withdraw them except on grounds of health, and this was designed to dissuade countries carrying their demonstrations into the Olympic arena where, for instance, an African runner might refuse to appear in the same heat as a New Zealander. The IOC was weak not to sanction those who withdrew for political reasons.39

By imposing this new rule, the IOC hoped to avoid future boycotts; they hope this rule would be a sufficient deterrent in countries contemplating a boycott of the Games. Killanin and the IOC did not want the Olympics to be used to advance political agendas. Notably, Killanin reiterated that sanctions would have punished African athletes, not the actual individuals responsible for following the boycott.

As IOC President, Killanin tried to avoid bringing politics into the Olympics. In a letter dated January 1977 to a Mr. A. Hebert of New Zealand, Monique Berlioux, Director of the IOC writes:

I would comment that whilst the IOC deplores, even forbids, racial discrimination in Olympic sport, it has absolutely no authority at the present time to boycott countries which permit and aid sports contact with those exercising apartheid, and would only be able to make a recommendation in this respect. Its field of power is restricted to the Olympic Games and recognised Olympic sports (of which rugby - the sport in question - is not one), and therefore the African countries' demand that New Zealand be excluded from the Montréal Olympic Games could not be considered.

On the contrary, within its scope the IOC now has the authority to suspend or withdraw recognition of an NOC which infringes the Olympic Rules. As pointed out by Lord Killanin in his letter, by withdrawing in protest against New Zealand's participation in the Games (thus using the Games as a

39 Killanin, My Olympic Years, pp. 135-6.
political platform), the African countries have caused severe disruption to the planned events' programme and indeed contravened the Rules, although it was decided not to apply sanctions in this particular instance.40

In terms of historiography, the Olympic boycott of 1976 has been hailed as a major blow to apartheid sport and an important turning point in the anti-apartheid sports boycott. According to Bruce Kidd: 'Although sharply criticized by the Western media, which interpreted the obvious shock and disappointment of departing athletes and coaches as opposition to the decision, the boycott achieved both immediate and long-term results.'41 Kidd notes that within days, FIFA and the IAAF had expelled South African and '...before the year was up, the IOC had agreed to use its 'moral suasion' against South African sporting contacts, even in non-Olympic sports.'42 The boycott gave credence to the call for South African sport isolation, it did not go unnoticed by major sports leaders at the time.

Most importantly, Kidd, and other historians, point out that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau feared a boycott of the Edmonton Commonwealth Games - he did not want to host 'a conspicuously white-only games'.43 This boycott fear was an important catalyst in the adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement. Trudeau and other Commonwealth countries began preparations for the upcoming 1977 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), being held in London, England. This preparation included lobbying support for a declaration against apartheid in sport and an easing of hostility towards New Zealand from non-white Commonwealth countries. On July 30, 1976, Prime Minister Trudeau met with Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal. The memorandum regarding their discussion has been removed from its External Affairs file. This file was originally closed, and, when it was opened through an Access


42 Ibid.

to Information request, this document was withheld from the public.\footnote{Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 3062, File 105 - July 30, 1976.} This leaves the reader wondering what Trudeau and Ramphal discussed. Why is it still important for the record of this conversation to remain closed, more than 30 years after the fact?

Abraham Ordia issued a press statement in November 1976 noting that the SCSA’s concern was now focused on the upcoming All-African Games and the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. In regards to the Commonwealth Games Ordia questioned: ‘Will New Zealand be taking part in the Games while maintaining sporting relations with Apartheid South Africa?’\footnote{Historical Archives of the International Olympic Committee. CIO JO-1976S-BOYCO, 1971-1988, 204879 - November 17, 1976.} And, he notes, that Bill Young, a vice-president of the Commonwealth Games Federation, was quoted as saying “Africans were not missed in Montréal and would not be missed in Edmonton. If the Africans wish to withdraw, it’s entirely their business, the Games will go on. Eleven White nations founded the Games 45 years ago and they will compete in Edmonton.”\footnote{Ibid.} By quoting Young’s statement, Ordia preyed on the fears of Trudeau and other Commonwealth political figures. An all-white Games would have disastrous repercussions on the Commonwealth as a whole; the boycott threat was real and had plagued other host cities throughout the 1970s. Finally, Ordia points out:

> In Canada, Australia and Great Britain, although a few sports associations and clubs still continue to compete with South Africa, the Governments of these countries are publicly opposed to such exchanges and make their views well known to the associations and clubs involved. The New Zealand Government, in contrast, defiantly and openly aid and support such sporting exchanges. This is why we make a clear difference between New Zealand and other countries. That is why we shall continue to boycott all competitions, Championships or Games in which New Zealand, individually or collectively, are also to feature.\footnote{Ibid.}

The SCSA took exception to the Muldoon government’s policy. Canada, Australia and Great Britain, by this time, had all adopted the policy of discouraging sports contact with South Africa. Canada also refused financial assistance and funding for events taking place in South Africa and events taking place in Canada in which South African athletes were invited. Although the African nations would have preferred a complete
boycott of South Africa, they accepted the public admonishment of South African sporting contact by the governments of Canada, Australia and Great Britain.

South Africa itself reacted to the boycott in a most unexpected way. In 1976, after the Olympics, the government announced further changes in its sport policy that enhanced existing multinational sport policies. The Canadian daily, the Globe and Mail, reported that integrated teams would be able to represent South Africa abroad and compete against each other within South Africa.48 Sam Ramsamy indicates that ‘the eight-point plan defined the parameters within which mixed sport would henceforth be permissible. It provided for mixed race events or leagues to be arranged by “umbrella” sports bodies at national or provincial level, but only under certain specified circumstances.’49

With this change in policy, Vincent Tshabalala, a black golfer, became the first black athlete to receive the Springbok colours and an Indian from Rhodesia, I. Ramabhai, was allowed to play squash in the South African Open championships.50 According to Booth, multinational sport’s extension to the club level ‘...marked an ideological turning point. Rather than portraying mixed sport as synonymous with racial conflict, the state claimed that it would ease racial conflict.’51 Again, like the initial change to multinational sport, the government of South Africa hoped that these amendments would make apartheid in sport more palatable to international sports organisations. The government’s main concern was that integration should occur through white sporting federations, not through existing multiracial federations with links to SACOS.52 Guelke notes that SACOS was an unequivocal supporter of the international sports boycott of South Africa and ‘its policy was that even SACOS affiliates achieving international recognition should not participate in international sport until apartheid itself was dismantled.’53 Booth explains that for SACOS ‘...there was a greater appreciation that sport did not transcend politics and that black people would continue to experience

49 Sam Ramsamy. Apartheid: The Real Hurdle (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1982), pp. 36-7. For a full transcript of the points, please see Appendix D.
50 Nauright, Sport, Cultures and Identities, p. 142.
51 Booth, The Race Game, p. 104.
53 Ibid.
discrimination in sport while they suffered mass unemployment and poor living conditions, inadequate health services and transport, housing shortages, inferior education and subsistence wages.\textsuperscript{54} However, most countries saw these moves as tokenism and blatant attempts to seek reinstatement into international sporting organisations; there were no real changes in the policy - apartheid was still vigorously applied to sport.

The final legacy to be addressed is that of the Toronto Paralympiad. As noted, the Olympiad for the Disabled went ahead, as planned with South African participation, in August 1976. Although Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was an official patron of the Paralympiad, it does not appear that he withdrew his patronage after the funding debacle, but he did not attend any of the Games. Minister for Health and Welfare, Lalonde, tried to recoup the $50,000 advance the federal government gave to the Olympiad’s organising committee. The committee refused to return the money, so Paul Woodstock, Assistant Deputy Minister, Fitness and Amateur Sport, requested a legal opinion from the Legal Services department of the federal government on recovery of the $50,000 advance. As the money was approved and the contract signed between the federal government and the Olympiad, prior to July 1975, there was little hope of recouping the money. According to Robert F. Lee, Director of Legal Services, the only hope of making a case was the facet that Jackson had sent a letter to the Minister, Lalonde, indicating that he

\[...\text{had accepted the Government’s posture regarding South African participation and would proceed to inform the South African organizers that they would be unable to participate. }...\text{ It may be that the subsequent breach of this undertaking would disqualify the 1976 Olympiad from receiving the $450,000 which they might have otherwise obtained. It may also well be that the 1976 Olympiad may be entitled to keep the $50,000 already forwarded to them since the Minister in his letter of June 4, 1976, officially advises Dr. Jackson that the Olympiad is no longer eligible for financial assistance from the Government of Canada.}\textsuperscript{55}\]

It remained possible that if the government tried to sue the Committee for the $50,000 they wanted returned, the Committee would counter-sue for the remaining $450,000 that had been promised to them in the contract. In September 1976, after further


\textsuperscript{55} Sport Canada Fonds. RG29 Volume 3239, File 7122/W561-5(1) - August 3, 1976.
investigations, Legal Services lets Woodstock know that, based on an opinion from the government’s Justice Regional Director of Toronto, ‘there was no legal condition upon which the $50,000 was made ... the breach of which the Crown could recover upon.’56 Due to the unclear policies and the lack of publicity and appropriate dissemination of information surrounding Canada’s decision to withhold funds from events with South African participants, the federal government could not force the Committee to refund the $50,000 advance. The government ended up allocating the $450,000 that would have gone to the Olympiad to ‘extending additional support to sport for the handicapped’ in Canada.57 This was a key move as the government had been accused of discrimination against disabled athletes; the donation would go a long way in repairing the government’s reputation in the eyes of disabled athletes and organisations.

Preparing for London and Gleneagles
Canada had a long, tactical road ahead; it was the nation’s goal to prevent another boycott. According to Macintosh, Greenhorn and Black, by December 1976, government officials had prepared recommendations for Prime Minister Trudeau, which included: ‘urging the New Zealand High Commissioner to impress upon his government the necessity of meeting with SCSA President Ordia; requesting the personal assistance of leaders of key Commonwealth countries; and sending a special emissary to appropriate countries to seek a solution to the problem.’58 The government of Canada took on the major responsibility of tackling this issue. As the host of the Olympic Games which fell victim to an African boycott and as the upcoming host of the 1978 Commonwealth Games, Canada was in a unique and important leadership position. According to Baka and Hoy ‘Canada’s involvement in this controversial matter has been to attempt to discourage a planned boycott of the 1978 Games by many of the disgruntled black member nations. As host of the upcoming festival, Canada does not want a repeat of the African boycott which plagued the 1976 Olympic Games.’59 Finding a solution to the boycott threat became a key foreign policy task for the

57 Ibid.
government over the next two years. Mihir Bose explains that Canada was held in high esteem by black Commonwealth members and felt that ‘something must be done to prevent the Games from being disrupted.’ Canada had a sense of moral responsibility to ensure the Games were a success for all Commonwealth members and, more importantly, the Canadians did not want to fall victim to a second major sport boycott in two years.

Sir Keith Holyoake, Minister of State for New Zealand, in September 1976, travelled to New York City to explain New Zealand’s position regarding sports contact with South Africa to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. He was there in an effort to repair the damage caused by the Olympic boycott and made a ‘scathing’ attack against apartheid, informing the General Assembly that his government would remind New Zealand sports bodies of relevant UN resolutions on apartheid. The New Zealand government was in damage control; it had quickly become a pariah in international sport. New Zealand had established a reputation for being a racially tolerant country; its treatment of its native population, the Maoris, was progressive. Yet, now they were closely associated with South Africa’s apartheid regime and showed, despite their protests to the contrary, implicit support of apartheid through its sporting contacts. Despite Holyoake’s trip, Professor Cecil Abrahams, the Canadian representative of SAN-ROC, said that ‘pressure will be intensified to keep New Zealand out of the 1978 Games’ and pointed out that South Africa’s changes in its apartheid sport policy were a hoax and attempt to fool the world into thinking changes had occurred.

In a letter dated December 15, 1976, Prime Minister Muldoon, in response to Jean-Claude Ganga, lays out his country’s current policy in regards to apartheid South Africa and sport. In conciliatory tones he writes:

The New Zealand Government deplores the selection of any sports team, from South Africa or anywhere else, on a basis of racial discrimination. We have therefore said publicly that we do not welcome, encourage, or give recognition to exchanges with teams selected on the basis of apartheid. ... Sporting bodies in New Zealand have traditionally be autonomous organisations wholly free from Government control. ... During the last few months there has been a significant change in attitudes of New Zealanders


towards sporting contacts with South Africa. This has been reflected in a series of decisions taken by sporting bodies themselves. On 29 November the New Zealand Lawn Tennis Association announced that it was withdrawing the invitation it has previously issued for the 1978 Federation Cup competition for international women’s tennis to be held in New Zealand if it could not be held in Australia. On 3 December, the New Zealand Rugby Football Union, the largest sporting organisation in this country, announced that it had declined an invitation to send a representative Maori team to South Africa in 1978. Other sporting bodies in this country have cancelled planned exchanges with South Africa. Public opinion in this country has in fact moved to the point where I believe there will be no more significant contacts with racially selected teams from South Africa.63

Muldoon explicitly states that his government does not support sporting exchanges with teams selected on the basis of apartheid. In an attempt to calm things down and appease the OAU and the SCSA, Muldoon reaffirmed that sports organisations are autonomous in New Zealand, but, at the same time, highlights that although they are autonomous and free to associate with any country they choose, his government does not support racial discrimination in sport. It was hoped that such a statement from New Zealand would prevent a Commonwealth Games boycott.

In January 1977, Allan MacEachen, in a memorandum to Trudeau, laid out Canada’s current sport policy with South Africa versus New Zealand’s:

Canada will not give financial or moral support to Canadian teams who wish to travel to South Africa, or to Canadian sport bodies who wish to invite South African teams to compete in Canada. ... The New Zealand Government has no sport funding policy; therefore, no means of denying financial support. ... The difference between our policies is therefore that while we explicitly deny financial support, New Zealand has none to deny. Also, we are willing to criticize contacts, while the New Zealand Government is only willing to advise against them if their opinion is asked by sport bodies. ... Canadian policies have not been summed up in a public statement since this controversy began. As several Canadian sports federations are known to be contemplating contacts with South Africa within the next two years, I believe that the Government should publicly voice its opposition to all such contacts as soon as possible.64

In his analysis from External Affairs, MacEachen points out that it is important for the Government to clearly state what its policies are and how they differ from New Zealand. This remark was twofold in its importance. Firstly, Canada began a two-year term of the UN Security Council ‘at a time when international pressure for stronger

action against apartheid was becoming increasingly irresistible. And, secondly, in the run up to the Commonwealth Games Canada needed to distance itself from New Zealand and anything the two countries had in common in terms of their policies regarding apartheid sport.

