LANGUAGE AND METAPHOR IN POSTMODERN ARCHITECTURAL MEANING: AN INTERPRETATIVE MODEL

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER TWO: SEMIOTICS, GESTURE AND EMBODIMENT

Sign, Signifier And Signified

Word And Image: Gestural Semantics

Embodiment and Gesture

Theatricality And Gestural Rhetoric

CHAPTER THREE: MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNISM

Modernity And Its Definitions

Continuity And Discontinuity

Cultural And Socio-Economic Transition

Postmodernist Space And Modernist Temporality

The Allegorical In The Postmodern

Theory And Post-Theory

CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

The Philosophy Of Language
CHAPTER FIVE: RHETORIC, VISUAL METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY, AND INTERPRETATION

Rhetoric

Visual Metaphor And Allegory

Visual Metaphor

Allegory

Interpretation

PART TWO

CHAPTER SIX: THE ARCHITECTURAL TRACE

The Modernist Grid

The Trajectory From Modernism Into Postmodern Architecture

From Postmodernism to Poststructuralism: From Simile To Metaphor

Poststructural Architecture And The Neo-Theatrical

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE READING OF BUILDINGS

Sculptural Gesture As Origin

Frank Gehry And Remembrance

The Architectural Curve

The Reinscription Of Modernism In The Fold
ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to establish an interpretative model of, or mode of response to, postmodern and in particular, poststructuralist architecture. The existing lacuna of interpretation in this area is the result of the disfiguring, but ubiquitous, 'language of architecture' formulation which is formally challenged here as part of the construction of a model of interpretation. Interpretation as a key term is not only dealt with specifically in Chapter Five, but is also illuminated for example by the discussion in Chapter Two of signification and the complex relationship between visual image and language, since language has to emerge holistically as an aspect of architectural meaning.

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One comprises four theoretical chapters which are not necessarily 'about' architecture as such, but which provide the theoretical components of a model of interpretation. It needs to be clearly stated that this model is not epistemologically exclusive or absolute in any sense, but is only one among many other interpretative possibilities. The first chapter deals with methodology and a literature review. Chapter Two establishes the importance of signification and the sign and the semiotics of image and word. Chapter Three deals with ideas of what the postmodern might mean since the architecture principally dealt with is poststructuralist. The fulcrum moment of schism between Modernism and Postmodernism around 1960 is discussed, as is the vitally important allegorical nature of the postmodern. Chapter Four looks at the philosophy of language and meaning since language is indispensably a part of postmodern architectural meaning. Chapter Five discusses interpretation within the development of literary theory which must underpin the reading of buildings as the source of a coherent account of interpretation in general as well as particular architectural meaning.

Part Two contains two chapters. Both are specifically about architecture and how it might be read in postmodern and poststructuralist context. The first, Chapter Six, deals with the trace of the development of postmodern architecture as both an aspect of Modernist architecture and a subversive imperative against it. Chapter Seven, the final chapter, puts into practice in an almost Leavisite way the interpretative stances established in Part One. Major works by poststructuralist architects are read in terms of metaphor, especially visual metaphor, rhetoric and allegory. From Part One to Part Two is from theory to practice.

The thesis concludes by suggesting that architectural poststructuralist semantics and interpretation can only be deepened by dispensing with 'the language of architecture' in favour of language as emergent from architecture; the language of architecture does not exist.
LANGUAGE AND METAPHOR IN POSTMODERN ARCHITECTURAL MEANING: AN INTERPRETATIVE MODEL

CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The title here, Language And Metaphor In Postmodern Architectural Meaning: An Interpretative Model, suggests that postmodern architecture, unlike the Modernism from which it evolved, implicates meaning within the relationship of architectural built form and the visual metaphors it contains which become linguistic. Such visual metaphors do necessarily become linguistic because if postmodern architecture is assumed to have referential meaning, then that meaning can only be inferred through the process of readership. Readership in its turn is essentially both interpretative and ‘literary’. The interpretation of architectural built form becomes linguistic as meaning emerges from the visual metaphors embedded in the form of buildings considered as postmodern.

Modernist architecture, say that before Corbusier’s Ronchamp, was largely antireferential and predicated on the form follows function relation. Its episteme was antimetaphorical in favour of an architecture that emphatically subjected form and architectural style to the dominating priorities and demands of structure and function. In this sense, Modernist architectural functionalism was inherently disinterested in metaphor and unconcerned with semantic inflection. Postmodern architecture has substantially subverted and reversed this position. It displays reference, often by a stylistic recursion to Historicist signposting such as faux classicism. This element of display is, certainly in early architectural postmodernism, an example of contrivance and theatricality. In this sense it is an architecture of rhetorical allusion. That this rhetorical display is, or was, playfully ironic or sardonic and subversive of architectural Modernism is now an established and accepted position in relation to early Postmodernism. However, a distinction needs to be drawn between early and late-phase postmodernist architecture,
and it is the later manifestation which is mainly treated here and is the principle concern, and which is designated as poststructuralist. This later architecture is poststructuralist in the sense that it is heavily influenced by 'Theory', especially so when informed by Derrida and Deleuze. One essential aspect of 'Theory' is that derived from Craig Owen's foundational paper *The Allegorical Imperative* which seeks to establish that the driving mechanism of the postmodern aesthetic is palimpsest-like in its recursion to earlier forms; that is that poststructuralist architecture is construed and interpreted here as profoundly allegorical in its concern with both presence and absence. The allegorical ghost which, as it were, haunts the poststructuralist architectural form, is Modernism itself from which the postmodern emerged and yet remains an aspect of it.

In many ways, the central issue of architectural meaning as the interpretation of visual metaphor is the demand that interpretation itself, as an inevitable act of readership as a literary act in part at least, necessarily becomes linguistic. In that sense, meaning flows from embedded built metaphor to become language. This 'unconcealing', as Heidegger would have it, is the philosophical justification of interpretation as language from built form. The phenomenological hermeneutics of the visual as instanced by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is perhaps the best fit between built visual metaphor and language. And it follows from the semiotics of the sign as Lessing, Saussure, Peirce and Barthes for example have speculated, that the sign in order to signify, including visual signs, oscillates between the visual and the linguistic.

In what has become a hugely influential semiotics of architecture, 'the language of formulation is now a widely, if not universally, accepted paradigm. The most influential work in this field in a generation has been Charles Jencks's *The Language of Postmodern Architecture*. But we are also confronted in a wider context by 'the language of sculpture' or 'the language of landscape' and so on. In attempting to generate a model of interpretation of postmodern architecture, a central argument here, amongst others, is that language is a product of architectural interpretation and is not an essential inherent property of architecture in the sense that language is understood to be an inherent property of the human mind. Interpretation as language emerging from architectural form
is fundamentally phenomenological. Assuming that architecture has an inherent propensity for language is, in the opposite direction, a product of philosophical idealism and is a contradiction of the proposed and supposed semiotic nature of 'the language of architecture'. There is no language of architecture; there is only language from and generated by architecture. Only texts have language, and architectural meaning only becomes textual after interpretation.

Interpretation itself requires a frame of reference in order to prevent it succumbing to personal opinion or ad hoc accounts and narratives. The frame of reference secures the constitutive elements that constitute an interpretative model. The constitutive model here consists in having four underlying themes or epistemes. The first is the metaphorical nature of the sign and its visual and linguistic journey from Modernism to Postmodernism since metaphor is the genesis of postmodern architectural meaning. The second involves the discussion of the complex existential nature of Postmodernism itself since it is postmodern architecture that is the interpretative focus. The third is a philosophical and hermeneutical justification of the proposal that architectural meaning as encoded in visual metaphor 'unconceals' linguistically in acts of readership. The fourth is based on the assumption that any interpretation of an aesthetic object or process is necessarily linguistic and has to be grounded in literary theory which naturally subsumes readership itself. The four themes constitute the four chapters of Part One and holistically represent the model of interpretation. The two further chapters of Part Two discuss both the trace and the particular interpretation of mainly public buildings by poststructuralist architects such as Frank Gehry, Daniel Libeskind, Rem Koolhaas and Zaha Hadid. Part One represents the theoretical model of interpretation and Part Two the practical criticism of actual buildings – theory into practice.

Within the four theoretical chapters of the first part are themes which spiral forward, or indeed, refer back retrospectively. What follows immediately as comparatively short, concentrated sections are the basic assumptions which appear throughout the thesis and underpin the interpretation in the second part. As the passage on methodology insists, this does not in any respect amount to a causal argument, more the constitutive elements of an interpretative model.
1 Architectural meaning must ultimately be linguistic and be derived from architectural shape and form and detail. Shape and form configure architecturally and in the postmodern, signify metaphorically. Meaning is not wholly governed by authorial intention. What the sign means is tripartite and is constitutive firstly of the form itself as signifier, secondly as architectural or authorial intention and thirdly as an 'interpretant' which confers a reading of the other two in a manner redolent of the hermeneutical circle. The tripartite nature of the sign is derived from Peirce who himself pointed out that each 'interpretant' as an act of interpretation inevitably requires a subsequent interpretation, thus invoking an inevitable infinite regress and so making each interpretation and making each reading dependent on prior interpretations. In this way, the sign as a signifying entity is destabilised. Meaning in this sense cannot be fixed and restricted to intention.

2 Meaning inheres in the sign and the sign is fundamentally and necessarily metaphorical. This is so because one thing which suggests or points to something else as the sign does as part of its nature is acting metaphorically and so requires interpretation. Without interpretation there is no sign in a meaningful sense. The presence of the metaphorical reference in the sign makes interpreting that sign an imperative.

3 In postmodern architecture, the sign will be metaphorical and its interpretants infinitely regressive. The regressive nature of the sign creates a meaning which is layered on a previous meaning and represents a palimpsest. Any palimpsest, as an overlying of one meaning or text on a previous one, then creates two conditions. The first, as an overlayering involves time. In turn, and secondly, this creates an absence and a presence. The postmodern sign is then a temporal palimpsest. And as Craig Owens has shown, the recursive dimension of time in the palimpsest always instigates the presence of the allegorical. The underlying presence of the allegorical as an essential element involved in interpreting the postmodern will be a recurrent theme here.

4 The allegorical sign is both visual and linguistic. The relation between the visual or iconic sign and language is rather like the 'duck-rabbit'. At any moment, what is seen is
either the duck or the rabbit but actually never as both at precisely the same time. In allegory, the sign works by implicating a 'figure' which carries a conventional or language-based meaning. Gotthold Lessing's discussion of Horace's *ut pictura poesis* ('as in painting so in poetry') initiates in the Enlightenment the modern interest in the relation of language and visual form and remains an important source.

5 In postmodern architecture the allegorical sign is necessarily an aspect of rhetoric. The use of irony to produce a particular mood or tone in which something which is 'said' is used to convey an opposite or deliberately dissimilar meaning conforms to the rule of allegory to say one thing but mean another. This is the classical orator's device to signal to a knowing cognoscenti while apparently saying something more banal to the multitude. Postmodern architecture is allegorically ironic and therefore self-consciously rhetorical in saying one thing but meaning another. In the same sense as the classical rhetorician, the device of irony represents a deliberately self-conscious 'display' as a rhetorical flourish. In postmodern architecture, both display and flourish are represented by visual metaphor. The notion of 'display' is treated elsewhere here as an instance of architectural theatricality.

6 Postmodern architectural rhetoric, as a form of display and contrivance, is characterized by what Michael Fried has called 'theatricality'. Fried's version of theatricality is seen here as the primary marker of the shift from high Modernism to the postmodern during the nineteen sixties. Fried and Clement Greenberg's defence of Abstract Expressionism and Post Painterly Abstraction is the paradigmatic moment of discontinuity between Modernism and Postmodernism, hence the significance of Jackson Pollock as the emblematic practitioner of the Modernist avant-garde. Pollock also represents the final moment of retinal Significant Form which was anti-metaphorical and which was to be replaced increasingly by referential installation in the postmodern aesthetic. The continuing importance and relevance of Pollock is as the last of the Modernists.

7 After Fried and the collapse of the idea of the Modernist Avant-Garde and the emergence of Robert Venturi, postmodern architecture looked backwards since,
following the demise of the avant-garde, there could be no further progressive march into
the future. It became recursively Historicist and initially was characterized by
conspicuous contrivance. This historicist contrivance was also insistently revivalist in
sardonically revisiting past architectural styles. This in its turn implicates an almost
Proustian return to lost time which as an absence assumes a presence and may be seen as
an aspect of mourning and the elegiac. This allegorical concern with past or lost time is
an essential component of absence in presence and is a constant in the recursive
postmodern aesthetic.

8 'The return' in later poststructuralist architecture dispenses with the wide historicist
referencing of early postmodernism such as faux classicism. As a palimpsest, it folds
back instead on to the architectural Modernism from which it emerged.

9 Part of theatricality and rhetoric in postmodern architecture is embodied in gesture. An
early recognition of the semantic importance of pose, posture and repose and what Susan
Langer calls 'the gestic' is found in Lessing's treatment of the Laocoon sculpture.
Architectural gesture and pose are significant indicators of mood. The influential
'Bilbaoism' of Frank Gehry, for example, is heavily informed by the gestural rhetoric of
curvature, bending and folding.

10 Visual representations of meaning as metaphor only become available as language.
Meaning as language emerges from form. Implied meaning from form such as mourning
or the elegiac, represented by the absence implicit in voids for instance, becomes
linguistic in ways suggested by Heideggeran phenomenological hermeneutics and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Cartesian ocularity and the hermeneutics of the
visual. Meaning in postmodern architecture is language latent in the form and made and
generated by visual metaphor.

11 'Unconcealing' the language latent in the metaphors of built form represents an act of
critical interpretation. The sense of 'critical' here suggests the theoretical rather than any
normative or adversarial judgement. Any interpretation is an act of readership. 'Reading'
assumes that ‘the building’ is a form of concealed or potential text. Its reception by the
reader is pivotal, hence the significance and fundamental importance of literary theory
and criticism. Literary criticism has many variants. However, interpretation here is
justified by recourse to Reception Theory, Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Stanley Fish’s
‘interpretive communities’.

12 Interpreting potential meaning in built form is in part an act of language. It becomes
essential to be absolutely clear that this does not represent ‘the language of architecture’
formulation favoured by architectural critics such as Charles Jencks. ‘The language of
architecture’ confuses the idea of language as an inherent property of architecture with a
far simpler aspect of the built environment which amounts to not much more than the
familiar nostrums of architectural style and genre. In terms of the themes which spiral
forward through the present work, a resistance to ‘the language of architecture’, ‘the
language of sculpture’ or ‘the language of painting’ and so on is of primary significance
and forms a notable component of architectural interpretation.

13 The allegorical in aesthetic Postmodernism is intimately associated with language and
time and is an indispensable element of architectural interpretation. Allegory dissembls
between past and present. The absence imposed by time infers not only the sense of loss
and mourning, but the presence of the tragic itself. Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the
ruin as the archetypal allegorical trope of ‘present absence’ is an important adjunct to the
palimpsest as a temporal folding back or recursion and a key aspect of the architecturally
postmodern. The ruin revisited allegorically in poststructuralism is of course Modernism
itself, and in architectural terms, particularly the early Modernism emerging after The
Bauhaus and during the emergence of CIAM. The very act in which Modernism is
parodied and subverted by the postmodern has to be seen not only as restitutive but also
as an institutional or commemorative process which installs Modernism as something
close to a founding memory.

14 The meaning of a building can, may, and probably will, change over time according to
its social use. The redundant church is converted to apartments; the sacred becomes
secular and is then characterized by the quotidian and the banal. Meaning in architectural contexts across time is contingent and not singular or absolute. Any synchronic reading of a building will be modified in time by its diachronic history. Nor is meaning solely or even largely dependent on authorial architectural intention. In the diachronic context, and indeed even synchronically, architectural intention has to be supplemented by the spectator's own reading as 'interpretant'.

**METHODOLOGY**

Methodological considerations are clearly important in establishing a critical frame of reference. Constructing a theoretical model with which to interpret potential meanings latent in postmodern, and in particular poststructuralist, architecture obviously will ultimately demand that 'Theory' embraces the practical task of confronting and reading those meanings in actual buildings. A model is a means to an end. The end is the emergence of meaning. Theoretical models allow and facilitate interpretation by means of the imposition of frames of reference. The frame, in quite a real sense, governs the qualitative nature of the outcome. And the outcome is the interpretation of meaning in actual, real buildings by means of the kind of 'practical criticism' which is prompted by the model.

Frames of reference determine the nature of the model, which in practical terms, means its constituent parts. It is legitimate to ask why this or that particular model or frame of reference is selected rather than another from what could clearly be a plethora of alternatives. In other words, the adoption of this model rather than that requires some principle of justification. In seeking meaning from or within postmodern buildings as visual metaphor, there is an inevitable focus on form. Other frames of reference reflect different concerns and priorities. A sociological model for instance might deal with issues of power, or a Feminist perspective might understand architectural design to be a gendered issue, and so on. What makes the present model what it is, is the fact that poststructuralist architecture is heavily informed by what is generally understood as Theory. 'Theory' tends to mean an approach to significance which is fundamentally
semiotic and which evolved from Structuralism and became the Poststructuralism of Barthes, Derrida and Deleuze. Poststructuralist architects such as Peter Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid and Daniel Libeskind for example are cultural theorists as much as they are architects. What governs the frame of reference here, then, is the poststructural nature of the theory with which such architects inflect their buildings. As well as semiotics, this represents a particular kind of philosophical emphasis based on the Continental rather than the Analytical tradition and openness towards possible interpretation which is 'literary' because it is semiotic and implicates language.

It will be noted that a theoretical model is of the essence constitutive. It has component parts which in practical criticism generate holistic meaning. The constitutive parts here are arranged in the four theoretical chapters which represent Part One. Each chapter has a broad theme. Firstly there is metaphorical nature of the sign and the implications of and for language. Secondly is the ontological or existential condition of the postmodern itself which inevitably instantiates the Modernism from which it comes and so represents a cultural shift involving both continuities and discontinuities. Thirdly are the philosophical implications of Continental Phenomenology. And fourthly, there is an exposition of the literary implications for interpretation which is derived from literary theory.

These chapters naturally sub-divide into thematic sub-sections. Such themes spiral forward and recur because they interrelate. Examples of thematic imperatives are metaphor and allegory, gesture, rhetoric, theatricality, vision and ocularity and visual metaphor. Theatricality, for instance, is established in Chapter Two, reappears in relation to rhetoric in Chapter Five and becomes a major interpretative element in Part Two.

It is of the greatest importance to distinguish between the constitutive status of the theoretical model against the familiar causal argument. What is proposed here does not represent such a causal argument. Theoretical models belong to theory and practice arrangements where the theory endows the practice of interpretation with a derived authenticity. Theoretical models are neither hierarchical nor causal. The ordering of the parts is an almost arbitrary process. In the present case, for example, it would hardly
matter if the entire order of Part One was to be reversed, or if, say, interpretation preceded, rather than followed the philosophically based contents of Chapter Four.

To confuse the procedural requirements of the theoretical model with the consecutive steps of the causal argument would in effect be a category error. A causal argument is necessarily propositional. Its truth conditions need to be falsifiable and developed in a logical chain of argument. At the end of the proposal, the proposition is thought to have been 'verified' in the usual adversarial way. Theoretical models on the other hand are not formally verifiable. Their 'proposal' is one form of interpretation among many possible alternatives. It is only 'verified' in the sense that the kind of interpretation which its practice confers is subject to the normal constraints of discourse and what Stanley Fish calls 'interpretive communities'. Any kind of interpretation is always subject to being modified by competing alternative interpretations arising from other acts of readership. Part One here, as the foundation of the interpretative process as it were, is not actually mainly 'about' architecture but, rather, 'Theory'. In fact as a thorough-going theoretical model it would need not be about architecture at all. Furthermore, each chapter as based on a significant thematic element such as the semiotic or the philosophical or the literary represents a distinct and discrete subject matter. Not only are chapters easily subject to rearrangement because their elements are not hierarchical, it could be further argued that each, because of the distinctive nature of their thematic content, in some sense stands alone, and that they only function as a model holistically as the parts fashioning the whole. In practice, the formal content of chapters often do, but not necessarily so, relate to each other. Thus, for example, both the allegorical and rhetorical aspects of Postmodernism as an aesthetic movement do relate to the distinctively literary aspects of both allegory and rhetoric as instances of metaphor which is dealt with in a different chapter. Nevertheless, despite such cross-referencing, it remains the case that the content contained in any given theme or chapter is often inherently related intrinsically to that particular theme and not others. If this does not entirely represent stand-alone autonomy, then it comes quite close to it.

The requirement of the theoretical model to have its internal frames of reference brings into focus the issue of the selection of buildings. On what basis is such a selection made
and why are some specific architects included and others not? The majority of the buildings discussed are in fact public commissions including museums and galleries. There is perhaps an important link here with the fact that such buildings are commemorative and this often invokes the temporal revisiting of the past with its connections with allegorical and nostalgic mourning. In practice here, for example, in terms of architectural practice, the familiar buildings of Foster and Rogers are not addressed. Neither falls within the present remit because neither has a practice which is informed by Theory and neither in any meaningful sense is a poststructuralist architect. The shortfall created by the absence of a theoretical model between inquiry and outcome would inevitably result in buildings and architects being selected piecemeal, then requiring some form of justification having to be bolted on subsequently. In this case, paradoxically, the building would determine the model.

**REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

A review of the literature which relates to architectural metaphor in the sense that the term is used here to identify visual metaphor which transmogrifies into language and meaning has produced limited results. Searches of databases accessed through an Athens/Edina account such as The British Journal Of Aesthetics produce much that is useful concerning the nature of metaphor itself, but very little that informs a context of architectural semantics. Equally other databases such as J-STOR (Open University) or Infotrack which obviously interrogate multiple sources through their key-word searches produce little of relevance to the present topic. A ZETOC search-alert at the British Library also only produced the usual set of references such Charles Jencks's *The Language of Postmodern Architecture*. And it is also the case that where references do occur to architectural metaphor, they usually use the term 'metaphor' as a simile, so suggesting that metaphorical reference associates with the comparatively trivial idea that
buildings resemble something else so that, for example, ‘shiny’ equates with ‘modern’ or ‘new’. The simile approach to architectural metaphorical reference is not conducive to the central concern that architectural visual form generates linguistic meaning. The paucity of reference to what might broadly be described as phenomenological approaches to architectural meaning suggests that the influence of ‘the language of’ formulation remains powerfully influential and hegemonic. Similar investigations of architectural sources such as RIBA, The Architect’s Journal or Architectural Design for example does not appear to produce work which examines architecture in terms of literary theory and allegory or rhetoric and semiotics, which are very much the central concern here. Thus Franks (2000, ‘Yes, we wear buildings’) suggests that architecture may be understood to be ‘clothed’, and the metaphor of architecture as clothing suggests that buildings as ‘wearing clothes’ relates more to fashion rather than allegorical or poststructuralist reference. McCormack (1996, ‘Architecture, Memory and Metaphor’) makes useful connections between forms of architecture and a sense of its past as ‘trace’ but does not elaborate the significance of emergent language in this process, or deal with the issue of rhetoric.

Since this dissertation lends itself to a typological or taxonomic grouping of subject matter, it may be convenient to address the relevant literature within the following arrangement: semiotics, postmodernism, philosophy, literary sources, architectural theory and trace and the issue of language itself. Dates for the most part relate to publication date.

SEMIOTICS
Any discussion of semiotics begins with Ferdinand Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce. Since the emergence of Structuralism and the Poststructuralism which emerged from it, is essentially French in character, ‘Theory’ has often been seen to originate with Saussure and his ‘Course’ (1916). However, it is Peirce (1968-Papers), writing at the same time as Saussure who extended Saussure’s sign/signifier into sign/signifier/interpretant. Peirce’s additional treatment of the variety within the sign as symbolic, iconic and indexical is indeed foundational. The later contribution of Roland
Barthes, particularly in his later poststructuralist writing such as *Image, Music, Text* (1977) is also highly significant in the area of form generating text. Jacques Derrida’s contribution to this area is of course well known. In the present context, his treatment of Kant’s parergon in *The Truth In Painting* (1987) has proved very fruitful in terms of the frame (of reference) and what may be ‘in’ it and ‘out’ of it. The most significant later semiotic contribution has come from the *October* collections (1997) involving Rosalind Krauss and Hal Foster among others. But in relation to the present work here, Craig Owens’s *Allegorical Imperative* as part of the first *October* series has been of the very highest importance. Its relevance for an understanding of the metaphorical nature of Postmodernism cannot be over-estimated, and its significance for an understanding of postmodern metaphor as being allegorically inflected is unrivalled.

**POSTMODERNISM**

There are of course any number of works dealing with the ontological or existential character of the postmodern, a representative selection of which appears in Charles Jencks’s *A Postmodern Reader* (1992). Lyotard’s provocative account of postmodernism *The Postmodern Condition* (1979) is justly celebrated as is Baudrillard’s *Simulacra And Simulation* (1981). However, the two works which have been pivotal here have been Frederick Jameson’s *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991) which sets postmodern aesthetic themes such as photography, architecture and installation in a socio-cultural context and David Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity* which both offers an account of postmodernism and a critique of it. Terry Eagleton’s *After Theory* (2003) although contentious in suggesting a now existing state of the post-postmodern which may be capable of being theorized but is difficult to justify in practice, is nevertheless another provocatively useful text.

**PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE**

The theoretical and philosophical underpinning here begins with Aristotle and the discussion of the nature of metaphor and the tragic. Kant’s *Critique Of Pure Reason* has its inevitable relevance, but in fact, the justification of the argument for language from
form is based largely on Heidegger’s *Being And Time* (1927). Time, it will be noted, is an aspect of allegory, and it is the allegorical which is a fundamental aspect of the postmodern, so reinforcing the recursively temporal disposition of Postmodernism. Of equal importance is Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology Of Perception and The Visible And The Invisible* (1964) with its powerful endorsement of the importance of embodiment. Gadamer (1989) in *Truth And Method* is important with his dialectical treatment of ‘the conversation’ as an important version of meaning-exchange. Equally, Martin Jay in *Downcast Eyes* (1994) in his discussion of the influence of what might be called retinal Cartesianism remains a valuable indicator of that whole sub-genre of visual hermeneutics represented by books such as *Interpreting Visual Culture: Explorations in the Hermeneutics of the Visual* (1999) edited by Heywood and Sandwell or *Modernity And The Hegemony Of Vision* (1993) edited by David Levin. The decisive influence of the later Wittgenstein (1958) such as the *Philosophical Investigations* within the complex issue of language use is well known, and the later treatment of this work by Stanley Cavell (2002) is instructive. Susan Langer’s suggestion in *Feeling And Form* (1967) that gesture is an important constituent feature of visual meaning has a direct relevance for postmodern architectural semantics.

**LITERARY SOURCES**

Literary theory is an indispensable tool of interpretation that needs to be appropriated as an interpretative imperative for the realisation of architectural meaning. Eagleton’s account of modern literary theory (1983) remains indispensable in spite of some critical attempts to judge it as tendentiously Marxist. It includes a useful discussion of Baudelaire’s discourse on irony in the nineteenth century. When coupled with the sardonic tone, both have subsequently been recognized as key postmodernist tropes. Christine Brooke-Rose’s analysis of literary metaphor remains vital, among others such as I.A. Richards in the first part of the twentieth century, as does Angus Fletcher’s re-establishment of the importance of allegory in the later twentieth century (1965). In more modern discussions of metaphor, Paul Ricoeur’s rejoinder to analytical language philosophy that metaphor is non-propositional still hits its mark. Ricoeur suggested that
the very language in which analytical truth propositions are presented cannot escape metaphor itself (1978). David Lodge's *The Modes Of Modern Writing: Metaphor and Metonymy* (1977) discusses Roman Jakobson's indispensable distinction between metonymy and metaphor and the key concept of contiguity. Paul de Man's two books, *Blindness And Insight* (1983) and *Allegories Of Reading* (1979) remain the most radically deconstructive versions of literary theory. One of the most recent manifestations of literary interpretative theory, which is of the utmost significance here for the proposed theoretical basis for the interpretation of architecture, is Reception Theory. Gadamer has pointed out that authorial intention does not exhaust the meaning of a text. It is Reception Theory, emphasizing as it does the role of readership in the realisation of holistic meaning and echoing Barthes's reader as the destination of the text, which revisits Peirce and installs the reader as the 'interpretant' constituent of the sign. Stanley Fish's 'interpretive community' (1980) represents the final justification of interpretation here. Any reading, that is, remains subject to interrogation by other writers and readers in what constitutes the universe of discourse.

ARCHITECTURAL THEORY

The architectural theorizing of the postmodern emerged embryonically in Robert Venturi's *Contradiction And Complexity* (1967), followed by *Learning From Las Vegas*. Venturi's *Las Vegas* book comprehensively engaged with 'low' street architecture, something Reyner Banham did for Los Angeles a few years later (1971). Both books contained the anti-Modernist suggestion that architecture might just now subsume kitsch. This is perhaps one of the most radical resituating moments in architecture which subverted previous notions of 'high form' in Modernism and earlier historical styles. Charles Jencks, in the late nineteen seventies effectively initiated the theoretical semiotics of architecture virtually single-handed. In doing so he popularised 'the language of architecture', and incidentally numerous other pursuits, to the extent that the phrase 'the language of....' not only became overwhelmingly influential, but it also entered the lexicon itself. This dissertation opposes 'the language of architecture' formulation not as a causal central argument, but as a necessary excision in order to establish an authentic
phenomenological interpretative theory. Nevertheless Jencks's *The Language of Postmodern Architecture* (1981) and its subsequent six editions remains powerfully hegemonic. In a decisive move away from *The Language of Postmodern Architecture*, although still acknowledging it, Christian Norberg-Schulz's more phenomenological and Heideggeran approach (1984) proved constructive although he did not deal in a substantive way with the problem of language. Derrida's comments on architecture, such as his 'Letter to Peter Eisenman' or 'Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good Books' in connection with Villette, Paris, although relevant are tangential. Poststructuralists themselves, including Eisenman, have proved to be highly proficient theorists themselves such as Daniel Libeskind's *Countersign* (1991), Rem Koolhaas's multi-genre *Delirious New York* (1978) or Zaha Hadid's theoretical acknowledgement of early architectural Modernism (2003). Perhaps the most recent major theoretical influence has been Gilles Deleuze's treatment of the fold (1993) and the later explication of the rhizome metaphor. The rhizome is emblematic of the non-hierarchical nature of cross-genre theory as opposed to the more familiar vertically oriented roots analogy.

**LANGUAGE**

The language problem is enormously complex. But here it is largely confined to the relation between aesthetic form and meaning on the one hand and the implications of metaphor on the other. The notion that language is latent in aesthetic form and must somehow be 'released' may sound like a proposition that analytical philosophers would rather shred, much in the way that Roger Scruton regards Heidegger, who is the source in this respect, as either an unconfined genius or charlatan, and it is difficult to be sure of which (Kenny, 1994). Lessing's discussion of the relation between different kinds of aesthetic form such as sculpture and painting and language (1776) during the Enlightenment initiated the modern debate, and examples of more recent aspects of that debate such as Barthes's *Mythologies* (2000) emphasize the continuing relevance of the issue. Charles Jencks's *The Language of Postmodern Architecture* effortlessly assumes its enormously important position, and part of its significance is that it continues to grapple with precisely the relation initiated by Lessing *pace* Horace; language and the
aesthetic object. The position of metaphor is hardly less complicated. One by-product of Jencks's hegemonic language of architecture is that since he deals with architectural reference largely in the simpler terms of simile, the problem of architectural meaning is widely understood in terms of simile and empirical resemblance rather than the infinitely more complicated issues of metaphorical reference. In fact, one of the earliest uses in the dissemination of the phrase 'the language of architecture', although not in Jencks's semiotic terms, seems to have been by Max Reiser (1946) and then later by Sir John Summerson in *The Classical Language Of Architecture* (1964). Linguistic philosophy typically supposes that metaphor is not meaningful other than as a literal statement because it does not have the status of truth conditions generated by logical propositions. The most complete modern representation of this position is that of Donald Davidson (1984). However, if meaning is restricted to the truth conditions of propositions, then architecture cannot mean because it does not have propositions in that sense. This is a position to which this dissertation is fundamentally opposed. What is assumed here is that metaphor in architectural interpretation releases meaning.

The dissertation is in two parts. Part One consists of four theoretical chapters which, when taken holistically, provide the theoretical frame of reference which constitutes the theoretical model on which the architectural interpretation in Part Two is based. Part Two has two longer chapters which deal specifically with the architectural trace of postmodernism and poststructuralism and architectural interpretation respectively.

**PART ONE**

Each of the four chapters subsequent to the first methodological chapter deals with a substantive area of knowledge. Each is a distinctively different frame of view. Although each chapter deals with a different epistemological area, the themes within each chapter
do spiral forward and engage with and touch on thematic lines developed in other chapters, as the previous example of theatricality demonstrated.

Chapter Two

This chapter, called Semiotics, Gesture and Embodiment, deals with the metaphorical nature of the sign, the semiotic relation between image and word and the significance of the sign as embodied gesture. It is divided into four sections.

The first, Sign, Signifier and Signified, establishes the centrally important concept of the metaphorical aspect of the sign and the way in which this immediately implicates language.

The second, called Word and Image, treats the semantics of gesture, image and word and examines Lessing's *Laocoon* as a foundational Enlightenment text dealing with the aesthetic object and language and the idea of meaning from shape or gesture, important subsequently for postmodern architecture.

The third, called Embodiment and Gesture, examines the relation of parts and notions of mimesis and the copy.

The fourth, called Theatricality and Gestural Rhetoric, gives an account of the Greenberg and Fried debates which signalled the end of Modernism and the opening of the postmodern. Fried's ascription of metaphorical theatricality to what is now recognized as the postmodern has enormous implications for the rhetorical nature of postmodern architecture.

Chapter Three

Called Modernity and Postmodernism, this chapter looks at the existential qualities of both Postmodernism and the Modernism from which it emerged and of which it remains a part. The continuities and discontinuities are discussed, and the formative property of early Modernism established which becomes a principal feature of poststructuralist architecture. The chapter has six sections.
Section one discusses the importance of the Modernist theories of Clement Greenberg for an understanding of what the postmodern imperative was subverting. It is called Modernity and its Definitions.

Section two, Continuity and Discontinuity, looks at positions defending Modernism such as that of Habermas and counter-positions such as those of Lyotard and Baudrillard.

The third section called Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition discusses the polemics of Frederick Jameson and the continuing ambivalence surrounding the base and superstructure formulation.

Section four deals with the important issue of the distinctions between Modernist and Postmodern temporality and the significance of the installation as both an index of the postmodern and an instance of the architectural. This section is called Postmodern Space and Modernist Temporality.

Section five, The Allegorical in the Postmodern, assumes a fundamental importance for the whole dissertation. It discusses Owens's Allegorical Impulse which establishes the recursively allegorical aspect of the postmodern. The nature of photography is discussed as an exemplar of the postmodern condition.

Section six, Theory and Post-Theory, looks at Eagleton’s theory that ‘Theory’ has passed into a state of post-theory and presumably, into the Post-Postmodern as well. The section nevertheless insists that the continuing focus of the present work involves essentially the discussion of the postmodern nature of the theory and practice of poststructuralist architecture.

Chapter Four

This chapter is called Language And The Philosophical Background. It is concerned with the relation between the aesthetic object and its potential or possible meaning and how that meaning must become linguistic. The considerable tension between the Analytical and Continental philosophical traditions is resolved in favour of Wittgenstein’s later formulation of language use and the significance of phenomenological approaches to meaning is established. The chapter is in four sections.
The opening section called The Philosophy of Language is mainly concerned with the later Wittgenstein and his acknowledgement that if meaning inheres in language use, then it must in part be metaphorical.

Section two deals directly with Heidegger’s phenomenology, particularly in *Being And Time* and is called Phenomenology and Interpretation.

The third section, From Icon to Text, looks at Barthes’s later position on the textual in the visual and goes on to assess the importance of Gadamer. There is also an account of the hermeneutics of vision, particularly in regard to Martin Jay and Merleau-Ponty.

Section four which is called The Felicitous and the Infelicitous examines the implications of Austin’s language philosophy and establishes ‘the infelicitous’ as a basis for interpreting postmodern architecture later as having self-consciously infelicitous rhetorical tropes.

**Chapter Five**

This chapter is called Rhetoric, Visual Metaphor and Allegory And Interpretation. It is concerned with the necessarily literary nature of interpretation as linguistic meaning from form. It therefore deals with literary theory as providing a theoretical justification for interpretation. There are five sections.

Section one looks at rhetoric and proposes that self-consciously rhetorical form is recurrently postmodernist, and especially so in architecture. Important contributions to the theory of rhetoric are examined, particularly Aristotle, I.A. Richards and Paul de Man.

The second section called Visual Metaphor and Allegory looks at the implications for metonymy and metaphor in the work of Roman Jakobson, Wittgenstein and the duck-rabbit and Mitchell’s discussion picture theory and language.

Section three which is called Visual Metaphor examines the metaphorical nature of visual form and the ways in which meaning may emerge from it. This is particularly
important for an architectural interpretation involving particular detailing such as fenestration.

Section four examines the significance of allegory and its relevant history and treatment. Walter Benjamin’s idea of the ruin as an archetypal trope is discussed and applied in a later chapter to Frank Gehry’s Santa Monica House. The importance of Baudelaire’s invocation of irony is also examined.

The last section is concerned with the nature of interpretation itself. Its development in literary theory from F.R. Leavis’s Practical Criticism to Reception Theory and Stanley Fish’s ‘interpretive communities’ is traced.

PART TWO

Part Two moves from theory towards a more practical interpretation of poststructuralist architecture. It comprises two chapters, the first of which attempts to trace the trajectory of the architectural postmodern and the second which looks at particular buildings and architectural practice in interpretative terms. Much of the foundational underpinning derived from the theoretical positions of Part One are freely deployed without the need for constant definition or qualification because their theoretical provenance has already been secured in Part One.

Chapter Six

Chapter Six, called The Architectural Trace, has four sections. Broadly, the chapter assesses the movement away from the Modernist rational grid towards what Venturi called complexity and contradiction at the opening of architectural postmodernism. The significance of theatricality, which was introduced in Chapter One, is examined as an exemplar of architectural rhetoric.

The first section, The Modernist Grid, looks at the rational planning inherent in architectural Modernism and what almost amounts to the sanctity of the right angle.
Section two is called The Trajectory From Modernism Into Postmodern Architecture. It looks in particular at the interventions of Jane Jacobs in objecting to Modernist urban zoning and gridding and arguing for historical differentiation and colour in locales which was in accord with Venturi’s complaint that ‘less is a bore’.

The third section, From Postmodernism To Poststructuralism: From Simile To Metaphor, interprets Gehry’s Santa Monica House as allegorical ‘ruin’ and examines the architectural theory of Peter Eisenman and Christian Norberg-Schulz.

Section four is called Poststructural Architecture and The Neo-Theatrical. Corbusier’s Ronchamp is signalled as the instigation of an after-Modernist theatricality. As an instance of the insistent recursion to the example of early Modernism in poststructuralist architecture, Tschumi’s references to Russian Constructivism at Villette are assessed in their historicist perspective.

Chapter Seven

Chapter Seven called The Reading of Buildings has five sections. This chapter tries to put into effect the interpretation of specific architects, their practice and instances of their built commissions. It obviously depends heavily on earlier considerations of thematic lines such as allegory, rhetoric and readership. In the sense that Part One established the theoretical framework of interpretation, this chapter tries to interpret and read buildings in the light of that framework, and is in one sense a test case for the efficacy and authenticity of the theoretical model put into practice.

Section one, Sculptural Gesture As Origin, looks at the profound importance and signifying power of the church building as an originating instance of allegorical commemoration.

Section two which is called Frank Gehry And Remembrance assesses Gehry’s unique position within the poststructuralist momentum. His later work from Vitra to Ginger and Fred is interpreted in the light of its allegorical richness of reference.

The third section, called The Architectural Curve, looks at the bending and folding which characterizes late poststructuralist buildings and the influence of Gilles Deleuze and the implications of his *Le Pli*. It is not the case that Derrida and Deconstruction have
been supplanted; rather folded in. The implication of the all-over nature of BLOB architecture is also examined.

Section four looks at the significance of the fold in Eisenman, Hadid and Koolhaas and is called The Reinscription Of Modernism In The Fold.

The final section looks specifically at Daniel Libeskind both as theorist and practising architect. His work, especially the Jewish Museum, Berlin, is interpreted in terms of absence and presence, with one aspect of that ‘presence’ being the tragic. This section is called Daniel Libeskind And Building On The Past.
CHAPTER TWO: LANGUAGE AS EMBODIED METAPHOR

This chapter attempts to establish embodied gesture and metaphorical significance within the characteristics of the objecthood of the art-work as sign. Additionally there is a preliminary discussion of how language might be implicated in the process of interpretation of the visual object. The intention is not to discuss the implications for architecture directly at this stage, but rather, to give an account of the way the sign and its signification are understood to operate as fundamentally important aspects of what might be called aesthetic meaning. The chapter is divided into four sections.

The first, Sign, Signifier and Signified, deals with the treatment of the sign by Saussure and Peirce and their respective traditions and the necessity for an interpretative procedure which goes beyond iconography. The second, Word and Image: Gestural Semantics, deals with Lessing’s *Laocoon* and the significance of gestural form as a semantic indicator and instantiates the critical debate concerning the relationship between image or form and word and its meaning. The third, Embodiment and Gesture, examines the relationship of parts and the implications of mimesis. The fourth, Theatricality and Gestural Rhetoric, discusses the importance of the defence of Modernism by Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried and invokes Fried’s notion of theatricality as an indicative postmodernist sign. Fried’s version of theatricality assumes a large significance and is explored as a theme throughout, but particularly in relation to postmodernist architectural rhetoric. It needs emphasizing, although it may be self-evident, that the arts of painting, sculpture and architecture all embody ‘attitude’ in their gestural inflection and rhetorical stance, and all are discussed. The rhetoric of form in architecture is treated later. It will be noted that the themes which are explored and developed in this first chapter are not necessarily architectural at all, but are essential prerequisites for later discussions of architectural meaning and interpretation and are constitutive parts of a larger theoretical model of architectural interpretation which is the objective overall. It will be noted that the elements or parts of the model, although often correlated and thematically linked, are not in any necessarily causal or hierarchical arrangement.
Sign, Signifier and Signified

This section establishes the metaphorical nature of the sign in contrasting the theories of Saussure and Peirce, and introduces the possibility that the metaphorical sign often implicates allegory. The later discussion of architectural meaning is predicated on the assumption that architectural meaning, especially in poststructuralist buildings, is the result of the metaphorical transfer of meaning from the physical, gestural and rhetorical form of the building to the linguistic and semantic interpretation of it under the auspices of language. The sign as a version of metaphor is therefore fundamental. In Saussure's version of the sign, it is represented as both 'arbitrary' and conventional in meaning. In architectural terms this arbitrary sense of the sign has an obvious application to Modernist architecture which was broadly based on the form and function relation and was often explicitly non-referential and anti-metaphorical. However, postmodern architecture is constituted by reference and metaphorical allusion, and in this sense has a greater approximation to Peirce's symbolic and indexical signs. The indexical sign implies 'touch' and leads to Roman Jakobson's treatment of metonymy as a version of contiguity and Paul de Man's discussion of Proust's use of metonymy prior to metaphor, both of which are discussed in Chapter Four here. The arbitrary conventional sign seems paradoxically a Modernist signifying within a paradigm that resisted signs (H. Foster, R. Krauss et al 2004, 119).

Buildings mean. Semiotically, a meaning is invoked by the disposition of signs. Something is signified. But what needs selection from the corpus of semiotic discourse is that the fundamental relationship between the sign and its signified is metaphorical. That is, the sign indicates meaning as an image. This is palpably the case in visual art, but it is clearly also true that texts signify metaphorically with imagery; although poetic meaning inheres in the words, its metaphorical meaning frequently, but not exclusively, secures an equivalence or agreement between the symbol and that symbolized which as an image is visual. And that agreement or equivalence as imagery demands a visual comparison between two disparate elements whose very difference is unified in their similarity. The
Aristotelian prescription for metaphor is met; in difference, similarity. One thing means something else that is different from it, yet is, by indication, similar. And of course, underlying the metaphorical signifier to signified relation is the fact that the antinomic tension between them is in the form of an oxymoron. In one figure, both similarity and difference have to be present at the same time. And the emerging paradox, that, in the case of a text, that it can generate linguistically some form of visual equivalent, and that reciprocally, a visual form or context can induce, or come into language, is precisely the issue which underpins Lessing’s *Laocoon*: Horace’s *ut pictura poesis* (as in painting, so is poetry).

The referential nature of the sign, in the sense that an interpreting subject construes a sensible, empirically verifiable objective thing in itself as something else, implicates the presence of the semantic analogue. This in turn suggests that an inherent attribute of the sign is a constant oscillation between the signifying object and what is signified or represented, and that this to and fro is not only palimpsest-like, but also transitive, in the sense of crossing over, whether the source of the signification is linguistic or visual. The transitive nature of the sign has implications for the figural metaphor, especially rhetorical tropes such as chiasmus and metonymy. The two defining approaches to the sign were established at the beginning of the twentieth century by Saussure and Peirce (Jonathon Culler, *The Pursuit Of Signs*, 1981, 25). Saussure is acknowledged to have conferred on subsequent linguistics the foundation of semiotics, and the establishment of a line that runs through to Chomsky and Structuralism, to Barthes, Foucault and Derrida and Poststructuralism. Saussure’s account of the sign as dualistic, containing object and referent, implies a third element, that of recognition and the required presence of the cognizant spectator. This would also be the case in Peirce’s triadic version of the sign. It is perhaps the case that not every sensible object in the world actually is a sign, but rather that the object, even if constituted in the mind, is putative, and has the potential to become a sign only in a conscious act of association and cognition. The existential condition of the sign is such that it only ontologically ‘becomes’ after it is, as it were, ‘switched on’ by some conscious act of interpretation or construal. Saussure, credited as a founding father of semiotics, suggested that the linguistic sign acts as a code. Thus the sign d-o-g, which denotes the class *canine*, cannot be confused with the linguistic sign c-
o-g precisely because of its difference from it. The meaning of the words *dog* and *cog* are conferred by convention and are arbitrary. There is no relation between the sign d-o-g and spoken utterance. The word does not mean by its sound, but by an arbitrary and conventional rule of transference. In other words, the *form* of the word, its letters and their sounds which accord a fixed referent, is not metaphorical, but is conventionally coded. It is the *content* of the word d-o-g which affords connotative implicature as something other than the typological class of canines. The later work of Wittgenstein reminds us that meaning is ultimately derived from language use, and therefore a contextual phrase like 'dirty dog' in the case of d-o-g, can refer to other metaphorical, rather than simply generic, meanings. However, visual signs are not arbitrary and conventional. The depiction in a visual sign may indeed represent, and be an image of the thing it refers to, such as a bird, or dog or sun. But on an Egyptian frieze, all of these images might represent, not membership of the typological class of avians, canines and heavenly bodies, but nothing less than gods. As a sign, the word must always and only refer to the category which has been singly and conventionally conferred upon it. But as a sign, the image not only represents its referent, but at the same time, other potential references according to context. The linguistic sign as sign is uni-referential and essentially unambiguous; the visual sign as image is multi-referential, contextual and inherently invokes ambiguity. It is important to note that architectural meaning, as in other visual arts, dependent as it is on visually coded metaphor, will always tend to provoke the not inconsiderable problem of semantic ambivalence in any interpretation in built environments, and that therefore that the relation between visual metaphor and language will be of the highest conceptual significance. This separation of signification between clarity and ambiguity is further represented in Saussure’s distinction between *langue* and *parole*, established in *The Nature of the Linguistic Sign*, 1916 (L. Burke et al 2000, 21-32.) Saussure characterized *langue* as the syntactically ideal state of a language and *parole* as its imperfect and idiosyncratic utterance. Wittgenstein’s shift away from Bertrand Russel’s Theory of Descriptions towards meaning as use further points up this distinction (W. Lycan 2000, 90-93). Saussure’s characterization of the arbitrary, conventional linguistic sign in *langue* was proposed as a basic model for the development of semiotic theory and has provided an enormously powerful cultural heritage since,
which in semiotic analysis, has extended the idea of what a ‘text’ might represent far beyond the purely linguistic. (See, for example, Margaret Iversen, *Saussure v Pierce: Models For A Semiotics Of Visual Art* in Rees and Borzello Eds, 1986, 85.) Yet however provocatively rewarding semiotic analysis has proved over time, Saussure’s model of arbitrary and conventional meanings as the constituent features of the linguistic sign will not directly assist us with the interpretation of the visual sign. It is at this point that Peirce’s triadic formulation of the sign can add a further dimension (H. Foster, R. Krauss et al. 2004, 36-39).

But what the application of Saussurean semantics has done is to extend the idea of a ‘text’ beyond the purely linguistic, so that other cultural objects become signs and submit to interpretation as an analogous ‘text’ which can then be ‘read’. Previously, from the Renaissance to Panofsky and Gombrich, the visual sign has been treated in two fundamental ways. First, the visual sign was accorded a direct, natural relation between the depiction and the depicted; it would be, in Plato’s terms mimetic, second-hand and a copy. Any value it might have would be severely restricted to its formal qualities. It would not mean in the sense that a word does and would have no referential meaning; that is, as a signifier, it signifies itself. Secondly, when an image was understood to symbolize something other than itself, perhaps by gesture or accoutrements, then it was assumed that the image concerned referred to a pre-existing narrative. So the reclining figure holding the arrow would be Sebastian, and so on. The visual image, because it is instantaneous and outside the temporal process which narrative obviously incurs, like the photograph, was nevertheless assumed to refer to, and therefore implicate as its meaning, the narrative it depicted. The meaning migrated from text to image, to icon as the sign, from language as the underlying semantic. Iconography has traditionally been preoccupied with the interpretation of figurative imagery, particularly from the Renaissance period, and since this might involve allegories, its concern with narrative as a key feature of depiction in the visual arts clearly merits acknowledgement. (See, for example, Erwin Panofsky, *Titian’s Allegory of Prudence: A Postscript*, in E. Panofsky, 1955, 181-206.) However, iconography in this sense is inevitably autonomous. It would not postulate that a visual representation would have referred to its own contemporary context as much as to a past narrative to which it might be semantically attached. Thus
the Michelangelo *David* would not be construed as Renaissance homoerotic gesture because of the implied narrative blasphemy, although that remains, potentially at least, an interpretative possibility. Nor would iconography appear to offer much assistance in interpreting contemporary culture. If we seek to account for Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, Berlin as in some sense embodying the tragic (see, for example, Richard Patterson, *The Tragic In Architecture*, 2001) then an iconographical referral to a narrative of Jewish history would not seem to further that account.

Panofsky, though, recognized that pre-iconographical and iconographical levels of interpretation were insufficient to account synchronically for ‘otherness’ in a diachronic account of a previous culture. Decisively, the analytical mode has to shift from the denotative to the connotative; from the iconographical to what he calls the iconological (E. Panofsky 1955, 57-67). He makes clear that iconology is, unlike iconography, a synthetic, not an analytical procedure. Even so, iconology’s concern continues to be with ‘intrinsic meanings’, although interpretation of ‘symbolical values’ might include *Weltanschauung* through a process of ‘synthetic intuition’ involving an hermeneutically circular methodology which Panofsky calls a *circulus methodicus*. Symbolical values are ‘a symptom of something else which expresses itself in a countless variety of other symptoms’ and must therefore be metaphorical and refer to an equivalence extrinsic to the work of art. Iconology, Panofsky asserts, is activated ‘wherever iconography is taken out of its isolation and integrated with whichever other method, historical, psychological or critical we may attempt to use.’ (For an extended treatment of Panofsky’s iconological account of Titian’s *Allegory of Prudence* see R.S. Nelson and R. Shiff, Eds 1996; Stephen Bann, *Meaning/Interpretation* 128.) So that if there is no pre-iconic text or narrative which iconographically supports an authoritative interpretation of the meaning of an image, then it becomes necessary to intuitively accord a meaning iconologically, using whichever methodologies might generate a putative meaning. Two issues of real critical consequence emerge, in turn producing a third concomitant one.

In the first case, it will be noted that in iconography, language, in the form of the originating text, moves *to* the art object in its visual form and empirically ‘resolves’ its meaning. The resolution of the text-image interface alleges a one-to-one meaning between the words which ‘resolve’ it and the image. The emergent meaning claims a final

29
semantic resolution, and in ejecting ambiguity, an arbitrary epistemological status; and an inherent meaning has, as it were, flowed from the intentionality of the art object to the interpretative spectator. In the second case, in what seems analogous almost to a deconstructionist procedure, the processes are reversed. Meaning is iconologically imputed to the art object, which suggests that, in part, what we think of as the meaning of the visual image is represented by the intention of the spectator or 'reader' guided by a hermeneutical best-fit procedure. This might seem like an act of inscription by the reader rather than, or as well as, the author. Crucially, meaning flows from the art object in the sense that, since its symbolical status is metaphorical, that is, something standing for something else, its potential visual meanings must linguistically 'come into language' in the interpretative act. One arbitrary meaning is replaced by a multiplicity of potential meanings. The language flows are reversed, and semantic resolution is replaced by ambiguity; the semantic flow from text to image is reversed to image to text. And thirdly, and obviously, the final iconographical resolution of the image assumes an empirically derived arbitrary and intrinsically autonomous meaning and interpretation. In fact, such fixed meanings require deep interrogation by theories of readership. Of course, Panofsky would have to acknowledge the semantic shift from denotative iconography to connotative iconology, but also that the theory of iconology is highly tentative and is perhaps best characterized as indicative. Many of the issues raised here are the result of critical inquiry since Meaning In The Visual Arts, 1955, first established iconology as the threshold of hermeneutical interpretation in modern art-historical criticism, and much has been founded upon it since.

Panofsky, perhaps unknowingly, and perhaps as an example of Weltaschuaang in itself, seems to implicate an almost Structuralist concern for a deep structure of interpretation that is both linguistic and semiotic. Saussure's semiosis has clearly been of great influence right up to Barthes and beyond in Poststructuralism. But in itself, since it deals with the linguistic sign, it cannot, although it may be necessary, offer a sufficient account of the visual sign.

Peirce's typology of signs include the elements of index, icon and symbol, and can be enormously complex in their interrelationships (C.S. Peirce 1931-58, 228.) This is so because not only do the indexical, the iconic and the symbolic relate to each other and yet
remain different from each other, they also have an extended agenda of attributes, so that immediately it can be seen, for example, that all three are indexical in some sense. All three may also be iconic, and similarly, all of them may act symbolically. And it is clearly the case that the Peircian sign may function in all three senses in the specific context of one particular art object. The principal attributes associated with indexicality are contiguity, metonymy (as in part to whole) and surface and touch. The indexical deals with relation. Thus a fingerprint as a surface mark or touch will represent the person who made it as a sign of that person. In an extended sense, the fingerprint will also signify as the part symbolizing the whole, rather like the crown signifying monarchy, and therefore becomes synecdochal. The iconic sign functions visually. It is pre-iconographical in recognizing the visual image, and in identifying the depicted subject and what it represents, it is located in the present of what the eye actually sees. When a sign works symbolically, it is both iconographical and iconological; iconographical in the sense of being metaphorically something other than itself and iconological in its demand to be interpreted connotatively. If a sign functions symbolically, it does so verbally rather than visually or as a relation. And just as it refers to a previously existing text and settles in language as in traditional iconography, so its temporality lies in the past. If metonymy characterizes the indexical sign in Peirce’s terms, then the symbol is characterized by the metaphorical. And finally, in a highly elided treatment, response to the indexical sign will involve synthesis. Response to the iconic sign associates with and implies description. And in the case of the symbol, spectator response is characterized by some form of affectivity. It will be noted that in responding to architectural semantics in terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign, all three elements will necessarily be involved. Clearly, the tripartite nature of the Peircian sign facilitates access to the visuality and objecthood of the art object which Saussure’s semiotics might not. Nevertheless, since architectural semantics is here treated at one level as visual metaphor which must ‘come into language’, Saussure’s linguistic sign remains pertinent. (Margaret Iversen in Rees and Borzello Eds 1986, 86.)

Peirce’s iconic sign, which because of its visuality seems to assume an almost preeminent status, associates with the Kantian analytic in the sense that it is a self-contained visual depiction in the same way that the analytic is a valid proposition by virtue of the
meaning of the words alone. Thus, ‘all spinsters are unmarried’ is necessarily true and independent of any justification outside of the proposition. An iconic depiction of trees, lake and fields in an eighteenth century painting would necessarily have ‘landscape’ as its subject, whereas the attribution of St Sebastian’s martyrdom to the reclining man holding an arrow is only true by convention. The attribution of pastoral or picturesque landscape as the necessarily depicted subject inside the frame of reference is visually equivalent to the necessary meaning of the analytical proposition contained within its words. In Panofsky’s typology, the iconic sign functions pre-iconographically or optically as open to a visually analytical interrogation of what is ‘there’, de facto, as subject. If the depiction were of, say, a farm rather than a landscape, then the landscape subject becomes troubling and may cease to be either a version of picturesque or landscape. In the case, for example, of Jackson Pollock’s Lavender Mist as an iconic sign, it has no subject or depiction, but does have content, which is the embodied expression of Pollock’s aesthetic, and is ‘there’ de facto, as iconic gesture. The analysis of the iconic, or pre-iconological painterly or gestural sign in Lavender Mist precludes the erroneous attribution of it as a depiction or as having a subject [Fig 1]. In the case of architecture, which is similarly abstract in form, it, too, will have no subject, but will have as its content the expression of its gestures. And it will have, further, its gestures perhaps as postmodernist emphasis, or as modernist reticence, but gesture nonetheless. It is essential to note that the architectural sign as gestural configuration and the bearer of meaning in the visual metaphors of its form, precisely precludes conventional narrative but becomes discourse when, and as, it means. In fact, Pollock was playing games with the critics in giving the painting a name at all. His normal practice was to simply number his abstract pictures in sequence, sometimes confusingly it must be said. ‘Lavender Mist’ is certainly not a picture of a lavender mist. Nor is it by intention a simile of a mist, lavender or otherwise. Pollock had seen native north Americans pouring
coloured sands as part of their own rituals, and this gave him the idea of dripping and pouring paint. In the studio his technique was to pour paint and drip and flick it with a stick. With a certain amount of notoriety, this technique became known as ‘action painting’. There is no literal content in Lavender Mist, only the record of Pollock’s gestures.

Although there might not necessarily be a subject, Peirce’s symbolic sign does implicate content, albeit not as narrative. Artistic or architectural content will not conform to Kant’s analytical procedure as necessarily logically enclosed and therefore outside of the need for interpretation. It is much more likely to approximate to the synthetic proposition which is coherently syntactical, but not necessarily true, as in ‘all artists paint’, and be subject to further interpretation. The art object as symbolic sign will by definition represent something else (or else it would not be symbolic). That is, it is necessarily metaphorical, and like the synthetic proposition, is subject to interpretation, and is not clearly ‘there’ when exposed to visual scrutiny. Lavender Mist dramatically demonstrates the tripartite nature of Peirce’s account of the sign. Not only is Lavender Mist powerfully iconic, it is also self-evidently indexical in its address to the surface mark, but is also symbolic in its being an example of what Clement Greenberg called ‘American-type painting’ (Clement Greenberg, After Abstract Expressionism, 1962, in Harrison et al Eds 1992, 766). Gombrich makes the significant point that visual metaphors signify the Aristotelian ‘difference in similarity’ just as effectively in the image as in the word. Gombrich further suggests that metaphors, both iconic and symbolic, do not only represent what the subject of the metaphor is by comparing it with, or substituting it for, something else which exemplifies it, but the metaphor also declares what the subject of the metaphor is not (E.H. Gombrich, Visual Metaphors of Value in Art 1963, 24). There is an existential absence as well as presence here. Lavender Mist might be understood to be a metonymical representation of ‘American-type painting’ as part of its presence. What it emphatically did not represent in its 1950s context was European-type painting. The metaphorical absence was the tradition of European-dominated art history and accounts of painting up to the 1950s, and as the assertion of the new relevance and domination of American painting, Abstract Expressionism subversively substituted New York for Paris as the locus for avant-garde Modernism.
Figuratively, presence and absence often implicate allegory, and it may be that the example of the supersedence of American Abstract Expressionism over European post-war painting was achieved sardonically or ironically. Certainly it had 'attitude', which may be suggestive of the allegorical. Attitude as an aspect of meaning is also an aspect of expression or intention. It is meant to convince and persuade, and is, as it were, a gesture of assertion. That is, attitude is an act of persuasion. It is, in other words, a version of rhetoric. And it remains the case that this rhetorical implication of meaning is metaphorical. In the case of Abstract Expressionism, it might be that gesture was a key component of the implicit message. Not only was the large painted gesture a sign of expressive content, but also the exaggerated, almost overlarge canvas itself as a version of the painting's gesture, functioned as a rhetorical device; its very size was a declaration that it was essentially American. Size became emblematic of American painting, and a decisive element of its rhetoric.

Thus we would expect the building to exhibit metaphorical signs coded as part of its gestural rhetoric. The central issue associated with visual rhetoric is the tendency for rhetoric to be linguistic, but this couples with the imperative of the visual sign to signify iconically. In terms of image and word, there appears to be a chiasmic contradiction. The word must seemingly paint the image and the image write the word; icon and text meeting reciprocally.

It will be noted that metaphorical meanings are characterized by an absence as well as a presence. What is manifest or present is the signifying object, perhaps the large painted gesture which substitutes for 'American-type painting' in Abstract Expressionism. What is absent or latent in this example is something equivalent to a phrase like 'the conservative and old-fashioned European history of art'. This absent or implied meaning is nothing less than a 'commentary'; the visual as somehow a text. The same 'iconic text' refers by implication to a previous text; that is, European-type art criticism now seen as defunct. There is here a movement from present to past. For the commentary to be understood in the mind at all, the present or manifest text has to invoke a previous one, itself both past and latent. This oscillation across time involving both temporality and exegesis are the hallmarks of allegory. Absent or latent metaphors may be understood to be recessional, and manifest and present metaphors as emergent. Recessional and
emergent as descriptive of metaphorical attributes are useful terms and represent the latent and manifest respectively. In a further sense of absence and presence, recessional and emergent, or latent and manifest metaphors, might also be understood to represent the concealed and revealed. In an important way, this will involve links with Heidegger's phenomenological 'unconcealment' in *Being And Time*. The terms 'latent' and 'manifest' are often associated with Freudian or psychoanalytical procedures, but here are restricted to the respective meanings of 'concealed' and 'revealed'.

The discussion of the inadequacies of iconography and Panofsky's shift to what he called 'the iconological' mirrors a move in poststructuralist criticism in the work of someone like Roland Barthes from the denotational to the connotational and the importance of theories of readership and the relevance of literary criticism for the interpretation of architecture.

**Word And Image: Gestural Semantics**

Lessing's groundbreaking work, the *Laocoon*, makes a sharp distinction between the metaphorical nature of 'painting', that is the image, and 'poetry', that is the word. The image inevitably contains an instantaneity depicted on a surface of some kind, whilst the poetic (or linguistic) equally inevitably incorporates the opposite in the temporal. This discussion of word and image which leans on the important contributions to this area by W.J. Mitchell, lays the foundation for the description at a later point of the nature of the relationship between word and image and the way in which architectural meaning emerges from architectural form as linguistic.