In January 1977, the Cultural Affairs Division of the Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) Office undertook a similar comparison of Britain’s sport policies with South Africa. An FCO memorandum states:

New Zealand’s policies on sporting contacts with South Africa are not, in fact, much different from our own. In the last resort we cannot prohibit sporting bodies from making their own decision but we are careful not to highlight this. We also take every opportunity of publicly deploring racialism in sport and discourage, at Ministerial level, sporting contacts with those who practice it. The New Zealand Prime Minister on the other hand, has chosen to emphasise the independence of New Zealand’s sporting bodies rather than these aspects of his Government’s policies which would be more acceptable to African Governments.

The memo also points out that Canada sees the boycott threat as not only a threat to the Commonwealth Games, but a threat to the Commonwealth itself; a concern shared by Britain. The importance of a successful boycott-free Commonwealth Games was also important to British foreign policy. Another boycott by non-white Commonwealth countries would have caused irreparable damage to the Commonwealth as a viable, multiracial institution.

Also in January, a cable was sent to External Affairs in Ottawa reporting on a meeting of the Organization for African Unity (OAU). According to the cable, the President of the SCSA, Abraham Ordia, called on delegates to find a solution to apartheid in sport through unity, not recrimination. To the cable writer, Ordia inferred that the boycott decision in Montréal had been taken in haste and he wanted to avoid future similar situations. The writer of the telegram is confident that Ordia and Ganga are sympathetic to Canada’s views and that Ordia is determined to see the Commonwealth

67 Ibid.
Games succeed. Along these same lines, Ivan Head, wrote in a memo to Trudeau in preparation for an upcoming press conference, in early February 1977, that in regards to the Commonwealth Games:

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa has recommended to the OAU that the boycott against competitions with New Zealand athletic teams be suspended for the time being while a continuing close watch be made of New Zealand activities and attitudes with respect to apartheid. We are not yet out of the woods with respect to the Commonwealth Games but this is certainly a forward step, though not as complete as we should have liked. If asked, you could welcome the decision taken by the SCSA and express your confidence that the Games will proceed, on the basis of correspondence which you understand has passed between Prime Minister Muldoon and the African body.

Head was confident that the boycott could be prevented. News that he felt the Prime Minister could surely report to the media in a press conference. Encouraging words from Muldoon and pressure from within made the SCSA reconsider its positions in regards to the boycott. Ironically, by trying to isolate South Africa from international sport, African nations were also isolating themselves.

In response to his letter from late 1976, New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon was asked by Ordia to make clear his country’s policy on visas to sporting groups from South Africa. In a press statement which included quotes from his letter of response, Muldoon reiterated and elaborated on his previous letter to the SCSA - sport organisations in New Zealand were multiracial and that they were ‘...autonomous organisations wholly free from Government control and do not depend on Government for financial support. It is the Government’s policy not to interfere in their affairs. The Government does not therefore seek to dictate to New Zealand sports bodies what teams they should or should not play against. It does, however, deplore the selection of any team in any country on a basis other than merit.’ Muldoon clarified that his government would not change its stance - non-interference in sport was an important aspect of his election campaign and the government was unwilling to bend to appease political forces outside of New Zealand. Non-interference in sport had been a standard policy of most New Zealand governments, starting in 1960 when Prime Minister Walter

69 Ibid.


Nash indicated that, although the government was opposed to racial discrimination, it would not prevent or interfere with the Rugby Union’s right to proceed with an All Blacks tour of South Africa. Muldoon’s government continued along the same lines by refusing to interfere with the Rugby Union’s actions. His government would also not prevent its athletes from traveling abroad nor would they put visa restrictions on South African athletes traveling to New Zealand.

By March 1977, the OAU was, again, calling for a boycott of the Commonwealth Games. The Star reported ‘The African boycott of sports events involving New Zealand will be widened to include any country maintaining sports links with South Africa...’ Canada, responsible for hosting the upcoming Commonwealth Games, was obviously concerned. In a cable to External Affairs in Ottawa a press release from the OAU Secretariat noted with concern continuing sports contact with apartheid South Africa by countries and international sport organisations and, building on the successful boycott of 1976, passed a resolution calling on OAU members, throughout 1977 and 1978, to refrain from participating in any sporting events which include athletes from New Zealand or any other country maintaining sporting ties with New Zealand. The calls for a boycott were back on. According to the OAU, there had been no discernible change in New Zealand’s policy; the country still maintained sporting contacts with South Africa.

In a further conversation with Ordia, according to a cable to Ottawa, the ‘cause of the strong OAU resolution was continuing erosion of New Zealand’s credibility.’ Ordia also told the telegram writer:

that if New Zealand were to take demonstrable steps to terminate all sporting links with Republic of South Africa then he and OAU Secretary General would be in position to set in motion lifting of boycott. This he considered could be achieved by obtaining clearance of OAU chairman and without need for further OAU deliberation. However, when it came to what would constitute demonstrable action on New Zealand’s part he would go

74 NA/FCO 13/862 - March 1, 1977.
no/no further than say it would have to be unequivocal [sic] statement in public which he doubted Muldoon would give.76

Although Ordia felt that steps had been taken by New Zealand to ease the situation, the OAU had taken a hard line in response to Muldoon’s February letter and New Zealand’s continually providing of visas to South African athletes.

Trudeau, the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, and Commonwealth Secretariat, Shridath Ramphal, went about finding a solution that would appease the OAU and Muldoon. A memo from M.F. Daly in the Cultural Relations Department of the FCO, dated March 1977, states:

John Noble of the Canadian High Commission came to meet me at his request yesterday. His main purpose was to emphasise the importance the Canadians attach to seeing that the Commonwealth Games went off smoothly; they would coincide with Federal elections and the government were particularly anxious not to have any trouble in Alberta. I said we shared the Canadians concern.77

Along with trying to prevent a poor showing at the Commonwealth Games, it appears that the Canadian government was also concerned with the upcoming elections. Alberta, noted in the memo, is historically not a strong supporter of the Liberal Party of Canada. Ensuring that the Edmonton Commonwealth Games went off without a hitch would be important to Alberta voters. The memo also touches upon both Canada’s and Britain’s policies towards apartheid sport:

We agreed that our own policies were very similar and that although it was difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the attendance of South Africans and other possible undesirables at sporting contests, our policies of reiterating our advice to sporting bodies not to give encouragement to contacts with teams selected on a basis of racial discrimination was acceptable to the Africans. We agreed that it was singularly unfortunate that Mr Muldoon did not seem prepared to use a similar form of words.78

Both Daly and Noble agreed that the situation surrounding the upcoming CHOGM and the Commonwealth Games boycott was worsening. The governments began to redouble their efforts to ensure the cancellation of a boycott and a satisfactory solution for all parties involved.

76 Ibid.

77 NA/FCO 82/719 - March 8, 1977.

78 Ibid. See also Macintosh, Greenhorn, Black, ‘Canadian Diplomacy’, p. 39.
According to Macintosh, Greenhorn and Black, the government of Canada supported the suggestion of the British Sport Minister, Dennis Howell, to create a statement of principles that would be strong enough to placate African nations but would allow New Zealand to feel comfortable signing the document. Commonwealth Secretariat Ramphal would draft the statement; he would also be responsible for selling the idea to other Commonwealth nations.79

Within Canada itself, Trudeau was feeling pressure to ensure that the Edmonton Commonwealth Games would not face a boycott. On March 10, 1977, Member of Parliament for Edmonton-Strathcona, Douglas Roche, asked Secretary of State for External Affairs Jamieson what steps the government was taking to ensure that African Commonwealth countries would not boycott the Games. Despite having formulated a plan to help avoid a boycott, the Canadian government evaded answering Roche’s question. Jamieson noted that he did not want to be too specific; simply indicating that there were a number of efforts taking place to ensure maximum support from Commonwealth nations.80

In reply to the letter, in July 1977, the President the Sports Federation of Canada, Maureen O’Bryan, wrote an opinion piece in the organisation’s newsletter Coast to Coast Sport. O’Bryan complained that the government should not dictate who can play with whom and under what conditions:

...I believe this approach to be an extremely dangerous intrusion of government in the right of sports governing bodies to order and develop their national and international affairs. ... The policy on sports isolation with South Africa is discriminatory in that it uses the highly visible, human contact of sport as the striking weapon when the much more pervasive and infinitely more profitable questions of trade relations are left untouched. ... Most sports have little contact with South Africa - largely because their federations have insisted that it desegregate its teams. Canadian sports that do continue to play and interact must be allowed to do so, even if we have to suffer sanctions from those nations who would use the Commonwealth Games as a forum for their own political beliefs.81

It is O’Bryan’s opinion that the federal government should not be interfering in the policies of Canada’s sports bodies and agencies. In a rebuttal letter, former Olympian Bruce Kidd pointed out that due to pressure from individuals and lobby groups the government:

...is now asking that in situations where athletes are heavily subsidized and are universally considered as national representatives - i.e. in international competition - the athletes conduct themselves in accordance with national policy. If a sports federation is opposed to government policy, it has the option of declining the conditional grants and going it alone.\(^{82}\)

In response to O’Bryan’s assertion that sanctions do not work, Kidd pointedly asked ‘Why have the only attempts at liberalization of apartheid sport in South Africa closely followed significant steps in the spread of the boycott?’\(^{83}\) Kidd made strong arguments against O’Bryan’s opinion. O’Bryan was advocating a complete separation of politics and sport; Kidd an anti-apartheid activist and supporter of SAN-ROC in Canada, often wrote letters to explain the situation and brought individuals to task on the continuation of sporting links with South Africa.

In late March 1977, Jamieson, supported by Iona Campagnolo, Minister for Sport, outlined in a memo to Trudeau three ways in which to strengthen Canada’s apartheid sport policies. The options were: refuse visas to South African teams; withdrawal of federal support, not just for a specific event, but from activities of the offending federation or sports body; public criticism, in the form of press releases, government statements, for every instance of sport contact with South Africa which the policy fails to prevent.\(^{84}\) Jamieson and Campagnolo supported option number three. A response from Trudeau’s secretary, Mary Macdonald, noted that Trudeau supports option three with the possibility of looking at option two sometime in the future, if necessary.\(^{85}\) In their memo, the two ministers also include a draft of a strongly worded letter that they propose be sent to national sport governing bodies; Trudeau also agreed with the draft and the letter was sent May 11, 1977.\(^{86}\) The Toronto Star, on April 1, 1977, concludes


\(^{83}\) Ibid.


\(^{85}\) Ibid.

\(^{86}\) Ibid. See Appendix E for full draft letter.
that Ottawa is faced with three options ‘To go ahead with the Games in the face of a boycott by black Commonwealth governments; to refuse to let New Zealand take part; or to call off the Games.’\(^{87}\) It was important to the federal government that they take a hard line against apartheid and sport and that they make these policies very visible to the public.

The CHOGM was taking place in early June 1977 in London. On May 25, 1977 Trudeau received a memo from the High Commissioner of Britain, J.B. Johnston. The memo included a personal message from Prime Minister James Callaghan. He invited Trudeau and his wife to join him and his wife at Gleneagles, Scotland: ‘We shall have the whole of Gleneagles at our disposal, and the intention is that Heads of Delegation, Secretary General and our wives should spend two days together without our colleagues or official advisors.’\(^{88}\) Callaghan goes on to state that the weekend will provide the heads of government some privacy to discuss items on the official agenda in an informal atmosphere. This is reiterated in a memo from High Commissioner Johnston to Ivan Head on May 26, 1977:

Lord Thomson’s impression from his discussion with African and Caribbean Governments was that although they feel strongly on this issues, and are determined to press for some movement from New Zealand, they are not seeking a noisy confrontation at the meeting, and would be glad to see the matter disposed of before or in the margins of the formal sessions and the result recorded in the communiqué. ... Mr Callaghan feels that a compromise in respect of sporting contacts will be difficult to achieve if Heads of Government tackle the subject in a high key in the formal sessions. For this reason, although he accepts that there will be strong statements, he would like to achieve general agreement in advance that the way should be left clear for negotiation outside the formal sessions, preferably at Gleneagles.\(^{89}\)

By offering an informal session to discuss apartheid sporting contacts, Britain, Canada and the Commonwealth Secretariat hoped to find a solution to the potential boycott of sporting events by African nations, most specifically the imminent Commonwealth Games. This was conveyed by Fernand E. LeBlanc, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on June 6, 1977. Roche addressed the House of

\(^{87}\) ‘Hobson’s Choice for Edmonton’, Toronto Star, April 1, 1977, p. C03.


Commons to voice his opinion that Canada had not ‘exerted enough muscle’ to prevent a boycott; he felt the country had been too timid and should have acted sooner to stop the boycott threat. Roche felt particularly strongly that Canada should have admonished Muldoon of New Zealand when Muldoon noted that the Commonwealth Games were not sufficiently important to stop New Zealand teams from touring South Africa. LeBlanc assured Roche and Parliament that the government was concerned about the current situation and wanted to ensure that there were representatives from all members of the Commonwealth in attendance at the Games. In terms of a solution, LeBlanc did reveal:

What we envisage is a statement by all heads of government reaffirming their opposition to the practice of apartheid in sport and to contacts with South Africa by Commonwealth sports bodies and individuals. The Secretary General has been charged with finding a suitable formula for discussion, and the exact content of the statement will no doubt be a matter for debate among heads of government.