Gotthold Lessing in his preface to *Laocoon* (1776) speaks of a man comparing poetry and painting. 'Both, he felt, represent absent things as being present and appearance as reality. Both create an illusion, and in both cases the illusion is pleasing.'(G.Lessing, *Laocoon* 1984, 3). Lessing anticipates much in later criticism concerned with language and image. His position was certainly radical, perhaps even iconoclastic. The prevailing assumption, which he challenged, and which had emerged from Renaissance positions on
classical art and poetry, supposed that art and poetry were actually aspects of each other. Horace's dictum *ut pictura poesis* (as in painting, so is poetry) was widely assumed by eighteenth century Enlightenment criticism to be self-evident. (Moshe Barasch 1990, 149.) Lessing quotes the aphorism attributed to Simonides that poetry is blind painting and painting mute poetry. His impatience with the synoptic view of poetry and painting, language and image, as mutually reciprocating and dialectically fused, extends to his characterization of illusion as a form of present absence. Lessing wants nothing less than a separation of powers, a clear division between the poetic and the visual. The poetic is linear, and in the epic, touches narrative. It is, in its very linearity, inevitably an extended account of an event or condition. Poetry is ontologically temporal; it can only produce its illusion and its mimesis of reality through time. He makes it clear that he is not only referring to poetry as temporal, but implies that progression through time is an attribute of writing (Lessing 1984, 6). Poetry, like painting, indeed, is not a simple duplication of nature formed in the mind as pleasing or sublimely beautiful. Each acts differently as a sign. In chapter sixteen of *Laocoon*, Lessing speaks of painting making 'use of entirely different means and signs from those which poetry employs'. Signs are either coded in language or in visual configuration, not both.

Painting, it is made clear, is characterized by simultaneity. It can only represent, on the whole, one thing at a time. A painting other than allegory necessarily depicts a frozen, singular image and is outside of time in the sense that its whole, or gestalt, is apprehended by the instantaneous glance. (There was much for Clement Greenberg to admire here, and his debt to Lessing is acknowledged in his own *Towards A New Laocoon*.) Although it would not have seriously compromised his argument, Lessing may not have been aware of the medieval convention of depicting different time-frames in one painting, such as Duccio's version of Christ healing the blind man at the National Gallery, London, and which shows before and after the healing on the same picture-plane. Painting cannot give an account of a narrative precisely because of the essential aspect of the simultaneity of its frozen visual constituent feature. And language does what painting cannot do as an element of what Poststructuralist critics like Roland Barthes would call its syntagmatic nature. That is, the syntactic property of units of meaning like sentences when they close, presupposes the implied existence of the next unit which does
not yet exist (Roland Barthes 1977, 50). However, we note that ‘painting’, Lessing’s term for the visual arts in general, exists as physical object as well as depiction. In an actual painting, what is depicted in contour and gesture metaphorically alludes to something else as the subject, coded in its medium of pigment. This is the dominant or manifest metaphor which bears a direct relation to what it as an object refers to, and which signifies as a presence. Yet the recessive metaphor, or Gombrich’s area of absence which indicates what the latent metaphorical meaning might be, must be a quality or state rather than a depicted subject. By definition, it will not have objecthood. Objecthood associates with the dominant or manifest metaphor. But then how may the qualitative state be signified, since it is non-visual and has no objecthood, other than with language? Lessing in his radical attempt to disturb the prevailing aesthetic consensus that *ut pictura poesis* presided canonically over critical orthodoxy, wholly separates the semiotic or linguistic sign from the iconic sign as representative respectively of poetry and painting. And yet it would seem that recessive metaphorical meaning can only be construed by coming into language from the emergent or manifest visual meaning. And Lessing, in his determination to disrupt *ut pictura poesis* and to demonstrate the essential separation of poetry and painting, cannot contemplate or acknowledge the possibility that the painterly sign demands language for its semantic resolution. In fact, Lessing devotes some time to recounting the narrative of Laocoon since this bears on the efficacy of the sculptural gesture. In doing so he of course establishes a relationship between the sculptural form and its preceding narrative, Virgil’s *The Aeneid*. It might be argued that the sculpture was a consequence of the narrative text and presumably would not have come to exist without it, which at least indicates a relation between narrative and sculpture, although that relation is not
necessarily causal. In Peirce’s terms, it is interesting to note that the art object, the sculpted Laocoon, and Virgil’s account of the Greek story as language are reciprocal. In this sense, language and image are ‘touching’, and must represent a part-whole relationship indicative of Peirce’s indexical sign. The ‘touching’ will be contiguous and therefore metonymic. And in the case of the metaphorical meaning, the relation between recessional and emergent metaphor will be similarly part-to-whole, contiguous and metonymical. The metonymical aspect of metaphor will need to be further considered in the light of Jakobson’s theory of language arising from the studies of aphasia.

Lessing, in his use of painting as a generic term, includes all the visual arts. In discussing the Laocoon sculpture, [Fig 3] he generalizes from sculpture as a paradigmatic case for the visual arts. (Lessing, Introduction, xxvii.) Thus painted gesture would partake of the sculptural. In an extension of Lessing’s argument, if architecture is to be included in the visual arts as it surely must, then its form must in some way be reconciled with the sculptural. Work by late-phase Postmodernist architects such as Gehry and Libeskind would seem to fit this prescription, as would Vitruvius’s account of the specific place of caryatids in classical architecture.

Lessing’s demarcation of the verbal and the visual creates binary opposition such as the temporal in language and the spatial in the visual arts. That painting and poetry, image and word, are contrary processes can hardly be disputed. But what has become increasingly accepted from Coleridge’s treatment of the symbol onwards, is the conviction that imagery cannot signify independently of language. Despite Clement
Greenberg and Michael Fried’s insistence on the optical pre-linguistic nature of painterly visuality, particularly in Fried’s *Art And Objecthood*, the critical trend has been towards a semantic transference from the iconic image in the form of semiotic interpretation, succinctly summarized by W.J.T. Mitchell. ‘In the modern era the main direction.....would seem to be from the image, conceived as a manifest, surface content or ‘material’, to the word, conceived as the latent, hidden meaning lying behind the pictorial surface.’ (W.J.T. Mitchell, *Image And Word in Iconology*, 1986 in Harrison et al 1992, 1106.) The use of the prepositional terms ‘from’ and ‘to’ here is apposite in the light of the earlier discussion. The limitations of painting, nevertheless, induce it to produce its own sense of what amounts to an aspiration towards visual discourse. ‘Even the legendary founder of the *ut pictura poesis* tradition, Simonides of Ceos, acknowledges that at best, ‘painting is *mute* poesy.’ It may aspire to the eloquence of words, but it can only attain the kind of articulateness available to the deaf and the mute, the language gesture, of visible signs and expressions.’ (W.J.T. Mitchell, 1986, *Mute Poesy and Blind Painting*, in Harrison et al 1992, 1109, emphasis original.)

Although Lessing, to a modern ear, differentiates too sharply between word and image, he has important things to say about the significance of the imagination for meaning, and its embodiment in gesture. In agreeing with Winckelmann that the sculpted Laocoon is represented as not screaming but stoically sighing, Lessing argues that the gesture (*gestus*) cannot show, or embody states *in extremis* precisely because it denies the faculty of imagination its function of interpretation [1] and [Fig 2]. ‘But only that which gives free rein to the imagination is effective. The more we see, the more we must be able to imagine. And the more we add in our imagination, the more we must think we see. In the full course of an emotion, no point is less suitable for this than its climax. There is nothing beyond this, and to present the utmost to the eye is to bind the wings of fancy and compel it, since it cannot soar above the impression made on the senses, to concern itself with weaker images shunning the visible fullness already represented as a limit beyond which it cannot go.....One either hears him either merely moaning or else sees him dead.’ (Lessing 1984, 20.) The comparison between The Laocoon and Bacon’s Pope [Figs 3 and 2] represents a notable distinction between ancient and modern, between the treatment on
the one hand of classical ideal form and on the other the deliberate depiction of distressed and distorted anomie.

There is a fascinating arc which jumps from Lessing's *Laocoon* to modern Continental philosophers of phenomenology and embodiment such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger who insist that meaning must be a product of the reader's intention as well as that of the author. The philosophical underpinning of the relation between language and form which is rehearsed in Chapter Three here or the literary basis of interpreted meaning established by Chapter Five are both indebted to Lessing's distinction between word and image in the *Laocoon*.

**Embodiment and Gesture**

In an empirical object such as the building, metaphorical meaning will be embodied in its structure. Embodiment implicates the recurrent idea of the copy. If one thing is a version of another thing, or contains the reference to another thing or is a simulacrum or mimesis of it, then it must of course be in some part metaphorical. Thus even emphatically poststructuralist architecture, say by Zaha Hadid, which 'acknowledges' its Modernist precursors, is metaphorical in this sense. This section examines the implications of mimesis and the way that gesture as meaningful is both mimetic and metaphorical and looks at the significance of Vitruvius and Emmanuel Kant within this complicated issue.

Although Lessing does not refer to embodiment as a specific term, he clearly separates it from the imagination; '...signs existing in space can express only objects whose wholes or parts coexist, while signs that follow one another can express only objects whose wholes or parts are consecutive. Objects or parts of objects which exist in space are called bodies. Accordingly, bodies with their visible properties are the true subjects of painting.' (Lessing, Chapter Sixteen.) 'Painting', we remind ourselves is Lessing's term for the visual arts. He is once more establishing the difference between the function of the sign in visual form and in language, the one as relational and the other as consecutive. At the same time, he also clearly distinguishes between the construction of meaning in the imagination from the physicality and materiality of the art object which embodies, in its
attitude and gesture as visual metaphor, states of mind such as, in the case of Laocoon, stoicism and the tragic. Imagination, then, operates as an aspect of mind, and visual shape, gesture and posture as metaphorical embodiment represented by imitation or mimesis. Another temporal arc diachronically links past to present. The gestural resting place of the postmodern building, its postural repose, will embody its metaphorical meaning in the mind of the spectator as the embodiment of its figural tropes, and in its attitude, its rhetorical stance. Lessing’s aesthetic theory of gestural restraint and decorum is evaluative and normative, whilst contemporary modern theory might well locate itself more in the discussion of difference. Nevertheless, such a contemporary theory must still, in its own synchronic moment, address the nature of postmodern visual metaphor, and in the case of the installation and architecture as spatial forms, the spatial resolution of its gestural inflection. Lessing’s remarkably modern-sounding emphasis on the sign as an indicator of gestural metaphor again heavily involves the spectator in interpretation of both value and meaning. Kant’s later formulation of ideal beauty intuited by the mind by a process of judgement which is other than pure reason would seem to implicate intuitive recognition rather than interpretation. Beauty is inherently there within the disposition of the form and intuited transcendentally, autonomously independent of the conditions of spectatorship. Ideal beauty, after all, must exist a priori, and the sensorium is only an empirical means to a much larger conceptual and moral end. Lessing, however, insists that the aesthetic status of the art object as an entity must allow the imagination of the spectator to enter the fullest potential meaning, rather than be confronted by an interpretative end-point. In this sense, the status of the work of art in the imagination or mind of the spectator is not a transcendentental given. In marking out this ground, Lessing was prescient. Although firmly of his own Enlightenment period, he anticipates, as it were, the issues confronting Structuralist and Poststructuralist theories of readership, as may become clearer later. Lessing’s suggestion of the need for a layer of interpretation by the spectator makes the sign a palimpsest. The original creative intention is overlaid by the observer’s interpretative assumptions. And in the act of interpretation, the observer’s need to revisit what might be the author’s intention is an act of restitution and reinstatement. It also both instantiates original intention, and from the imagination, accommodates a flow of possible alternatives. In an important and additional sense, the
presence of the palimpsest also implies an act of appropriation by the reader, or a process of complicity which is ultimately allegorical. Lessing’s demand for *decorum* and appropriate modesty in depiction allowing for interpretative completion, makes the status of the art object as sign inevitably ambiguous.

Both Lessing and Kant would insist that the art object is imitative, a copy derived from the embodiment of natural form. Despite Plato’s expulsion of the poets from the Republic for pedalling metaphor and rhetoric as a form of second-hand copy, or appearance over reality, mimesis has been in essence the legacy classical art has bequeathed on western culture. It is interesting to note that if interpretation is an act of restitution, of reinstating assumed authorial intention, then the act of interpretation is itself mimetic. Imagination as response, proceeds from an original intention to the spectator’s second-hand reinstatement of artistic intention. Given that artistic intention is literally embodied in the art object itself, the spectator’s response to the object flows to a perceived artistic intention. The two processes, imagination and embodiment, historically represent mind and body. The Cartesian dualism is less interesting here than the suggestion that temporally and procedurally, embodiment precedes imagination, as ‘from’ must be anterior to ‘to’. In a further sense, the spectator’s interpretative response to the art object, to its embodiment that is, is a form of ‘touching’ between interpretation and intention. It would seem, then, that since intention and interpretation are conceptually contiguous, the process of interpretation is indexical. Peirce’s indexicality is expressive of relation, and both intention and interpretation are parts of the whole sign, and what emerges as meaning must oscillate between the parts. At a given moment, perception and embodiment dominate, and at another, concept and imagination. At all events, the indexical relation between them will be metonymic; part to whole and back again. In the later interpretation of architecture here, this metonymic transfer will assume a large significance.

So, albeit simplistically, the classical idea of beauty inhered in mimesis as a copy of nature. Art turned nature, the natural and the real, into the artificial. When the question of what nature and the real provide for formal artistic beauty is pursued, the traditional response from Vitruvius and the Renaissance Neo-Platonists, for example, was in the virtues of proportion, balance, euphony, rhythm and so on; in short, the attributes of
Proportion was seen as the fundamental unifying process which related size and shape, and metonymically, part to whole. The proportion and balance in design referred to surface and not subject, form not content. Classical themes might well have been copied as subject in the classical period from the Renaissance up to the emergence of Romanticism in the early nineteenth century, such as Titian's *Bachus And Ariadne* (National Gallery, London). But what made the art object beautiful was the disposition of the parts, which in turn involved the physical materiality of the medium arranged for order and balance, and composition which worked, in the case of paintings, through the surface. In painting, this amounted to the arrangement of contour and shape in the painted medium, in sculpture the modelling of three-dimensional form and in architecture the ordered assembly of facades.

Vitruvius makes it clear in *The Ten Books Of Architecture* that architecture depends on the imperatives of Order, Arrangement, Eurythmy, Symmetry Propriety and Economy (Vitruvius, 1960, Book One, Chapter Two, 13). Later on in Book Three, ‘On Symmetry: In Temples And The Human Body’, he elaborates symmetry as based on the human body [2]. It is the human body, formed by nature which accords to Order, Arrangement and Symmetry their underlying proportionality. Vitruvius’s metonymical fractions of body parts to whole are highly specific; the head (crown to chin) is one eighth of the length of the body, for example (E. Panofsky 1955, 95). His citing of the human body as an originating source for proportion and propriety in the arrangement of buildings, expressed in part in the modular, and in part in the ornamental, grounds the equivalence between the human body and architectural design as metaphorical. When speaking of propriety in Book One, Chapter Two, Vitruvius insists that appropriateness of style is an important component of the building’s suitability to its site. He asserts: ‘The temples of Minerva, Mars and Hercules will be Doric, since the virile strength of these gods makes daintiness entirely inappropriate to their houses’. Describing buildings as ‘virile’ or ‘dainty’ confirms both their historical embodiment and their capacity to substitute for human states. The implication is that Doric columns are metaphorically masculine, possibly even phallic, and that Corinthian or Composite columns might represent femininity. (J. Onions, 1998, Chapter Two, *The Orders.*) It follows that since these distinctions rest on contour and gesture, that the greater the degree of expression, the greater degree of overt gesture.
In the case of buildings in this respect, Corbusier's trajectory went from impersonal, Purist and classical modernism to the highly expressive at Ronchamp. In this context, Ronchamp begins to look sculptural precisely because it is gestural. Whether architecture is not overtly gestural, like Vitruvius's classical temples, or highly gestural as in Saarinen or Nervi, the underlying template is embodied gesture.

Of course there is possible an almost limitless typology of gestural sign, such as 'resignation', 'aggression', 'supplication', 'celebration' and so on. The gesture signs as an iconic 'something', as it were, a 'visual noun' which in interpretation becomes, or represents, an abstract quality like an abstract noun. The shift from concrete to abstract 'noun' is analogous with the movement in cognition from perception to interpretation, from embodiment to imagination. It may be that the interpretation of gesture is only possible because we have both a biological imperative and cultural experience. In the perception, as distinct from the conceptualisation of gesture and posture, it can be reasonably speculated that there are specific eye-to-brain linkages and responses which have evolved and have been selected for in a hunter-gathering past because they favoured survival. The instantaneous recognition of, and essential distinction between, hostile and social gesture, for example, might still be the biological basis of the perception of form in general, and aesthetic configuration in particular. Even the act of differential perception, it will be noted, requires an act of interpretation; early humans, like other animals, needed a typological inventory of gestural form in order to avoid predation (R. Gregory et al 1995; R. Latto The Brain Of The Beholder, 86.)

In the case of art, much of the meaning assigned to gestural attitude or posture is conventionally and culturally conferred. The total sign as gestalt will, in non-abstract art, require the context of the whole and its parts to be resolved into an interpretation. If we recognize the folded arms gesture, for example, only the larger synchronic context will determine whether it represents resolution or resignation or something else altogether such as petulance. In chapter seventeen of Laocoon, Lessing discourses on the implications of the parts and the whole in the case of poetry and painting. Painting, in as much as it depicts a single subject and not an implied narrative, assembles the parts as representative and constitutive of a whole depicted at once visually in what is a spatial relationship. Poetry, on the other hand, in 'painting' the same scene in language, must go
to extraordinary lengths to account for the parts and their connections, and such a
description would be of inordinate length, and demand of the reader or hearer prodigious
feats of recall and memory. ‘To the eye, parts once seen remain continually present; it can
run over them again and again. For the ear, however, the parts once heard are lost unless
they remain in the memory. And even if they do remain there, what effort and trouble it
costs to renew all their impressions in the same order and with the same vividness; to
review them all in the mind at once with only moderate rapidity, to arrive at an
approximate idea of the whole!’ Lessing does not discuss *ekphrasis*, the rhetorical trope
of representing poetically iconic imagery in language, such as Homer’s lengthy account
of the appearance of the shield of Achilles in *The Iliad* which Lessing does discuss at
length. The advantage of a poetic account over a visual depiction is that it can set a
context which enriches the understanding with a successive account where, say, a
painting of the shield can only depict one image characterized by simultaneity and
outside of any context. Alternatively, a visual allegory or visual symbol such as a
medieval painted icon of the Mother and Child signified so powerfully in its frozen
gesture between mother and child as parts constituting the whole, that the Reformation
iconoclasts frequently destroyed such images. The fear was that the visual image so
powerfully embodied the mystery of the Virgin that the icon, a visual sign, would signify
more potently than preaching and biblical exegesis; in a manner of speaking, the visual
icon would deafen the word. (Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff, Eds, 1996; *Sign*, Alec
Potts, 26). [3] Of course, the sign has first to be recognized as generic. We can, for
example, look at a building in terms of its engineering and structural functions. But we
can also, with Vitruvius, appreciate the building as delight, in which case it signifies as
art. But the art object as sign is itself by its nature, constitutive, and is formed by the
relation of parts to whole. The sign, then, in general, is in Peirce’s terms indexical since it
has its parts in contiguity and is therefore metonymic. We seem to have a case here of a
metonymic sign indicating that its parts signify metonymically. Peirce’s sign, it would
seem, must assume the status of a meta-sign; the sign of a sign. It is immediately
noticeable that Saussure’s sign is, in contrast, binary; the sign and its signified referent.
The sign can only signify in some code, such as language or pictograms, and the semantic
relation between signifier and signified may be one-to-one or not. If not, then the
meaning of the sign must be subject to interpretation. But it exists as an entity which is 'there' as a potential meaning outside the context of its recognition. If no one perceived it, it would still be a sign, but putatively. It is langue, not parole. This is rather like the later distinction Noam Chomsky draws between 'competence' and 'performance.' Competence, like langue, refers to language as an ideal state, the ideal grammar, while performance represents the rather more idiosyncratic condition of language-use. Saussure's sign remains a sign autonomously, independently of social context, even if it is not perceived by anybody as a sign. Peirce's sign only signifies when it has been subject to an apprehending act.

Peirce, in describing the sign as constituent, acknowledges that its very tripartite, part-to-whole relationship invokes an infinite regress. The apprehending subject perceives the signified object as referent and as emerging from the metaphorical transfer of meaning between the material sign and its semantic analogue. However, the emergence of the new meaning itself constitutes a new sign subject to being apprehended. This new or secondary sign will in turn produce new possible meanings, and so on indefinitely in an infinite regress. It is important to note that the meaning of Peirce's originating sign is not a totality. Part of its meaning or sense is deferred into a proliferating series of new signs. In Poststructuralist or Derridean terms, the proliferated sign as an absence by deferral, or 'differance', constantly deconstructs and subverts the dominant or manifest originating sign as presence. Peirce's infinite regress seems to be a passage from the presence of each new meaning to the absence of the interpretation behind it which in turn becomes the latest present meaning about to be subverted by the next absent interpretation, and so on indefinitely. In a similar syntagmatic way, language itself as the principal medium of meaning and communication, defers the totality of meaning in Derrida's system. The conflict between this and the traditions of western analytical philosophy is both obvious and familiar. In the case of Pollock's Lavender Mist, Pollock's gestures depict nothing, and so there is no traditional subject, but there is Pollock's expression and intentionality as content. Since Lavender Mist depicts nothing and refers to nothing 'outside' itself, it can only signify self-referentially as a sign which refers to itself as sign, and is, in this sense, an example of meta-signification. We perhaps recognize that Pollock's painted gesture echoes the brushstrokes in his earlier surrealist painting. This work was
influenced by Ashile Gorky, who, as a refugee European working in New York after World War Two, in turn was heir to the traditions of European painting. And so Pollock’s originality is indefinitely deferred. Other lines of signification may set up other chains of signification, domino-like, ad infinitum. Each new signification is metonymically dependent on the previous one. The proliferating sign is both new and old in a series of oscillating presences and absences. Each new sign is also necessarily a palimpsest of layered meaning. Each of Pollock’s gesture-marks, which dramatically embody his physical actions, can only mean as ciphers of his affective response to the medium confronting him.

*Lavender Mist* evidently defies *ekphrasis*. An account in language of the painting would not allow a copy or replica to be made of it. Contrariwise, Homer’s ‘painting in’ of Achilles’s shield in poetic imagery could generate a visually depicted copy as an example of iconic mimesis. *Lavender Mist* is a collocation in an empirical sense; the whole is represented by the collection and disposition of its marks and touches, which intentionally reveal embodied human agency as its source. Since it does not represent any subject, but instead indicates the physicality of its surface, what is denoted and revealed is something like ‘painterliness’ as its dominant meaning or metaphor. But the association of its concealed symbolism, its absence in other words, is with an affective state or condition. Which existential condition might be instantiated by Pollock’s apparently compulsive strokes – ‘neurosis’, ‘alienation’, ‘anomie’ or whatever - is not of direct concern here. Because there is no subject, as in a building, whatever condition inheres in its visual form must be the result of metaphorical substitution. And that existential condition can only be explained by the use of abstract nouns which assist the understanding and imagination. In what seems a useful way, the implied existential condition, whatever that may be, seems most appropriately represented by the ascription of ‘keywords’ rather than through extended descriptive sentences (Raymond Williams, *Keywords*, 1988). This suggests that the status of visual, non-narrative art, including the building, is ontologically mediated, and not simply formalist or eidetic. The fact that the semantic significance of the visual art object cannot be fully explained by language implies that its meaning must be self-contained in some way, and that the object is an example of a thing-in-itself. This does not mean that language is not implicated in the
understanding of what might be called ‘the existential status’ of visual art. The art object may indeed not have its own self-contained ‘language’, as in ‘the language of architecture’ or ‘the language of sculpture’ and so on, an issue discussed at length later. Such rhetorical turns disguise the process whereby visual art, in revealing its meanings, necessarily comes into language. In visual art, the ‘language of this’ or ‘the language of that’ only acts to obfuscate that what this so-called ‘language’ actually represents are forms of metaphorical gesture, shape and pose. An essential aspect of the ontological condition of the visual art object will be a further sense of the palimpsest. What will also be layered in the visual sign will be the linguistic imperative somehow ‘behind’ or ‘below’ the visual. What a building signifies oscillates between the two in particular ways.

The implication of language within the visual sign as recessional or latent indicates that it is ‘there’ as an absence. Such oscillation between the tacit and implicit, particularly involving time, often appears to be what Auerbach in *Mimesis* calls ‘Figura’ (Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis*, 1957, 64). ‘Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons in such a way that the first signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second involves or fulfils the first.’ Auerbach cites biblical exegesis in the figural account of Adam’s sleep producing Eve, the original mother. In the New Testament, Adam’s sleep is a figure of Christ’s death-sleep, and from Christ’s wound in the side flows a new mother, the church, just as Adam’s wound produced Eve. For the moment, it is important to note that such figural oscillation suggests the presence of allegory as an implicit text which was previously ‘absent’. *Mimesis* of course involves the copy. If there is a copy, then as Auerbach’s figural analogues imply, there must be an original. However, Derrida, in discussing Rousseau, questions originality. Rousseau argues that originality arises from nature, and that art’s quiddity lies in line and not colour. *Mimesis* inheres in shape, not tint. The copy is made essentially from *outline* hence establishing the engraving as the paradigmatic art form. (It would be suggested here, although neither Rousseau nor Derrida pursue it, that the paradigm of the outline leads inevitably to gesture, pose and visual rhetoric.) In a difficult, but ultimately rewarding way, Derrida denies the possibility of origin. If the ‘original’ beauty remains beautiful after the copy, then that very beauty contained that which could be reproduced.
as part of its beauty. ‘If the beautiful loses nothing by being reproduced, if one recognizes it in its sign, in the sign of the sign which a copy must be, then in the “first time” of its production there was already a reproductive essence. The engraving which copies the models of art, is nonetheless the model for art. If the origin of art is the possibility of the engraving, the death of art and art as death are prescribed from the very birth of the work.’ The original has to be represented as a drawing from nature, drawing being the instrument of the outline. What appears to be original is dependent on a previous originality leading presumably to another regress in which originality is indefinitely deferred, as in the case of Peirce’s triadic sign. The original is itself a copy possibly derived from nature, and its mimesis, Derrida reminds us in Of Grammatology, is a result of ‘re-production’ and ‘re-presentation’ (Jacques Derrida, 1998, 208/9). Auerbach’s Mimesis invokes the idea of the copy as a metaphorical simile and is a provocative anticipation of the tropes of postmodern architecture (as against poststructural forms) which in its earlier manifestations was self-consciously mimetic in parodically reinstating earlier architectural styles such as classicism. The opening of postmodern architecture is conspicuously Historicist and mimetic and is heavily dependent on the function of the simile rather than full-blooded metaphor. Mimesis is one of its highly significant constituent features, and is discussed at length in Chapter Six here.

Theatricality and Gestural Rhetoric

Michael Fried’s foundationally important work, Art And Objecthood opposed the movement of art during the early nineteen sixties away from painting towards objecthood, and is now widely seen as the defining debate about the emergence of the postmodern art object becoming increasingly an architectural form of installation. Fried’s characterization of the Minimalist, or postmodern work of art as an act of contrivance and
theatricality is often associated solely with the debate about the future of the plastic arts and not architecture. However, this section appropriates Fried's conception of theatricality, applies it to architecture and suggests that the very notion of theatricality is highly apposite as a way in to postmodern architectural rhetoric which is developed thematically later.

The critical conflict between Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried and the Minimalists in the nineteen sixties is now seen retrospectively as a rearguard defence of Modernism itself (Charles Harrison et al Modernism In Dispute, 1993, 196). This is of some considerable consequence because Fried's impassioned defence of visual simultaneity in *Art And Objecthood* is representative of a fulminating line between the fracture of Modernism and the conceptualism of the postmodern. Although Fried resisted to some extent Greenberg's reductive and essentialist account of American modernist art as an evolutionary or dialectical apotheosis, both agreed about the definitive constituent feature of Modernism. Just as Lessing had initiated simultaneity as the defining feature of the image at the beginning of the modern in the Enlightenment, so Fried and Greenberg established the optical as the quintessential of spectator response at its end. For a discussion of simultaneity as paradigmatic of Modernism, a paradigm fundamentally opposed by Postmodernism, see *Art Since 1900*, H. Foster, R. Krauss et al 2004, 122-124. A number of important consequences flow from Greenberg and Fried's position. Their characterization of the modernist art object acknowledges much that is found in the writings of Roger Fry and Clive Bell in the early twentieth century in the emergence of Significant Form. Since abstract art (and in particular Abstract Expressionist painting and sculpture) contained no subject, it dispensed with the depicted illusion and as a consequence emphasized surface and gesture. Despite Pollock's 'cutting the [picture] plane' as Greenberg had it, the Minimalists like Donald Judd and Robert Morris argued that any painting, including abstraction, would be inevitably illusionist because of the necessary consequence of the figure/ground spatial depth created by any mark on any surface. 'Specific Objects', as theoretically free of gesture and expression were to replace modernist painting and sculpture. Frederick Jameson has represented the postmodern as an *emptying*; of a flat, depthless and calculated superficiality in which the affective has
been excluded (Frederick Jameson, *The Cultural Logic Of Late Capitalism* 1991, 6-10). The waning of affectivity is accompanied by the disappearance of expression. Fried’s account of the Minimalist object as ‘literalist’ might be seen as characteristic of the objecthood of the postmodern art object itself. As postmodern art has become more objectified and has forsaken the wall for the floor, particularly in the installation, it has also become an occupant of space, and in that sense has moved towards the architectural. And in assuming objecthood it has dispensed with expression. The literalist object (Emin’s bed, Hirst’s shark and so on) in emphasizing its objecthood, has shed illusion, but not necessarily allusion, and at the same time has similarly discarded the possibility of its being ‘artistic’, let alone ‘beautiful’ precisely because of its literality. Duchamp’s found object, the Fountain or *pissoir* becomes paradigmatic. The literalist found object within the institution of art sardonically installs the possibility of art becoming non-art. In what at first seems a paradox, just as postmodern painting and sculpture has reified into objecthood and excised expression, postmodern architecture has palpably become sculptural, gestural and overtly expressionistic. It was architectural Modernism which expelled expression and gesture prior to Ronchamp. Mies’s Seagram Tower, New York, was mute. In fact, of course, architecture always has embodied objecthood and literality by necessity in order to function as building; it always has been an object. So the postmodern building already finds itself as an object which cannot objectify or reify itself further, unlike the painting or sculpture. In order to resist Modernism and become Postmodern, it has, in other words to incorporate as a form of presence that which Modernism consigned to absence. Architectural Postmodernism has moved in the opposite direction to painting and sculpture. In order to become postmodern, architecture has had to reject Modernist versions of Purism and classicism and become through its gestural inflections, expressionistic. This expressionist flowering during the opening period of postmodern architecture, which is traced in Chapter Five here, is characterized, in its opposition to Modernism, by the extravagance of its visual and historicist rhetoric.

As well as emphasizing the instantaneous optical nature of the spectator response to visual art, Fried and Greenberg were also insistent that such experience defeated time and what Fried called ‘theatricality’. (Michael Fried, *Art and Objecthood*, 1967, in Harrison et al 1992, 822-834.) Fried’s ascription of objecthood extended beyond the Minimalist
objects of Donald Judd, Robert Morris and Carl Andre to the ambiguity of the painting-becoming-sculpture of Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns. In a way, the climactic moment arrived with Fried’s advocacy of Anthony Caro’s sculpture, *Early One Morning* [Fig 4]. What matters about it is its contiguity and metonymy. Its relational parts amount to a version of Significant Form. The contrast with the Minimalist object of Judd or Morris is acute. The parts relate gesturally, and if the whole refers to or embodies the human form in an abstract way, it nonetheless remains abstract and non-mimetic. (‘The idea that Caro’s sculpture can liberate gesture does not make it like a body in a mimetic sense, but the release of gesture does depend on the relational character of the sculptures.’ Anthony Causley, *Sculpture Since 1945*, 1998, 112.) Relationship is crucial. Fried suggests that the authenticity of Modernist art resides in its interior, intrinsic and autonomous visual relation of parts. What makes the Minimalist object theatrical or ‘a kind of stage presence’ (original emphasis) is that the relation, in being extrinsic, is externally dramatised; ‘...the spectator perceives an object as that which it literally is, something existing in space and time. The experience is then of interest to the extent that the relationship between spectator and object can be invested with drama; that is to say, to the extent that the relationship can be made ‘theatrical’.’ (Charles Harrison, 1993, 191.) As art approaches the condition of theatre, so it degenerates, and value lies in the internal authenticity of any art-form. Extrinsic relations *between* arts, such as painting and sculpture, as in Rauschenberg’s Combines for example, make the art ‘theatrical’. It might actually be suggested that the condition of theatricality is broadly that of the postmodern and not simply the Minimalist object. Theatricality might also be supposed to be an aspect of contrivance and hence of the rhetorical. If we suspend Fried’s normative judgements, made at his synchronic and historical moment, and instead simply document...
‘theatricality’ as an act of contrivance, it becomes a useful template for an account of first-phase architectural postmodernism, as may become clearer later.