Private deliberations and discussions would allow countries to make concessions without feeling like they were in the spotlight or that they appeared to have folded under pressure. However, LeBlanc did not share this information with the Canadian House of Commons. The negotiations would be tenuous and the Canadian government wanted to tread lightly to appease African nations and to ensure that New Zealand did not feel pressured. This was most important in the case of Prime Minister Muldoon who, in the run up to the CHOGM, felt backed into a corner and put on the defensive.

**The 1977 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting**

In the run up to the meeting, several senior Commonwealth nations began to make provisions to adopt an agreement regarding Commonwealth principles about apartheid in sport. It was hoped that such an agreement would avoid further boycotts by African and Asian countries; most specifically, an imminent boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. During the conference, Canada had more at stake than its stated foreign policy as an honest broker in the Commonwealth, the 1978 Games were being held in Edmonton and Canada had a vested interest in preventing another boycott of a major

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91 Ibid, p. 6349.
sporting event held within its borders. A repeat of the boycott at the 1976 Olympics inspired Canada to push for a Commonwealth compromise.

The main goal was to appease New Zealand’s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. According to Anthony Payne, Secretary-General Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal felt there were two problems facing the Commonwealth: the human rights situation in Uganda under General Idi Amin and New Zealand’s sporting contacts with South Africa. Payne writes:

Muldoon was, in effect, brought before his fellow heads of government at the July 1977 summit in the most demeaning fashion. ... The association [sporting contact with South Africa] was highly embarrassing to New Zealand and served to underline the seriousness with which Ramphal intended to force the Commonwealth to find a practical way of translating its rhetorical opposition to apartheid into a common policy on the matter of sporting contacts with South Africa.92

Senior white Commonwealth nations, Canada, Britain and Australia, along with Ramphal obtained consensus among non-white Commonwealth nations to discuss the proposed statement outside of the formal meetings being held in London. Malcolm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister at the meeting, notes that when the leaders arrived at Gleneagles, Muldoon and the African states could not have been further apart on the issue of sporting contacts with South Africa.93 Having the meetings in private provided for a non-confrontational, informal atmosphere in which to hash out the important points that needed to be included in the statement to settle tensions. In a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society in Toronto in 1974, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, touched upon the importance of the Commonwealth, politics and candor:

...when political questions arise, they are approached in a manner that enables members to accept different positions, to identify the common elements in them, to determine whether they are amenable to Commonwealth treatment, and then to move forward from this agreed basis to a solution or an amelioration of the problem. The stress increasingly is on practical collaboration and co-operation, and the avoidance of futile political altercations. ... The association provides, through its evolution, a unique forum where members discuss and exchange views in complete candour and informality, on a basis of full equality. The practice of understanding


differences and resolving problems, of seeking constructive solutions by
agreement rather than by voting, brings members together, rather than
dividing them; this cohesion reinforces Commonwealth endeavour and
makes co-operation easier.\textsuperscript{94}

The Trudeau government's rhetoric in the 1970s called upon the Commonwealth to
reach consensus to solve problems. This feeling is echoed by Fraser, who in his
memoirs explains that one of the strengths of the Commonwealth summits was that
much of the business was conducted during retreats where heads of government got to
know each other. They 'left behind their staff, their public relations operators and their
advisers, and met face to face for long discussions.'\textsuperscript{95} This openness and camaraderie
was unique to the Commonwealth and allowed the association to make decisions via
consensus while trying to avoid acrimony. Canada was pro-active in finding solutions
and working behind the scenes to gain consensus for solutions that were beneficial to
Canada and the Commonwealth as a whole. Although not a great supporter of the
Commonwealth when he became Prime Minister, Trudeau realised its inherent value
and worked hard to ensure it continued as a progressive organisation, making
decisions that benefited all member countries.

According to a memorandum, June 7, 1977, from Ivan Head:

Chona [Personal Assistant to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia] and
Gordon Wells (Permanent Secretary, PMO, Jamaica) both accept without
qualification our strategy that the sporting issue not be raised in any fashion
by anyone until the weekend. In order to guarantee this result and to
strengthen the Chairman’s hand, Mr. Manley tomorrow will move that the
issue be entered on the agenda but under an item that will not be reached
until Tuesday. If any speaker attempts during the Southern African debate
to allude to sporting contacts the Chairman will then be able to call him to
order. I have spoken to each of the Secretary-General and to Sir John Hunt
(Cabinet Secretary, Britain) and they support this ploy. Additionally, Mr.
Anyaoku (Assistant Secretary-General) has confirmed to me that Nigeria
will accept this strategy.\textsuperscript{96}

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his team actively pursued consensus and collusion
from Commonwealth nations in the days preceding the start of the conference.

\textsuperscript{94} Allan J. MacEachen. 'The Commonwealth and Canada - Association for the Future', Number 74/17

\textsuperscript{95} Fraser and Simons, Malcolm Fraser, pp. 490-1.

\textsuperscript{96} Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds. MG26 O11, Volume 71, File Commonwealth, Prime Minister's Conference,
Therefore, several people were privy to the plan, yet it was kept tightly under wraps. On June 9, Trudeau and Head met with Prime Minister Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese Tufuga Efi and Attorney-General N. Slade of Western Samoa to discuss the conference.97 The transcript of the conversation reveals a frank, candid interaction:

Efi: I came to question you on sporting ties - to pick your brains.

Trudeau: That’s what the Commonwealth is all about. Our tactics [sic] to wait for the weekend. Muldoon feels he’s a target. It’s important he feel we’re well disposed. There’s not a great deal of difference between New Zealand and Canadian policies. I intend to speak to the Nigerians. It seems the problem is Muldoon’s manner. Canadian policy is not to interfere or prevent Canadians from going to South Africa. Neither is it to prevent South Africa’s entry to Canada. However, no financial support for such or for events, or to have government presence at such events. New Zealand instituted visas to control sport. Yet now the issuance of visas appears to be a positive acceptance of apartheid athletes.

Efi: I told Muldoon we won’t support him; it’s not a question of fashion, but of conviction. Muldoon’s language is not helpful to a settlement of the issue.

Trudeau: Yes, perhaps more style than substance. Is there any chance to change, either of policy or his expression of it?

Efi: Our impression is that Muldoon is gearing for a scrap. He’s very provocative; but does he want to go down fighting, or is he looking for an out? Perhaps he could leave victoriously?98

In the absence of Muldoon, Commonwealth leaders felt free to talk about him and about why they were protesting New Zealand’s sporting contact with South Africa. Canada, as a well-established ally of non-white Commonwealth members, was an important confidant for these countries. Trudeau often provided both insight and advice to these nations, thus increasing the bond. Although New Zealand’s policies were very similar to both Canada’s and Britain’s apartheid sports policies, African nations took exception to Muldoon and the way he defended New Zealand’s national policies. He very rarely spoke out against sporting contacts with South Africa and often defended New Zealand’s point of view by indicating he was voted into office on a policy of non-interference in sport.

97 Now known as Samoa.

It was a tough battle for Commonwealth members. Trevor Richards reports that as Muldoon ‘stepped off the plane in London he announced: “I certainly am not going to compromise the Government’s standards on the freedom of the individual to get a black athlete to Edmonton.” Tough talk, but the rest of the Commonwealth had prepared itself well for what was required. Muldoon’s hostile rhetoric would come face-to-face with the rest of the Commonwealth; an association which had been working for weeks, behind Muldoon’s back, on a statement that would, hopefully, ease hostilities between New Zealand and non-white members.

It fell to Jamaica’s Prime Minister, Michael Manley, to pass along the message to Muldoon that the Commonwealth needed a declaration on apartheid in sport. Richards points out that Muldoon was not pleased with what he was told. However, the Commonwealth nations had out-maneuvered the New Zealand Prime Minister, everything was in place and everyone was on side with the plan to adopt a declaration during the weekend’s hiatus from the official conference in London. Anthony Payne notes that ‘Muldoon’s isolation was obvious, but discussions were not acrimonious. There was an understanding that Muldoon had to be helped out of the predicament in which he found himself and that the best way forward was to draw a curtain as much as possible over the events of the past, notably the controversial All Blacks tour of a year earlier.”

As previously stated, the weekend at Gleneagles was touted as an opportunity for heads of delegations to discuss topics in an informal atmosphere, therefore, there are no official minutes of any of the meetings which took place at Gleneagles. According to a memo from the Cultural Relations Department in Britain, the text of the agreement was drafted by ‘Canada, New Zealand and certain African and Caribbean countries and the UK was not closely involved in its drafting.” In remarks to the press on June 13, 1977, Trudeau answered questions about the agreement:

99 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p. 182.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid and Macintosh, Greenhorn, Black, ‘Canadian Diplomacy’, p. 44.
103 NA/FCO 13/866 - June 14, 1977.
Q: Prime Minister, could you tell us the details of the agreement reached among the Commonwealth Leaders to head off a threatened African boycott of the Games?

A: I couldn’t give you any details: we worked rather extensively in little groups both Saturday and Sunday to arrive at a text which so far as I know is acceptable to Canada and so far as I know is acceptable to the main players. But it still has to be shown to various people for modifications put in so that all Heads of Government are given a chance to see if they agree on it and if they do which I hope they will, well, we will see it in the final communiqué. But the details I would rather just ask you to wait until you see the communiqué.

Q: Can you tell us essentially if it amounts to a condemnation of sporting links with apartheid countries?

A: Well it depends on what you mean by links. It’s something you could best describe I suppose as something not very different from what Canada is actually doing. So from that you could assume what’s (inaudible). It is linked to specific condemnation of apartheid in general and it applies to sports the general kind of principles that Canada has.104

Trudeau did not reveal any information regarding the agreement in advance of its publication. Importantly, he was also hesitant to state that the agreement was an outright condemnation of apartheid in sport. But, according to Bruce Kidd, ‘...the Canadian Government, which had committed some $18 million to the capital and operating costs of the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and did not wish to play host to a white-only Games, took the lead in persuading the other dominions to accept this new obligation,’105 The delicate foreign policy taking place at the Heads of Government Meeting would continue long after the Gleneagles Agreement was signed and published. Gustafson elucidates: ‘After discussion and agreement on the main points to be included in the agreement, Ramphal, with the help of officials in the Commonwealth Secretariat, prepared a draft which was then amended to meet the views of Pierre Trudeau of Canada, Michael Manley of Jamaica, and Muldoon.106 It was key to the success of the agreement that the wording of the document pleased

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both the African Commonwealth nations and New Zealand. Also, it was necessary that Muldoon and New Zealand did not come out of the agreement looking guilty of racism and that African nations did not appear to be soft on New Zealand’s sports contact with South Africa.

There was some limited mention of the agreement in the final communiqué of the conference, otherwise, the only official acknowledgment of the statement was its release on June 15, 1977.107 The agreement was a form of soft diplomacy; Mihir Bose points out that ‘Strictly speaking Gleneagles was neither an agreement nor a declaration, and nobody signed anything. It was a press statement endorsed by the Commonwealth leaders.’108 The Globe and Mail reported that, with the adoption of the agreement, the curtain of isolation was drawn more tightly around South Africa.109 The Gleneagles Agreement was purposely vague and did not force any Commonwealth nation to cease sporting contact with racist regimes. It was the ‘urgent duty’ of every Commonwealth nation to combat apartheid in sport, but how they chose to fight it, was up to the individual country.

Canada and other senior Commonwealth nations were able to produce a statement that satisfied both non-white Commonwealth members and New Zealand. According to Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal ‘...it was a conference which I believe got down to business in greater detail and substance than many that went before it.’110 Like many of the Commonwealth Conferences which preceded it, the 1977 conference was successful in that group was able to avoid the threat of its break-up. Although the Commonwealth was touted as an association of independent nations able to come together to make thoughtful decisions and build consensus, it often faced the threat of break-up, mainly due to the differences between white, established nations and newer, non-white nations.

107 A copy of the final published version of the Gleneagles Agreement can be found in Appendix F.
108 Bose, Sporting Colours, p. 117.
CHAPTER 8: The Edmonton Commonwealth Games

Reaction to the Agreement & the Agreement in Action

In regards to the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977, Adrian Guelke states: ‘In practice, the effectiveness of the Gleneagles Agreement depended on the willingness of government to override the autonomy of sporting bodies. This was to vary, but the Agreement was, nonetheless, a serious blow to South African participation in international sport.’ It was up to every Commonwealth nation to ensure that the Gleneagles Agreement was being respected within its borders and by its citizens. As Booth points out, ‘...the interpretation of the agreement and the machinery available to governments to control their sports people varied from country to country,’ Secretary-General Shridath took responsibility for monitoring the Agreement in action over the year that preceded the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton.

In a memo from the Department of External Affairs to Prime Minister Trudeau it is revealed that Trudeau had sent telegrams to Francophone African colleagues after the Gleneagles Agreement was signed and before the OAU meeting in Libreville in July 1977. According to the memo:

The OAU decided to amend the resolution passed in Lomé in February which made the boycott against New Zealand definite and comprehensive. It appears that they considered in retrospect that the far-ranging boycott provisions then enacted would, if applied, have little use in achieving their purpose of isolating South Africa -- rather it would isolate Africa from most significant competition. The Liberville [sic] resolution calls for a boycott of any individual national sports federation which maintains sporting links with South Africa, instead of a boycott of whole nations. As explained to us by Abraham Ordia, President of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, this could mean that some events in the Commonwealth Games might be boycotted, without implying a boycott of the entire Games. Ordia stressed that New Zealand still has to prove her good intentions by being seen to reduce contacts with South Africa. We are still assessing African reactions, but general indications are that the danger of a general boycott of the

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Games has been lifted unless a very blatant example of contact between New Zealand and South Africa takes place hereafter."13

It appeared that the Gleneagles Agreement was a successful tool in avoiding an African boycott of the Commonwealth Games. Interestingly, the OAU decided that a complete boycott would have negative effects on African sporting relations as a whole and would be detrimental as Africa was itself in danger of becoming isolated from international sport.