Fried’s expostulation of theatricality in art after Modernism as an act of contrivance seems to suggest a tendency towards a certain version of taste that is Mannerist; a certain self-consciousness of affected and declared attitude, designed to persuade, or to be, in other words, rhetorical form. The rhetorical attitude, particularly in three-dimensional form, is of course a function of gesture. This will include the installation and the building as well as sculpture and painting. In architecture this has long been recognized. In the fifteenth century, Alberti was a principal source for classical forms in Renaissance Italy. His own originating source, Vitruvius, he considered unsatisfactory, and the Vitruvian scheme of Arrangement, Eurythmy, Symmetry, Propriety and Economy he judged to be tendentious. In De Re Aedificatoria, Alberti abandons the Vitruvian scheme which moved arbitrarily from one kind of paradigmatic building type to another. Alberti’s system was instead based on principles of construction, function and design; firmitas, utilitas and venustas. In this way, Alberti separates forms and structures from ornament. Obviously, the underlying distinction here is between function and form. In order to support analysis only, they are separated, and in order to give unity they are synthesized. What is wholly novel about Alberti’s scheme is the fact that the unifying and synthesizing element in design is classical rhetoric. Alberti clearly argues that iconic visual form should be informed by the tropes of language, thus contradicting Lessing’s insistence on the inherent separateness of language and visual form. Alberti’s model is Quintillian whose subject was oration, and in particular, inventio or ‘invention’. In Alberti this was translated into the manipulation of inventive forms but which nevertheless conformed to the strictures of decorum. Quintillian proposed that a speech, in order to be convincing and persuasive, had to have a quality of disposition or order, and equally Alberti seeks to impose order from dispositio on issues of planning and relating part to whole in the layout, particularly in the city. And Quintillian’s elocutio, or adornment by tropes, Alberti adopts as the guiding taste for the suitability and appropriateness of embellishment and decoration (Anthony Grafton, Leon Battista Alberti, 2001, 274-5.)
dissatisfaction with Vitruvius was based in part on his empirical studies of Roman and Greek building in the 1440s. The buildings themselves were said to be better models than Vitruvius’s prescriptions, especially when realised in a corpus of drawings. Alberti effectively says that the propitious architectural form is an expression of its rhetorical tropes. This vital link will necessarily reappear in the later consideration here of the gesturally rhetorical form of the postmodernist building which seems to bloom after the formalities of architectural Modernism receded.

In terms of visual culture, Fried’s Modernist art object accedes to the glance as a condition of its immediacy and simultaneity. The gestalt is the means whereby its visual authenticity is authorised and time elided by contact with the moment. On the other hand, the postmodern literalist object demands that the spectator enters its space in the same way that the playgoer enters the fictive stage setting and mis-en-scene of the theatrical experience, and the glance is deferred by the intrigue of the gaze. And in entering that space and in following Coleridge’s familiar ‘suspension of disbelief’, the spectator becomes in a sense complicit and even compromised by joining in the contrivance of the theatrical. At all events, however much Fried’s disapproval of the postmodern art object may sound like a version of Puritanism, what it substantiates is that in the case of the postmodern art object, the critical relationship is not only within the object’s parts and whole, but between spectator and object. And although he does not say so, Fried’s disapproval of theatricality, his impatience with its very contrivance, represents a distaste of the rhetoric of display. What Fried also does not say is that in deferring the diminutive glance which potentially confers a kind of receptive epiphany, the postmodern work of art implicates language.

Clement Greenberg’s authority as the Fidei Defensor of late Modernism remains of the highest importance. For a generation from 1940 on, Greenberg’s influence became hegemonic both in America and Europe. His position changed radically. Towards A Newer Laocoon wholly abandons the leftism of Avant-Garde And Kitsch of the previous year. Lessing becomes powerfully relevant in separating word and image and Greenberg invokes the Laocoon as a means of insisting on the optical nature of experiencing abstract painting which suspends not only the linguistic but also the temporal. In other words, Greenberg’s procedure has become transcendental. It also suspends the significant
historical account in *Avant-Garde And Kitsch* and in denying time, suspends history itself, making the experience of art autonomous and *a priori*. Greenberg’s Kantian position (Peter Osborne 2004, 651-2) remains of the greatest significance because it represents what Postmodernism is *against*. (The spatial and temporal aspects of Modernism and Postmodernism are discussed in the section ‘Postmodern Space and Modernist Temporality’ in Chapter Three here.) Rosalind Krauss writes:

‘In 1940 Clement Greenberg writes ‘Towards a Newer Laocoon’ in which he attacks Surrealism, among other things, for being narrative, and Lessing’s *Laocoon* becomes a kind of master model (though it was published in 1766!) of how to separate the visual and spatial arts from the verbal and temporal arts in modernism. For Greenberg the literary is temporal, Surrealism is literary, and so it must be condemned as impure.’

(H. Foster, R. Krauss et al 2004, 320)

What Greenberg repressed, the experience of language and time in art in the name of an immediate, optical and pre-temporal response becomes the linguistic and temporal palimpsest which ushers in the allegorical in the postmodern.

This chapter has sought to establish a number of fundamentally important and recurring themes. The metaphorical nature of the sign underpins everything and anticipates the more specific treatment of visual metaphor as the conduit of meaning into language to come as well as the associated metaphorical constituents such as contiguity, simile, synecdoche, catachresis and metonymy, which are the mechanisms of metaphorical reference, and which are intimately related in origin to classical rhetoric. It has also been important, following Lessing, to establish that physical gesture, whether in abstract painting, sculpture or architecture is an important part of how an empirical and non-linguistic object such as the building might indicate rhetorical attitude as part of its significance. Equally, the fact that gesture is an aspect of embodiment leads later to a developed position which is supported by the phenomenological approach of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer, and which explicitly rejects transcendental views of the work of art as characterized by Kant’s version of the Beautiful. And the notion of
mimesis is also later developed as the basis of the simulacrum and essential to the concept of allegory which illuminates the idea of the postmodern. Michael Fried's foundational work on what has become postmodern objecthood and installation runs as a theme throughout and his concept of theatricality represents a key link with the rhetorical nature of the postmodern and poststructuralist building. Finally, the profoundly complex and difficult nature of the relationship between visual form and linguistic meaning, Lessing's image and word initiated classically with *ut pictura poesis*, forms the basis of a continuing discussion of the language and form debate that leads to the rejection of the assumptions embedded in the modish characterization of architectural significance as 'the language of architecture'.
CHAPTER THREE

MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNISM

This chapter deals with the perceived transition from Modernism to Postmodernism, but assumes that the postmodern remains an aspect of both modernity and Modernism. There are then continuing issues which centre around the nature of transition and its continuities and discontinuities. As well as discussions of the characteristics of Modernism and Postmodernism, the possibility of the Post-Postmodern is also considered. The chapter is divided into six sections: Modernity and its Definitions, Continuity and Discontinuity, Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition, Postmodern Space and Modernist Temporality, an important section here called The Allegorical in the Postmodern and finally, Theory and Post-Theory.

Modernity and its Definitions

It will be extensively argued here in Chapters Six and Seven in Part Two that the postmodern imperatives embedded in poststructuralist architecture are, in a very real sense, the embodiment of a return to early Modernism in the sense that the Postmodern is a version of Modernism but one which parodies and subverts its ‘origin’ or ‘source’. The comparison of the two, the modern and the postmodern, is then an obvious requirement for an understanding of architectural postmodernism. It then in turn becomes essential to have a clear understanding of the driving imperatives of Modernism itself. This section offers a brief historical account of the emergence of Modernism. It then considers the key ideas of Clement Greenberg, universally recognized as the most accomplished theorist of Modernism and looks at the villas of Corbusier as exemplifiers of the Modernist impulse. Fried and Clement Greenberg in their different but basically similar ways represent the fullest expression of Modernist theory. Much is previously anticipated in Roger Fry and
Clive Bell, but Clement Greenberg in particular is widely understood to explicate Modernism’s ideology in its most accomplished and representative form.

In *Avant-Garde and Kitsch* (1939) Greenberg identifies a ‘Bohemian’ tendency in avant-garde practice which emerged in the 1850s and 1860s to withdraw from what he then saw as the mass commodity of capitalist culture. Greenberg is speaking of the avant-garde:

Hence it developed that the true and most important function of the avant-garde was not to ‘experiment’, but to find a path along which it would be possible to keep culture moving in the midst of ideological confusion and violence. Retiring from public altogether, the avant-garde poet or artist sought to maintain the high level of his art by both narrowing and raising it to the expression of an absolute in which all relativities and contradictions would be either resolved or be beside the point. ‘Art for art’s sake’ and ‘pure poetry’ appear, and subject matter or content becomes something to be avoided like a plague. (C. Harrison et al 1992, 530-541 original emphasis)

In fact, what is meant by familiar terms such as ‘modern’, ‘modernity’ and ‘Modernism’ is often unclear. The term ‘modern’ itself seems often associated with the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of the Romantic sensibility during the nineteenth century. It can be argued, however, that ‘modern’ is a relative term that could have been used by the Romans as well as the Victorians with equal legitimacy. ‘Modernity’, on the other hand has been convincingly linked to the post-Renaissance period which itself was founded on dynamic changes in capitalist organization. [4] In Britain, for example, during the reign of Elizabeth 1 there were two quite clear early revolutions in industrial output (J.U. Neff *The Economic Review* 1935) which helped to create a new land-owning and capitalist middle class which ultimately suppressed the monopolistic practices of the Crown in the English Civil War (Christopher Hill 1961, 145-61). ‘Modernism’ itself is now largely confined to the aesthetic developments which began with the Impressionist practices of Edouard Manet and continued through the emergence of Post-Impressionism and beyond into Cubism. The single definitive founding moment for architectural
modernism was the creation of The Bauhaus by Walter Gropius which later evolved into the International Style (C. Harrison 1997, 42). Greenberg saw the gradual historical development of the movements of modernity such as Realism or Romanticism for example, suddenly accelerate during the second half of the nineteenth century into the explosive change generated by Cubism. Art and cultural practice after Cubism was Modernism. And it was Modernism that both Greenberg and Fried defended in the nineteen sixties against what they increasingly perceived as the theatrical contrivance of objecthood and the installation.

If Greenberg’s primary terms such as ‘avant-garde’, ‘moving’, ‘high’ and ‘absolute’ were reversed, then almost immediately there would exist a preliminary of the postmodern in the sense that Postmodernism has reversed Modernism at almost every point. He goes on to invoke Enlightenment and in particular, Kantian self-criticism and scepticism and the necessity of progress to justify an avant-garde utopian aesthetic of forward movement. Greenberg is speaking of high art, of Joyce and T.S. Eliot and Matisse. Low art is essentially mimetic and copies or apes the great art of the past in a sentimental denigration of form. It is a popular, mass art, both commercial and kitsch. In the following year, Greenberg published *Towards a Newer Laocoon*, whose reference is principally to Lessing. Just as Lessing, in speaking of word and image, had queried the boundaries between and across art forms, Greenberg suggests that authenticity in the visual arts is a condition of its proper medium, or, in another sense, of its autonomy. And of course it is Michael Fried, Modernism’s other great advocate, who argues in *Art and Objecthood* that painting which presumed to become sculptural, as in Rauschenberg’s Combines, is a version of theatre. *Towards a Newer Laocoon* treats Greenberg’s fundamentally important treatment of flatness. Avant-garde painting in particular, in emphasizing facture and therefore surface, destroyed the illusionist picture plane of academic art. All avant-garde visual art avoided illusion and subject and delighted in appearance in a denial of realist meaning and narrative. There is a trajectory here. Modernism proper begins with Manet’s flatness [5]. (T.J. Clarke, ‘Preliminaries to a possible treatment of *Olympia* in 1865’.) There is then a ‘forward movement’ which increasingly denies the picture plane and moves towards abstraction. Abstract Expressionism is then an historically advanced visual art-form which denies reference
and metaphor. In retrospect, we can reasonably associate the architectural Purism of Corbusier or the Functionalism of Gropius and Mies with the historical destiny of abstraction. All Modernist culture was seen to be moving away from narrative and ornamentation, and indeed, depiction itself. In *Towards a Newer Laocoon* Greenberg says:

A vibrating tension is set up as the objects struggle to maintain their volume against the tendency of the real picture plane to reassert its material flatness and crush them to silhouettes. In a further stage, realistic space cracks and splinters into flat planes which come forward parallel to the plane surface....(C. Harrison et al 1992, 554-560)

The historical result is abstraction as a form Hegelian end-state, dialectically achieved through time. This seems necessarily teleological, although what it is in Modernist visual art that is temporally purposive is difficult to pin down. Greenberg’s teleology may be critically inscribed within the project of Enlightenment, which Jean-Francois Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition* (1984) describes as an example of ‘Meta-Narratives’ which invoke postmodernist scepticism and incredulity. The difficulty with end-states is that any further ‘movement’ can only be recursive, whilst Modernist ‘movement’ in order to remain avant-garde must be ‘forward’. Once that Greenberg was obliged to concede that a bare tacked up canvas on a wall would still count as an abstract picture – although not necessarily, as Greenberg said, a successful one – then the wall metaphorically represents the Modernist cul-de-sac. Although Modernist theory required avant-gardist progression, the only possible ‘direction’ the practice of art could take was in reverse. That reversal becomes and initiates the postmodern. In going backwards, Postmodernism ushers in the very condition of temporality that the optical instantaneity of Greenberg and Fried denied. Often enough, this new concern with historical past time has been called New Historicism. How could anyone take art ‘forward’ after Jackson Pollock. The only remaining possibility for abstraction was to make the painting different by adding another dimension as Frank Stella did. But this in turn made what had to be two-dimensionally abstract and flat, despite Fried’s support for Stella, into a three-dimensional object which it seemed would need to become sculptural and therefore submit to objecthood and,
presumably, theatricality. The very act of looking backwards down the Modernist cul-de-sac because there was no ‘forwards’ beckoned the postmodern. The Greenberg/Fried moment is singular. However much they might resist objecthood and the threat to the Modernist art object as pure optical form, the newer kind of art as produced by Rauschenberg and Johns in particular, mimicked Abstract Expressionism in retrospect, whilst simultaneously punning on its nature as object. The period from the late 1950s into the 1960s is the inception of the postmodern moment. In architecture, Robert Venturi’s *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* achieved the same result. In sculpture Donald Judd and Richard Serra moved towards the contextualized literalist object and initiated ideas of installation. In painting, Rauschenberg and Johns re-accommodated the Dadaist found object and in making their ‘painting’ *figural*, announced the event of Conceptualism and the presence of allegory as an essential aspect of the emerging postmodern.

Clement Greenberg’s trajectory of Modernist Kantian teleology is here taken as paradigmatic of Modernist theory. However much postmodernist theory might dissolve the dualist binaries of Modernism, such as that between high and low culture and in ‘deconstructing’ them effectively reversing them, Modernism remains a retrospective part of the postmodern. Immediately, the palimpsest reappears in this temporal layering of the modern with the postmodern. And this oscillation between a postmodern present and a Modernist past represents, as it were, a search for lost authorship and instigates the auspices of allegory which is discussed in a later section in this chapter and more extensively in Chapter Four.

Modernist art and architecture were understood to be different aspects of the same historical imperative towards abstraction as the apotheosis and end-point of Modernism. Modernist art belonged in Modernist buildings. It was no accident that the abstract paintings of Mark Rothko were originally destined for Mies’s Seagram Tower, New York, perhaps the most powerful statement of architectural international Modernism. During the earlier phase of Modernism, which may be conveniently if artificially demarcated between 1900-1960, it was the abstract Purism of Corbusier, promulgated internationally by CIAM, which defined architectural Modernism. Corbusier’s assumptions are concordant with Greenberg and Fried, and also the arguments in favour
of ‘Significant Form’ of Roger Fry and Clive Bell (C. Harrison et al. 1992, 78-86). Abstraction and Significant Form were credos for the existence of a transcendental beauty, almost as a version of Platonism to which the architecture of Corbusier subscribed. ‘Extending some of the ideas of Purist painting to architecture, and revealing the underlying Platonism of his outlook, Le Corbusier argued that there were basic and absolutely beautiful forms transcending the mere conventions of period and style.’ (W.J. Curtis 1999, 169)

Corbusier’s early encounter with the Parthenon and Greek classical architecture was decisive. The Parthenon was seen as long and low, its laterality conferring classical order, proportion and arrangement. That laterality was of course the product of using stone as the pre-eminent building material which effectively constrained the height of the building for structural safety. That conflation of the classical with the lateral produced Corbusier’s defining principle of the Five Points. At the Villa Stein, Garches, 1926, he designed a dwelling of formidable horizontals comprising decks and the fenêtre en longueur, or strip window, liberated from structural compromise by the Domino-type frame on which hung the free façade and its wall-wide fenestration. The lateral building, like Corbusier’s other Villas, then assumed a classical repose of ordered arrangement (W.J. Curtis 1999, 181). Despite the classically ordered exteriors of his Villas, Corbusier’s interiors do not reproduce the same interior format of the classical building with its structurally-imposed arrangement of the rational grid. (The grid as a recurrent imperative and sign of Modernism is examined in Chapter Six.) At the Villa Savoye, for instance, the processional demand of the inner arrangement is immediately signalled by replacing conventional stairs with a continuous up-slope ramp which conducts the visitor to the upper floors. And of course, just as the frame liberates the external wall into a free façade, so the frame equally generates the inner arrangement into the free plan which can be altered at will because the internal walls are non-structural dividers. What in Greenberg’s terms is essentially Modernist about these buildings is not simply the industrialist frame as the structural device of mass-construction, but the aesthetics of the visual which approaches the abstract by deferring ornament and creating the instant visual epiphanies of Significant Form in whatever medium or genre. It remains extraordinary that Corbusier’s archetypal Modernist structures, largely stripped of
metaphorical reference, transmogrified into the metaphor-saturated Ronchamp, the first architectural appearance of the postmodern at the end of his life.

**Continuity and Discontinuity**

There are a number of versions of the relationship between Modernism and Postmodernism. They might reasonably be placed typologically into five groups, although there could be more. The first position, occupied by Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard, although for different reasons, understands Modernism to be ongoing. The second, perhaps most powerfully elucidated by Frederick Jameson, sees postmodernist culture as historically discrete, but as existing in relation to late-phase capitalism, a position reinforced by Jean Baudrillard in a post-Marxist position which equates the postmodern phase of capital with the production of signs and images. A third grouping, as represented by David Harvey, for example, offers a critique of Postmodernism as indifferent to value. The fourth grouping, loosely held by Charles Jencks, is that initially at least, Postmodernism adopted the culturally low and populist position opposed to Greenbergian high Modernist culture, and the fifth, held by Terry Eagleton, speculates that we may already be in a new instability which is Post-Poststructural, Post-Theory and Post-Postmodern. This section examines each of these with the intention of representing the postmodern not simply as opposed to anything Modernist, but as a complex and often indecisive thing in itself with its own philosophically derived precepts which are discussed further in Chapter Four.

The intention here, especially in Chapter Six, is to give an account of postmodern architecture in particular, broadly from Robert Venturi to, say, Daniel Libeskind as part of postmodern culture. That is, that architecture *de facto* in the period under review, like other cultural forms, came to differ very significantly from Modernist preferences, whatever any interpretative grouping may make of it. Habermas, however, has suggested that that what has been characterized as postmodern, is in fact a reactionary and neo-conservative tendency in the modern itself which the vanguard and avant-garde utopianism of Modernism has always resisted. In this sense, Modernism is an ongoing
project with its Enlightenment principles of rational self-interest and self-criticism within authentic social forms largely intact but under threat. The postmodern then becomes not simply different from Modernism, but a virulent form of anti-Modernism. Habermas mourns the loss of rationally planned Enlightenment collective space whilst acknowledging Theodore Adorno’s trajectory, similar to that of Clement Greenberg, that Modernism was a principled space for high art. (Theodore Adorno, 1962 in Harrison et al 1992, 761-764) Habermas’s position, principally in Modernism — An Incomplete Project (C. Harrison 1992, 1000-1008) seems unable to concede that however much aspects of Modernism may be valued, the rational collective space of the modern has been dissolved by the global market and by, as it were, its mass economic individualism. Lyotard suggests that the modern must always contain the capacity to become postmodern, but at its opening, so that at the inception of Modernism the postmodern already implicitly ‘exists’ in order for the modern to defeat ossification and renew itself in constant rebirth. ‘A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.’ (C. Harrison et al 1992, 1012) Lyotard suggests that the modernist aesthetic is a nostalgic aesthetic of the Kantian sublime and that presumably the transmogrification of the modern by the postmodern will help resist the authoritarian horrors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; ‘Let us wage war on totality.’

Habermas and Lyotard resist the naïve view that Postmodernism represents a complete break with Modernism. But both in their different ways, understand Modernism as forward movement, even Lyotard’s, postmodernistically at least, more ‘advanced’ position. (‘In an amazing acceleration, the generations precipitate themselves.’) The Modernist metaphor of ‘forward movement’ of course implies temporality, and arguably stems from the imperative of Enlightenment Utopianism. The postmodern aesthetic prerogative over space on the other hand, with its artistic objecthood requiring installation and therefore contact with the architectural, would appear to be only able to treat time figuratively since it is necessarily intolerant of narratives. (See the later section in this chapter called ‘Postmodernist Space and Modernist Temporality.’) Although Postmodernism rejects the temporality of ‘Grand Narratives’ and is therefore placed in spatial rather than temporal attitudes, when it does deal with time as it must, it often does
so retrospectively, rather as an aspect of mourning or Lyotard's nostalgic sublime. The position taken here is that the nostalgia of mourning, that is of recursive temporality, is a necessary condition for the underlying imperative of the postmodern which is allegorical. This, it should be noted, is the opposite of Lyotard's 'amazing acceleration', although his notion of the postmodern aesthetic as a version of the Romantic sublime is taken up later here, as is Frederick Jameson's suggestion that both Modernism and Postmodernism are basically differently evolved aspects of Romanticism itself. (Frederick Jameson 1991, 59.)

Jameson suggests that Postmodernism is a cultural function of late-phase capitalism. This third phase of capitalist development is derived from Mandel. (See the next section, 'Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition'.) Postmodernism on this argument is the cultural and social arrangement of global, 'post-industrial' capitalism. If economic organisation such as capitalism is staged, so far into early, middle and late, then perhaps we can all see another infinite regress appearing when the late becomes the late-late or post-late, and so on. At any rate, modernity is defined by and characterized by the emergence and development of capital. Jameson sees late capitalism as increasingly integrating the production of new culture into the production of commodities which favour the individual expression of choice. Product placement accompanies commodity production. In order to keep pace with competition, there is a constant demand for innovative technologies which, like computers, develop in generational waves. The discard is the obsolescent not the dysfunctional. The constituent features of the postmodern become:

....a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary 'theory' and in a whole new culture of the image or simulacrum; a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our relation to History and in the forms of our private temporality whose 'schizophrenic' structure (following Lacan) will determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic relations in the more temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional ground tone – what I will call 'intensities' – which can best be grasped by a return to older themes of the sublime; the deep constitutive relationships of all this to a whole
new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system....
in the bewildering new world of late multinational capital. (Jameson, 1991, 6)

It becomes possible, even necessary to refer back to McLuhan’s *Gutenberg Galaxy* which
now seems extraordinarily prescient in its depiction of the (then) coming electric global
village with its cascading streams of electronic information simulating and representing
the external appearance of an increasingly tenuous reality. This presentation of the real as
copy, as simulacrum, becomes in the form, say, of the Internet what Jean Baudrillard
calls in *The Hyper-realism of Simulation*, the hyperreal (C. Harrison et al 1992, 1049-
1051). McLuhan’s electric tides of information and Baudrillard’s media saturation of the
apparently real may seem to represent a fairyland apostasy of lit-up communication, a
twinkling version of the postmodern sublime. The real, Baudrillard says ‘is volatised,
becoming an allegory of death.’ As an example of precession, he invokes a Borges fable
in which cartographers produce such a perfect map of a territory that it actually comes to
cover quite literally the territory exactly, like a vast palimpsest. However, in the
postmodern, it is the territory, not the map which decays, because the ‘map’ precedes the
real. The ‘real’ becomes engendered by the simulation of it as the precession of simulacra
(J. Baudrillard 1994, 1-3). In the movie *The Matrix*, reality is a digital construction of
simulacra as science fiction, but it becomes postmodernistically allegorical when it is
realized that the film can also be read as a commentary on the contemporary political and
corporate manipulation of media as ‘presentation’.

David Harvey understands the emergence of the postmodern as ‘the shift that everyone
agrees has occurred’. (David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 1990, 42.) Despite
the continuities of the postmodern as part of the modern (such as the representation here
of postmodern temporality as being recursive in revisiting Modernism in the form of
parody or pastiche), Harvey cites Hassan’s schematic differences between Modernism
and Postmodernism. (Ihab Hassan, 1985, and in Charles Jencks, Ed, 1992.) Although the
oppositional pairs in Hassan’s scheme are only schematic, it is worth noting that what
was oppositional to Modernism is now propositional in Postmodernism. In other words,
Derrida’s process of binary reversal as an act of deconstruction has apparently become
institutionally postmodern. This would seem to further suggest that the postmodern ideatum, or the equivalence between the real and its representation, is largely embodied in poststructuralist theory. Derrida would of course have only accepted binary opposition as a means to the larger end of deferring 'presence', such as reversing the conventional primacy of speech over writing. What is 'present' (speech) is deferred and what was antinomically 'absent' (writing) itself assumes the ontological status of the present. Necessarily, each new present is subject to its own deferral. Each moment of deferral when an antinomy is becoming 'reversed' is synchronic. Once deferred, and a present has become a past, the 'reversal' becomes diachronic. The relation between oppositional forms is complex. In the case of the dialectic, the opposition between the thesis and its antithesis is resolved, not deferred by the synthesis of the two terms into a Hegelian 'higher form', which is obviously hierarchical. But however opposed, each oppositional form necessarily implies the presence of the other, so that each is contained in the presence of the other (Derrida 1976, 165-268).

The oppositions between the modern and the postmodern are normally understood as being non-dialectical because Poststructuralism would treat the Hegelian dialectic as a totalising 'Grand Narrative'. One oppositional pair in Hassan's scheme is reading and interpretation versus against interpretation and misreading. The first is deemed modern and the second postmodern. An elaboration of this apparently simplistic opposition suggests that the postmodern distrust of interpretation is itself an interpretation of interpretation. There are different versions of reading implicated here. The postmodernist objection is not to reading/interpretation as such, but to a version of them which produces a definitive and absolute resolution, rather like Frank Kermode's 'sense of an ending'. Poststructuralism distrusts both source and origins and destination and absolute end-point (Shiff 1996, 105). There is neither origin nor destination. Barthes's 'death of the author' is rhetorically the death of textual destination and the birth of the text as a product of readership (Barthes 1977, 142-148). Syntagmatically, there can be no resolution only an apparently infinite process of deferral by acts of readership against authorial or narrative intention. The text becomes a palimpsest of readership overlaying authorial authority. The 'reading' is in part a reproduction or reconstitution of the text, and as such is mimetically a copy of it. All copies are required metaphor; something as something else
both similar and dissimilar (Aristotle, *Poetics*, XX1). Interpretation then assumes the attribute of the simulacrum, but does not 'vanish' or become dissolved by the postmodern. The simulacrum itself is a mimetic creation; a copied version of the real as appearance, the real in this instance being authorial intention. In another fundamentally important antinomy, Hassan characterizes metaphor as a feature of modernism and oppositional to postmodernistic metonymy, which has come to displace it. In Peirce's terms, metonymy is connected with coterminous or contiguous relations which are often associated with the flatness and depthlessness of collage as a figure for postmodern conceptual randomness against the teleological 'project' of Modernism (Harvey 1990, 302-3). But it needs emphasizing here that such large-scale generalizations, although perhaps usefully indicative, often conceal as well as reveal important attributes. This means, for example, that metaphor was not within the exclusive provenance of Modernism. In fact, in the case of architecture, it could be suggested that it was Modernism rather than the postmodern, perhaps in the case of Corbusier's Purism as a Modernist paradigm, which eschewed metaphor as potentially ornamental non-functional reference. It then transmogrifies into postmodernist architecture in the process of becoming expressive and in so doing acquires the attributes of the theatrical metaphor. And it is also the case that if postmodern temporality is recursively nuanced with ironic parody, then the postmodern imperative towards allegory is deeply metaphorical as Craig Owens proposes (Preziosi 1998, 315-328).

Harvey appears to speak from a largely Modernist perspective. 'I also conclude that there is much more continuity than difference between the broad history of modernism and the movement called postmodernism. It seems more sensible to me to see the latter as a particular kind of crisis within the former, one that emphasizes the fragmentary, the ephemeral and the chaotic...' (D. Harvey 1990, 116). Everyone seems to agree that Postmodernism exists as a kind of cultural theory commensurate with globalism. In one sense, then, theories of continuity and discontinuity are of marginal significance. All equally seem to agree that the postmodern is implicated in the modern and that notions of a 'break' are simplistic and untenable. So we have, *de facto*, postmodern culture in, say, architectural forms which instantiate postmodern mores such as figural and metaphorical tropes together with ironic parody which would never have appeared under Modernism.
Nor do we need necessarily to evaluate such culture normatively. The documentation and description of the empirical forms of the postmodern as an account needs to distinguish between fact and value and avoid value-judgement. Harvey, as Modernist sympathiser, on the other hand, does offer a critique of postmodernism as 'deconstruction bordering on nihilism' and for its 'preference for aesthetics over ethics' or its accommodation of the market as both 'shameless' and as a mark of 'reactionary neo-conservatism' (Harvey 1990, 116). Harvey's rather larger point that the ceaseless deconstruction of all forms of theory, including itself, leading to constant instability and relativism, echoes Eagleton’s later position which characterizes the situation as 'after theory' and as post-Postructuralist (Eagleton 2003, 23-40). For all that, the later works of Frank Gehry, for example, remain securely postmodernist. Regardless of disputes surrounding possible breaks, or continuities and discontinuities, Postmodernism is empirically quantifiable and qualitatively discrete. It exists as a characteristic taste and tendency, producing aesthetic culture and art objects as descriptively different from those of Modernism.

**Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition**

This section, which relies on Frederick Jameson’s discussion of the condition of postmodernity in economic and cultural terms and their relation, suggests that basically postmodern culture acts, as it were, as a semantic analogue of the globalism of which it is part. Jameson is clearly correct in insisting that what we perceive as 'Postmodernism' is not a purely cultural process. The old deterministic case, however, that the economic base in the long term generates the cultural superstructure, has long since been abandoned in favour of a model that includes human agency and reciprocity. At all events, an understanding of the dynamics of postmodern culture is a clear prerequisite for any understanding of the cultural products of Postmodernism such as postructuralist architecture, for example, the focus of attention here in Chapter Seven.

Frederick Jameson’s use of the term ‘late’ (‘The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’) is derived from Ernst Mandel (Mandel 1978). Mandel has identified three phases in the development of machine and technological innovation which has underwritten capitalism
since the eighteenth century Industrial Revolution (Jameson 1991, 35). This involved a series of transitions in the underlying mode of production. Steam-driven engines which appeared from about 1848 were superseded by the electric and combustion motor at the end of the nineteenth century. The third transition towards nuclear and electronic technology appeared after World War Two. These production technologies typify and characterize their stage of development. The equivalent stages are described as the market economy, monopoly capitalism and the post-industrial or global multinational society. The following general statements appear to be stable.

The first phase, in the Victorian market economy, produced free trade after the repeal of the Corn Laws. The art of this period was predominantly Realist. Clement Greenberg in "Towards a Newer Laocoon" describes the art of the first half of the nineteenth century as Romantic and "exhausted" by 1848 (Harrison and Wood 1992, 556). Interestingly, if Constable and Turner are included in this Romantic rubric, their treatment of the sublime in landscape not only encapsulates realist rather than symbolic or allegorical treatment of art-subjects that were typical of much previous art, but also makes Realism in the form of the sublime what Baudrillard would call an instance of the hyper-real. The art of the second phase, that is monopoly capitalism, corresponds to Modernism up to about 1960. Third-phase capitalism, or post-industrialism, has Postmodernism as its constituent art form.