Also in July, ‘...the New Zealand parliament gave its approval to a resolution supporting the Gleneagles Declaration and Prime Minister Muldoon issued a statement defining government sport policy, calling on all national sport bodies to adhere to the Declaration.'14 He also reiterated, however, that the final decision on whether or not to have sporting contact with South Africa would lie with individual sport bodies. ‘In making such a statement, Muldoon was giving a clear message that he did not truly support boycotting sporting contacts with South Africa, despite his signing of the Gleneagles Agreement.'15 As such, in August 1977, seven New Zealand rugby players accepted invitations to play rugby in South Africa.6 According to a memo from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Trudeau, Muldoon expressed disappointment that the New Zealand Rugby Union passed on the invitation to the players who then accepted the opportunity, but there was nothing the government of New Zealand could do to prevent the players from travelling.7 At a time when all African nations and members of the Commonwealth were closely watching New Zealand’s sporting contacts, rugby players flouted the Gleneagles Agreement and travelled to South Africa to participate in the rugby tour. Interestingly, the memo notes that, British players also participated in this tour. And, Richards points out, one Australian player also participated, despite protests from the Australian government.8 There was other contact between South Africa and New Zealand - Canadian External Affairs also noted that four

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4 Donald Macintosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black. ‘Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games’ Journal of Sport History, Spring 1992, p. 44.
8 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p. 90.
South African fishermen competed in the Bay of Island International Billfish Contest, taking place in New Zealand, in March 1978.\(^9\)

In an attempt to defuse the situation, in August 1977 the New Zealand High Commissioner to Ottawa, Dean J. Eyre, forwarded a cable from Muldoon to Trudeau’s office. The memo reiterated New Zealand’s commitment to the Gleneagles Agreement and quoted from Muldoon’s July press conference. During the conference, Muldoon talked about his Government’s obligations under the Agreement and the steps they were taking to ensure the Agreement was followed:

In discharging its commitments under the Gleneagles Agreement and to assist national sporting bodies in making their decisions in this area, the Government proposes:

To make available to national sporting bodies through Minister of Recreation and Sport the official text of the Gleneagles Agreement

To offer guidance and counsel of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to any sporting organisation faced with a decision on whether to have sporting contact with a country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

To make known the Government’s views and those of the Commonwealth Head of Government whenever it appears that such contacts are in contemplation by a New Zealand sporting organisation.\(^{10}\)

In October 1977, when asked to evaluate the Gleneagles statement, with specific reference to individual New Zealand rugby players travelling to South Africa for the rugby tournament and the possibility of other athletes following suit, Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath stated:

It was always recognized, indeed it is implicit in the agreement itself, that there could be situations in which despite the best efforts of Commonwealth governments there would be contacts of one kind or another at the level of individuals. It was always understood that not all Commonwealth governments could exercise a measure of constraint, for example, through withholding passports. In a large measure, sportsmen who persist in individual contacts with South Africa are more misguided than evil. ... I believe that the Government of New Zealand, like all other Commonwealth governments, has done what it undertook to do in relation to the cessation of sporting contacts. The fact that, despite those efforts, some players from New Zealand, and indeed other from some other Commonwealth countries,


over the heads and advice of their governments, have accepted invitations in their individual capacity to go to South Africa, is to be deplored. But this does not represent an erosion of the Gleneagles agreement, and it does not in my view represent a threat to Commonwealth sport.\textsuperscript{11}

Shridath implies that athletes who continue to play sport with South Africa have not truly considered the ramifications of this contact. This is a surprisingly patronising statement by Shridath. By stating that these athletes are misguided he implies that they are simply ill-informed and that if they had the correct information they would choose not to participate in such sporting events. He also acknowledges that each Commonwealth government would support the agreement by means which were acceptable to each individual government. Many Commonwealth governments, like Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia, were unwilling to deny passports to their citizens and, therefore, restrict their freedom to travel. As such, the agreement could easily be broken. However, Shridath did not think it undermined the agreement, as he felt, at that point, the signatories were living up to their obligations.

In October 1977, Iona Campagnolo, Minister of State (Fitness and Amateur Sport) made a general statement in the House of Commons regarding sport in Canada. She made a point of reiterating Canada’s stance on South Africa: the government would not provide funds or moral support for the participation of Canadians in sporting events involving South Africa, either in Canada or the apartheid state:

\begin{quote}
The Gleneagles compromise, largely spearheaded by our Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), put Commonwealth leaders on record as being opposed to sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries and South Africa. This is a consistent policy of this government, and not just something conjured up to keep next year’s Commonwealth’s [sic] Games at Edmonton on track.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

The Canadian government needed to ensure that every individual athlete and sports body understood Canada’s current policy on apartheid in sport. Unlike in the early 1970s, when policy was not as publicly enunciated, the government undertook efforts to make clear its policy regarding apartheid in sport. It wanted there to be no confusion regarding the policy and no contravention of the policy in the run-up to the 1978


Edmonton Commonwealth Games. Any links with apartheid sport could have sparked another call for a boycott.

Also in October, Baka and David note, the President of the XI Commonwealth Games (Canada 1978) Foundation, Dr. Maury Van Vliet, travelled to Africa on a five nation tour to discuss ‘...air charter travel arrangements for African athletes and to talk with African leaders.’\(^{13}\) This goodwill tour showed that Canada was an ally for African nations, willing to help out wherever necessary. The Canadians wanted to ensure a successful Games and provided assistance to African participants, which would go a long way towards mending fences and helping prevent another boycott of a major sporting event hosted by Canada.

Interestingly, Bruce Kidd wrote to Campagnolo to protest about the inclusion of Canadian golfers in an event in the Philippines. Kidd questioned the government’s application of the Gleneagles Agreement explaining Canadian pro golfers competed in the World Golf Championship in Manila, which also included South African pro golfers as participants. Kidd believed this was a violation of UN resolutions against apartheid in sport. Also, he pointed out, that according to the Gleneagles Agreement, the Canadian government was obligated to use moral suasion to discourage Canadian participation in events involving South Africa.\(^{14}\) Kidd brought the government to task; he questioned why the government did not speak out against Canada’s participation in the event. At the time of Kidd’s letter, however, policies regarding Canadian-South African sports contact in third party nations had not been clearly addressed.

Another event which stirred the Canadian press occurred in November 1977, Canadian swimming coach, Deryk Snelling, was suspended for contravening FINA’s instruction that forbade members from ‘having anything to do with aquatic programs’ in South Africa. Snelling conducted swimming clinics during his holiday in South Africa over the summer and, due to this contact, the Canadian Amateur Swimming Association banned him for three months and he was dropped from the coaching staff of the


Commonwealth Games.\textsuperscript{15} This rigorous application of the Gleneagles Agreement provides an excellent example of how seriously Canadian sports federations were viewing contact with South African sport in 1977. A seemingly innocuous event proved disastrous for Snelling, and set an example for other sports federations in Canada.

The Gleneagles Agreement came at a key point in Commonwealth history; at a time when unity within the Commonwealth was imperative, otherwise, there existed the real possibility that the association would have disintegrated. James Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, felt that the Agreement ‘...prevented a serious rupture of the Commonwealth Games.’\textsuperscript{16} In 1978, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson noted, that:

\begin{quote}
The Commonwealth is basically a consultative rather than a negotiating forum, and works by consensus; unlike the United Nations, there are no votes or vetoes, no ideological or geographical blocs. ... There is freedom to disagree; but, in a forum of long-standing friends and associates, disagreement can be without hostility, with tolerance and, above all, with a better understanding of the other point of view.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

It was imperative that the African Commonwealth nations and New Zealand felt that their voices were heard with regard to the boycott situation. This was able to happen through the frank, candid conversations which took place at Gleneagles and it also happened through understanding and a desire to ensure that the Commonwealth continued to succeed as an association.

\textbf{Changes to Canadian Policies}

In the year that preceded the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Canada made several changes to its South African foreign policies as international political pressure against apartheid increased. In 1977, the Trudeau government received letters and telexes of protest regarding the trial of the Pretoria 12, the death of Steve Biko, and the

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banning of almost 20 organisations in South Africa.\textsuperscript{18} The communications were unique and individually written by each organisation, mostly from trade unions, church groups and anti-apartheid organisations across the country, including: Manitoba Peace Council; Campbell River, Courtenay and District Labour Council; CCSA; Hamilton and District Labour Council; Canada United Autoworkers Union; United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America and the Central Canada Synod Lutheran Church of America.\textsuperscript{19} There was consistent pressure on the Trudeau government to make changes to its policies governing it relationship with South Africa. Canadian anti-apartheid groups, trade unions, student unions, and churches increased their letter writing campaigns; a broader cross-section of Canadian society was becoming engaged and involved in anti-apartheid groups and campaigns. As the 1970s progressed, the anti-apartheid movement in Canada was gaining strength and the government received increased correspondence, mostly written protests, against South African apartheid policies and Canada’s South African foreign policy.

Donald Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made a lengthy speech in the House of Commons on December 19, 1977 regarding Canada’s foreign policy. In his speech he revealed that Canada was phasing out all government-sponsored, commercial-support activities in South Africa. But, what did that mean exactly? According to Jamieson:

For example, we will as quickly as possible withdraw our commercial counsellors from Johannesburg and close the office of the consulate general in that city. We will also withdraw our commercial officers from Cape Town. We will, of course, maintain our offices in Pretoria for normal business, because we do not feel that the breaking off of diplomatic relations at this time is advisable. We will wish to have an opportunity to do what we can in order to impress upon the government of South Africa the necessity for change. We also want to have an opportunity to talk to respected leaders who are opposed to apartheid in South Africa.\textsuperscript{20}

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\textsuperscript{18} The Pretoria 12 were on trial for terrorism and conspiracy to overthrow the government charges. Steve Biko was a well known anti-apartheid activist and founder of the Black Consciousness Movement; in September 1977 Biko was killed while in police custody.


In addition, Jamieson also announced the phasing out of commercial activities, the withdrawal of all Export Development Corporation (EDC) government support from transactions relating to South Africa, the requirement of non-immigrant visas from all residents of South Africa traveling to Canada, and the publication of a code of conduct and ethics for Canadian corporations doing business within South Africa.21 In 1974 Britain introduced a similar Code of Practice, with the hope ‘...that economic contacts could be used to promote reform, first in the workplace and then leading to broader social and political change.’22 Extensive analysis of Canada’s new trade and investment policy ensued and was revealed to be mostly cosmetic in nature. For example, the announcement was ‘...at first interpreted as meaning that all commercial support facilities would be discontinued....’23 Yet, a locally appointed commissioner to the Canadian embassy in Pretoria was available to answer trade questions, which meant that Canada-South Africa trade was still being promoted.24 Only loans to importers ceased, therefore, ceasing commercial-support to activities from within in South Africa; insurance to exporters continued, therefore, continuing commercial-support from within Canada.25 In an interview with the CBC, Pik Botha, South Africa’s Foreign Minister in 1977, told Barbara Frum that South Africa would not make changes, despite Canada’s own changes to its trading relationship with the republic. He also noted that Canada should stay out of South Africa’s internal politics, and that South Africa does not ‘hammer’ Canada on topics like ‘Québec and the Red Indians.’26 Again, Canada’s comparison to South Africa in terms of the treatment of native populations is used to highlight similarities in policies of the respective governments of each country. By comparing Canada to South Africa, Botha attempts to legitimise his government’s apartheid policies. Botha’s interview was flippant and he left the impression that South

24 Linda Freeman. The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 76.
Africa would not be phased by the changes, despite Canadian hopes that these changes would be a catalyst for change.

Basically, trade with South Africa changed very little; the government simply closed up shop on projects that were failing, losing money or not being utilised. According to an assessment by the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, ‘For reasons of political expediency (Commonwealth games, larger potential markets in the rest of Africa, Canada’s participation in Namibia negotiations, etc.) the Cabinet decided that Jamieson should take a public stand on South Africa without effectively jeopardizing [sic] the interests of those with a stake in the status quo.’

The Taskforce made an important connection between changes in Canada’s trade and economic policies and the upcoming Commonwealth Games. It shows how seriously Canada was taking the threat of a boycott. Perceived changes in Canada’s South African foreign policy were key to maintaining its stance of being hard on apartheid.

Macintosh and Hawes reveals that Campagnolo played a part in pushing for changes in Canada’s South African economic policy. Concerned that Canada’s anti-apartheid policies were too focused on sport she lobbied the cabinet ‘...for parallel “compensatory” action against South Africa on the economic side. In particular, she called for the closing of all trade offices in South Africa to balance the contribution being made by sport in opposing apartheid.’

Trudeau, importantly, ‘...supported Campagnolo’s argument in cabinet for fairness in distributing more broadly sectoral responsibility for opposing apartheid.’

Spreading out Canada’s anti-apartheid actions gave more validity to the Government’s stance and supported their rhetoric of abhorrence for apartheid. Economic changes, even cosmetic ones, were long overdue. These changes came at a key time in Canadian history, during the country’s tenure on the UN Security Council and preceding the Commonwealth Games. After Jamieson’s announcement regarding changes in Canada’s trade and investment policies with South Africa, the government received correspondence from around the world. The Jewish Labour Committee applauded the Trudeau government, as did Joe Saloo Jee,

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29 Ibid, p. 80.
the Canadian Representative of the ANC and Joan Bhabha of the CCSA. The CCSA and the ANC hoped that Canada would expand these measures. For Bhabha, Canada should withdraw the Commonwealth Trade Preferences and

Canada must immediately support the calls of the anti-apartheid people’s organizations, trade unions and all the national liberation movements of South Africa, the African National Congress, and halt all economic, diplomatic, cultural and sporting contacts with the apartheid regime. ... Canada must also support the General Assembly’s call for a mandatory economic embargo of the illegitimate racist regime.30

Canada also received praise from Trudeau’s long-time political ally, President Kaunda from Zambia. Kaunda received with joy Canada’s decision to institute action on trade sanctions against South Africa; it was ‘...concrete [sic] testimony to your personal commitment and that of your government to the principles of human dignity freedom and justice. I therefore want you to know how profoundly we value this decision os [sic] historic significance and which is a good example to other nations.’31

For the most part, feedback received by the government was positive; anti-apartheid organisations and NGOs approved of the changes in Canada’s economic and trade policy for South Africa and even asked the government to make more changes. The Canadian Export Association, however, did not agree with the Trudeau government’s new policies. K.C. Hendrick, Chairman of the Association, wrote in January 1978: ‘Canada should be in a position to trade openly and freely with all countries in the world. Such a policy recognises the importance of trade to the Canadian economy and the contribution which trade makes to international understanding and cooperation.’32

Iona Campagnolo announced to the House of Commons in April 1978 that Canadians were contributing $40 million to the Edmonton Commonwealth Games and she was very pleased to see ‘...the very great pleasure that Canadians from every part of Canada take in sharing in those games.’33 Interestingly, for the Commonwealth Games,


the federal government lauded both their moral support and funding. Unlike the Montréal Olympic Games, which remained solely the responsibility of the governments of the City of Montréal and the Province of Québec, the federal government was pleased to be associated with the Commonwealth Games. Even though there was more potential for international prestige in an association with the Olympic Games, the Canadian government, especially Trudeau, distanced themselves from those Games. It was important to Trudeau that he did not appear to be pandering to Québec. And, it was equally important to publicly support the Commonwealth Games for two reasons: first, to ensure the Games were a success and not faced with a potential boycott and second, to help quell regional factionalism. Trudeau wanted to show that he and his government supported all regions of Canada, not just Québec and Central Canada.

In mid-July 1978, less than one month before the beginning of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Campagnolo announced that ‘Visas will be withheld from South African citizens coming to participate in sports competitions or associated congresses as representatives of that country. ... Visas will also be withheld from representatives of South African national sport federations or any member organization of a federation and from South African executive members of an international sport governing body.’34 The Globe and Mail noted that, according to Campagnolo, this new policy met requests by sports people that the Government take responsibility for the administration of its South African sport policy.35 The previous policy, in which associations and federations had to monitor invitations and ensure no participation from South African athletes at events in Canada, was difficult to monitor and apply. The new policy, however, would be policed by the government as all South African citizens would have to apply for visas to enter Canada and the government could, therefore, refuse visas to athletes applying for entry in order to attend sporting events.

After the change in Canada’s sport policy was announced, Sharon Capeling, Director of Public Affairs of CUSO wrote to Campagnolo praising the government’s decision:

We would like to express our support of your decision to bar South African athletes and sports organization representatives from participating in competitions and congresses in Canada. We feel this toughening of


government policy against South Africa’s iniquitous apartheid laws will add appreciably to the ostracism that country is facing in the world of nations. The high calibre of many of its athletes is well-known, and if enough countries ban their participation in sports, the South Africans and their government may begin to question seriously their unjust policies.\(^{36}\)

In October 1977, Canadian Concerned about Southern Africa (CCSA) organised a conference for anti-apartheid groups in Canada. This was the first coordinated, mass anti-apartheid event within Canada. The CCSA invited members of the ANC, South African Congress of Trade Unions, Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, South West Africa’s People Organisation (SWAPO) and Canadian anti-apartheid organisation in an effort to:

...mobilize public opinion, on the South Africa question to the fullest extent. It is also important and urgent that the effort of the various support groups concerned with the Southern Africa question be co-ordinated so as to streamline the educational, informational, and aid programs in support of the liberation struggles. CCSA is therefore calling a national conference of all support groups and organisations active on the Southern Africa question.\(^{37}\)

The Anglican Church refused the invitation to observe the conference, indicating that the format of the meeting did not match the Church’s own anti-apartheid aims. Despite the negative response from the Church, the event was successful, according to one of its organisers, Lynda Lemberg.\(^{38}\) Some of the recommendations out of the conference included increased media outreach; a campaign to raise money for the liberation movements; continuation of the boycott of South African goods; and the initiation of a series of campaigns which focused on violations of the mandatory arms embargo, sporting events with South African and Canadian participation, investments in South African multinationals and Canadian banks providing loans to South Africa.\(^{39}\) The first coordinated anti-apartheid event within Canada was, for the most part, successful. The conference was able to come up with concrete plans on how to progress the movement’s mission in Canada. Yet, it would prove difficult for these groups to continue working on a national level. Throughout the 1970s they faced the same problems: expenses associated with communication i.e. long distance calls, travel; lack of


\(^{37}\) Anglican Church of Canada Archives. World Mission-Africa Files. GS 81-19, Box 4 - October 3, 1977.

\(^{38}\) Author’s interview with Lynda Lemberg, February 12, 2010.

\(^{39}\) Anglican Church of Canada Archives. World Mission-Africa Files. GS 81-19, Box 4 - No date.
leadership on a national level to provide consistency in messaging; regional groups with different aims and goals. It would not be until the mid-1980s that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement really picked up steam under the leadership of large Canadian trade unions, the student movement, and stricter anti-apartheid policies instituted by the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney.

In May, 1979, the Anglican Church provided the Canadian government and cabinet with additional recommendations concerning South Africa, including publicly discouraging new and expanding investments, removing the Commonwealth preferential tax agreement, and revisions to the Canadian Code of Conduct for companies operating in South Africa that would make companies more responsible for championing the right of workers.40 For the most part, these recommendations fell on deaf ears. But, the preferential tax agreement was revoked by the minority government of Prime Minister Joe Clark in 1979. According to Tennyson:

The announcement was made totally without fanfare, however, and the government emphasized that the decision reflected the size of the imbalance in preferential trade in South Africa’s favour, which meant that there was little economic justification from Canada’s point of view for continuing to exchange preferential tariff treatment. Thus, the decision was motivated more by financial than political considerations and, indeed, the impetus came from the Department of Finance rather than the Department of External affairs.41

Again, Canada acted in the best interests of its economy; only when the preferential agreement was no longer beneficial to Canada did the government revoke the tariff.

The 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games
Commonwealth Secretariat Shridath Ramphal ‘took on the self-appointed role of custodian of the [Gleneagles] Agreement’ and visited New Zealand in November 1977 ‘and made clear that the document was intended to be comprehensive, embracing individuals as well as teams, amateurs as well as professionals.’42 Through the end of

40 Anglican Church of Canada Archives. PWRDF Directorate. GS 97-06, Box 2 - May 1979.


1977 and the first half of 1978, Ramphal monitored New Zealand and its adherence to Gleneagles. By June he reported that all Commonwealth governments had adhered to their obligations under the agreement. In his letter he explains:

The real measure of the success of the Gleneagles Agreement is the fact that, since its adoption, there have indeed been no sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa. This was the belief unanimously expressed by Heads of Governments at Gleneagles; this was the promise of the Agreement. It is a promise that has been fulfilled. And, of course, its fulfilment has materially strengthened the collective international campaign against apartheid.43

Along with Ramphal's analysis, the Trudeau government noted that the SCSA had decided at a meeting in Rabat, that African countries should attend the Commonwealth Games, if they felt that New Zealand had sufficiently adhered to the Gleneagles Agreement; the decision to participate was left up to each individual country.44

Despite assurances from Ramphal that the agreement was successful and being applied appropriately, Nigeria chose to boycott the 1978 Commonwealth Games. On July 26, 1978, Léonard Legault, Canadian High Commissioner to Nigeria and Sierra Leone, explained that he was summoned to meet with Nigerian Permanent Secretary Ukegbu who let Legault know that Nigeria would not be participating in the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Ukegbu stressed that the decision was difficult to make, especially due to Nigeria’s high esteem for Canada and its leadership in the Commonwealth under Trudeau. Legault, using strong language in response to this news, let Ukegbu know that Canada deserved better and noted that the decision would ‘surely damage Nigerian/Canadian relations’ but hoped both sides would do what they could to limit the damage.45 In a press release issued by Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Information on July 26, the government of Nigeria explained that it:

...maintains that the philosophy that sports and politics should not mix is a specious and hipocritical [sic] one. Sporting achievements today are used as a country’s greatness. Sporting links foster development and understanding between countries. Therefore, a country which enjoys maintaining sports relations with South Africa stand guilty of giving indirect encouragement to the inhuman policies perpetrated by South Africa.

Nigeria stand opposed to any such encouragement and will fight apartheid in all its ramifications.\textsuperscript{46}

Having learned an invaluable lesson during the 1976 Olympics, the Canadian government reacted immediately in an attempt to avoid a mass African boycott of the Commonwealth Games. In a telegram from New York, a British official informed his government that he had spoken to Jamieson and that either Jamieson or Trudeau would be speaking to Nyerere and Kaunda to help secure their support for the Commonwealth Games. The British official had spoken to Ramphal who had already spoken to Nyerere and Kaunda and both leaders stated that their respective countries would be attending the Games.\textsuperscript{47} Acting Prime Minister Jean Chrétien sent a message to all African, Asian and Caribbean embassies. The message was drafted with input from Ramphal, who also advised Canada not to panic. Canadian embassy officials were to hand the message over in interviews with individuals in the host country’s government, at the highest possible level. The message read:

The government of Nigeria informed us yesterday in Lagos that Nigeria will not participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games and this decision was released to the press at the same time. The reason given by the Government of Nigeria is that New Zealand has not, in its view, lived up to the commitments accepted by all Commonwealth countries at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting last year (the Gleneagles Agreement) to take all practical measure to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa.

On behalf of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, I have informed the Government of Nigeria of Canada’s profound disappointment and dismay at the decision it has taken. The action of the Nigerian Government is inconsistent with the judgement of the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Mr Shridath Ramphal, recently conveyed to you, that all members of the Commonwealth have adhered to their obligations under the Gleneagles Agreement. The judgement accords with the information available to the Government of Canada.

The Nigerian Government’s action is difficult to reconcile with the decision of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, taken on July 20, formally to recommend to its members that they participate in the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. Thus I am confident that Nigeria’s decision will not affect the participation of your country’s team and I am happy, on behalf of

\textsuperscript{46} NA/FCO 68/780 - July 26, 1978.

the Prime Minister, to reiterate that Canada looks forward with pleasure to welcoming your team to Edmonton.48

Canada moved quickly to prevent another boycott on Canadian soil. It did so by leveraging its close relationship with non-white Commonwealth nations; they reiterated its policies and the findings of the Secretary-General in regards to the Gleneagles Agreement and its application and efficacy since its adoption. Unlike in 1976, Canada took very seriously any talk of a boycott of the Commonwealth Games and moved swiftly to avoid another boycott.

In August 1978, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Arms Forces for the Federal Republic of Nigeria wrote to Trudeau noting that Nigeria’s government was quite grieved ‘that by accident of the venue of the Commonwealth Games being Edmonton our decision not to participate has to touch directly or indirectly our very good Canadian friends.’49 Nigeria could not afford to alienate Canada, a strong Commonwealth ally. Much like the African nations’ response to the Olympic boycott, Nigeria reached out to Canada and reiterated to the government that their boycott was due to New Zealand’s continuing sport contact with South Africa, more specifically, in this case, the tour of South Africa by a small number of New Zealand rugby players.

According to Jim Kernaghan of the Toronto Star, Games officials crossed their fingers that Nigeria’s withdrawal was an isolated event and not a repetition of the Montréal boycott.50 In the end, Nigeria was the only country that boycotted the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Payne writes that despite Nigeria’s withdrawal, ‘the rest of the Commonwealth had no desire to pursue the matter further at this stage.’51 African athletes had paid the ultimate price at the 1976 Olympics by not participating in the Games. It would have been another blow to African athletes and the prestige of African sport had they gone through with a boycott of the Commonwealth Games. In effect, they would have further isolated themselves from international competition; this would

51 Payne, ‘The International Politics’, p. 422.
not have been good for their international relationships nor for their sense of nationalism. After the Games ended, Ramphal wrote to Trudeau:

Apartheid of course is still very much with us, and as long as this is so Gleneagles cannot be consigned to the archives. On the contrary, it must remain a vital expression of the Commonwealth’s opposition to a social evil that remains to be rooted out. No one can be more aware than yourself that the question of apartheid not only endangered the Games, but threatened to envelop the entire Commonwealth in acrimony. That it did not do so is a tribute to the goodwill and good sense of our members, and not least to your impressive statesmanship.52

After the Montréal Olympics, Canada moved into a leadership role in regards to the anti-apartheid sport movement in the Commonwealth. According to Macintosh and Hawes, this was easy for them to do because ‘...Canada had no significant sporting ties with South Africa in that country’s most important sports: rugby and cricket. .... One can only conclude, then, that sport was a convenient vehicle with which Canada could show its resolve against apartheid without either doing harm to the economy or running into any significant opposition from special-interest groups.’53 As mentioned earlier, anti-apartheid groups in Canada never used the sports boycott to its full capacity, mainly because Canada did not have the same links to colonial sport that Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa shared. The sports boycotts were successful in these countries because it affected everyday people, not just a small group of athletes supporting obscure sports. Canada became pro-active in publicly speaking out against apartheid sport only in the mid-1970s when two major international events, hosted by Canada were threatened. At this point, it was the government who acted, to maintain its international reputation, by tightening its stance on contact with South African sport.

Continuing Sports Contact with South Africa up to the 1980s
The British government had drawn up a document that could be used, if needed, in a defensive situation at the Commonwealth Senior Officials Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, November 1978. Should Britain’s application of Gleneagles be questioned, the government planned on reiterating its sports policy in regards to contact with South

53 Macintosh and Hawes, Sport and Canadian Diplomacy, p. 89.
Africa: ‘We maintain a policy of active discouragement including the withholding of grants in cases where contacts with South African sports teams are involved. This policy extends to such contacts in all countries. Given the independence of our sporting bodies, our efforts may not always be successful but they are an honest method of reconciling our opposition to Apartheid with the expression in our laws of the freedom of the individual.’ The document also shows that there was limited sporting contact at the 1977 and 1978 International Paraplegic Games in Stoke Mandeville and at the 1977 International Tug of War Championships in Jersey.

Anthony Payne explains that although the number of sporting contacts with South Africa decreased after the signing of the Gleneagles Agreement, contact was not eliminated and continued to cause embarrassment:

For example, in September 1979 Commonwealth High Commissioners in London publicly expressed their disquiet about an impending visit to Britain by a South African Barbarians rugby team; in July 1980 a meeting of the Commonwealth Games Federation turned bitter when African and Caribbean representatives insisted on discussing a recent British Lions rugby tour of South Africa, pointing out that the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, had spent noticeably less energy seeking to prevent the tour than she had in promoting a boycott by British athletes of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games; and in March 1981 the government of Guyana in the Caribbean refused an entry permit to an English test cricketer, Robin Jackman, on the grounds that he had longstanding [sic] sporting links with South Africa.