Jameson has represented these historical changes as transitions within capitalism itself. Although he wishes to retain notions of agency in the culture/society relation, and indeed, reciprocity, he still addresses the nature of the relation in the familiar causal terms of economic base and cultural superstructure (Jameson 1991, xxi). 'To say that my two terms, the cultural and the economic, thereby collapse back into one another and say the same thing, in an eclipse of the distinction between base and superstructure that has itself often struck people as significantly characteristic of postmodernism in the first place, is also to suggest that the base, in the third stage of capitalism, generates its superstructures with a new kind of dynamic.' The philosopher David Hume long ago distinguished between apparent causality and correlation in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748, (A. Kenny 1994, 162-5). So it might be possible to assert that something called the Big Bang for example, caused the expansion of the universe, the
expansion being both a necessary and sufficient consequence of the original Big Bang. But then, of course, there would have to have been a previous cause which entailed the Big Bang as its consequence into an infinite regress of causes of causes. Hume has a further point of relevance here. If a cause produces an effect, it is reasonable to expect that in order for it to be a cause, its effect should follow it in time and to be separate from it. In fact, the Big Bang and the expansion are instantaneous and not only inseparable, but the existence of each is a precondition of the existence of the other.

If we substitute ‘economic base’ for Big Bang as cause and ‘culture’ as its effect, the two should be inseparable, each as a condition for the existence of the other. But it would seem premature to assume that something called ‘market capitalism’ caused the appearance of Modernist art which is meant to correlate with it and at the particular historical moment of the opening of the twentieth century for example. Clement Greenberg’s account of the origins of Modernism as a kind of bohemian retraction in ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’ (C. Harrison and Wood 1992, 531) involved a response which Raymond Williams called a ‘structure of feeling’ incorporating a rejection of modern mass civilization (R. Williams 1961, 64-88). The modernist impulse was then a response to the culture as experience, so that we seem to end up with the effect that is the culture, as part of the cause of which it is supposed to be the effect. This familiar dispute about the relative importance of base and superstructure is seen here as best treated as a ‘collocation’ rather than a causal sequence. Culture is then understood to be part the experience of the quotidian rather than the result of whichever form of economic determinism the ‘base’ historically produces. Culture, then, as response, is something closer to an appropriate ‘structure of feeling’. Postmodernism as quotidian experience is a response to, not an effect of, the set of economic and social constraints labelled as ‘post-industrialism or ‘globalism’, but as a constituent part and not simply a product. A further difficulty with economic base as cause is that it is inevitably entailed like any other ‘source’ in some prior cause – the regression in this case into the causes of causes (R. Krauss 1997, 170). Thus post-industrialism regresses into monopoly capital which regresses into market capitalism, into mercantilism into the domestic system and so on back to slave labour in the classical Greek and Roman society. Even if the argument is
pushed back to an assumed origin when the first hominid fashioned the first tool, there must have always be an anterior causality entailing it, *reductio ad absurdum*.

Based on these approximations, it naturally follows that aesthetic Postmodernism is homologous with post-industrialism and that the constituent parts of the post-industrial are aspects of the postmodern. Mandel’s monopoly capitalism has been otherwise characterized as ‘Fordism’ (D. Harvey 1990, 125-140). Fordism is characterized by national mass-production commodity capitalism and was the basis of post World War Two expansion and consumption. It began in 1920s America and spread in the West after the 1930s Great Depression. Its period of greatest production and boom coincided with the influential period of high Modernism in the 1950s, the classical period of the nuclear family and welfare state capitalism which have both been in substantial reverse under post-Fordism and post-industrialism.

Fordism encountered increasingly severe difficulties during the 1960s and 1970s. The entrenched positions of labour and capital in financing an increasingly expensive welfare state produced rising inflation and the beginnings of western de-industrialization in the face of Japanese competition and Third World production costs. The oil shock of 1973 and after produced hyper-inflation and the wider acceptance of the need for flexible adjustment rather than Fordist fixed regimes of production. During the 1970s, Fordism was modified by greater technological innovation in information technologies and the emergence of a ‘service-sector’ economy which replaced the traditional heavy industries as production was exported to the Third World.

If there has been a cultural and aesthetic transition from Modernism to Postmodernism, then in regard to base and superstructure ideology, we could expect to find an homologous transition in economic organization. The evidence is complex (D. Harvey 1990, 189-197). But however complicated the data, there does appear to be consensus around fundamental socio-economic shifts, beginning in the 1960s and accelerating during and after the 1970s. So family structure and home ownership, the decline in the influence of organized labour, the flight of manufacturing, the growth of the service economy, the decline in traditional ‘authority’, the electronic transformation of information and technology, the rise in embourgeoisment and the creation of sub-working class and underclass dependency culture, privatisation, market competition within
welfarism, the rise of economic individualism, consumer indebtedness, the rise of differentiated pay over pay scales and the rise of inventoried just-in-time production all represent change and transition towards postmodernity. This instant index of transition and change could of course be almost exponentially expanded.

Postmodernism as an instance of aesthetic, cultural, social and economic change in which the cultural superstructure and economic base reciprocate equivalently seems empirically justified. That postmodernistic socio-economic change remains a conspicuous aspect of capitalism reinforces the view that Postmodernism is also an aspect of modernity. Just as post-industrialism does not represent a ‘break’ with Fordism but continues to exhibit some of its constituent features such as supply and demand, so equally Postmodernism emerges reflexively from Modernism.

**Postmodernist Space and Modernist Temporality**

In the discussion which follows there is a further attempt to distinguish between two of the primary imperatives of time and space driving the modern and the postmodern. This is another highly abstract and conceptual area, but one which marks a fundamental difference between them and has important implications for the way that the modern has mutated into Postmodernism. There is an admittedly ambitious account of the way that the Renaissance initiated a retinal and optical art based on perspective which allowed the visual depiction of narrative and the way that this was subsequently ‘aesthetically institutionalised’ by Descartes during the Seventeenth century scientific revolution. There is also an exploration of the implications of Bergson’s theory of personal time coupled with Bachelard’s treatment of what might be called personal space. The object overall is to characterize Modernism as inherently concerned with time where Postmodernism and its objecthood is an appropriation of space.

Modernity has been defined here as the emergence of capitalist accumulation in the fifteenth (Italy and its Renaissance) and sixteenth centuries (Northern Europe and its
Reformation) and with the cultural forms which were its semantic analogue (Lisa Jardine 1996, 93-132). What emerged from the Reformation is not only the Protestant Ethic, but also the modern centralist nation state. The other great expression and form of newness and modernity, the Italian Renaissance, was of course many things, not least in its philosophical Neo-Platonism and classical referencing and its proto-capitalist socio-economic dynamism (Hooker, Ed, 1989, 132-4). But its revolutionary aesthetic was in the depiction of *space*. (That the revolutionary utopian forward dynamism of the Renaissance can be seen as a ‘product’ of emergent capitalism is a familiar commonplace which simplistically re-invokes the base/superstructure causal dichotomy.) The rediscovery of realistic depiction of space in perspective was largely theorized by Brunelleschi and Alberti and mathematically described by Piero della Francesca and depicted in painting by Duccio and Giotto (J. White 1966, 287-334). It is inaccurate to suggest that there was no perspective in medieval depiction, but alternatively, it was the case that it was stylistically symbolic, as in icon painting [6]. But the visual capture of deep space on a flat two-dimensional surface was the achievement of Italian theoretical painting and architectural practice during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. In general terms, the acquisition of realist perspective in the Renaissance replaces religious dogma with the central principle of rationality and the explanatory power of the auratic individual such as Michelangelo in the sixteenth century (Bram Kempers 1992, 241-243). This literally visionary epiphany is later theorized by Descartes in Cartesian optical dualism and is incorporated into Enlightenment philosophical Rationalism. (This topic is further discussed with reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Jay in the later chapter here, ‘The Philosophical Background’.) It may not be too far-fetched to suppose that this optically rationalist tendency of modernity on reaching the Enlightenment becomes codified into modernist visual theory such as nineteenth century Pointillist colour-theory (Griselda Pollock in Hooker 1989, 339). Greenberg and Fried’s insistence on the visual and optical nature of the modernist aesthetic experience then retrospectively becomes grounded in Cartesian dualism and is an end-point of the process of the optical and retinal aesthetics of Descartes as Martin Jay, for example, has shown. This is obviously a highly encapsulated discussion of a lengthy and complex historical and cultural process which needs further examination in the next chapter.
It is clearly quite impossible to separate the spatial and temporal since neither can be thought of without the other. Least of all are they in binary opposition. However, that does not preclude different synchronic forms of emphasis. The underlying subtext of visual modernity from Renaissance ocularity within perspective onwards is Realism. The essential attribute of Realism is the representation of forms of action in space but which inevitably occur in linear time. Even mythical or allegorical subjects are treated realistically, quite unlike the frozen temporality of the medieval icon. Renaissance depiction becomes increasingly realistic both in painting and sculpture within the frame of the ultra-realism of the portrait, especially in northern Europe, as the celebration of economic individualism and which in turn becomes synchronically a version of the 'hyper-real' (Craig Harbison 1991, 13-18). Realism of course undergoes its historical nuances. Mannerist exaggeration of the real is succeeded by the dramatic movement of the Baroque only to be followed by Rococo whimsy. And in the opening drama of modernism, romantic nineteenth century gesture in the form of the sublime remains a contest between the artificial and the real in which nature as the touchstone of the real wins. Once the perception of Renaissance perspective emancipates realism, then the substantiating account of action in space, but through time, becomes possible in the pre-eminence of the narrative. Lessing was quick to assert in the Laocoon that the simultaneity of the visual image always requires a pre-text in the form of a written story or account before it can represent narrative. Lessing’s insistence on the image becoming word before it can assume the status of the depicted or implied narrative will be important in the case of the postmodernist installation (G. Lessing 1962, 88). In the case of Botticelli’s Primavera, for instance, we need to know about the Three Graces, Ceres, Zephyr and other allegorical figuration in order to decipher the iconography of the subject. But also we have to ‘read’ the painting from left to right, as in an actual act of textual reading. The conceit is to make the visual, iconic painting simulate indexically its concealed metaphor – the myth of spring as narrative language. The depicted sign as painting then becomes, dramatically, a simulacrum for its underlying visual meaning.

It should be said that modernist art after the 1860s increasingly avoids academic illusionism in realist depiction following its collision with photography. The art object had to distinguish itself from the contemporary ‘hyper-realism’ of the photograph and its
perfect surface by creating aesthetically interesting perturbation on the painted surface, as in the case of the Impressionists and Post Impressionists. Despite this, Picasso's Cubism, for all its phenomenological multiplicity of viewpoint, remains an account of the real as subject, albeit non-realistically. Jackson Pollock’s *Lavender Mist*, although it may not have a subject as such, nevertheless is precisely real in being the result of Pollock’s actions in the disposition of its pigments, really there on the surface (Rosalind Krauss 1997, 221-242). Postmodern Conceptualism, in opposition to Modernist realism still deals with the real but as objecthood, as installed objects, and not as depiction. The real and literalist objects (shark, bed and so on) are literally real as objects but become figuratively conceptualised as declared works of art. Although an aspect of the real, and thus of modernity, Conceptualism as installation only functions conceptually in space, even architecturally, and as a paradigm of Postmodernist aesthetic is relatively unconcerned with showing or representing time in any association with narrative. It may however conceptualise time, perhaps as autobiography or perhaps as sardonic stylistic recursion.

The implications of narrative as an essential aspect of realism demand the sequential arrangement of events in time which typically travel from an introduction, through a development to some end-point or conclusion. Language structure is hierarchical. Noam Chomsky in *Language and Mind* proposes that the language is stratified between a deep and a surface structure in which the grammar or syntax serves a semantic function. The hierarchy is essentially in ascending order, phonemic, morphological and syntactic. The model for the ideally correct set of phonemic and morphological inflections - 'correct words' that is - is the paradigm. (P. Adams 1972, 330-331) Correct words in the correct order are represented by the syntactic model of the paradigm. And the sequential movement through the proper words arranged properly syntactically from beginning to end is through the sentence which then indicates a finite meaning. Expanded, this is how narrative itself works from beginning to denouement. However, the implied fixed temporality of moving sequentially from a beginning and reaching an end or denouement is symptomatic of realism and start-stop temporality. Postmodernistically this sequential paradigm is opposed in, for example, Hassan's schematic, by the syntagm. Syntagmatically, meaning is deferred since each causal step is preceded by previous
causal steps and indefinitely succeeded by effects as each succeeding clause or sentence demands another successively, so defeating the fictive end-point. (Time can only ‘stop’ fictively.) The apparent disruption of time in early Modernist fiction such as James Joyce’s *Ulysses* is, in fact, a disruption more of narrative and the arrangement of sequence than the fundamental notion of causal sequence itself. In *Mrs Dalloway*, Virginia Woolf has Mrs Dalloway walking to the flower shop as Big Ben strikes the hour. She, and the other characters who are simultaneously touched by the sound of the bell are the protagonists in a common moment, one of Woolf’s pre-eminent leitmotifs, and their geographical arrangement in space is of subsidiary importance as the spreading concentric rings of sound ‘touch’ the characters [7]. The striking of the hours then becomes a metonym of time, not space, encapsulating the brevity of time as a kind of temporal *memento mori*.

Modernism, then, can be characterized as being concerned with perspectively depicted space through the passage of time in narrative and within the parameters of realism. Postmodernism occupies real, not depicted space in its forms of art; it defers both temporal and narrative termini and engages with the real in literalist objects which it ironically conceptualises as figuratively unreal. Installed, the Postmodernist art object becomes part of the architectural. So time seems to be a Modernist, and space a Postmodernist imperative. ‘A certain spatial turn has often seemed to offer one of the more productive ways of distinguishing postmodernism from modernism proper, whose experience of temporality – existential time, along with deep memory - it is henceforth conventional to see as a dominant of the high modern.’ (F. Jameson 1991, 156)

Jameson’s association of deep memory with Modernism and subsequently the Postmodernist memory of modernism as nostalgia, highlights the significance of temporal absence as loss. Proust’s *A la Recherche du temps Perdu* with Joyce’s *Ulysses* as the definitive Modernist novel, introduces poetic diction into the realist novel (D. Lodge 1977, 79-80). It is the deployment of poetic discourse within realism which enables nostalgia to become Walter Benjamin’s allegorical ruin of time creatively expressed as a version of Henri Bergson’s *la duree* in Proust’s *Recherche*, particularly in the episode of the madeleine (Proust, [Penguin Books] *Swann’s Way*, 48). What definitively emerges from this very complex issue is that Modernism and its implicit narratives has been
concerned primarily with time, whereas Postmodernism in its trajectory towards objecthood, installation and the architectural centres on the idea of the spatial.

Bergson has two versions of time. In ‘An Introduction to Metaphysics’, he gives an account of time as the measurement of movement across the divisions or intervals between two points in space. This approximates to the fixed, universal time of Newton’s physics which time was to be reconstructed by Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity in 1905. In 1889, Bergson had published *Time and Freewill* in which he distinguished between Newtonian time (*le temps*) and time as duration (*la durée*). Duration is the reconstituted events available to memory but reconstituted subjectively. The process of objectively ordered time may differ from the objective order of occurrence in *le temps* (McNeil and Feldman, Eds 1998, 89-96). ‘Duration’ as memory and subjective recollection (with the implications for mourning and the sense of loss of irrecoverable past time, especially for childhood in Proust and Bachelard) then becomes the defining aspect of both of meaning and consciousness, although Bergson is insistent that ‘duration’ is an aspect of mind. The theoretical division between Modernist temporality and the postmodern episteme of spatiality is never absolute. Modernist time needs space just as postmodern space needs temporality. Thus the recursive nature of Postmodernism depicted here as allegorical is dependent on retrospective nostalgia and time which is usefully characterized by Bergson’s ‘duration’. In a further instance of the Modernist/Postmodernist antithesis, it will be noted that Bergson belongs to the Continental Philosophical tendency associated with the postmodern, while the dominant philosophical outlook of modernity is normally lodged in the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition. The fact that Bergson’s ‘duration’ inhabits the fringes of allegory by oscillating in the presence and absences of memory and remembrance makes it an important element in postmodern ‘historicism’ and the nature of the allegorical itself.

The Postmodernist imperative away from temporality lies in its distrust of the narrative sequences of both aesthetic Realism and philosophical Idealism and their proclivity for the ‘totality’ of ‘Grand Narratives’ and ‘forward-movement’ through time in the form of avant-gardism. The Postmodernist shift away from depiction and Realism and the narrative progressions which they suggest, and instead towards objecthood and literalism,
puts the postmodern art object in an immediate spatial context. One paradigmatic case of the metamorphosis from temporality to spatiality is the movement in sculpture from the statue on the plinth to the architectural context of the installation. The plinth and its statue have been characterized as commemorative (R. Krauss in D. Preziosi, Ed 1998, 281-298). And of course, any commemorative act is an act of memory and time, even if the work is abstractionist like Henry Moore’s eponymous King and Queen. In the case of architecture, it has always been necessarily spatial anyway, and Postmodernistic architectural space is configured into ‘bad space’ in the sense of opposing modernist rational space, and is an adversarial anti-modernism. It deliberately invokes time as an aspect of its figurative and metaphorical referencing. In familiar ways, Modernist architecture rejected reference, temporal or otherwise, in favour of rationalist space and purity of form. Once architectural space becomes commemorative, then its deep semantic structure allegorically implicates a structure of feeling, almost as belief when an architectural site such as Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, Berlin, almost becomes a shrine. (See the chapter The Architectural Trace here.)

What might be called Postmodernistic ‘commemorative space’ (because it is architectural) is described in The Poetics of Space (Gaston Bachelard, 1964). Bachelard’s account of space is closely linked with the Imagination, which makes it ‘poetic’. Just as Bergson has two radically different versions of time as Newtonian and personal, so Bachelard speaks of what might be called ‘Newtonian space’ and ‘personal space’; that is, one that is both real and contingent as well as subjectively represented and ‘constructed’. Representation as a kind of construction of spatial reality and memory is founded on the one hand by rationalism which allows interpretation, and on the other by realism as the very material required for interpretation to occur at all. The realist aspect of Bachelard’s formulation has a tendency towards the scientific and empirical, given that space is geometrically dimensional. The antithesis here between rationalism and realism, between appearance and reality, is dialectical (J. Lechte 1994, 3-6). Bachelard also characterizes space as an imaginative dimension. It has the psychological and spiritual qualities of the refuge, in which the imagination acquires a certain tranquillity which derives from reverie rather than the Freudian dream-state of displacement, or as Bachelard has it, rather like the condition of the nest (Bachelard 1964, Chapter 6). In one
sense, the certainties of the refuge permit the imaginative reverie. There are two basic elements running in opposed but complementary directions. The one is primitive and visceral, the physical embodiment of the reassurance of survival and continued well-being, whilst the other leads to the contemplative rationality of the imagination. The refuge is then constituted as the house in human habitation which becomes a vast reservoir of spatial metaphor for memory and security in which the room signifies the inner within the outer. The Proustian inflection here is immediate, but where Proust mourns the lost time of Bergson’s ‘duration’ and childhood, Bachelard asserts that it is the space which conditions memory as experience in the phenomenal world. Bachelard also speaks of space as potentially felicitous (G. Bachelard 1964, ix).

...the images I want to examine are quite simple images of felicitous space. In this orientation, these investigations would deserve to be called topophilia. They seek to determine the human value of the sorts of space that may be grasped, that may be defended against adverse forces, the space we love. For diverse reasons, and with the differences entailed by poetic shadings, this is eulogized space. Attached to its protective value, which can be a positive one, are also imagined values, which soon become dominant. Space that has been seized upon by the imagination cannot remain indifferent space subject to the measures and estimates of the surveyor. (Original emphasis)

In the case of architecture, the idea of the felicitous space is later deconstructed here as the ‘bad space’ of Postmodernist architecture which then becomes subject to J.L. Austin’s account of the infelicitous performative. In another sense of the infelicitous which Bachelard seems to ignore, it can also be the case that nests, the inner sanctum protected by the outside, can also become areas of threat [8]. Bachelard’s apparent avoidance of the possibility of threat and dysfunction within the domestic interior has become subject to feminist critique (P. King 2004). Shortly after The Poetics of Space, Robert Venturi began to dismantle or at least loosen the interface between inside and outside in Contradiction and Complexity in Architecture (1967) as did Derrida in Of Grammatology. Although one of Bachelard’s principal distinctions between the inside
and the outside was later deconstructed, particularly by Derrida, nevertheless *The Poetics of Space* in its preoccupation with space over time remains a key indicator of the postmodern.

Bachelard also maintains that the effectiveness of the inside as refuge is in part a function of the outside as setting, context and *site*. Postmodernistically, the concept of site has become problematical. After Modernism, sculpture not only abandoned the plinth for the installation, but also deserted the gallery and the museum (D. Crimp in H. Foster, Ed, 1983, 43-56). In the process, the idea of site became de-monumentalized, de-commemorated and desacralized (R. Krauss 1997, 276-290). The site and setting of display made the entire inner space of a gallery or non-gallery room a part of the aesthetic object as the defining space of its installation. Once the art object had been installed outside the gallery and the non-monumental environment became the site or setting, the art object became part of the landscape, part landscape itself and part architecture, each neither wholly 'in' the frame of reference of the other. Intriguingly, the exteriorised art work then began to ape Enlightenment conceits of Nature and the artificial and the Picturesque and the Postmodern deployment of space summoned up the recursive memory of the figural meanings it was intent on confronting and violating. The disruption of the traditional site of display in galleries and museums was conspicuously adopted by Land Artists such as Richard Long or installationists such as Daniel Burren, Hans Hacke and particularly by Marcel Broodthaer's series *Museum: enfants non admis* (1968). The spatialized art object then became existentially public rather than private, and in the process became decommodified and literally ruinous as it became subject to weathering and erosion, like Robert Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* (1970). However, it needs noting carefully that the tendency of the installation to be subject to decay or removal, although it might also code for the denial of originality, implicates decay and ruin as Benjamin's temporal allegory and *memento mori*, and therefore time [9]. The allegorical function of the photograph as approximating to almost an act of preservation of that which cannot be preserved then collects an added significance as image demanding text in a reversal of Lessing's pre-iconic narrative. The larger distinction between Modernist temporality and Postmodernist space also has implications for the consideration of genre. The installation as an aesthetic hybrid also destabilizes the Modernist imperative towards
the autonomy of genre as an enclosed narrative end-point. The modernist preoccupation with the specificity and uniqueness of the individual medium resulted in a fairly sharp demarcation between apparently discrete disciplines such as literary studies and architecture, for example. This hegemonic separation of genre, which demands a clear sense of what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the generic frame of reference, has been increasingly subverted by the ambivalence and conscious ambiguity of the installed art work. It was as if the Modernist membrane was not punctured exactly, but rather became osmotic. In a way, the ultimate violation of the idea of the room institutionally ‘inside’ the house, gallery or museum as a defined architectural space was committed by Gordon Matta Clark who destructively deconstructed it with the chainsaw, and in the process equally ‘massacred’ Bachelard’s felicitous space.

The Allegorical in the Postmodern

The point to make here is that the postmodern is allegorical because it is inevitably recursive in its processes and addresses past and irretrievable time. In being recursive, or going back in time after Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, Postmodernism becomes characterized by layers. That is, a present superimposed upon a past; a present inscribed on an absent past where that past nonetheless is constantly reiterated into an absent presence. In Chapter Four, the nature and evolution of allegory as a rhetorical trope is discussed in greater detail, but the immediate point is that it was Craig Owens’s enormously important and influential work, The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory of Postmodernism (In D. Prezioni Ed 1998, 315), which defined the postmodern as palimpsest-like and therefore always subject to the inflection of mourning which is a key characteristic of allegory and as a consequence, of Postmodernism itself. The allegorical then is necessarily a constituent of all postmodern culture, including postmodern architecture. It is the task of Chapters Six and Seven to trace the embodiment of the allegorical in poststructuralist buildings and reveal the possibilities of meaning which this extends. This section also deals with photography which is recognized by both Owens and Jameson as a primary indicator of the postmodern and therefore important for an understanding of the nature of Postmodernism which this chapter attempts to describe.
It has already been noted that painting in the second half of the nineteenth century progressively declined to compete with photography and increasingly emphasizes the presence of the surface of the painting. The illusionist picture-plane came closer to the surface as depiction became flatter. In one way, then, photography transformed realism into a commodity, even as Modernist painting practice as evidenced, say by Cezanne, became less real. The great nineteenth century photographic images from Fox-Talbot to Roger Fenton through the Julia Cameron portraits to the moving film of the Lumieres were the iconic narrative parallel to the narrative realism of Dickens, Zola or Dostoevsky. What of course is striking about the nineteenth century photographic image is how it is posed and lit to resemble painting, particularly history painting. Painting itself in order to become modern, was at the same time moving away from realistic depiction, although not from Realism itself. The realist tradition in photography continued in the first half of the twentieth century in the definitive black and white images of Henri Cartier-Bresson, Bill Brandt or Robert Capa. (N. Rosenblum 1989, 461-513). However, after the 1960s, photography was increasingly appropriated into the area that had been Modernist painting. Thus Rauschenberg’s Combines and Allegory and Rebus series frequently carried the photographic image as part of spatial collage in doing so. But the most conspicuous use of the photographic image in the early 1960s was in Warhol’s screenprints where the random, commonplace image served as a Duchampian found object as an exemplum of Jameson’s characterization of flat depthlessness as paradigmatic of the postmodern art object (Jameson 1991, 6-11). Warhol’s appropriation of the photograph into the painterly device of the screenprint comprehensively demolished the screenprint and its image as realist, so that the printed image became the simulacrum. In a further sense, Warhol’s layering of the printed onto the photographic image introduces a hybrid condition, part painting and part photograph, which then assumes the characteristics of the palimpsest and as such also undermines the traditional genre-distinctions between painting and photography. Immediately any ‘text’ is doubled, then allegory becomes implicated (Craig Owens in D. Preziosi, Ed, 1998, 316). Owens suggests that that reading one text through another is not only the potential invocation of allegory, it always implies the presence of the palimpsest as both exemplifying allegory
and the postmodern. The photographic image is indissolubly a part of postmodern global information culture.

Cindy Sherman's self-portraits as photographic versions of Monroe or 'character' from paintings of iconic stature not only defy the possibility of originality, but also become simulacra which, in a further turn, are then representative of Sherman's practice as autobiographical (R. Krauss in D. Hooker, Ed, 1989, 436). The autobiographical is inevitably Proustian. It is always an attempt to retrieve that which is constantly deferring retrieval: the past. The fact that the characteristic episteme of Postmodernism is spatial rather than temporal and that the temporal nevertheless paradoxically insinuates itself as a presence in postmodern allegory is dealt with here in the later section on allegory itself.

In speaking of Smithson's work, [Fig 5] Owens argues that since it is site-specific and in and part of the landscape and therefore subject to inevitable ruin, it can only be 'preserved' by the photograph. 'In this the site specific work becomes an emblem of transience, the ephemerality of all phenomena; it is the memento mori of the twentieth century. Because of its impermanence, moreover, the work is frequently preserved only in photographs. The fact is crucial, for it suggests the allegorical potency of photography....As an allegorical art, then, photography would represent our desire to fix the transitory, the ephemeral, in a stable and stabilizing image.' (C. Owens in D. Preziosi Ed 1998, 319) The 'reality' of real objects which postmodernistically become metaphorical is also eroded by performance art such as the early 'living sculpture' of Gilbert and George whose real corporal appearance signifies the conceptually unreal.

The importance of the photograph in postmodernist culture is hugely amplified by its other media. The vast proliferation of information culture in computers and their games and the use of video and digital imagery may indeed be in the sardonic awe which they induce, examples of Baudrillard's ironical postmodern electronic sublime. And in the
case of digital photography, it will be noted that the creation of apparently real imagery is obtained by layering successive individual image into the 'real' totality of what appears to be a photograph of what Cartier-Bresson called 'the decisive moment' (N. Rosenblum 1984, 483) [10]. This digital palimpsest in its apparent capture of a uniquely instantaneous moment is indeed cynical in its manipulation of the real, and renders as 'authentic' photography's claim to 'fix the transitory, the ephemeral, in a stable and stabilizing image' in Owens's formulation. This is a version of the really unreal. The attempt to stave off the inevitable ruin of time by eternalising the now in the painted or photographic image is fatally compromised, because the 'now' is in fact an act of contrivance and another aspect of Michael Fried's theatricality as characteristic of the postmodern. The layering of the digital image as a series of composites which de-authenticate its apparent depiction of the real at a given, precise moment, would seem to be another basic example of the postmodernistic impulse towards collage. 'The decisive moment' belongs to the modernist authenticity of Cartier-Bresson and Fried because the authenticity would lie precisely in the truth of the moment. The postmodern digitally manipulated image is profoundly and self-consciously inauthentic and its very manipulation an act of contrived theatre. This collagist practice, to reinforce the point, operates in a spatial context in which images attach and become contiguous rather than paratactically generating narration in a temporal context. It is the spatial assembly of the digital image which defeats the representation of the decisive moment in time. That said, Owens reminds us that the photographic or multi-media image still manages to reconstitute a moment of past stasis, or at least represent it as such, which in turn implicates empathic mourning, and therefore the allegorical, and then, therefore, recursive temporality. Jameson, who believes that '...photography, whose extraordinary reinvention of today (in theory as well as practice) is a fundamental fact and symptom of the postmodern period...' is surely justified in codifying the essential postmodern aesthetic in terms of the photograph and the installation, and indeed of the installation of the photograph and the (reminiscent) photograph of the installation (F. Jameson 1991, 173). For Walter Benjamin, the ruin was the archetypal symbol of the allegorical, particularly in The Origins of German Tragic Drama which is discussed here later. For Postmodernism, the allegorical ruin has become transmogrified technologically into the
ruin of temporality as the collaged photo-image. In many ways Jeff Wall’s ‘The Storyteller’, 1987, remains postmodernistically iconic and paradigmatic. The photograph, displayed in a life-size light box, is a carefully arranged version of Manet’s *Le déjeuner sur l’herbe* but set under a modern freeway. In ironically revisiting the origins of Modernism, Wall inevitably invokes the temporal palimpsest, and at the same time, the almost sacred photographic realism of Modernism is subverted into the ‘really unreal’. The theatricality of this postmodern ‘staging’ of Manet as apparently real but in fact deeply historically double-coded is self-evident, and it is this contrived artificiality which confers the work’s continuing paradigmatic status (J. Wall, ‘Marks of Indifference’ 1995 in J. Gaiger and P. Wood, Eds, 2003, 151.)

If the palimpsest is the paramount and recurrent constitutive feature of Postmodernism, evidenced across many contexts as *collagist*, then it is Peirce’s indexical sign which becomes privileged. Peircian indexicality consists in metonymically and contiguously relating part to whole. Synechdochal imagery, for example, as part for whole then becomes indexically linked as if by touch. Often the touch is understood in collagist procedures as operating between, across, sideways and adjacently, because collage, in order simply to be seen, juxtaposes images. However, in the in the original sense of the palimpsest as one text superimposed on another, the relation, although remaining spatial, was expressed not ‘horizontally’ but ‘vertically’ in an act of layering as in digitally produced images. (The important implications for this discussion in Jakobson’s treatment of metaphor are addressed later.) The photograph is the pre-eminent Postmodernist sign because it deals with trace and imprint. Scott Lash suggests an historical hierarchy for Peirce’s system of signs. The first, the symbolic, relates to the cognitive dimension of writing and the printed word such as McLuhan’s ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’. The second, the iconic, came to replace symbolic printed representation during the modern period. And the new dominant which has superseded the iconic as paradigmatic, is indexicality. Of Peirce’s three modes, indexicality is the least mediated and most immediate as ‘touch’ because then the phenomenological immediacy of the body and embodied experience become paramount in a clear opposition to the Platonist tradition of sceptical suspicion of
direct empirical experience. Then, the embodied indexical sign can be seen as opposed to
the traditional western apriorism of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tendency.