In regard to the Barbarians tour of Britain, which would involve a mixed race team from South Africa, the Minister of Sport, Hector Monro, requested that the Home Rugby Unions reconsider their invitation to the Barbarians team. Monro also wrote to Peter Hain, Chairman of Stop All Racist Tours, to let him know that the British government did not have the power to prevent the tour. The tour went ahead. Abraham Ordia wrote to Monro in October 1979, admonishing the British government for not taking every practical step to stop the tour and accusing the British government of contravention of

55 Ibid.
the Gleneagles Agreement.\textsuperscript{59} The subjectivity of the agreement allowed for philosophical disagreements of this kind - the British government felt that it did all it could do to prevent the Barbarians tour, but the African nations felt that Britain fell short of its obligations. Ordia went on to threaten a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics should sporting contact with South Africa continue.\textsuperscript{60}

Canada’s new visa policy ‘...disallowed visas for all South African athletes and sports representatives wishing to enter Canada to participate in sports competitions or associated congresses.’\textsuperscript{61} However, this policy only applied to individuals that were entering Canada as official representatives of South Africa; it did not apply to professional athletes who were not formally representing the apartheid state. According to a memo from Eric Morse, Sports Liaison Officer, ‘It appears that the consensus at the official level is that visas should be withheld, at least from nationally-representative teams and individuals. The question of professionals is a difficult one; again consensus favours not interfering with their entry as this could represent legal problems.’\textsuperscript{62} The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jamieson, wrote to the Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport, Campagnolo, in May 1978 to reiterate the new policy:

\begin{quote}
I therefore propose that we deny entry to nationally representative South African teams or individuals wishing to visit Canada for purposes of competition, until South Africa wholly abandons the policy of apartheid in sport. The term “nationally representative” would include any team or individual participating in an event, either multilateral or bilateral, in which competitors represent their country, or a national sport federation, or any component of such federation. On the basis of my Department’s consultations with the Employment and Immigration Commission I understand that this is the most feasible policy to adopt. While it would exclude neither professionals, unless they were participating in an event organized on the basis of national representation, nor groups of tourists with sporting interests, it would effectively prevent all significant sporting contact between Canadians and South Africans within Canada. I believe that we can reasonably maintain that professionals normally ought not to be excluded since they usually represent only themselves, and that the proposed policy represents the most that it is practical for us to do.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{59} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 15285, File Part 7 - October 20, 1979.

\textsuperscript{60} ‘African sports group may seek expulsion’, \textit{Globe and Mail}, December 12, 1979, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{61} Macintosh, Greenhorn, Black, ‘Canadian Diplomacy’, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{62} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 15285, File Part 5.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
Therefore, visas continued to be issued for ‘professionals’ entering Canada to compete in sporting competitions. Professionals included tennis players, golfers, jockeys, squash players, and a reporter who was affiliated to an athletic association in South Africa but was entering as a reporter, not an athlete. The process of obtaining visas for these individuals was as follows: a professional athlete would apply for a visa to the Canadian consulate in South Africa, the consulate would contact External Affairs in Ottawa with the following information: name, date of birth, occupation - e.g. professional tennis player, and the name of the event that the individual was participating in; External Affairs in Ottawa would approve the request and a visa would be issued.64 Even after the announcement of the change in Canada’s policy regarding visas for South African athletes there were numerous applications approved by External Affairs for professional South African athletes.

Visas applications were also requested for the President of the South African Amateur Athletic Union, Charles Nieuwoudt, and a Director of the Union, Gert le Roux, both attending the World Cup of Athletics in Montréal in 1979. The President of the Union claimed to be entering as a private tourist and, as such, he would not undertake any official contact with sport federations and organisations nor would he have any official public activities while in Canada. Le Roux noted that he wanted to maintain informal sport contacts in hopes that South Africa would be able to rejoin the IAAF.65 The visa requests were denied by External Affairs, with the explanation ‘For your info parameters of policy would appear to permit decision either way in this case, however given general objective of policy, and fact that Republic of South Africa sport is long way from achieving genuine integration, we see no reason to be forthcoming at this time, nor do we wish to provide precedent for opening door beyond present limit of unaffiliated amateurs and professionals.’66 The Ottawa Citizen ran an article on the denial of the visas, noting that both men had applied for tourist visas only; Nieuwoudt explained that he had told the Canadian Embassy that he was not attending any IAAF meetings and was travelling to Canada to watch the World Cup.67 The article noted that


66 Ibid.

the reasons given for the refusal was Canada’s obligations under the Gleneagles Agreement which discouraged contact with South African sport and then pointed out that other South African athletes had been allowed entry into Canada in recent months, like golfer Gary Player. This reiterates the confusion surrounding the government policy: Nieuwodt and le Roux were associated with the Amateur Athletic Union in South Africa and, as such, the government felt that they would have entered Canada as representatives of South Africa. Professional athletes, who were not in Canada officially representing the Republic, were issued visas because the government chose not to prevent this type of sport contact, as professional athletes were not, in most cases, representatives of a specific country.

The Canadian government continued to provide funds that allowed teams to take part in events that included South African teams in third party countries. The government’s new policies, implemented in the late 1970s, did not prevent this type of sport contact with South Africa. In a letter to the President of the Soaring Association of Canada, A.O. Schreiter, André Levasseur of Sport Canada, informed Schreiter that Sport Canada had been informed that a South African team would be participating in the 1978 World Soaring Championships in Chateaureaux, France in July-August 1978 and:

In accordance with the federal government’s policy on sport participating with South Africa, I wish to advise you that although the Canadian team is free to participate, each individual member must be advised of Canada’s policy relative to sporting contacts with South Africa. Would you, therefore, notify all members of the Canadian team that South Africa competitors may be participating in the competition.68

A handwritten note at the top of this letter reveals that the information provided by Sport Canada to the Soaring Association was ‘the normal position taken with respect to events outside Canada.’69

Internationally, Canada continued to be involved in anti-apartheid sport activities. In the wake of the Montréal Olympics, in November 1976, the UN passed a resolution that urged states ‘...to refuse any official sponsorship, assistance or encouragement to sport contacts with South Africa; to refuse visas to South African sportspersons [sic];

69 Ibid.
and to deny facilities to teams or sportspersons for visits to South Africa.\textsuperscript{70} The UN Security Council, of which Canada was a member from 1977 to 1978, passed resolution 418 which imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in 1977. And, by December 1977, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution which included a lengthy international declaration against apartheid sport. Resolution A/RES/32/105 was the most comprehensive UN resolution against apartheid in sport. One of its main recommendations was the refusal of financial and other assistance to teams and individuals participating in sport against South Africa, something which Canada had already implemented. Other recommendations included: denying visas and/or entry to individuals and teams from countries practicing apartheid and requested that states provide public education on the principle of non-discrimination in sport.\textsuperscript{71} Given the political upheaval caused by sports boycotts and protests during the 1970s and the obvious success of the boycotts, strictly in terms of the boycott's popularity and success thus far, the UN moved to solidify its process of isolating South African sport.

Once the declaration was approved, the UN started drafting an international convention against apartheid in sport. Although Canada had been influential in helping draft the UN declaration, it refused to take part in the drafting of the convention:

Canada has demonstrated in New York its support for campaign against sporting contacts with South Africa by participating actively in elaboration of drafting declaration on subject and in promoting western support for that declaration. Its role has been appreciated. Drafting committee must now devote itself to elaboration of convention on basis of principles enshrined in declaration. Since Canada does not anticipate being able to become a party to any such convention and since all western countries consulted by us during UNGA indicated similar inability of disinclination, consider there is no point in Canada participating in drafting convention. It will be time-consuming exercise and believe comments on Canadian preoccupations would only be counterproductive in view of inability to adhere to convention itself. Recommend therefore that Canada decide not to seek reappointment to drafting committee in 1978 but remain member of ad hoc committee as demonstration of interest.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} Macintosh, Greenhorn, Black, ‘Canadian Diplomacy’, p. 52.


\textsuperscript{72} Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 15285, File Part 5 - March 6, 1978.
External Affairs agreed with the suggestion from the office at UN headquarters that Canada continue as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee, but not as a member of the drafting group for the convention. The government chose not to be party to a convention as it was not in the best interest of Canadians, however, it was, nonetheless, interested in observing the process as it allowed them to continue displaying Canada’s abhorrence of apartheid.

Along with the declaration against apartheid in sport, the UN declared an International Anti-Apartheid year, running from March 21, 1978 to March 21, 1979. According to a British government telegram: ‘Its aim is to increase understanding world-wide of the nature and practice of apartheid and to mobilise support at all levels to oppose it. UN member states are required to report on activities undertaken during the year.’

To end the decade, in the wake of continuing crises throughout Africa, a declaration was drafted during the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, Zambia in 1979. The declaration built on previous Commonwealth documents dealing with racism: Singapore Declaration and the Gleneagles Agreement. According to the Commonwealth Secretariat:

Lusaka expanded upon principles first outlined in the Singapore Declaration of 1971, which set out how member states of the Commonwealth must embrace equal rights for all regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief.

Crucially, it explained in greater detail the obligations that member countries face in eliminating discrimination in their own societies, including in the right to vote, in civil rights and access to citizenship, or in economic, social or cultural fields such as education, health, employment, occupation, housing, and social security.

The formal declaration solidified the Commonwealth’s position on discrimination - the association would not tolerate it and promised to fight it.

By the late 1970s, the Trudeau government was in trouble. Canada was struggling with high unemployment and inflation. And, by 1979 Lévesque and Trudeau were in a fight for the hearts and minds of Canadians. Samuel LaSelva summarises: ‘Trudeau’s

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73 NA/FCO 45/2474 - December 5, 1978.

implicit appeal is to the Canadian community and the universalism it represents; Lévesque’s appeal is to the Québécois community and the particularism implicit in it. At their deepest level, such appeals represent not a political impasse so much as a moral challenge. The challenge is to imagine a form of federalism that accommodates adequately both the universal and particular, and re-imagines Confederation. As the separatist movement gained momentum in the late 1970s, the country was at a crossroads again. According to Pierre Trudeau, in 1976 the PQ had come to power:

...on the promise of good government, but no sooner were they in office than they began talking about the referendum they were going to hold to have Québécois decide between Canada and independence. And, of course, their line was that Canada was so far gone that it couldn’t be fixed. Canada, they said would never accommodate Québec’s legitimate aspirations, so it was no longer a matter of special status; Québécois would be asked to vote for independence. Naturally, under the circumstances, I had no choice but to reopen the constitutional can of worms once again.

Trudeau was a nationalist Prime Minister; he knew that he had to appease each of the different loyalties which made up the identities of individual Canadians. By the end of the decade, Trudeau hoped the patriation of the constitution would formalise and centralise national feeling within the country. In a Globe and Mail article in 1978, Trudeau pleaded ‘The regions and groups that make up Canada must be united. Their unity requires a political framework. This framework is the federation and these institutions the ones which make up the federal authority. The Constitution must define this framework and these institutions. The unity of Canada must transcend the identification Canadians have with provinces, regions and linguistic or other differences.’ Trudeau’s plea was heartfelt; he wanted to save Confederation. Trudeau went on to explain how the Government plans on making changes in six key areas: improving the federal-provincial relationship; make consultation processes more time-efficient and less demanding on resources; ensure freedom of action for each government to ‘fulfill its constitutional responsibilities’; better understanding of intergovernmental process for taxpayers and citizens; eliminate duplication of legislation, policies, programs or services. And, he promised a new constitution and a


charter of rights and freedoms for Canada by 1981. Trudeau hoped these steps would help save Canada and stop the separatist agenda. Patriation of the constitution would need the support of the provinces, previous governments had already failed in garnering this support. So dedicated was Trudeau to the patriation of the constitution from Britain he was willing to undertake unilateral patriation should the provinces not support the federal government.

Pushing forward with the separatist agenda, in 1979, the PQ published the White Paper: The Québec Government Proposal for a New Partnership Between Equals: Sovereignty-Association. The paper called for Québec to be its own independent nation, but still use the Canadian dollar and tariffs. Lévesque believed that the patriation of the constitution would have negative effects on Québec. He found the proposals regarding the constitution insufficient:

> These are old questions that many federal-provincial conferences have not succeeded in resolving ... because the provinces fear they will lose those guarantees of autonomy assured them by the British North America Act, but gnawed at by Ottawa. The constant failure of these periodic endeavors is related in particular to a fundamental contradiction which has existed since the beginning: between the French people in Québec who need autonomy, more and more self-government, and the anglo-Canadian people who would easily be able to accommodate a more and more centralized regime because they are the ones who would control it.

This decade saw great shifts in the power struggle in Canada; Trudeau wanted to limit regional-provincial-federal power struggles and make a strong, cohesive federal government while Lévesque wanted Québécois to form their own separate nation. The two French-Canadians were in a very public struggle over Canadian confederation. On June 4, 1979, the Progressive Conservative party won a minority election and Joe Clark became Prime Minister. The Trudeau government fell due to Canada’s economic situation and Trudeau’s preoccupation with constitutional matters. His constitutional aspirations would be put on hold for the 200 days that made up Clark’s minority government. Conveniently, with Trudeau out of the picture, in December 1979, Lévesque published the question which would be put to Québécois during the

78 Ibid.
referendum, to be held in May 1980. The push to save Canada was on. Despite no longer being Prime Minister, 1980 began with Lévesque and Trudeau struggling over the future of Canada.