Derrida’s version of Peirce’s three modes of signification as difference are the phonic, visual and tactile respectively (Scott Lash 2004, Chap 7). In a familiar procedure, Derrida transcribes the notion of ‘difference’, which arises from ‘difference’ in Saussure, into ‘differance’. Lash supposes that Derrida’s separation of the tactile, or Peirce’s indexical sign, from the anteriority of symbolic and iconic signification is the difference between the constant deferral of the immediacy of the tactile as presence into absence. It has already been noted that Lessing in the Laocoon in the eighteenth century understood well the distinction between absent and present in the relation between language and the visual sign. For Lessing, the difference represented the absence of one in the presence of the other, and, rather like the celebrated ‘duck-rabbit’, never both at the same time. Derrida’s treatment of this kind of difference as the deferral of presence into absence in ‘differance’ involves time. What becomes absent or deferred becomes mourned, again in a Proustian or Bergsonian turn, and mourning and time (effectively recherché) indefatigably usher in the allegorical. Derrida’s own temporal palimpsest, where the textual present is syntagmatically deferred into absence, itself remains a characteristically poststructural version of allegory.

Theory and Post-Theory

The problem of participant observation remains. The difficulty is that once an observer enters the arena they wish to observe as a distanced spectator, they immediately and inevitably also become participants. And in becoming participant they become part of and therefore change the very situation they wish to observe. There seems no way out of this dilemma of the spectator becoming a participant. It therefore becomes extremely difficult to claim any objective knowledge of any given cultural situation. Hence there is a serious difficulty in being able to ‘know’ about any culture by its internal spectators who are part and parcel of the very thing they seek objectively to observe. Virginia Woolf famously observed that ‘In or about December 1910, human character changed.’ (P. Rogers, Ed 1987, 407) She was of course referring to the first Post-Impressionist exhibition in
London curated by Roger Fry who saw it as the total embodiment of Significant Form. Perhaps part of the resolution of the spectator/participant paradox is that it might be less difficult to discern the beginning of change much as Virginia Woolf did (retrospectively it should be said). Detecting the end or transition of a cultural imperative seems much less secure. Thus there needs to be a consistent scepticism about whether we are ‘in’ or ‘out’ this or that cultural mainstream such as Postmodernism – whether or not we are in a state of Post-Postmodernism and that in some curious way, the postmodern is ‘finished’ and that we have all moved on from the Theory which defines the cultural appearance of postmodernism, and in particular, Poststructuralism in its various forms including architecture. The following discussion looks at this issue and assesses the contribution of Frederick Nietzsche and the origins of ‘theory’ in Structuralism.

In many ways Frederick Nietzsche’s description of the tragic in Greek drama and poetry as a dialectical process which oscillates between the Dionysian and the Apollonian has been seen almost as a fable of modernity. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, the Dionysian impulse towards ecstatic disgust is modified by Apollonian culture and restraint. Writing in 1870 at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, Nietzsche understood what Baudelaire called ‘the heroism of modern life’ as the unbridled Dionysian. ‘Our entire threadbare culture is plunging at the breast of the horrible demon’ (R. Safranski 2002, 67). The Nietzschean account of experience as the death of God and the status of art as beyond good and evil in the face of the flux and transience of the phenomenological sounds now as insistently postmodern. Only the exercise of will in the presence of the death of God, allegorized in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* as the *Übermensch*, could prevail when confronted by time as ‘eternal recurrence’ (F. Nietzsche 1961, 136-139). The prospect of the inevitability of re-encountered time on an eternal scale, and which might involve the reoccurrence of unleashed Dionysian dystopia, has been understood as disturbingly ironic. (The notion of recurrence is of course dramatized and theatricalized in the ironic, and recursive parody of earlier aesthetic forms in New Historicism within the postmodern.) Meaning is replaced by interpretation and the normative distinction between the good and the bad transcended in *Good and Evil* (1886). And Nietzsche’s disruption of linear time in the doctrine of eternal recurrence echoes a familiar disruption of narrative realism in the postmodern and which subverts the Modernist account of time as ‘Hegelian’. This view
of time as almost as transcendentally ascendant has already been encountered in Clement Greenberg’s teleological account of the destination of Modernist painting. In one respect, Nietzsche’s suggestion that it is *art* which transcends distinctions between fact and value, is presciently postmodern. Nietzsche disposes of metaphysics in favour of culture, which then resembles poststructuralist deconstruction (D. Harvey 1990, 18-19). In a further ‘ironically postmodernistic’ dissolution of binary opposition, Nietzsche not only sees Dionysian culture as potentially monstrous or terrible, but as actually welcome. His confrontation with his own experience of contemporary modernity makes him sound as if he anticipates the postmodern with his own cynically ironic critique of modernism’s potential for nihilism. Although he remains self-triumphantly *sui generis* in his ‘pre-postmodernistic’ confrontation with modernism, Nietzsche nevertheless instigates an anti-modernist distrust of fixed moral or truth-like propositions. Despite not being specifically relativist, this position, which like Kierkegaard’s, was contemporaneously shocking, was certainly seditious of any form of cognitive absolutes and little short of breathtaking in the elevation of aesthetic over philosophical understanding.

Being without, in both the sense of absence and as outside of the reassurance of fixed moral understanding or trajectories, was indeed a leap in the dark since the commentator is already a member of the class or set being commented on. This in turn is rather like committing the medieval heresy of fideism that the (religious) truth can only be established by acts of faith and not by Aristotelian or other forms of reason, as in Aquinas for example. Postmodernistically this translates into refusing to judge normatively between different cultural norms as high or low. Postmodern culture can only ever *indicate* the experience of ‘structures of feeling’ and is therefore suspicious of normative canons of prescribed cultural products (T. Eagleton 2003, 55). Cultural observers can at best exercise choice. Across the spectrum of the culture in which they exist, such observers reserve the right to prefer to choose one end of that spectrum from the other whilst acknowledging that what separates the choices is their difference rather than their value. This ‘leap of faith’ into choice is what Soren Kierkegaard also pre-figures postmodernistically in the necessarily relative and subjective position of the choosing subject among the objects of choice (R. Scruton in A. Kenny 1994, 221).
The wave of theory which is inseparable from the postmodern really began with the dissatisfaction of Structuralist critics with the premises of literary New Criticism. Significantly, Structuralist criticism identified a semantic deep structure independent of authorial intention. Secondly, it identified cultural objects as surrendering to textuality as part of their immanence. (The development of literary criticism is more fully discussed in a later section here.) In the first instance, all texts, 'high' or 'low', became subject to deep structural analysis. Fairy tales, fables and myths and legends became doubled with a surface and a deep structure. Although Chomsky's linguistic account of surface and deep structure would not countenance it, this might well be an early indicator of the prominence of the palimpsest as an embedded postmodern figure in textual contexts. Thus the Three Bears become the ogre-like guardians of the threshold between private desire and the property rights of others; Little Red Riding Hood represents the transition from the grace of sexual innocence to the fall of corrupt experience. And presumably, The Very Hungry Caterpillar might very well be an emblem of Nietzschean will. Properly speaking these fable-like narratives are examples of *fabula* and carry an explicit didactic function as in Aesop or in Ovid [11]. At the high end of the cultural spectrum, the Structuralist critic Tzvetan Todorov, for example, in examining the doubling in Boccacio's *Decameron*, linguistically demarcates 'character' as nominal (nouns), attribute as adjectival and the narratology as functioning as verb (T. Todorov 1969, Chap 2). Almost as a consequence of this kind of textual activity, 'Theory' became semiotically attached to the linguistic interrogation of texts as exemplars of surface form as *telling* and semantic depth as *meaning*. The problem for Structuralism, as its internal critics such as Derrida and Foucault pointed out, was that the very idea of some disembodied 'structure' which in some way inhered in cultural objects as 'text' was itself prone to philosophically ideal accounts as something to which Structuralism was supposed to be opposed. The fact that a deeper structure than simply authorial intention was an inherent aspect of a text raised the not insignificant question of where it came from if it was not to be an Idealist or transcendental account. The second Poststructuralist wave of French theory (Kristeva, Foucault, Derrida) is often regarded as the most accomplished and complete representation of Postmodernism, although perhaps modified now by the writing of Gilles Deleuze. Despite the reservations of its trenchant critics as being asocial, apolitical,
formalist and unstable, Poststructuralism has succeeded in theorizing a cultural condition which is sufficiently and distinctively different from Modernism to be able to make its own existential claim to exist as state.

More conservative criticism, such as Daniel Bell’s, continues to seek to relate texts to autonomous ‘close reading’ within the liberal perspectives of ‘Criticism’ as it existed prior to Structuralism. The more recent and radical attacks on ‘Theory’ have come from anti-theorists such as Richard Rorty or post-theorists such as Stanley Fish [12]. The obvious problem with anti-theory is that you require a theory of not needing a theory. However, post-theorists like Rorty and Fish insist that being of and in a culture, we can never step outside it in order to be able to account for or describe it objectively. In other words, in being a part of the object as subject, it becomes impossible to adopt a position other than Kant’s in the Critique of sensible intuition. This then becomes rather like another version of fideism – another subjective ‘leap of faith’. ‘Theory’ is then seen as a form of justification, almost legitimatization. It is contingent and mediated by the cultural presence or ‘noise’ of the observer’s own experience of it which should be bracketed in order to be explained but which never can be (R. Rorty 1989, 46).

For this reason and because of new directions thought to be emerging in discourse towards embodiment, gender and sexuality, for example, Eagleton considers Postmodernism to be moribund and the era of Theory to be over (T. Eagleton 2003, 23-40). For the present at least, this kind of speculation is bound to be inconclusive. In architectural terms, which is the immediate focus here, no recognisably post-postmodernistically distinctive form appears to have emerged. What, however, is certain is that Postmodernist architecture de facto as formally different and otherwise theorized from Modernist forms, can be both explained and understood. In order to better explain and to understand the phenomenon of postmodern architecture, the prevailing assumption here is that the underlying postmodernist cultural imperative is allegorical. In that sense, discussion concerning the ‘beginning’ or the ‘ending’ of the postmodern is of marginal significance. Since Postmodernism has staked out its own existential claim to exist as state, its cultural forms such as architecture can be seen as being emblematic of that state and therefore metaphors of the allegorical.
This chapter has argued that since the nature of Postmodernism is allegorically recursive and that the postmodern is a version of the modern which evolved from it and against it at the same time, it becomes essential to have a qualitative description of what Modernism involved. It is precisely to the origins of architectural Modernism that poststructuralist architects have returned, particularly to the founding movements such as Constructivism, the Bauhaus and Corbusian Purism. The subversive quality of that return is traced in chapters Five and Six. The continuing presence of the Modern in the Postmodern was examined in terms of continuities and discontinuities, a theme further pursued in the discussion of cultural and economic transition. The treatment of postmodern space and modernist time often seems relentlessly abstract, but is of real importance and significance and leads into that pre-eminently postmodern condition of Duchampian or conceptual objecthood, resisted so long by Michael Fried, and characterized by the architectural implications of the installation.

The section on the allegorical nature of Postmodernism is fundamentally important and runs throughout as a recurrent theme. Craig Owens's piece, *The Allegorical Imperative*, remains a foundational text and lays the basis here for the later discussion of postmodern architecture as being constituted by the allegorical palimpsest of the postmodern re-inscribed on the modern. In terms of architecture, this does not seem to appear elsewhere in the literature and is an important aspect of what Postmodernism is, and in particular how it illuminates the nature of postmodern architecture itself. The application of allegory to poststructuralist architecture, especially as rhetoric and visual metaphor, rather like appropriating Michael Fried's notion of theatricality, is considered to be distinctively novel and not found within the appropriate literature surrounding the significance of postmodern architecture.

The final section of this chapter has dealt with the distinction between the spectator/participant roles and its implications for the 'in or out' debate and concludes that since there seems no *prima facia* evidence for the emergence of a distinctly recognizable and quantifiable post-poststructuralist architectural form, that it is the architecture of the poststructuralists that should occupy critical attention and that is dealt with specifically in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER FOUR

LANGUAGE AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

Since the spread of structuralism and its emphasis on text, and the subsequent Poststructuralist imperative to consider cultural objects as imminent text, it has become a commonplace to ascribe to aesthetic objects the properties of language. Hence we have, for example, William Tucker’s ‘The Language of Sculpture’ (1964) and the highly influential ‘The Language of Postmodern Architecture’ (1989) by Charles Jencks. And it was Michael Fried who described the internal relationships of Anthony Caro’s sculpture as ‘syntax’. The implication is that in itself, and according to its arrangement, the aesthetic visual object conforms to linguistic rules, otherwise it would be impossible to try to speak of the ‘language’ of art, sculpture, architecture or whatever. The position here is that this position of regarding artistic form as language is highly confused. Significant theorists such as Roland Barthes in particular have established that cultural objects such as a Citroen car function not only as an empirical and visual thing, but also as a semiotic signifier which demands to come into language as part of its existential aesthetic (R. Barthes 2000, 88-90). The key link here is not the ‘grammar’ or ‘syntax’ of form, but immanence. And immanence is found in the philosophical line linking Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. There is no language of sculpture and no language of architecture and indeed, no language of any art form. In constructing a model of the interpretation of postmodern and Poststructuralist architecture which is a primary purpose here, the idea of immanence, rather than architecture actually having or containing language in some way, assumes a critical importance. The ‘source’ of that immanent meaning as embedded in actual form resides not in the anti-metaphor ideology of the Analytical Tradition in philosophy, but in the philosophers of embodiment within the Continental Tradition, and specifically in the hermeneutical phenomenology of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

This chapter is divided into four sections: The Philosophy of Language, Phenomenology and Interpretation, From Icon to Text and The Felicitous and the Infelicitous in Form.
The Philosophy of Language

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s position in his early *Tractatus* might typically be that what can be thought can be expressed and what can be expressed can be expressed clearly (R.J. Fogelin 1995, 3-17). The *Tractatus* is an example of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in philosophy and its treatment of meaning as analytic. Wittgenstein’s teachers were Russell and G.E. Moore. Russell’s ‘Theory of Descriptions’ was probably the most influential version of the analytical approach and was a major influence on the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein was later in the *Philosophical Investigations* and the Blue and Red Books to almost wholly retract from his early commitment to the analytical or ‘atomistic’ view of linguistic meaning (S. Cavell 2002, 44-72). The analytical tradition has been broadly represented by a line from Frege, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Ayer and the Logical Positivists up to Donald Davidson (W. Lycan 2000, Chaps 2, 3, 8 and 9). The position of this tradition in regard to meaning is of fundamental importance in that it restricts meaning to logical propositions expressed in sentences. The core assumptions require brief explication. In *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson set out the analytical or objectivist programme succinctly if only in order to subsequently subvert it.

Meaning is characterized purely in terms of conditions of objective truth or falsity. The conventions of language confer on sentences an objective meaning which determines objective truth conditions. Elements of context which are indexically (in its linguistic, deictic, not Peircian sense) clear do not infringe objective meaning. A sentence is understood if the conditions under which it would be true or false are understood. The condition of objective falsity or truth exist and are accessible. Understanding the meaning of a sentence involves understanding what makes the sentence true or false. Meaning is independent of understanding and remains available by producing logical propositions. (G. Lakoff and M. Johnson 1980, Chap 26)

The writ of Kant’s analytic as true by virtue of the meaning of the words alone without reference to indexicality or entailment or other forms of context runs here (A.R. Lacey 1996, 9-12). If the proposition does not infringe the ostensible truth of the premise, then it
is analytical. (‘Spinsters are female’ is analytic because it is necessarily true.) The analytical tradition almost regards language as subject to suspicion because in usage it potentially prevaricates about the absolutely clear expression of transcendentally universal truth propositions; that language, unless it clarifies the logic of propositions, does some job other than stating meaning. However, what is important here is that the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* rejected the apriorism of the *Tractatus* and the analytical tradition in favour of *language use*. When Wittgenstein famously said in (116) of the *Philosophical Investigations*, ‘What we do is to bring back words from the metaphysical to their everyday use’, he came close to suggesting that meaning can only be understood as the product of some context and that therefore what a sentence finally means is what the speaker intended by those words [13]. The ‘context’ is then made necessarily into the social and psychological and Wittgenstein ‘...comes close to saying that knowing how to use an expression constitutes both a necessary and sufficient condition for knowing its meaning.’ (R.J. Fogelin 1995, 121, original emphasis) Part of the context of language use is the application and recognition of rules, and if meaning is a product of use, then the rules must be social as well as cognitive. Wittgenstein says that the rules are like language games. The relevance of games is, of course, that they are highly structured entities governed by the conventions of rules in any particular context of use (W. Lycan 2000, 90-93). Wittgenstein’s account of meaning in the *Philosophical Investigations* is a direct rebuttal not only of his own earlier *Tractatus*, but also Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and the analytical procedures of Anglo-American philosophy. When Wittgenstein said, in (116) that, ‘What we do is to bring words back...to their everyday use’, he was proposing not that language use contains no logical or truth conditions, but only that sentences exclusively and only of the analytical type might exclude the very kind of usage required for understanding meaning experientially rather than as a closed, self-contained philosophical procedure. Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning as socially inflected by the conventions of rules of address in usage has increasingly positioned the later work on the margins of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and by virtue of his insistence on experience, has aligned him with modern phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Gadamer or Merleau-Ponty.
If only analytical sentences are directed towards the meaning of the art object under the auspices of the analytical tradition as summarized above, that must suppose that either visual works of art contain objective truth conditions, or that alternatively that as objects, they cannot. Either version is unhelpful in interpreting art objects. It might reasonably be asked how a piece of sculpture, an installation or a piece of architecture, for example, can ‘contain’ logical propositions or truth conditions as, necessarily, an essential aspect of its meaning. And if it supposed on the other hand that the aesthetic object cannot contain logical propositions precisely because of its objecthood, then under analytical procedures, it has no meaning and therefore no possible interpretation. In fact, although the art object may not proffer logical propositions of the universal truth type, and its meaning may be immanent in its form, and in that sense be obscure, or even hidden, it demands interpretation as a condition of its existential or ontological state. Its potential meanings will be metaphorical, not literal or analytical. And it is metaphor that the analytical tradition excludes from its account of meaning. Wittgenstein’s rejection of analytical truth conditions as the exclusive basis of understanding meaning in favour of language usage in its full social and psychological setting meant that everyday language use would constitute entailment of metaphorical meaning, and the wide use of figurative language. Architecture, like other forms of aesthetic objecthood can only connote its meanings as visual metaphorical tropes and not as purely logical propositions. The central issue is not truth conditions, but how visual metaphor transmogrifies and transmutes into linguistic-type meaning from form.

**Phenomenology and Interpretation**

Heidegger in *Being and Time* identifies ‘Being’ as an aspect of time. And that time is located in the real time of history, unlike the transcendentally ideal universals of the Platonic tradition which are understood as timeless, or even ‘outside’ time itself (H.G. Gadamer 1989, 254-264). Heidegger understands meaning as locked up, concealed and immanent. It is ‘Being’ through historical, not ideal, time which reveals or ‘unconceals’ meaning. The concealed, then, or the absent becomes presence; the process is one from
latency to manifestation. Heidegger is clear that the process of ‘becoming’, as opposed to idealist hypostacized time, is, because historical, experiential and phenomenal, and what in Merleau-Ponty will be deeply embodied. In other words, Heidegger maintains that ‘Ontology is only possible as phenomenology.’ (M. Heidegger in W. McNeil and K. Feldman, Eds, 1998, 119; the sentence emphasis is original.) ‘Phenomenology’ is constituted by phenomenon + logos. ‘Phenomenon’ derives from Greek phainomenon, meaning ‘to show itself’, or as Heidegger has it, ‘...that within which something can become manifest, visible in itself.’ (117) What can become ‘manifest, visible in itself’ in the art object can only do so metaphorically, that is as aspects of the form serving as tropes for something else, the latent meaning understood metaphorically as allegory or some other rhetorical figure. The meaning will of necessity ‘come into language’ as logos, that is, phenomena become word. In a decisively important section of Being and Time which Heidegger calls ‘The Concept of Logos’, he says:

*Logos* lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely what is being talked about, and indeed for the speaker (who serves as the medium) or for those who speak with each other. Speech “lets us see” from itself...what is being talked about...

When fully concrete, speech (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking or vocalization in words. *Logos* is phone, indeed phone metaphantasias - vocalization in which something is always sighted. (M. Heidegger, 118)

In the aesthetic object what is signified becomes a form of inscription; from the visual to the linguistic. In a sense, then, from *form* to *text*. The building, in a case of Architectural Parlante, ‘speaks’. The act of interpretation which follows the realization of meaning as form transcribed into language is hermeneutical. ‘Phenomenology of Dasein [Being] is hermeneutics in the original signification of the word, which designates the work of interpretation’ (M. Heidegger 120, original emphasis). Phenomenological concepts themselves must be distinguished from ‘ordinary’ conceptualisation.

Now what must be taken into account if the formal concept of the phenomenon is to be deormalized to the phenomenological one, and how does this differ from
the common concept? What is it that phenomenology is to “let be seen”? What is it that is to be called “phenomenon” in a distinctive sense? What is it by its very essence that becomes the necessary theme when we indicate something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that does not show itself at first and for the most part, something that is concealed, in contrast to what at first and for the most part does show itself. But at the same time it is something that essentially belongs to what at first and for the most part shows itself, and indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground. (M. Heidegger 119 emphasis original)

This Heideggeran account of the phenomenological sign as unrevealed, echoes the distinction made here earlier in Chapter One between latent and emergent [14]. Lessing’s sharp distinction between image and word in the Laocoon is eroded by the transitive movement of meaning from the Peircian icon to the symbol, from visual form into allegory as language.

Under Heideggeran phenomenology, the act of interpretation is necessarily hermeneutical. Schleiermacher’s original separation in formulating the Hermeneutical Circle between scientific or rationally causal explanation and interpretative understanding in human action remains important (R. Scruton in A. Kenny, Ed, 1994, 230). The hermeneutical process as circular and ceaselessly interrogating the relation of parts to whole and whole to parts in a procedure of both imagination and the reconciliation of part to whole is further discussed in Chapter Five here.

Heidegger’s proposal that ‘Dasein’ has to be understood within, as it were, historical non-transcendental real time contrasts strongly with the position of his teacher, Edmund Husserl. With Brentano, Husserl is understood to be the progenitor of the modern phenomenological tradition (R. Scruton 1994, 227-230). Husserl’s phenomenological method required the radical separation of the perception of empirical phenomena from mental phenomena. Husserl’s project was a study of mind, but based on the embodied experience of external phenomena, which have to be ‘bracketed’ or subtracted in an act of ‘epoche’ (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 246). What becomes important for interpretation is Husserl’s suggestion that the mental understanding of real phenomena in the mind is in part a product of mental direction ‘towards’ objects which are in a sense reconstituted as
a result of *intentionality* (E. Husserl in McNeil and Feldman, Eds, 1998, 102-103). In the theory of interpretation, especially literary interpretation, Husserl’s intentionality as authorship becomes apodictic, or what Husserl calls ‘eidetic’, (R. Scruton 1994, 228) and what is bracketed, parenthesised or marginalized such as extrinsic biography or acts of readership is the result of favouring authorial intention as having directional force (T. Eagleton 1997, 51-52). The primacy of authorial intention as it has come down from Husserl’s ‘epoche’ is challenged by Reception theory, not least in Gadamer’s interpretative acts between subject and object, between reader and text and between spectator and art object in *Truth and Method* and is also discussed in Chapter Five.

**From Icon to Text**

The ‘from-to’ here is important. In the case of architecture as a field of empirical objects – buildings and the *genius loci* of their contexts – if there is to be a transmission of meaning or significance, then that ‘message’ must flow from the visual attributes of the building towards language. This suggests that the art object immanently ‘contains’ meaning in visual form. There may be difficulties implicit in moving from visual form to meaning, both as explanation and understanding. Conventionally, meaning is conveyed by syntax in some kind of phatic code as in Jakobson’s model of sender/medium/receiver (Roman Jakobson in T. Sebeok, Ed, 1960, 353). The medium or code might be words, digital programs, morse-code or even ships’ flags. But in the case of the building, abstract paintings and sculpture and installations for example, where there is neither overt subject or narrative content, it is indeed difficult to see what the medium of the message could be, even though we may be quite convinced that the particular art object under view does in fact signify and mean. Since there is no ‘language of architecture’ or ‘language of sculpture’ and so on, because neither buildings or sculpture have phonemes arranged in morphemes arranged in words which have some semantic reference and which are arranged grammatically in syntax, then in the case of the building, there can be no intercessional semantic code or medium. Meaning must inhere in the moment of vision when the visible of the object transmogrifies into the linguistic sense of the receiver/spectator. This section addresses this fundamentally important transition.
Roland Barthes in *The Photographic Message* suggests that certain kinds of aesthetic genre such as photography have no medium but represent a message without a code. In the sense that the photographic image is an analogy of the reality originally caught in that image, then the reality of the image is denotative of that reality. ‘Certainly the image is not the reality but at least it is its perfect analogon and it is exactly this analogical perfection which, to common sense, defines the photograph. Thus can be seen the special status of the photographic image: *it is a message without a code*. (R. Barthes 1977, 17 original emphasis) As an empirical object, ‘the building’ has no sender or medium of transmission, which is what Barthes and Jakobson mean by ‘code’. The building will have no obvious denotative code such as the depicted in a painting and therefore no conspicuous code. But what it will have, as suggested in Chapter One, will be the expression of its gesture which substitutes semantically for ‘code’. So that like the photograph, in this instance, although it has no code, we nevertheless remain certain that the mediaeval cathedral, for instance, as a building and a structure (not, that is, its internal iconographic accoutrements and symbolic elements such as statues and stained glass and so on) is powerfully semantic. (See ‘The Architectural Trace’ here in Part Two.) Barthes goes on to contend that the denotative level of the message or meaning, carries palimpsest-like, a secondary or connotative layer of meaning. The denotative is the form (building, photograph and so on) and the suggestion of meaning arising from the form is the connotation.

In the case of the building (like the photograph) the point of reception of its visual meaning, and as Jakobson has it, its ‘contact’, must be retinal. The difficult issue of how an optical experience, the embodied experience of visual form, becomes semantic and interpretative, persists. Speaking of the photograph, Barthes says:

…the photograph is verbalized in the very moment it is perceived; better, it is only perceived verbalized…From this point of view, the image – grasped immediately by an inner metalanguage, language itself – in actual fact has no denoted state, is immersed for its very social existence in at least an initial layer of connotation, that of the categories of language. We know that every language takes up a position with
regard to things, that it connotes reality, if only in dividing it up; the connotations of
the photograph would thus coincide, 
grasse mondo, with the overall planes of lan-
guage. (R. Barthes 1979, 28-29)

In the same way, the building’s connoted visual meanings must come into language
rather than be constitutive of meaning, as the hypostasis of ‘the language of architecture
would suggest. In The Rhetoric of the Image, Barthes speaks of ‘rhetoric thus appearing
as the signifying aspect of ideology’. By ‘ideology’ he means the connoted cultural
meanings available socially and historically in any given society. The way in which such
cultural connotation is signified is characterized as an aspect of rhetoric. In an image such
as an advertisement for Italian food, pasta connotes metonymically not only as attractive
food, but persuasively as what Barthes calls ‘Italianicity’ (R. Barthes 1977, 50). What is
suggested here is that the formal items of the advertisement, that is the arrangement of the
food, represents a visual trope or what Barthes calls ‘figures’.

Thus the rhetoric of the image (that is to say, the classification of its connotators)
is specific to the extent that it is subject to the physical constraints of vision
(different, for example, from phonatory constraints) but general to the extent
that the ‘figures’ are never more than formal relations of elements.(R. Barthes 1979,
49)

‘Figures’ which emerge from the constraints of vision, in other words, signify
metaphorically as, in so far as they are ‘of’ the image (or building here), metonymically,
part to whole. The visual connotation which signifies as ‘figure’ or trope is the act of
rhetoric. In the same way, Postmodern architecture is highly tropic in its visual form, and
part of its ‘display’ as theatricality may similarly be seen as rhetorical. In exploring the
transition from the visual to the linguistic meaning, Barthes further says ‘...language
clearly has a function of elucidation, but this elucidation is selective, a metalanguage
applied not only to the totality of the iconic message but only to certain of its signs.’ (R. Barthes 1979, 40) and notes that visual form understood as analogous linguistic meaning seems necessarily expressed as abstract nouns. ‘To express these semes of connotation, would therefore require a special metalanguage and we are left with barbarisms of the *Italianicity* kind as best being able to account for the signifieds of connotation, the suffix-*icity* deriving an abstract noun from an adjective...’ (Barthes, 48).

Semiotically, the image and the building as visible to the viewer and subject to both the denotative and connotative signification of vision, become analogous of its implicitly textual characteristic; the visible becomes the textual. Lessing’s arbitrary dichotomy between image and word unravels and reassembles as the dialectical relation between the visible and the linguistic. A number of important consequences emerge. From Plato onwards, of course, the underlying notion of dialectic has been dialogue, which in turn implicates conversation. And no conversation can proceed without the imbrication of *hearing*. And so we proceed to the proposition that that the spectator/interpreter enters into a conversation with the visible art object by *listening* to its *visual* tropes or metaphors. In the case of the building, the issue of Postmodernist or New Historicism metaphorical referencing, for example, is discussed in ‘The Architectural Trace’ here in Part Two [15].

In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer, in speaking of texts, nevertheless underlines the presence of language in *all* interpretation.

All understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own language. (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 389)

Gadamer proposes that it is the dialectics of the conversation which ‘brings to mind’ (and which, as he says, ‘allows the object to come into words’) the previously unforeseen cognition of newly emerging dialogical propositions (N. Davey in I Heywood and B. Sandywell, Eds, 1999, 9). In the antiphonal responses between argument and counter-
argument, thesis and antithesis, a new and entirely unexpected, even disquieting possibility may emerge as the synthesis. And even in a multi-participative conversation, the process retains an objective and potentially analytical character, but which nevertheless results in the possibility of revelation and epiphany as understanding. A similar ‘conversation’ might take place between the interpreter and the text as written; the task then becomes hermeneutically interrogative in assessing the fit of the hermeneutical circle. ‘Hence it is more than a metaphor; it is a memory of what originally was the case, to describe the task of hermeneutics as entering into dialogue with the text.’ (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 368)

The ‘text’, we remind ourselves, is embodied in the visual art object as Barthes proposed as a form of *immanent inscription* as well as in the actuality of writing.

In addressing the significance of the art object we have to interrogate its visual form not simply as some thing in itself, some potentially attractive or beautiful object, but as the interface between form and meaning. And if visually configured meaning is to undergo Heideggeran ‘self-unconcealing’, the dialogue with the object demands that it be ‘listened to’ or ‘heard’ (I. Heywood and B. Sandywell, Eds, 1999, 238). Gadamer says:

...we must take account of the particular dialectic implied in *hearing*. It is not just that he who hears is also addressed, but also that he who is addressed must hear whether he wants to or not. When you look at something you can also look away from it by looking in a different direction, but you cannot “hear away”. This difference between seeing and hearing is important for us because the primacy of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon, as Aristotle saw. There is nothing that is not available through the medium of language. (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 462 original emphasis)

The process of hearing within dialogue is aletheic in the sense that the building reveals its metaphorical meanings in a condition of disclosure (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 482-4) [16]. The disclosure is fundamentally an act of language. Despite the dominance of the visual
in the western tradition since the Renaissance (M. Jay in N. Mirzoeff, Ed, 1998, 66-69), it is language which is the carrier of meaning. 'In the light of our hermeneutical inquiry this ancient insight into the priority of hearing over sight acquires a new emphasis...in contrast to all other experience of the world, language opens up a completely new dimension, the profound dimension from which tradition comes down to those now living.' (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 462-3) The fact that the disclosure 'brings to mind' understanding through the dialogical means that our appreciation of the aesthetic will always be an acknowledgement that 'allows the object to come into words' (N. Davey in I.Heywood and B. Sandywell, Eds, 1999, 10). The dominance of the ocularcentric in the west as a form of embodied hegemony is testified by the intense saturation of the language with metaphors of vision and light.

In many ways, the familiar debate about the 'inside' and the 'outside' of sensory information and consciousness and how the outside becomes internalised in the mind has been dominated by the Cartesian scopic regime of perspectivalism (Christopher Jencks 1995, 1-5). Descartes's *Cogito* created the modern dualism between body and mind, and in association with the rise of scientific explanation in the seventeenth century, emphasized the visual as the principal source of sensible information for the mind, or in Descartes's location, the soul (M. Jay 1993, 21-82). Maurice Merleau-Ponty, both in *The Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible*, contested the dominance of Cartesian ocularcentrism, although not the remaining importance of acts of visual perception in themselves. Merleau-Ponty’s programme incorporated not a rejection of the idea of an internal construction of real external, material phenomena, but rather the prevailing assumptions of Rationalism (G.B. Madison 1988, 57-81). In as much as rationalism followed the Platonic tradition of marginalizing sensory data as unreliable in the face of universal essences, so Merleau-Ponty subverted it. He also disrupted the truth propositions in the treatment of language by the analytical tradition by not only proposing that the visible must come into language, but also by maintaining that the language involved must inevitably be metaphorical. Merleau-Ponty’s challenge to ocular scientific
Rationalism, his insistence on the importance of embodied perception and his acceptance of metaphorical as well as analytical meaning, has led to some considering him as a postmodern philosopher prior to the fact, if not a fully fledged postmodernist as such (G.B. Madison 1988, 60). The two traditions, the analytical Anglo-Saxon and Continental Phenomenology, divide fundamentally about linguistic and other forms of meaning. Each regards the area of concern of the other as outside its terms of reference. Unless we are to address the aesthetic condition of the postmodern building in terms of essence and its ascription to the norms of universal forms of the beautiful, which would seem bizarre, the analytical tradition offers no entry to the ironic and parodic metaphorical meanings of the postmodern which inevitably defer the absolute aesthetic condition which the analytical tradition would demand. Interpretation, as Gadamer insisted, is necessarily phenomenological.

Merleau-Ponty’s argument with what Martin Jay calls ‘the scopic regime’ of ocularcentrism (M. Jay in M. Mirzoeff, 66), involved in essence a disagreement with the cognitive frame imposed by (Cartesian) perspectivalism (M. Jay 1994, 298). Visual perception, particularly after Alberti, involved scopic interrogation of external form. The perspectival frame of reference was analytically mathematical and geometrical. This not only excluded other forms of sensory information such as the idea of touch as metaphor which fascinated Merleau-Ponty, but never asked about the possibility of meaning and significance in the object as a result of the subject’s acts of perception. Rationalist dualism demoted embodied sense experience as potentially dystopian only to be reconfigured within the mental framework provided by the mind and its ideal ideas. In fact, Merleau-Ponty distrusted both empiricist and transcendental a priori accounts which he saw as respectively ‘perceptualist’ and ‘intellectualist’.

The empiricist solution – that each sense was utterly distinct – and the intellectualist alternative – that a transcendental knowledge of space exists prior to sense experience – were both inadequate, because they failed to register the primary layer of intersensory experience in the body anterior to the differentiation of the senses and their resynthesis on the level of reflected thought. Instead, Merleau-Ponty claimed, the unification
was like the merging of monocular and binocular vision, produced by a kind of bodily intentionality before mind distinguished itself from matter. "The senses", he contended "translate each other without any need of an interpreter, and are mutually comprehensible without the intervention of any idea." (M. Jay 1994, 310)

Philosophically, this position in The Phenomenology of Perception is very radical because although not dismantling the importance of ideas, it does accord to sensory experience something approaching autonomy. Merleau-Ponty begins with Husserl’s intentionality and ‘epoche’ and builds on Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics (M. Jay 194, 269-275). In The Visible and the Invisible, he develops the argument for the senses to be able to ‘translate’ each other by speaking of what amounts to the contiguity of the look. ‘Hence without even entering into the implications proper to the seer and the visible, we know that, since vision is a palpation with the look, it must also be inscribed in the order of being that it discloses to us...’ (M. Merleau-Ponty in W. McNeil and K Feldman, Eds, 1998, 170). He says that we could not dream of seeing things ‘naked’ because ‘...the gaze itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh.’ (168)

This section of The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty calls ‘The Intertwining – The Chiasm’. The trope or figure of chiasmus (R. Latham 1991, 33) is a fundamentally important metaphor because the intertwining of the senses such as touch and vision then in turn intertwines with the reflection of ideas. But it is more than simply ‘intertwining’. Chiasmus not only links, but also reverses and establishes polarity. Thus ‘S/he entered in triumph and departed in defeat’ links ‘entering’ and ‘departing’ by reversing ‘triumph’ into ‘defeat’. In similar fashion the two underlying senses in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, sense and idea, become antiphonal, although remaining differentially mediated; the monocular (sense alone) oscillates with and forms the binocular (idea). The understanding of meaning can only emerge when binocular ‘vision’ combines the experiential and the ideated. What might be considered as valid as an idea, he contends, will always be mediated by, and embodied in, experience [17].
Merleau-Ponty has a similarly radical view of language. It is language which commands sense and meaning from the sensible objects of perception in the consciousness of the subject. ‘And henceforth movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other and to themselves, return towards their source and, in the patient and silent labour of desire, begin the paradox of expression.’ (M. Merleau-Ponty 1998, 174) In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had suggested that anything that could be thought analytically could be expressed and expressed clearly. Otherwise there is silence. In 6.37 he says, ‘The only necessity is logical necessity. What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence.’ (J.A. Smith in C. Jencks, Ed, 1995, 240) Merleau-Ponty’s contention that the concealed ‘invisible’ can only come into meaning and ‘be visible’ in metaphorical language through the touch of the visible is in extreme opposition to the truth propositions of the *Tractatus* and the analytical ‘Theory of Descriptions’ of Bertrand Russell to which it subscribed. But in terms of the interpretation of the aesthetic object, the semantic trajectory of hermeneutical phenomenology from Husserl and Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer, although analytically unverifiable, offers much to signal the latent as well as the manifest rather than the analytical sterility of ‘The only necessity is logical necessity’, a position Wittgenstein later wholly rejected.

Provocatively, Merleau-Ponty spoke of language as being experience in what he called ‘the occult traffic in metaphor’, and actually, that experience without speech is impossible; ‘...there is no experience without speech, as the purely lived-through has no part in the discursive life of man.’ (G.B. Madison1988, 75) In effect, consciousness is language. But the fact that the art object can only come into meaning through metaphor and language (because there is no language of the object) does not mean that the spectator cannot receive what Barthes calls the building’s (or whatever art form) rhetorical ‘enonciation’ or ‘utterance’ in its capacity to become textual (R. Barthes 2000, 3) [18]. It is not a finite, final or absolute meaning, but one possibility amongst others, scrutinized and ‘verified’ by a clerisy of fellow observers and commentators in what Stanley Fish designates as a community of Reception Discourse. (See Chapter Four here.) In quoting Merleau-Ponty from *The Invisible and the Invisible*, Martin Jay sums up the chiasmic intertwining between perception and language by quoting from Merleau-Ponty.
"Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the visible itself has an invisible framework (membrane), and the in-visible is the secret counterpart of the visible." If perception is a mute version of language, needing it to come into full speech, so too language bears within it the residue of its silent predecessor which inaugurated the drama of meaningfulness..." (M. Jay 1994, 324-5 Merleau-Ponty's original emphasis).

The movement from the visual aesthetic object to language or text as meaning does not implicate the paraphrase (see Chapter Five). In the first instance, the primary linguistic response to, say, the building as form will be in terms of Barthes's abstract noun formulation; that this building, as Libeskind's 'Freedom Tower' in New York might, as part of its annunciation, deal with mourning and the commemoration of the tragic. Such a shift from visual form to meaning is, and it can be argued, should be, full of 'disquietude' (dis: reversal; quietude: silence, calm, repose; from silence to sound, from repose to perturbation). The prospect of the building, even metaphorically, as 'speaking' (parlante) and its meaning as silently invisible then becoming unconcealed in acts of rhetorical annunciation – indeed that it be 'heard' – and that the beholder be 'touched' by its visibleness is certainly disconcerting, but equally certainly, not paraphrastic. Its meaning in visual metaphor will as language be illocutionary or, in other words, be a form of language use which as a 'speech act' hereby promises a certain kind of meaning.

The Felicitous and the Infelicitous in Form

J.L. Austin belongs to the Oxford school of Ordinary Language Philosophy which is clearly in concordance with Wittgenstein’s 'use' theories of language. Austin himself described his method as 'linguistic phenomenology' (S. Cavell 2002, 98). Austin's procedure is non-analytical. ('But even the bare title [linguistic philosophy] is suggestive: it suggests that the clarity Austin seeks in philosophy is to be achieved by mapping the
fields of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word, not through analysing or replacing a given word by others. In this sense, philosophy like his is not analytical. ’ Cavell, 100)

Austin proposes that utterance, as will become clearer, may be well-rounded and felicitous when obeying regulative rules, and infelicitous when violating the same regulative rules (M. Black 1972, 152-3). Clearly, art objects such as buildings have analogous regulative rules that typologically characterize them as ‘Baroque’, ‘Modernist’ and so on. The rules, within artistic form, represent ‘structures of feeling’ expressed in form as the repetition of motifs of design, and for the building or work of art to be ‘Baroque’ or ‘Modernist’, it must conform to the appropriate regulative rules of design in order to remain ‘felicitous’. If the regulative rules are violated, the object either becomes something else altogether, or more likely, a hybrid or stylistic chimaera, so that in the present example, Baroque becomes Rococo and Modernist becomes Postmodernist. The felicitous would have become the infelicitous in terms of its origins among the regulative rules. There is even a sense that in the case of Postmodernist New Historicism, architecture that became self-consciously infelicitous as faux classicism in the 1980s assumed such a degree of deliberate stylistic inappropriateness that it approached the condition of the mythic. The source of the felicity/infelicity inheres in visual appearance in the case of the building; in its rhetorical enunciation. And although Austin deals only with linguistic utterance, our own aesthetic sense of the meaning of the building as onlookers must become linguistic, and so must encounter the linguistically concealed, as it were, within the visual; in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the invisible. The implications of Austin’s felicitous/infelicitous distinction as a vehicle of visual interpretation, then becomes fecund.

Austin begins by addressing the ‘performative’ utterance in declarative sentences ['declare', from Latin declarare, to make clear, from clarus, bright, clear]. The building may be said to figuratively ‘make itself clear’ in annunciation as declaration, its ‘declared’ then being the ‘persuasive’ of its rhetoric. Speech acts, or ‘performatives’ are governed by two kinds of rules, constitutive and regulative (W. Lycan 2000, 180). Constitutive rules assert that the utterance is performative (or in its declaration, the building is Modernist or is Postmodernist, and so on). The infringement of regulative rules results not in the utterance ceasing to be performative in the sense of doing
something, but merely in becoming declaratively defective or infelicitous. Being infelicitous will mean that the utterance (or building in this case) is still performative in being declarative, but ambiguously so (W. Lycan, 174). In the present analogy from architecture, the Postmodernist building as a self-conscious acknowledgement of the constituent rules of Modernism, but still nevertheless representing a violation of them, becomes knowingly infelicitous, while still performative or declarative, perhaps even 'loudly' so. Austin distinguishes performatives such as 'I support the motion' from constatives which represent philosophical-type propositional meaning [19]. However, performatives are necessarily propositional of something or other because they are declarative (in the present example, 'The motion is sufficiently worthy to merit support').

Austin determined the force and authenticity of performatives by the introduction of the 'hereby' criterion. Declarations such as 'I support the motion' immediately accept 'hereby' as in 'I hereby support the motion.' Alternatively, if an ordinary member of the public says 'I declare that the state of the drains is unacceptable', then the 'hereby' criterion makes the assertion infelicitous, although still performative. However, if the Leader of the Council does so, the utterance becomes felicitous indexically, or according to its context of use. The 'hereby' confers authority and authenticity to the performative. If 'hereby' is added to constatives such as 'The cat sat on the mat', the result is either nonsensical or false (W. Lycan 178). The authority conferred by 'hereby' as a form of proclamation meaning adverbially 'as a result of this' is not within the constitutive rules of utterance, which remain unwritten (W. Lycan 176), but in institutional cultural custom and practice.

Within the institutional frame and cultural custom of architecture what becomes provocative or interesting about Postmodernistic architectural style is its temporally recursive nature, becoming two things in one, both Modernist (past) and Postmodernist (present) at the same time. This invites conscious ambiguity and dissembling, plays on appearance and reality and the doubling of the metaphorical (allegorical) palimpsest. A building like St Pauls by Wren is stylistically mellifluous and felicitous, being, in this case, baroque through and through; it is characterized by the strong 'hereby' of its
unambiguous stylistic constitutive rule. The authenticity, force and authority of its 'proclaimed' are precisely its synchronic stylistic unity. But in the case of the postmodern building, what is found is the weak signal of the inauthentic; its proclaimed are ciphers of differentiation and infelicity. A building like Corbusier's Ronchamp [Fig 6], apparently authentically Modernist in its white would-be Purism, suddenly reverses, becoming hugely gestural and expressive and metaphorical when, as of the modern, it should not be and becomes two ambivalently antinomic things in one. The felicity of its 'hereby' becomes more apparent than real as its chimerical quality reveals itself to the beholder. Ronchamp is discussed at further length in 'The Architectural Trace' in Part Two. Its doubling makes it arguably postmodernistically prescient; the first of the architectural authentically inauthentic and the first of the felicitously infelicitous. The infelicity of postmodernist architectural utterance will play a significant part in the interpretation of key Postmodern buildings such as Frank Gehry's Nederlanden building, Prague, and Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum, Berlin in Part Two.

This chapter has had to deal with both with genuinely complex issues surrounding the issue of language and form and the rather technical terms in which it is often expressed. Tracing the possible route of the translation of the art object's physical form into linguistic meaning via Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, although of the greatest significance, can also sound rather mysterious, as in Heidegger's 'unconcealing'. Because of the inherent difficulties of the subject, perhaps this is both inevitable and as it should be. What needs to be absolutely clear at this point is that the coming into language of the building's meaning is wholly trivialised by the ubiquitous 'language of' formulation, an
issue discussed at some greater length in Chapter Six. The route of the translation of meaning involves implicating Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological and hermeneutical approach in the change of the physical work of art into a form of linguistic significance. Addressing such a change or transmogrification inevitably involves a process of interpretation which is a major concern of the next chapter. Austin’s well-known distinction between felicitous and infelicitous speech acts, appropriated here as a means of interpreting buildings, helps later to construe the rhetorical self-announcement of an important poststructuralist building such as Daniel Libeskind’s Berlin Jewish Museum for example as infelicitously contrived. The principle established in this chapter that visual forms such as visual metaphor or gesture acquire meaning by coming into language from what Heidegger might have called a condition of immanence is of the greatest significance. How a building is ‘read’, interpreted or ‘received’ – its reception indeed – is in large part dependent on how its visual rhetoric translates into linguistic possibilities.
CHAPTER FIVE

RHETORIC, VISUAL METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY AND INTERPRETATION

This chapter deals with the metaphorical aspects of interpretation and the necessity for the presence of literary theory in any version of interpretation itself, architectural or otherwise. The chapter comprises five sections: Rhetoric, Visual Metaphor and Allegory, Visual Metaphor, Allegory and finally, Interpretation. Rhetoric and allegory are seen as essential components of the ‘self-announcement’ of postmodern architecture and their history and development are briefly traced. The relevance of these tropes for an understanding of postmodern and particularly poststructuralist architecture is highly significant. The section on visual metaphor, which is how the rhetorical tropes of postmodernist building are actually signified, sets out the nature of visual metaphor with particular regard for the metonymy/metaphor relation and the importance of Roman Jakobson’s work arising from the study of aphasia. The final section deals with interpretation. Since there is no language of architecture itself, but equally since meaning must be ultimately linguistic, the resolution, or not, of architectural form as emergent language and meaning needs some form of justification, best found in literary theory. The shape of that justifying theory of interpretation is located in Stanley Fish’s ‘interpretive community’.

RHETORIC

Since Plato, rhetoric has often been spoken of disparagingly as simply a device of display. That view was modified substantially by Aristotle who suggested that persuasion is a legitimate way of making a case or argument. Nevertheless, the idea that rhetoric is often a form of adornment or ornamentation persists. Alfred Loos’s dictum, ‘Ornament is crime’ is of course famous as a Modernist creed. Corbusier’s early Purism, discussed in Chapter Two, in its spare articulation contrasts vividly with the metaphorical gesture and
shape of his Ronchamp which is arguably, in its assumption of visual rhetoric, the announcement of the architecturally postmodern. After the historical decline of rhetoric, its own revival in twentieth century literary theory is traced, especially in the writings of I.A. Richards and Paul de Man. The account of postmodern architecture in Part Two relies on and is dependent on being construed as highly rhetorically informed.

One conspicuous aspect of the recent rise in the importance of what might be called 'the hermeneutics of visual culture' has been its incorporation of rhetorical terms (for example 'The Aporia of the Sensible', J.M. Bernstein in I. Heywood and B. Sandywell, Eds, 1990). This might be conceivably little more than verbal flourish, a rhetoric of rhetoric, serving only to create particular or impressive effects, and thus confirming Plato's original objection to it. Alternatively, the growth in interest in rhetoric might have a deep-structural connection with the postmodern itself. As part of the central argument here, the very theatricality of postmodern culture, especially in its visual forms, announces itself rhetorically in its visual tropes. Thus the Modernist decorum of Mies's Barcelona Pavilion, for example, contrasts strongly with the augendi causa (raising the voice) of Corbusier's gestural exclamation at Ronchamp. In other words, the current invocation of rhetoric is not rhetorical simply in its persuasive sense. It would indeed seem that rhetoric is an insistent presence as part of the postmodern condition. In opposing Modernist architectural decorum, postmodern architecture as part of its deliberately contrived self-announcement, often Historicism in nature, clothes itself as it were, in the rhetorical pose. The nature of rhetoric then clearly needs clarification before it can be applied to the interpretation of postmodern architecture, given that visual rhetoric is an important constituent feature of its appearance.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle resists Plato's disapproval of rhetoric as a form of persuasion which is superficially mimetic and metaphorical and which is applied as ornamentation and affectation (H.C. Lawson-Tancredi 1991, 15). In order to correct the dominant impression of rhetoric as ornamentation, Aristotle insists that rhetoric is fundamentally syllogistic and concerned with proof. 'Just as in logic we have induction and the real and the apparent syllogism, so it is with rhetoric, where example is induction and enthymeme syllogism, apparent enthymeme being apparent syllogism. Thus I call enthymeme the
syllogism, and example the induction of rhetoric.' (Aristotle 1991, Part 1, 75, emphasis original) Aristotle speaks of 'proof', that is, the making of a case. The hermeneutical interpretation of a building as ontologically 'tragic' or 'hortatory', for example, is assisted by the use of rhetorical tropes as part of 'making the case', of suggesting what is present as concealed and immanent. Rhetoric, Aristotle insists, is art as well as the politically and judicially forensic. In this sense, his treatment of style as simile and metaphor used for propriety and suitability is clearly valuable (Aristotle 1991, Part 2, ix, 215-242).

Clearly, rhetoric has its own interior and complex history of development extending across millennia, representing periods of emergence, latency and recession. In its earlier Graeco-Roman classical phase, rhetoric was a public act involving the marshalling and ordering of rational argument (P. Dixon 1971, Introduction). But taking Aristotle’s point about rhetoric being an art (Ars Rhetorica), under the typological heading of ‘Style’ [that is Elocutio one of the five organizing Faculties, the others being Invenitio or Invention, Memoria or Memory, Dispositio or Arrangement and Actio or Delivery], emerge the ‘Figures’ and ‘Schemes’. Figures of words such as tropes and metaphor were distinguished from figures of thought such as allegory or irony. The influence of Ornament, originally only one of four further components of style, was so pervasive that ornament and rhetoric became virtually synonymous (P. Dixon 1971, 38). The distinction between Schemes and Tropes was maintained into the mediaeval period and adhered to by Bede (De Schematis et Tropis) and rhetoric continued to be taught as part of the Trivium. Despite the enormous revival of interest in rhetoric during the Renaissance, during the following period of seventeenth century Empiricism, language was promulgated, almost in anticipation of the Analytical Tradition it would seem, as the means of clarifying objective ideas. John Locke wrote:

‘... and we must allow that all the Art of Rhetoric besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas; move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgement; and so indeed are perfect cheat.’ (An Essay In Human Understanding, Book 3, x in P. Dixon 1971, 67, emphasis original)
The increased marginalization of rhetoric was also confirmed by the rise of the novel during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, because of course the novel dealt with realism in opposition to rhetoric (I. Watt 1957, 13).

There is a further distancing of rhetoric in taste, sensibility and fancy at the opening of the Romantic Movement. It is intimately associated with a parallel rejection of allegory in favour of the symbol (see the following section here, ‘Visual Metaphor and Allegory’). The nature of rhetoric as a public art infringed the emerging aesthetic individualism of the sublime and private concept of the artist as genius, or as Gadamer puts it, ‘...the devaluation of rhetoric in the nineteenth century follows necessarily from the doctrine that genius creates unconsciously.’ (H.G. Gadamer 1993, 72) The intimate association of rhetoric with allegory and irony as a means of publicly ‘other-speaking’ in which the intended meaning is ironically opposite to the stated meaning, pointed up the value of tropes and figures and confirmed a relationship which was sustained right up to the Romantic period from its classical origins.

Although radically transformed, rhetoric was redeemed in the twentieth century after largely being ignored from Coleridge on. The first moment of redemption was I.A. Richard’s *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Although embracing the classical tradition, Richards also qualified it. Quintillian, for example, in *Institutio Oratoria* argued that res, the subject matter of speech or thinking, is inseparable from verba, the words uttered to express the thought. Quintillian’s famous aphorism, that language is the dress or clothing of thought, depends on the unity of thought and language. However, that unity can only occur when the speech is meet and fit for the decorum of the thought. The figures of speech and thought, although different, must remain congruent. ‘For the same things are often put in different ways and the sense remains unaltered though the words are changed.’ (Quintillian, *Institutio Oratoria* IX 1 16) Richards rejected the necessary unity of language and thought posited by both Quintillian and Cicero in favour of the essentially ambivalent nature of expressive and poetic language. Richards’s ‘New Rhetoric’ in the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* will be nothing less than ‘the study of verbal understanding and misunderstanding.’ (I.A. Richards 1956, 23) All fictive writing is an act of persuasion in which the writer seeks to ‘convince’ the reader and therefore this
collision of interest, rather than authorial hegemony, necessarily introduces ambiguity, a position far removed from Aristotle’s syllogisms and enthymemes. William Empson’s *Seven Types of Ambiguity* found similar rhetorical ambivalence in Shakespeare’s diction. Richards’s situating rhetorical and poetic meaning within an *aporia* between authorial intention and textual interpretation anticipates later semiotics and Reception Theory. His cleavage between *res* and *verba* is to some extent supported experimentally by Lev Vigotsky’s finding (1934) that language and thought have a common root but diverge at maturation into separate faculties; hence the infant can think but not necessarily be able to say it (L. Vigotsky 1962, 33-51). Rhetoric was accorded much attention in literary New Criticism, notably in *The Rhetoric Of Fiction* by Wayne Booth, which argued that any act of authorial intention is inevitably the imposition of the author’s meaning on the reader as another version of persuasion. But the decisive turn came in Structuralist and Poststructuralist treatment of the text as narratological deep structure.

This is of course an inevitably compressed and selective account. However, its importance for the building’s ‘enunciation’ remains undiminished and indispensable. The revival of interest in rhetoric and allegory in Structuralism and Poststructuralism has been highly influential, although seldom applied to architecture as a key element in interpreting potential architectural meaning, a lacuna the present work here attempts to address. The association between rhetoric and allegory and Poststructuralist theory is of fundamental importance. Following the collapse of the Modernist avant-garde, the *reinscription* of the postmodern, perhaps as ‘New Historicism’, often achieved architecturally as parody or irony, involved ‘other-speaking’ in a rhetoric of display. That rhetoric of display is characterized here in terms of Michael Fried’s notion of theatricality in *Art and Objecthood*. Clearly, there is a cultural need for an imperative of display. What then becomes important phenomenologically, is that display is not understood to be only visual (J. Birksted, Ed 2000, 2). Not only buildings, but also their setting – landscape that is – ‘declares’ itself in more than one cultural dimension. Time and memory, which ultimately invoke allegory, and which are embedded in landscape, are part of its

‘As for notions of memory, the landscape perspective would bring an increased awareness of how memory is ‘seen’. Landscape is of course historically linked to the ‘arts of memory’. Since vision appears to be natural it transforms memory into a seemingly natural experience, an experience present in the here-and-now. The interaction between vision and memory in the landscape is thus capable of generating narrative vision that cuts across the very basic distinction between the textual and the visual – a distinction which tends fundamentally to oppose, in art and architectural history, the iconographical approach to the approach of visual cultural studies. Hence, also a temporal dimension: transporting the past into the present, blurring past and present, recreating the present as past. Vision of landscape has a temporal dimension and thus brings the temporal dimension into the spatial dimension. The landscape perspective foregrounds time.’ (J. Birksted 2000, 3)

Another highly significant landscape element which emerged from the eighteenth century preoccupation with the Picturesque (Caroline van Eck in J. Birksted 2000, 243) and which is represented by Walter Benjamin’s iconic allegorical sign, the ruin, is further discussed here under ‘Visual Metaphor and Allegory’ [20].

It has already been suggested that I. A. Richards’s ‘New Rhetoric’ in The Philosophy of Rhetoric to some extent anticipates poststructuralist readings of texts in rhetorical terms as necessarily operating inside an ambiguity. In discussing semiology and rhetoric in Allegories of Reading (1979), Paul de Man senses a similar aporia between rhetorical figures and the grammar or syntax of a text. In assuming that semiology asks not of the meaning of words, but rather how they mean structurally, it has been assumed that rhetorically figural tropes are an aspect of syntax or structure (Paul de Man 1979, 5). He suggests that rhetoric associates with paradigmatic aspects of language, which of course is substitutive or metaphorical, but that this has paid insufficient attention to tropes and figures in a syntagmatic context. Paradigmatic approaches to language are metaphorical and substitutive, syntagmatic approaches contiguous and metonymic (Paul de Man 1979,
6). So it is the metonymic rather than the familiar metaphorical aspects of rhetoric which might repay exploration, a distinction made here in the later discussion of the metonymic and metaphorical implications in Libeskind’s fenestration.

This *aporia* between rhetoric and grammar, which demands some resolution, is echoed, de Man shows, in the inner characteristic of allegory and irony. Allegory and irony are major tropes within rhetoric and important, and indeed essential, elements of its typology. In ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’ in *Blindness and Insight* (1971), de Man shows the gap between anteriority and some present as a form of hesitation between a past and a present, Janus-like on a temporal threshold, as *the* distinctive feature of both allegory and irony (Paul de Man 1971, 222). Although for purposes of analysis it is useful to distinguish between the categories of rhetoric and that of allegory and irony, they are in effect, inseparable; allegory and irony relate to rhetoric by synecdoche. The postmodern building’s announcement of itself as rhetorical speaking will be allegorical and ironic because of course the postmodern itself is recursive in time and acts indexically in Peirce’s terms by the temporal ‘touching’ between past and present. Peirce’s version of the sign as part symbol and part referent requiring the third element of interpretation as meaning must always get caught up in a temporal progression. As has already been pointed out, each new interpretation of the sign as ‘meaning’ then in turn demands its own interpretation and so on indefinitely into the infinite regress. This sequence of interpretations has to move ‘forward’ each time and therefore is bound to leave a ‘trace’ which is temporal. It is the gesture of that procession of signs across time which implicates the rhetorical in the sign, but not necessarily as allegory or irony.

‘The interpretation of the sign is not, for Peirce, a meaning but another sign; it is a reading, not a decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be interpreted by another sign, and so on *ad infinitum*. Peirce calls this process by means of which ‘one sign gives birth to another’ pure rhetoric, as distinguished from pure grammar, which postulates the possibility of unproblematic, dyadic meaning, and pure logic, which postulates the possibility of the universal truth of meanings.’ (Paul de Man 1979, 9)
The course of grammar, as distinct from rhetoric, is towards the syntagmatic, towards the metonymic and, indexically, towards narrative. Currently fashionable phrases such as 'the language of architecture' or 'the grammar of form' or Michael Fried's 'syntax of form' in relation to Anthony Caro's early sculpture are obfuscatory and remain unhelpful. Such phrases are of course themselves rhetorically inflected and are designed to persuade or convince. But they do not make the necessary distinctions between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic in the opening of language emerging from the rhetorical self-annunciation in the interpretation of the aesthetic object. Intriguingly, rhetorical turns such as 'the language of architecture' or 'the grammar of form' seem to be examples of the imposition of the poetic on the discursive, typical, as Jakobson has suggested, of literary Modernism – the metaphoric overlaid on the metonymic.

In citing Austin's perlocutionary language as the language of effect, de Man is suggestive of significant rhetorical consequences (Paul de Man 1979, 8). What might emerge here is the conflation of Austin's 'felicitous' and 'infelicitous' with the allegorical and ironic presentation of aesthetic form as allegorically felicitous or ironically infelicitous. Gehry's own House, discussed in Chapter Seven, as a self-conscious postmodern 'ruin' would be ironically infelicitous.

The irresolution which hangs between metaphorical (rhetorical) and grammatical (or discursive) meaning that the beholder must be aware of, between connotation and denotation without which interpretation is 'blind', is the defining feature of the rhetorical moment.

'Nor is this intervention part of the mini-text constituted by the figure which holds our attention only as long as it remains suspended and unresolved. I follow the usage of common speech in calling this semiological enigma 'rhetorical'. The grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural meaning, but when it is possible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration.' (Paul de Man 1979, 10)
This rejection of Aristotelian logic endorses the radical edge of Richard's 'New Rhetoric'. The rhetorical oscillation resides in de Man's verb 'prevails'. Either the building is rhetorically metaphorical, in which case it is *showing*, or it is, as it were, grammatically discursive and invites a narrative account of itself [21]. In actual fact and in practice of course, interpretation oscillates between a 'grammatical' or empirical account and description of the building and the figural interpretation which emanates from it.

If the building can be read as a rhetorical 'text', displaying its figural tropes as 'showing', then it immediately speaks in one way, in the light of its form but in another in its figuration which makes it rhetorical. This is a recurrent feature of postmodern architecture. The presence of rhetoric generates a problem of belief, given that the beholder is confronted by two discourses or 'codes'. The rhetorical code is doubly difficult because it is necessarily from behind the fan, despite its need for a public face for its 'showing'.

'A rhetorical figure is a situation in which language means something other than what it says, a violation of the code. But lest that violation introduce a radical undecidability to linguistic situations, leading us to wonder how we could ever know whether language means what it appears to be saying, these violations are codified, as a repertoire of highly artificial and conventional devices.... The very notion of rhetorical effects - the possibility of metaphorical signification, for example - requires there to be a distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning and hence the beginnings of a rhetorical code.' (J Culler 1981, 46)

The poststructural surge of interest in rhetoric as other-speaking has led to an even greater concern for the significance of metaphor as a fundamental attribute of the sign (J. Culler 1981, 209-100). Traditionally, metaphor was understood as part of rhetoric, one of its tropes, along with allegory, metonymy, synecdoche and so on. But metaphor has become the figure of figures, and in the form of allegory, a key postmodernistic trope.

In the context here, postmodern architectural rhetoric has been characterized by the notion of *theatricality*, derived from Michael Fried's theory of objecthood. And that
theatricality has been powerfully expressed in the sculptural and gestural attributes of postmodern architecture, linking it with meaning which in turn implicates the constant dialogue between form and language. Lessing’s conversation between image and text and then gesture as meaning in the eighteenth century, reverberates still into the postmodern. In Part Two, in the discussion of the manner in which the postmodern building signifies, poststructuralist architecture is seen as a theatrical violation of the rational grid, especially in the form of the bend and the fold. The Modernist sanctity of the straight line and the right angle arranged in the contrasting masses of the horizontal and the vertical – Corbusier’s machine ethic – is traduced by the return of swing and movement, so that the Baroque becomes a significant postmodernist precursor, and which locus classicus finds a notable theoretical exposition in Robert Venturi’s *Contradiction and Complexity in Architecture* (1966).