Internationally, picking up where the Trudeau government had left off, Flora MacDonald, the New Secretary of State for External Affairs, informed an organisation competing in a world championship in Berlin about Canada’s policy of discouraging contact with South Africa and:

With respect to competitions in third countries, it is more difficult to arrive at a policy which will fulfil our commitment to the campaign against apartheid in sport and still be practical to enforce and fair to Canadian sport bodies. We consider that in most cases participation in a sport event is the responsibility of the host country, and that it would be unfair to demand that Canadian sportsmen withdraw from such an event when it is often impossible to know in advance whether South Africans will actually be present. Therefore when a Canadian team goes abroad to compete in an event in which South Africans may also be participating, the government advises the team that officially it discourages sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa, and if any member of the Canadian team refuses to compete against the South African team, the government will not provide any funds to replace that player, whether or not the original team had federal financial support.81

Previously, the Trudeau government had informed the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid that in third party instances ‘...the possibility of South African participation in an athletic event in which Canadians may also be participating is not a factor which can be influenced by the application of the financial restraints utilized under present Canadian Government policies. The only Government which can apply any such influence is the Government of the country where this event is being held.’82

By the end of the 1970s, Canada still had not addressed Canadian-South African sporting contact in third party countries.

The anti-apartheid sports boycott was weak in comparison to the focus on the economy and humanitarian affairs emphasised by the grassroots movement in Canada and in comparison with other Commonwealth nations. Bruce Kidd stands out as the main activist working to abolish Canada’s sporting links with South Africa. Few NGOs,

81 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume 15285, File Part 7 - August 14, 1979. Note: Names of these individuals cannot be provided, as per the terms of the Access to Information request approval.

church groups or grassroots organisations focused on the sports boycott; mainly because Canada had only limited contact with South African sport, unlike Britain, Australia and New Zealand. For the most part, the international sports boycott affected Canadian policy due to Canada hosting two major international sporting events in the 1970s. Canada’s policy in regards to South African sport evolved over many years and through great turmoil. However, by the end of the 1970s, the policies were well-established and would remain unchanged until Conservative Brian Mulroney became Prime Minister in 1984. Although the international sport boycott was the most successful campaign in isolating South Africa, in terms of popularity, by 1977 only ‘... 99.9956 per cent of sport was still played according to the segregated sports policy’ and ‘there were only 56 cases of people joining clubs of other racial groups.’ 83 Sport was important to South Africans and the government was willing to bend apartheid laws in order to continue playing international sport. But, by the end of the 1970s, South Africa was virtually isolated from international sport.

CHAPTER 9 Conclusion

For most of the last century competitive athletes and sports organisations tried to keep politics out of sport. But as sport became a mass phenomenon and increasingly subject to the forces of popular nationalism and ideological manipulation, the state was drawn in. This was most obvious in the case of totalitarian regimes of left and right, but it also could apply to the liberal constitutional middle ground of politics. In public liberal democratic governments have tried to be - or to appear to be - removed from decisions involving international sporting relations. Politics, however, proved impossible to keep out. The XXI Olympiad in Montréal is a striking example. This Olympics saw the first mass boycott by IOC member countries in the history of the modern Olympic Games. This boycott, undertaken by a multitude of African nations, Guyana and Iraq, took place just at the point at which Canada established a strong, coherent policy against apartheid sport. The two were necessarily connected. It was the threat of concerted diplomatic pressure from the new African states which had concentrated the mind of Canadian policy makers in the years immediately before the Montréal Olympics. It was also the fact of the boycott which drove forward policy making afterwards and concluded in the Gleneagles Agreement.

For all the many factors involved in the creation of an anti-apartheid sports policy, close analysis of the historical evidence shows the critical importance of a small number of policy-makers, and crucially of Trudeau himself from the time he took office in 1968 to when he left office in 1979. By the time he was reelected in 1980, it was clear that Trudeau was an important international figure, well respected for his work in increasing Canada’s influence and prestige, especially in the area of international relations and diplomacy.

When Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, there were two particular issues which commanded his personal attention: the rise of the separatist movement in Québec and his foreign policy goal to move Canada forward and have it play a more progressive role on the Commonwealth and, to a larger degree, world stage. Both, however, proved to be relevant to his future handling of the anti-apartheid movement. At that point he had no idea he would have to deal with the political ramifications of hosting two mega sporting events in quick succession. That the most important of the two - the Montréal
Olympics - was to be staged in the city at the heart of the separatist debate clearly meant the government had to tread warily and avoid being seen to undermine the event by a diplomatic failure. The Olympics also became mired in Commonwealth high politics. This in turn raised the profile of anti-apartheid sport diplomacy. The sudden decision to walk out after the Games had actually started caught the Trudeau government by surprise and was embarrassing for them in relation to the IOC and the Games organising committee. This, in turn, motivated the government to ensure the success of the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games by taking decisive diplomatic initiative in conjunction with the British. This move succeeded and led to the Gleneagles Agreement which headed off the risk of mass boycott of Edmonton and governed Commonwealth relations to South Africa in the 1980s.

During these 11 years the Canadian government, under Trudeau’s leadership, made extensive changes to its policies dealing with sporting contacts with South Africa. Increased activity and diplomacy on the part of Trudeau, the Secretaries of State for External Affairs and their Department brought Canada’s point of view to the forefront of the politics of international sport. In doing so policy makers at first were motivated by both internal and external forces with the balance swinging in favour of external diplomatic pressure as time passed.

Several key questions were posed at the beginning of this thesis, it is appropriate to address them now. What was the role of moral pressure exerted by Churches, trade unions and other progressive bodies and individuals in the formulation of an anti-apartheid sports policy? And, did Canadian economic and trading interests effect this? Simply, grassroots anti-apartheid groups, Churches, trade unions and other progressive organisations had limited influence on Canadian politics and Canadian public opinion during the period under investigation. The movement was fractious - several small groups worked in isolation in cities and towns across Canada. But the Canadian public at first took little notice. During the 1970s, the Canadian groups found moderate success in boycotting South African goods; with activists in British Columbia striking the largest victory when the province’s liquor stores removed South African wine from their shelves. But, in terms of ongoing trade relations and cultural and sport relations, Canadians took very little interest during the time period covered in this thesis. As shown above, Canada actually had limited economic and trade contact with South Africa. But, as part of the Trudeau government’s Third Option policy, the
government maintained this limited contact in order to diversify its economic and trade ties throughout the 1970s. The government and corporations paid very little attention to calls for cessation of trade with South Africa, voiced by trade unions, churches and anti-apartheid groups. The main reason the government undertook cosmetic changes to its trade and economic policies in 1977 was not due to pressure from these sectors, but due to the international relations and diplomacy fiasco surrounding the boycott of the 1976 Montréal Olympics and Canada wanting to avoid the same predicament during the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games.

The main reason for the lack of interest in the sports boycott was that Canada and South Africa did not compete with each other in popular Commonwealth team sports like cricket and rugby. Therefore, Canadians were not initially or directly affected by the sports boycott. This was one of the main reasons that it was easy for the government of Canada to take the lead in urging the isolation of South African apartheid sport. It is not difficult to imagine the outraged reaction from sections of the Canadian public to a boycott if there had been a long-standing ice hockey rivalry between Canada and South Africa as there was in rugby between the Springboks and All Blacks. In other white Commonwealth countries with cricket and rugby links to South Africa, the anti-apartheid movement gained momentum from the stubborn opposition of the relevant sporting bodies to ending South African touring teams and tours of South Africa. In Britain, Australia and New Zealand, anti-apartheid groups, trade unions and churches actively promoted and participated in actions that isolated South Africa sport. By encouraging the cessation of sporting contact, these countries were able to effectively support and expand anti-apartheid activity within their respective countries - for example, trade unions refused to transport South African athletes on commercial Australian airlines and churches participated in the Stop the Seventy Tour movement. In the 1970s, Canadian anti-apartheid activists lacked the focus for public activism present in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which may explain the relatively limited role of voluntary associations in the formation of policy.

What role did Canadian regionalism, notably the growing ‘problem’ of Québec separatism, play? Or was it rather external factors - Canada’s desire to increase its ‘middle-power’ status or the relations with emergent African nations, for example - which were the crucial catalysts for changes to Canada’s sports policy in relation to South Africa? Widespread regionalism is a striking Canadian characteristic; the main
regional division plaguing the Trudeau government during this time period was Anglo-
Canada’s relationship with Québec. Québec’s majority was French-speaking and the
Parti Québécois was making serious progress as a nationalist and separatist force in
the 1970s. In other circumstances, this would not have influenced sports policy but the
fact of Montréal, the largest city in Québec, hosting the Olympic Games, made it
imperative that the Canadian government should be seen to be alert to the growing
threat to the Games from the African Commonwealth states. The central government
could have greatly assisted the Games by making sure the voices of the African
nations were heard and by dealing with the sensitive question of New Zealand’s
sporting links with South Africa. Yet, the federal government did not publicly stand up
and support the African nations. The Canadian government did adopt strict foreign
policies dealing with apartheid sport, but this was not enough to prevent a boycott of
the Montréal Olympics. In the immediate run-up to the Games, Canada’s attention was
focused on the Taiwan situation and ensuring its delicate relationship with China was
not ruined. The IOC and Canada reacted too late to the boycott threat; once the wheels
were in motion and nations began to depart Montréal there was nothing that could be
done to bring them back or stop the boycott.

Whilst such internal pressures need to be borne in mind, the prime reason Canada
became a key player in the movement to isolate South African sport was their
vulnerability to external pressure as hosts of the Montréal Olympic Games and the
Edmonton Commonwealth Games. Canada’s policies against participation and
collusion with apartheid sport became stronger as the threat to these two major
sporting events increased, culminating in the withdrawal of funding for a disabled event
at which a mixed-race South African team had been invited. In the run-up to the 1976
Games, Trudeau approved changes to Canada’s policies dealing with South African
sport. These included refusing funds to events held in Canada where South African
athletes would be participating and withdrawing moral support for any events held in
Canada which included South African athletes. Although Canada appeared tough on
apartheid sport, a boycott of the Montréal Games went ahead because of New
Zealand’s ongoing rugby relationship with the apartheid state. After the failure to
prevent a boycott of the Montréal Games, Trudeau and External Affairs increased and
accelerated efforts to isolate South Africa from contact with Commonwealth sport,
leading not only to the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977 but also to limited economic and
trade sanctions and the refusal of visas to South African athletes by 1978. Canadian
regionalism, although rife, played a minor role in pressurising the federal government to change its anti-apartheid sport policies. The main pressure to change its policies came from non-white Commonwealth nations; they proved to hold the power. African nations, especially, proved to be the main external catalyst for change; once they walked away from the 1976 Olympics, Canada increased its role in isolating South African sport in order to ensure the success of the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. As noted above, the Canadian government worked at amending its own South African trade policies, changed its visa requirements, and proactively and aggressively pursued the adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement in order to avoid the embarrassment of a second boycott on Canadian soil.

Canadian historiography surrounding the development of Canada’s anti-apartheid sport policy and its role in the isolation of South African sport is limited. Linda Freeman, a former anti-apartheid activist, analyses the Trudeau government’s relationship with South Africa in The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years. Although Freeman does discuss the role of anti-apartheid groups during the Trudeau era, there is only limited mention of the sports and cultural boycotts. She emphasises the groups’ work on the boycott of goods and their work in advocating with corporations. Freeman’s book provides little support for the role Trudeau’s government played in isolating South African sport and focuses largely on Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government in the 1980s and its desire to change Canada’s anti-apartheid policies to completely cut all ties with South Africa.

In Sport and Canadian Diplomacy, Donald Macintosh and Michael Hawes over-simplify the role Canada played during the 1976 Olympics and 1978 Commonwealth Games; access to additional resources from External Affairs, focusing specifically on South African sport contact, and access to Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s archives, available since his death in 2000, provided in-depth detail regarding the development of Canadian policy through a variety of documents. Macintosh and Hawes note that Trudeau was too preoccupied with the Taiwan situation to adequately prevent the boycott of the Montréal Games. However, this thesis has shown that, beginning in the early 1970s, Trudeau, his government ministers and External Affairs worked diligently and consistently to isolate South African sport in an effort to prevent a boycott on Canadian

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84 Linda Freeman. The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
soil. This thesis has expanded its strong argument surrounding the active, participatory role that Canada played in isolating South African sport from 1968 to 1980. Additionally, regarding the Edmonton Commonwealth Games, Macintosh and Hawes provide an overarching history of Canada’s foreign policies targeting South African sport. They note that ‘sport carried the lion’s share of Canada’s more aggressive stance towards apartheid in South Africa’, mainly due to the fact that the Canadian public would not be inconvenienced by the lack of sporting contact with South Africa.\textsuperscript{85} This statement is accurate for the 1970s; yet it limits the active, participatory role that Canada played throughout the decade. Macintosh, David Black and Donna Greenhorn come to the same conclusion in ‘Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Commonwealth Games.’\textsuperscript{86} To expand on this argument, it is clear that Canada aggressively pursued the isolation of South African sport, mainly due to the fact that it was host to two global sporting events, in 1976 and 1978. It was in Canada’s interest to take a leading role in isolating South Africa; when Trudeau and other government leaders realised that the foreign policies that had been implemented in the early 1970s were insufficient in preventing the 1976 Olympic boycott, they ramped up their efforts and moved to promote change on the international stage through a Commonwealth agreement focused on eliminating contact with apartheid sport. This thesis has shown that, more than being an easy target, the isolation of South African sport was a major foreign policy and diplomatic development from 1968 to 1980. Canada moved to isolate South Africa in an effort to increase its middle power status, prevent a boycott of the 1976 Olympics and 1978 Commonwealth Games, and secure the stability of the Commonwealth.

The sports boycott and sporting isolation of South Africa was the most successful aspect of the broad anti-apartheid movement. White South Africans placed a very high value on sport and believed that sport was an important way to express national pride and identity. Their inability to participate in international sport was a major blow to the country, revealing the extent of international condemnation of apartheid, and in consequence, apartheid laws and policies governing sport began to be loosened before the liberalising of other aspects of South African society. Within the Commonwealth, Canada took a leading role in ensuring that the association remained


\textsuperscript{86} Donald Macintosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black. ‘Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games’ \textit{Journal of Sport History}, Spring 1992, p. 54.
strong in its stance against apartheid sport. Trudeau played a key role in this process, attempting to increase Canada’s importance and value within the Commonwealth while navigating the difficult relationship between sport and politics, Ottawa and Québec, and Canada’s move away from American influence to take a distinctive, independent place on the world stage.
Appendix A
Timeline of Key Events

- 1948 - apartheid becomes the official policy of the National Party under Daniel Francois Malan.
- 1958 - Campaign Against Race Discrimination (CARD) created in Wales.
- 1958 - June 22, 1960 - Jean Lesage of the Québécois Liberal Party elected provincial Premier - kicking off the Quiet Revolution.
- March 21, 1960 - Sharpeville Massacre where students protesting South African pass book laws are shot upon by the police, 69 people are killed.
- March 15, 1961 - South Africa withdraws from the Commonwealth.
- May 31, 1961 - South Africa declared a republic.
- 1962 - South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) established.
- October 30, 1964 to June 12, 1964 - The Rivonia Trial of Nelson Mandela and nine other leading ANC figures for sabotage and treason. Eight of the defendants, including Mandela, were sentenced to life imprisonment, one was found not guilty and one was discharged at the end of the case.
- April 1968 - South Africa’s invitation to the Mexico Olympics revoked.
- 1968 - IOC Killanin fact-finding group tours South Africa.
- October 1968 - Parti Québécois is formed.
- 1969 - Stop the Seventy Tour (STST) causes mass unrest during South Africa’s rugby tour of Britain in protest to the upcoming South African cricket tour of England, due to take place in 1970.
- April 20, 1970 - Robert Bourassa’s Liberal Party wins the Québec provincial election.
- May 12, 1970 - Montréal is awarded the 1976 Olympic Games at the IOC Meeting in Amsterdam. May 1970 - IOC expels South Africa from the Olympic Movement.
- May 22, 1970 - The Cricket Council cancels South Africa’s planned tour of Britain.
- October 1970 - On October 5 British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, is kidnapped by members of the Liberation Cell of the Front de libération du Québec
October 8, the FLQ Manifesto was broadcast to the media, as per the kidnappers request. October 10, Québec Minister of Labour is kidnapped by the Chenier Cell of the FLQ. October 16, Pierre Trudeau enacts the War Measures Act for the first time during peace, as per the request of the governments of the City of Montréal and the Province of Québec. October 17, Pierre Laporte is killed. James Cross is found alive on December 3. Members of each cell are arrested in November and December.

- 1972 - The Liberal Party develops the Third Option policy.
- October 30, 1972 - Trudeau’s Liberals win the election, form a minority government.
- Late 1972 - Louis E. Lefaive, Director of Sport Canada, advised amateur sports institutions that no federal assistance will be provided to Canadian athletes who intend to participate in events hosted in South Africa.
- 1973 - YWCA publishes Investment in Oppression.
- March 1973 - South African Council on Sport (SACOS) established.
- July 8, 1974 - Trudeau’s Liberals form a majority election, after a non-confidence vote which brought down the previous minority Liberal government.
- 1975 - federal government formally announces that it will not provide funding and would withhold moral support for athletes participating in sporting events in South Africa and for events in Canada where South African athletes have been invited.
- December 1975 - Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility established.
- May 7, 1976 - Marc Lalonde, Minister of Health and Welfare, reiterated to the Toronto Paralympiad Committee that the government would not be providing funding should the Committee allow South Africa to participate.
- June 16, 1976 - Soweto Massacre where South African police shot upon students protesting the replacement of English with Afrikaans as the main language of instruction in schools.
- July 1, 1976 - The Organization of African Unity meet in Mauritius and pass a resolution encouraging its members to boycott the 1976 Olympics.
- July 10, 1976 - Tanzania announces that it will be boycotting the Olympic Games.
July 17 - August 1, 1976 - Montréal Olympics.

November 15, 1976 - Parti Québécois wins the provincial election, René Lévesque becomes the Premier.

March 1977 - The Organization of African Unity (OAU) calls for a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games due to New Zealand’s continuing ties with South Africa sport.

June 15, 1977 - Gleneagles Agreement passed.

December 19, 1977 - Secretary of State for External Affairs, Donald Jamieson announces changes to Canada’s South African trade and economic policy.

July 1978 - Iona Campagnolo, Secretary of State (Sport) announces that visas would be withheld from representatives of South Africa’s national sport federations.

June 4, 1979 - Trudeau’s Liberal Party is defeated, Joe Clark and the Conservatives form a minority government

February 18, 1980 - Trudeau and his Liberal Party are reelected and form a majority government.
Appendix B
OAU Resolution on Sporting Links with South Africa

The Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Port Louis, Mauritius, between 24th and 29th June 1976.

Considering, that one of the manifestations of the abominable Apartheid system is the separation of the population of South Africa by race and the colour of their skin,

Reminding, all the States especially those peace-loving states that have an interest in the freedom and dignity of all mankind that the South African fascist regime is using sports for political and publicity purposes aimed at gaining international acceptability,

Being fully aware that while South Africa is committing wanton massacre of our brothers and sisters in Soweto, Johannesburg, Pretoria and elsewhere in South Africa, New Zealand condones these atrocities by entertaining South African fascists in sports,

1. STRONGLY CONDEMNS New Zealand and all countries and International Organizations that cooperate with and participate in any sporting activity with the Racist Regime of South Africa.

2. APPEALS to the International Olympic Committee to bar New Zealand from participating in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada.

3. CALLS UPON all Member States of the OAU to reconsider their participation in this year's Olympic Games in Canada if New Zealand participates.

4. CALLS UPON the International Community to demonstrate once more their solidarity with Africa in this struggle against Apartheid.

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Appendix C

African Nations’ reasons for boycotting the 1976 Olympics,
as provided by individual countries to the IOC.

4. Replies to circular AQ00 of 30th August from African and other NOCs:

KENYA : Government instructions to withdraw.
NIGERIA : NOC withdrew.
TANZANIA : In compliance with the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
resolution 44/20th June 1976 calling on all OAU members to boycott
Games. (Resolution attached Annex 2)

Zaire : Not due to political considerations, but to national priority
needs re finance.
Tunisia : Have requested CSSA for information concerning withdrawals.
Algeria : Government interventions to withdraw.
Uganda : Not a result of political pressure but a fight against apartheid
in sport.
Sri Lanka : Athletes did not reach minimum standards.
Swaziland : Withdrawal done without reference to NOC.
Guyana : Not motivated by political pressure. Decision taken by NOC re
participation of New Zealand.
Iraq : Withdrawal by NOC as act of protest on sports relations - New Zealar
South Africa.
El Salvador : Non-participation due to purely technical aspects and for lack of
necessary funds.

LETTERS OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE MAYOR OF THE OLYMPIC VILLAGE

Cameroon : Reason - racial segregation
Congo : No reason given
Libya :
Mali :
Niger :
Togo :
Egypt : "For private reasons"
Ethiopia : Protest re sports relations New Zealand/South Africa
Ghana : Protest at New Zealand's participation in the Games
Upper Volta : Due to refusal of IOC to exclude New Zealand from the Games
Sudan : Due to participation of New Zealand in the Games
Chad : Government intervention
Zambia : Government instructions to withdraw

- October 1976.
Appendix D
The Sports Policy Announcement of 23 September 1976

The Federal Information Council of the National Party accepts that, taking into account the applicable legislation and regulations, the interests of South Africa and all its peoples in respect of sport can be served in terms of the following policy:

1. White, Coloured, Indian and black sportsmen and women should all belong to their own clubs. Each should control, arrange, and manage its own sporting fixtures.

2. Wherever possible, practical and desirable the committees or councils of the different race groups should consult together or have such contact as would advance the interests of the sport concerned.

3. Inter-group competition in respect of individual types of sport (will) be allowed at all levels, should the controlling bodies so decide.

4. In respect of teams sports, the councils or committees of each racial group should arrange their own leagues or programmes within the racial group.

5. Where mutually agreed councils or committees may, in consultation with the Minister, arrange leagues or matches enabling teams from different racial groups to compete.

6. Each racial group should arrange its own sporting relationships with other countries or sporting bodies in accordance with its own wishes, and each should award its own badges and colours.

7. If and when invited or agreed, teams comprising of players from all racial groups can represent South Africa, and can be awarded colours which, if so desired, can incorporate the national flag or its colours.

8. Attendance at sporting fixtures can be arranged by the controlling bodies.¹

¹ Ramsamy, 1982, p. 45.
Appendix E
Iona Campagnolo to Canadian sport bodies

As you are aware, the question of sporting contacts with the Republic of South Africa is an issue that has caused increasing concern to the international athletic community over the last several years. In 1970, the International Olympic Committee decided to expel the South African National Olympic Committee because that country’s racist sports policies and practices were considered to be in violation of the IOC regulations.

Similarly, Canada and the international community, including a growing number of international sport governing bodies, have implemented policies designed to express to South Africa firm opposition to the application of the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination and to impress upon the South African Government and South African sporting federations the need to make significant changes in these discriminatory practices. Some countries and sports federations have imposed a total ban on all sporting contacts with South African athletes. Other countries have sought to restrict and discourage such contacts by other means. Canada, for example, has maintained since 1974 a firm policy of not giving either financial or moral support to Canadian sports bodies for the purpose of travelling to South Africa for competition, or of hosting events in Canada in which South African teams or athletes are allowed to participate.

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The Government does not consider itself to be in a position to place restrictions on the right of Canadian citizens to travel abroad. Nonetheless, the Government firmly disapproves of all sport contact with South Africa, and within the limits of the policy described above, has done all that it can to discourage such contacts since that policy was adopted in 1974.

As part of the international effort to eliminate racially discriminatory practices from sports, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions (in 1971, 1975 and 1976) calling on all member states to (among other actions) refuse any sponsorship, assistance or encouragement to sports contacts with South Africa, including official receptions for teams; refuse payments of grants to sports bodies or teams or sportsmen; and encourage national sports bodies to support the exclusion of South Africa from all international sports bodies, competitions or tournaments.

The Canadian Government has supported these resolutions and has declared its intention to implement their provisions. The Government considers that such measures as these are necessary to strengthen the international effort to bring about substantial change in South African sports policies and practices. While the Government recognizes that certain limited steps have been taken in South Africa in this direction, we consider that until now these modifications have been largely cosmetic, are designed solely to give the appearance of change, and are not indicative of any real and substantial alterations in the present racially discriminatory policies and practices in South African sports. Sport activities constitute a very important element in South African society, and it is clear that that society's self-esteem has been markedly affected by the growing isolation of South Africa in international sport. It is equally clear that the modifications undertaken to date have come about partly as a result of this isolation.

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It is with the above considerations in mind that I wish to discuss the question of future Canadian attitudes towards continued sporting contacts with South Africa. You will recall that African and other states boycotted the Montreal Olympics as a means of expressing their disaffection over the policies of New Zealand regarding sporting relations with South Africa. The possibility of some such action was raised in Mr. Lalone's letter of May 3, 1974, to all sport governing bodies, as was the possibility of a similar boycott against the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. While some progress appears to have been made in recent months in reconciling the differing views of the countries concerned, the Government believes that there remains a possibility that the success of the Edmonton Games may be undermined by a boycott along the lines of the Montreal example. The Government is anxious to minimize this possibility and is particularly concerned that such a boycott should not come about as a result of continuing sporting relations between Canada and South Africa.

In order to avoid such a development, the Government is concerned that Canadian sports federations and individuals should not undertake actions which might cause adverse international attention to be focused on Canada or on Canadian sports federations. I therefore strongly urge you and other Canadian sports federations to do your utmost to discourage sports contacts with South Africa at all levels within your sport, whether national, provincial or local. For its part, the Government will continue to enforce the policies expressed above. Furthermore, as a reflection of the seriousness with which we regard this matter, the Government will in the future strongly discourage and, if necessary, take a very critical attitude in public towards any proposed sporting contact between Canadians and South Africans, whether federal funding is involved or not. This concern would necessarily include proposals by Canadian sport bodies to host world-class events at their own expense in those sports where South Africa is a member of the International Federation and, as such, would be eligible to participate.
With your assistance and cooperation, the Government is hopeful that these actions will convince South Africa of the need to abandon apartheid policies and racially discriminatory practices in sport once and for all.

Yours very truly,

Iona Campagnolo
Appendix F

Gleneagles Agreement on Sporting Contacts with South Africa, 1977

The Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport, better known as the Gleneagles Agreement, was issued by Heads of Government from the Retreat held at Gleneagles in Scotland during their London meeting in June 1977.

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sport, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate intergovernmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or

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from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its law the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past, they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Governments of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord, there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.
Appendix G

Press Statement: Canada Defines Policy for South African Sportspeople

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CANADA DEFINES POLICY FOR
SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTSPEOPLE

OTTAWA - The federal government has established specific criteria for the granting of Canadian visas to South African sportspeople, it was announced today by the Honourable Iona Campagnolo, Minister of State, Fitness and Amateur Sport.

Criteria were established following the December 1977 announcement by External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson which stated that non-immigrant visas would be required for all South Africans visiting Canada. This policy went into effect with implementation of the new Canada Immigration Act on April 10, 1978.

Criteria released today disallow visas for South African citizens who wish to come to Canada to participate in sports competitions or associated congresses as representatives of their country. They also apply to representatives of South African national sport federations, to representatives of a constituent body of South African national sport federations, and to South African executive members of an international sport governing body.

The restrictions are in accordance with the Agreement reached by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Gleneagles, Scotland in June, 1977. The Agreement stated that Commonwealth Governments would take every practicable step to discourage sporting links with South Africa, because of that country's official policy of apartheid.

Policies similar to Canada's have been adopted by other Commonwealth countries, including Australia.

The new criteria, announced today, are designed to clarify the government's previous policy on sporting contacts with South Africa.

Under this policy, the federal government refuses to provide funding or other assistance to Canadian teams travelling to South Africa, or to sporting events or congresses in Canada at which South Africans are expected to participate. The Canadian policy is based on discouragement of Canadian sporting contact with South Africa in third countries.

The Minister felt the policy placed an unfair burden on individual sport and recreation governing bodies in Canada. Today's announcement will meet requests of many Canadian sportspeople that the government take full responsibility for administration of the South Africa Sport Policy.

Ref.: N.-René Mercier
Tel.: (613) 995-8465
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