**VISUAL METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY**

Metaphor has already been extensively dealt with in Chapter Two which established the metaphorical nature of the sign arising from the discussion of the semiotic significance of the work of Saussure and Peirce. Metaphor was also dealt with in Chapter Four in relation to the position of the analytical tradition in philosophy in regarding metaphor as cognitively non-propositional and therefore discursively and semantically unreliable. As a response it was proposed that since there is no ‘language of architecture’ (or of any of the other plastic arts) which might otherwise encapsulate architectural meaning, but only immanent and emergent language from architectural form, then that architectural meaning must reside in visual metaphor which
becomes linguistic when 'read' rhetorically by a beholder [Fig 7]. Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia, New Orleans, is a conspicuous example of the tendency in early architectural postmodernism towards what is normally designated as New Historicism. The architectural conceit here is in an almost ludicrously exaggerated version of classical Romanesque complete with metal orders containing hidden lights and strident colour effects. The faces on the wall are of Moore himself. Perhaps no other early postmodern building exemplifies better with its faux historical references the capacity to become a version of Fried’s theatricality and contrivance as architectural rhetoric.

The insistence of poststructuralist theory in breaking out of this kind of iconographical autonomy has resulted in a resurgent interest in metaphor as the paradigmatic postmodern trope located within the rhetorical stance (J. Culler 1981, 210). In architectural terms, the rise of metaphor in postmodern architectural rhetoric against the dominance of metonymy in Modernist building design is very clear (C. Jencks 1981, 40-52). The basis of Charles Jencks’s now famous ‘double-coding’ in The Language of Postmodern Architecture is of course the ‘other-speaking’ of ironic metaphor. Equally clearly, the essentially referential nature of metaphor is always suggestive of meaning. In Postmodernism, reference is through the semantic analogue as another version of ‘other-speaking’, whilst in Modernism, Louis Sullivan’s dictum that form follows function (W. Curtis 1999, 47-49) resisted the possibility that building shape could or should produce meaning. In architecture, since there is no ‘language of architecture’, its metaphors must signify visually. It is therefore essential to establish which salient features unite linguistic and visual metaphor.

It is hardly possible to give a full, comprehensive and historical account of metaphor since the field, which includes philosophical, literary and cultural theory, is so large. The present overview, apart from Aristotle, confines itself to the modern discussion of metaphor, particularly in the twentieth century revival of interest in rhetoric and metaphor generally. Equally, the discussion of allegory is largely modern.

In Aristotle’s scheme, metaphor is placed firmly within the rubric of rhetoric. Within the five main divisions of rhetoric, metaphor is placed under Elocutio with its
overarching sense of style (*lexis*; R. Latham 1990, 165). Metaphor falls under the *figures* and is further classified as *trope* in which words can mean other than their literal meaning. Figures are sub-divided into figures of thought as well as tropes. Figures of thought are large-scale tropes or schemes. Significantly, Aristotle characterizes allegory as a figure of thought (R. Latham 1990, 178). In the *Rhetoric* during the discussion of metaphor under ‘*Style*’ (3.10), Aristotle identifies four kinds of metaphor, but concentrates mainly on the analogical form, which implies identity, where simile involves simply likeness (Aristotle 1991, 236). His definition of metaphor as principally analogical is further defined in the *Poetics*. ‘Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or by analogy, that is proportion.’ (Aristotle 1997, XX1, 41) The mechanism of transference (the Greek root of the word ‘metaphor’) is juxtaposition (Northrop Frye 1957, 124), when likeness of image or sense migrates to an adjacent term showing difference, but at the same time, similarity. Instantly, as may become clearer, the duck-rabbit appears.

Aristotle’s account of analogical metaphor as being in proportion is clearly fundamentally important. It leads to the formulation that as A:B, so C:D and that also B:D and D:B. His example makes the point. ‘Or again, as old age is to life, so is evening to day. Evening may therefore be called ‘the old age of the day’, and old age, ‘the evening of life’, or in the phrase of Empedocles, ‘life’s setting sun.’ (Aristotle 1997, XX1, 41-2) Since metaphor was seen as an aspect of rhetoric and rhetoric involved the prosecution of a logical argument or case, the proportionality in metaphor was understood to be logical and helped to indicate the case. An abstraction is made concrete. Aristotle says of metaphor in the *Rhetoric* ‘....it puts the subject before our eyes; for we should see things being done rather than imminent.’ (Aristotle 1991, 236) Aristotle’s appliance of proportion to metaphor represents an emphasis on its logical formulation, constrained by the demands of *decorum* and propriety. However much Aristotle invites the
prudent use of metaphor in order to illustrate the nature of the argument during the adversarial use of the enthymeme as the basic confrontational weapon of rhetoric as logically forensic (R. Latham 1990, 65), metaphor insists on dissembling. Despite Aristotle’s proportionality, metaphor, unconfined to rhetoric, remains a figure of ambivalence. Owen Barfield in Poetic Diction, suggested that the equivalence in metaphor may well be implicit within the context rather than being specified, and made all the more powerful for that (T. Hawkes 1972, Chap 5). In the sentence, ‘The keel ploughed the deep’, ‘keel’ is synecdochically attached as part of the implied ship whose progress is plough-like across the ocean, which in turn is metonymically linked to the earth of the field (D. Lodge 1977, 75-77). Within a context, this kind of implicature can be very powerful indeed. In Macbeth 111, 2, Macbeth says to his wife, ‘Light thickens; and the crow/ Makes wing to the rooky wood’. We know that the extraordinary metaphor ‘light thickens’ refers to the darkening at the end of the day because that is when crows fly home. But we also know that what is implied beyond the equivalence of light fading and becoming opaque at dusk is that blood also thickens. So the metaphor ‘light thickens’ refers to in the context of the play the murder of Malcolm, and the further implication that the darkness falling as light thickens is a metaphorical presentiment of evil. In a similar visual metaphor, the sticking-plaster imagery of Libeskind’s Jewish Museum [Fig 8] suggests that the body of the building, ‘body’ being metaphorical, has in some sense ‘suffered’. Beyond that, like ‘light thickens’, is the metaphorical suggestion of wounding and the metonymic association of the Museum’s ‘body’ with the inherently tragic element of Jewish history. The elusive ‘presence’ of ‘the tragic’ in the Jewish Museum is discussed in Part Two. It is important to note here the relation between metaphorical and metonymic meaning. Paul de Man’s submission cited earlier that in fact Marcel Proust’s figural imagery in the Recherche is metonymic first and metaphorical in terms of identity second, also applies to the architectural example of ‘sticking-plaster’ fenestration. The connection of the fenestration with the whole building as ‘body’ is part-to-whole, ‘touching’ and therefore contiguous and consequently metonymic. The metaphorical connotation of ‘wounding’, which is one clue to the condition of allegorical loss and mourning, comes second and reverberates as the tragic presence within the context of the
whole building, much as Owen Barfield had suggested about the larger significance of the context in linguistic metaphor.

The most comprehensive account of the relation between metaphor and metonymy is by Roman Jakobson in ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbance’. Jakobson establishes the bipolar opposition between the metaphorical and metonymic poles of language from the study of aphasic loss of function in stroke patients. The resulting dysfunction is bipolar in the sense that the loss of function either affects metonymic and metaphorical language use but not both and that the loss of one is compensated for by the dominance of the other. From Saussure, Jakobson suggests that metaphor is a version of *langue* (discussed in Chapter Two) and involves selection or substitution, whilst metonymy relates to *parole* and the process of combination (D. Lodge 1977, 74). This bipolarity can be further overlaid by the antiphonal nature, respectively, of the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic previously discussed here under ‘Continuity and Discontinuity’ in Chapter Two. In aphasia, the loss of one faculty typically produces the dominance of the other. Paradigmatic language use involves the code rather than the message itself and vice-versa for syntagmatic language use. ‘Paradigmatic’ is *not* used by Jakobson to mean ‘model’ in any sense (D. Lodge 1977, 74-77). So ‘code’ is the equivalent of grammatical and syntactic selection, whilst ‘message’ involves the arrangement and relation of words and terms appropriate for the meaning, the one dealing in similarity or equivalence and the other in contiguity (R. Jakobson 1956, 76). Thus poetic language as ‘selection’ is opposed to discursive language as ‘arrangement’. In the plastic arts, Surrealism is opposed to Cubism and so on. Always the bipolarity is between metaphorical meaning and metonymic association. In a later version, Jakobson opposes ‘referential’ language use to ‘metalinguistic’ language use which relate to metonymy and metaphor respectively, or discursive and realist versus poetic and figural. Famously, Jakobson says, ‘The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination.’ (R. Jakobson in T. Sebeok Ed 1960, 358, original emphasis) In other words, creative language use imposes the poetic on the realistic, as in James Joyce. However, Paul de Man, in speaking of Proust, shows that what was previously thought to be exclusively metaphorical, is in fact preceded by metonymy. This is precisely what is found here in the discussion of Libeskind’s fenestration; it is the
metonymic association which leads to the larger metaphorical meaning behind it. As insightful and influential as Jakobson’s model remains, its principal drawback is that the underlying oppositional model has been largely superseded by the procedures of Poststructuralism. For example, Jacques Derrida in ‘The Outside and the Inside’ in Of Grammatology, suggests that a frame of reference, that is, being a ‘frame’ by its very outsideness, moves forward in time at moments of supersedure and becomes the ‘inside’ of the new episteme (J. Derrida 1998, 30-44). Derrida’s sustained critique of Saussure is based on the limitations which Saussure’s langue / parole polarity has produced, notably in Jakobson. Derrida’s own model of external / internal framing is not bipolar because it implicates time, and does emphasize the intimate relationship and co-dependence of apparently opposed imperatives.

Paul de Man’s reversal of the primacy of metaphor in Proust in favour of that selfsame metaphorical attribute as being dependent on metonymy also emphasizes the inevitable reciprocity rather than polarity between the two (J. Culler 1981, 222). In terms of visual metaphor, the primacy of metonymy contiguously associates two or more elements which can secondarily produce ontological or existential metaphorical significance – Aristotle’s ‘identity’. Ernst Gombrich’s piece ‘Visual Metaphor’, works essentially by deriving narrative pre-texts from visual simile. Or in the case of architecture, Gombrich suggests that classical columns were visual metaphors for the human body or trees and that the representation of the tree trunk in the form of a column was essentially a simile (E. Gombrich ‘The Language of Architecture’ in E. Gombrich 1996, 228-234). Images are deciphered according to the supporting classical narrative source such as Ovid in Renaissance iconography, much as Lessing intimated in the Laocoon. However, it is visual metaphor rather than simile which draws in the other-speaking of allegory and which is required for the interpretation of postmodern, and particularly poststructuralist architecture. And in architectural semantics, visual metaphor entails the palimpsest-like relation of metaphor inscribed on metonymy as another version of the palimpsest, established by Craig Owens as the fundamental mechanism and imperative of Postmodernism.
It was Gombrich who established the canonical status of the duck-rabbit [Fig 9] in *Art and Illusion* by saying of it that we cannot experience alternative readings at the same time. The impossibility Gombrich refers to is the *inability* to address singularly a visual oxymoron like the duck-rabbit; two things in one thing at the same time. The ambiguity in metaphors involves, similarly, dealing with two things in one in which meaning oscillates back and forth like the rabbit and the duck. In a metaphor, if this oscillation 'inside' the figure or conceit becomes temporal, then potentially, the figure addresses the allegorical. W.J. Mitchell in writing about meta-pictures, pictures about pictures, of which the duck-rabbit is an example, maintains that meta-pictures are ‘...a kind of summary image...that encapsulates an entire episteme, a theory of knowledge.’ (W.J. Mitchell 1994, 49) Speaking further of meta-pictures, Mitchell says:

They are not merely epistemological models, but ethical, political, and aesthetic ‘assemblages’ that allow us to observe observers. In their strongest forms, they don’t merely serve as illustrations to theory; they picture theory.

In an important sense here, if ‘three-dimensional’ meta-pictures like the architectural ‘ruin’, say, of Frank Gehry’s original House made by the new postmodern addition which then becomes inevitably a duck-rabbit in metaphor, really ‘pictures theory’, then the theory it pictures must be ‘inside’ it as a form of immanence; as the emergence of language.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s interest in metaphor as an aspect of ordinary language use has already been noted. He was also fascinated by the duck-rabbit in the *Philosophical Investigations* and drew
his own schematic of it [Fig 10] in order to avoid making either duck or rabbit life-like (W.J. Mitchell 1994, 50). Wittgenstein’s schematic representation of the image served to unsettle psychological accounts of it, and render it philosophically speculative. It produces speculation on the relation between ‘inner’ language games deployed to deal with the problem of interpreting external visual phenomena. Wittgenstein seems to say that it is not a case of external visual phenomena being represented by ‘inner speech’, but rather that aspects of interpretation of images as a mental operation can only be conducted under the auspices of language, in which case they can be made sense of (W.J. Mitchell 1994, 52-3). Even so, Wittgenstein’s schematic is in one sense designed to test the anomaly that although the image is composed oxymoronically as two things in one, we see them sequentially one at a time. Although visually we see one, either duck or rabbit, mentally we know of the attached existence of the other. The metaphorical relation is then once more metonymic. In the absence of one ‘pole’, as Jakobson would represent the metaphor / metonymy aspect of the duck-rabbit, although absent as part, it is present in the whole. Equally in verbal metaphor, the ship / plough is the equivalent of the visual duck-rabbit. What the metaphorical nature of the metonymic parts of both verbal and visual metaphor achieves is to allow the reader or beholder to maintain contact between the ‘presence’ pole and the ‘absent-yet-present’ pole. This may be relatively trivial in the case of a duck-rabbit, but when metaphorical absence behind, say, architectural form is for example, ‘the tragic’, then it assumes a considerable existential significance. The duck/rabbit is in itself is a powerful indicator of the allegorical figure of absence and presence.

The ambiguity at the centre of metaphor caused by the existence of two terms which imply each other in their difference, I.A. Richards called vehicle and tenor in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (A. Ortony Ed 1988, 3). Richards is clear that meaning can only emerge from a context:

‘...any part of a discourse, in the last resort, does equally what it does only because the other parts of the surrounding, uttered or unuttered, discourse, and its conditions, are what they are.’ (I.A. Richards 1936, 10)
The insistence on context is highly relevant as it also is in the case of visual metaphor as the example of Libeskind's fenestration shows. Richards characterized the 'poles' of metaphor as tenor and vehicle where 'tenor' is taken to be the underlying idea to be transferred and the vehicle is the analogical equivalent or ground. (So as darkness approaches as tenor, so light thickens as vehicle.) Richards indicates clearly that the metaphorical meaning involves the interaction of both.

'...the co-presence of the vehicle and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly distinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without their interaction.'

(I.A. Richards 1936, 100 original emphasis)

Without the simultaneous presence of both at the same time, like the duck-rabbit, the third implied meaning from the interaction of the two cannot emerge (P. Ricoeur 1978, 81). And it is the context which allows the interpreted meaning to be propitious as Aristotle intended (C. Brooke-Rose 1958, 208). Thus in the present example, light thickening and suggesting blood cannot emerge without the context of the play Macbeth. Architecturally, the visual metaphors that function within the building's context means that the architectural context, which will be much greater than simply visual, needs further explication and is dealt with in Part Two. The basic significance of the vehicle and tenor formulation applies both linguistically and visually. In the fenestration example, the building as 'body' acts as the equivalent to the linguistic tenor and the transference to windows as sticking plaster is the equivalent vehicle. The interaction metaphorically generates 'wounding' or 'the tragic'.

The issue of order is important. Under Richard's scheme, the tenor precedes the vehicle. However, Owen Barfield in Poetic Diction suggested that the vehicle might be stated and the tenor, as the originating idea, might be only implied. ('Light thickens' implies the dusk which is only hinted at by the flight of the crow.) The possibility of ambiguity is at the heart of the metaphorical process, almost so that when it ceases to dissemble, then it loses what Aristotle called 'vividness' and thence our attention (T. Hawkes, 1972, Chap 5).
Instead of saying that A is like B or that A is B, the poet simply talks about B, without making any overt reference to A at all. You know, however, that he intends A all the time, or, better say that he intends an A; for you may not have a very clear idea of what A is and even if you have got an idea, somebody else may have a different one. This is generally called symbolism. (O. Barfield 1962, 107)

The further symbolism of the Jewish Museum's fenestration is expressed in long, extremely narrow windows which from the outside resemble slashes. By symbolic implication, then, as Barfield intimates about linguistic metaphor, the external metal cladding of the building becomes, metaphorically, skin.

VISUAL METAPHOR

Barfield's subjunctive 'may', hovering between vehicle and tenor, makes metaphor, philosophically at least, non-propositional. However, it is inescapable and has to be re-emphasized that in the present example of Daniel Libeskind's fenestration in the Jewish Museum, the symbolic connotation of 'wounding' can only be derived from the reading of visual metaphor, and a discursively analytical approach would fail to distinguish between what Paul de Man characterizes as 'Blindness and Insight' (P. de Man 1983, 102-141) [22]. The characteristic and salient features of visual metaphor are therefore the metaphorical foundations of postmodern architectural meaning.

It has already been suggested that a traditional iconographical approach which typically deals with the visual image as simile, leading to a narrative account of content and not immanence, will be of limited value in figuring postmodern architecture. However, it should be noted that since postmodern architecture is recursive, ironically or parodically revisiting earlier forms in time, an element of iconography is actually essential. Thus Zaha Hadid's typical use, for example, of steel and glass, both mimics and acknowledges the foundational importance of the Bauhaus. Or Peter Eisenman's House 1-X sequence both acknowledges and subverts with what might be called 'structural
'Cubism', the Purism of Corbusier's early villas. A recurrent feature of postmodern architectural semantics is its recursion to prior historical form.

What are the salient features of visual metaphor as might apply to postmodern architecture? The following sections are suggestive of those key characteristics.

Salient Features of Visual Metaphor

1. Linguistic metaphors can be literally falsified. Juliet is not the sun (W. Lycan 2000, 210). Visual metaphor cannot be falsified because it has no literal content or narrative. The metaphorical relation between visual elements is arbitrary and 'visually subjunctive'; arbitrary because the link between the window and the sticking plaster either convinces the audience of Fish's 'interpretive community' or it doesn't. Visual metaphors as well as being literally beyond falsification are also incapable of verification in its analytical sense precisely because of their metaphorically subjunctive nature.

2. Visual metaphor involves the association of at least two, and probably more, things which because associated visually, are necessarily contiguous because a comparison based on similarity or substitution is, especially in imagery, bound to involve juxtaposition or 'touch'. This makes the initial yoking of the two different but similar elements metonymic. In visual metaphor, the elements literally touch, like 'sticking-plaster' and 'skin'. Juxtaposition reinforces similarity as contiguity. 'Descriptively, all metaphors are similes.' (Northrop Frye 1957, 123-4) Even highly abstract linguistic substitution such as Keats's 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty' (Ode To A Grecian Urn), like visual substitution, depends on metonymic 'touch' in the juxtaposition (C. Jencks 1969, 13).

3. The visual sign is, in Jakobson's terms and in origin, syntagmatic (metonymic) and not paradigmatic (metaphorical) because it requires the juxtaposition of 'touch'. To be associated, visual elements, in order to become metaphorical, must
be in the same context and be contiguous (D. Lodge 1977, 80-81). The syntagmatic is non-substitutive and associative; that is, metonymic.

4. The visual sign may be initially based on the simile, and the vehicle, say the window, may be a sticking-plaster by resemblance, and would remain simile-like if there were no further or larger context to make the simile become fully metaphorical, as in 'wounding'. Many examples of the architectural simile exist in Late-Modernist architectural style (C. Jencks 1981, 74-5) such as the Foster 'Gherkin'. The simile in Late-Modernism is discussed here in 'The Architectural Trace' in Part Two.

5. Visual architectural metaphor will tend to be based on simile and metonym when first encountered. Aristotle's metaphors of proportion, immediately perceived as such, will apply largely to linguistic and analogical similarity (A. Ortony 1988, 188-200). The shift in visual metaphor from part to whole is in proportion to the shift from metonym to metaphor; from A as B to A is B.

6. Architectural metaphor as visual form will have neither narrative nor subject as referential meaning. 'Meaning' in an architectural context must reside in the public functioning of the building (R. Patterson Ed 2000, 66-75). The cultural function (belief, commemoration and so on) determines how the building signifies and indeed may change through time. Sacred buildings, for example, such as churches may become redundant and be converted to secular use as apartments. The building's use provides the context for its symbolic significance. Significantly, the redundant church becomes 'de-allegorized'. An apartment at its east end would no longer allegorise on light, hope, birth and rebirth, nor the west end represent any longer death, resignation and darkness. This social and cultural context is discussed further in Part Two. The large, holistic allegorical significance is inflected by the building's metonymic and metaphorical tropes. Part to whole, the visual metaphors as 'significant form' suggest and associate with holistic meaning which in the example of commemorative architecture may be allegorical. Metonymic and metaphorical visual tropes as parts oscillate with and between holistic meaning. Within rhetoric, this oscillation, which drives meaning and significance, is between the tropic and the figural; between specific
‘empirical’ detailing suggestive of metaphor and the larger figural meaning of the whole building as an abstract idea like allegory.

7. As allegorical, the building will ‘contain’ commentary and other-speaking or parlante which is an aspect of rhetorical enunciation or ‘showing’, and which is ‘instigated’ by visual metaphor. The allegorical itself is not necessarily visual, but rather, as temporal, conducts a figural conversation between past and present.

8. Visual metaphor is characterized by what in conversation would be called implicature. That is, something is said ‘as if’ it meant something else (W. Lycan 2000, 190). H.P. Grice’s theory of implicature has a series of rules designed to avoid the ambiguity of implied meaning such as ‘Do not say what you believe to be false’. Nevertheless, says Grice, there are grammatically acceptable sentences which insist on defying the rules. ‘There’s the door’ literally indicates the door, but in speaking ‘as if’, it implies the imperative ‘You should leave’ without actually saying so, and despite the fact that ‘There’s the door’ is not conventionally metaphorical (H.P. Grice 1989, 50). Metonymic visual detailing in buildings such as sticking-plaster fenestration is rather like ‘There’s the door’. It implicates a secondary meaning without actually stating it. The equivalent of the conversation in which ‘There’s the door’ occurs in the architectural context is the conversation between building and beholder. Sticking-plasters and gashes as windows are also clear examples of Austin’s ‘infelicitous’, discussed earlier, and in which the announcement of the ‘hereby’ by the architect is almost tangible.

9. If metaphorical or metonymic transfer is to be effective when A:B, then some of the salient features of B must be in A. Following Barfield and Grice, the analogical salient features of B in A may be implied, or A itself may be implied by the salient features of B, as ‘keel’ implies the unstated ‘ship’.

Fig 11
Libeskind’s metallic exterior to the Jewish Museum as ‘skin’ has consistently exposed riveting around the windows where the main panels as cladding are ‘invisibly’ attached. The immediate effect is one of ‘suturing’. Then, if you see ‘stitches’, you also see ‘skin’, in turn allowing the wounding connotation. The attributes of one are associated with the other, again initially, as a metonymic transfer.

These ‘mechanics’ of the metaphorical transference from visual form to meaning, which is linguistically resolved, are of fundamental significance for the semantics of non-representative form and configuration. In the case of Michael Graves Portland Oregon Building [Fig 11], the spectator needs to pick up on the classical referencing. The front of the building presents two ‘fluted’ columns which might or might not be ionic. Along both sides is a heavily contrived frieze confirming the classical inference. However, the structure itself is a perfect geometrical cube, referring to the function and form imperative of Modernism. In other words, it refers to its own source in the Modernist movement as much to deliberately phoney classicism. In this way, it folds back in time towards its own origin and towards the allegorical.

Allegory

The relation between metonymy and metaphor in allegory itself, that is, allegory as the fundamental postmodernist impulse, is obviously crucial (C. Owens in D. Prezioni Ed 1998, 317-20). [Fig 11] The allegorical nature of the postmodern was discussed here in Chapter Two. Jakobson proposed that poetic Romanticism correlates with metaphor and that it is metonymy which engages with the more modernist prosodic possibilities of Realism in the novel. When metaphor is imposed on metonymy, what results is the ‘poetic function’. There is of course a further palimpsest here, two things in one like the duck-rabbit, but in this instance separated by time with metonymy as prior. There is also an implicit notion of writing, particularly as ‘writing over’, not as the physical act of reworking a text, but as the imposition of one sense of a text on another. The
superimposition of one text on another as a concept rather than a physical process, is the imposition of a secondary meaning on a primary one; almost an act of theft, certainly one of appropriation (C. Owens 1998, 317). The contiguity between the two as ‘touching’ suggests metonymy, and the substitution of one meaning for another, implicates metaphor. It has already been established that the nature of postmodern culture is recursive; that after Greenberg and Fried and the end of the Avant-Garde, the only way forward was backwards towards an ironic and subversive revisiting of Modernism, seen powerfully in the appropriation of early Modernist forms by the architectural poststructuralism, for example, of Rem Koolhaas and Zaha Hadid. This constant seeking after contact with the Modern by the postmodern is part of the contiguity or ‘touch’ between an irretrievable past sought by a retrospective postmodern present constantly searching for its source, origin and beginning in its progenitor, Modernism itself. The sense of the elegiac emerging from this reach back into past time is an absolutely essential aspect of the allegorical which is foundational to Postmodernism. As well as tracing the rise of allegory as a pre-eminent postmodern trope, this section also considers allegory as ‘other speaking’ and assesses the implications of Charles Baudelaire’s sardonic treatment of the nature of irony and Walter Benjamin’s important work on the significance of the ruin and its implications for postmodern allegory, architectural and otherwise.

However, the normal contact between the two, one being metonymic (Modernist) and the other being metaphorical (Postmodernism), is immediate and simultaneous, as in the case of the oxymoron and duck-rabbit. But in allegory, the contact between the two is distanced and separated by time because the allegorical constantly seeks the temporal. Allegory must oscillate ceaselessly between a present now and an absent past; ‘.... throughout its history it has functioned in the gap between a present and a past which, without allegorical reinterpretation, might have remained foreclosed. A conviction of the remoteness of the past, and a desire to redeem it for the present – these are its two most fundamental impulses.’ (C. Owens 1998, 325) The very impossibility of redeeming the past whilst it remains its presiding impulse and ‘desire’ makes allegory elegiac and always within the vicinity of the tragic. The impossibility of the redemption of a lost past
also accounts for the hortatory and didactic nature of the allegorical. We should also add that as an act of reinterpretation and appropriation, allegory also reinvents what it purloins, and in that sense is always some kind of commentary. Often that commentary, which approximates to a kind of historical attitude, is ironic or parodic as in postmodern architecture. Baudelaire, in 'On the Essence of Laughter' (C. Baudelaire 1964, 147-165) discusses the satirical nature of irony and Paul de Man links it indissolubly to allegory (P. de Man 1996, 208-228). Allegory does not simply proffer some pre-text as narrative which lies behind the image and gesture as Lessing assumed, but is disposed towards an anxiety of discourse, because of its imperative to convince the beholder, almost as a series of sententious moral observations. There is no doubt that this has been a principal cause of the critical disapproval of allegory at the opening of Romanticism until its revival in the twentieth century (W. Benjamin 1977, 160-163).

Allegory as a trope, maintaining the distinction between it and Craig Owens's version of 'the allegorical' as an impulse or imperative, fell into disrepute and disapprobation largely at the hands of Coleridge in England. In effect, the primacy of allegory through the Middle Ages, into the Renaissance and Baroque periods and on into eighteenth century Enlightenment was overthrown both in German criticism and in Britain by the Romantic sensibility. What came to replace allegory was the symbol. This revolution in taste has been exhaustively documented (R. Welleck and A. Warren 1973, 186-191). Nevertheless, the nature of that debate remains essential for an appreciation of the characteristics of the allegorical. It was Coleridge who produced the fullest theory of the symbol in the Biographia Literaria and The Statesman's Manual, both issued within the context of the influence of Goethe and Schelling (I.A. Richards 1960, 242). Goethe had written:

'There is a great difference between a poet's seeking the particular from the general and his seeing the general in the particular. The former gives rise to allegory, where the particular serves only as an instance or example of the general; the latter, however, is the true nature of poetry: the expression of the particular without any thought of, or reference to, the general. Whoever grasps the particular in all its vitality also grasps the general, without being aware of it, or only becoming aware of it a later stage.'
The effectiveness of Goethe's proposition here is in the chiasmic opposition ('seeking the particular from the general and his seeing the general in the particular'). In Coleridge this becomes a characterization of the symbol which is '...characterized by a translucence of the special [the species] in the individual, and of the general [genus] in the special....above all, by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.' (Welleck and Warren 1973, 189) The use of the term 'translucence' inferring transparency and the passage of light and illumination, is in stark contrast to Spenser's famous description of allegory as 'darke conceit' (Spenser's Preface to The Fairie Queene J.C. Smith and E. de Selincourt, Eds 1983) [23]. Goethe's representation of allegory as the specific being part of the general, of course makes the relation synecdochal, and makes the particular an instance of the general. The symbol will fire instantaneously where allegory always has a temporal gap between the allegorical figure and its prior reference in which there is an implied commentary, thus requiring some element of either implicit or explicit exegesis. Edward Honig, whose own book Dark Conceit (1959) was an important milestone in the restoration of allegory and titled from Spenser's Preface, characterizes allegory thus: '...allegory, a more extensive figure that lends itself to narrative, comes to be known for its hortatory and prosaic qualities.' (E. Honig 1959, 4) The Romantic Imagination becomes intolerant of allegory's moral exegesis in favour of the instant substitution found in the symbol and which resulted from Coleridge's own theory of the Imagination as distinct from the Fancy (I.A. Richards 1960, 242). But the Romantic insistence on instantaneity, met again later in Greenberg and Fried's Modernism, fails to acknowledge the constant search in the allegory for a past which remains elusively irrecoverable, and the source of its indelible sadness (W. Benjamin 1977, 66). It might then speculatively be said that the allegorical imperative of Postmodernism is itself an attempt at the resurrection of the irredeemable, albeit parodically and ironically [24]. Then the gaudy quality of early postmodern historicist architecture takes on the figural sadness of the clown. In the revolutionary fervour of the Romantic Imagination, the symbol, with its instantaneous metonymic contact between image and concept, embraced the possibility of the sublime in nature, while allegory
metaphorically dallied in a past landscape in which the artificial in the form of the ruin postured in the presentness of the Picturesque (Caroline van Eck in J. Birksted Ed, 2000, 247).

Although Craig Owens in his foundational text is justified in selecting allegory's temporality and the forlorn imperative towards the redemption of the past as nostalgic empathy as two of its principal characteristics, it also always also demonstrates the attribute of 'other-speaking'. In another key work in the twentieth century reinstatement of allegory, Angus Fletcher in Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (1964) represents allegory thus: 'In the simplest terms, allegory says one thing and means another.' (A. Fletcher 1964, 2) In many ways, this remains allegory's supreme quality and one to which the instantaneity of the symbol cannot aspire. It demands some discussion. Other-speaking is most obviously represented by irony. But allegory is not necessarily ironic as speaking otherwise, whereas irony implies not only something different or 'other' within the metaphor, but a directly opposite meaning from that depicted or spoken. What is said or depicted and what equally is implied as a form of 'doubling', rather like Charles Jencks's architectural 'double-code' (C. Jencks 1981, 6-8), comes from the traditions of classical rhetoric. The Greek origin of the word 'allegory' is in two parts; allos meaning 'other' and agoreuein or 'speaking in public'. Producing a coded message where a speech said one thing and meant another for those in a position to recognize and receive the double meaning as literally 'speaking other', was an instance of metaphorical rhetoric. This form of discourse, which as an oxymoron is both conspicuously public and deliberately misleading, and is at the same time dramatically private is known as allegoria (F. Orton 1994, 157). Allegory's capacity to dissemble about an existing and therefore by definition, prior, text by a coded disguise is allegoresis (M. Quilligan 1979, 97). The process of allegoresis is clearly in part exegetical, and in that sense has an imperative towards text as writing (W. Benjamin 1977, 175-6). 'Text' may of course include visual forms such as architecture or painting where visual configuration confers meaning as immanent language from the form. The notion of allegory as an extended series of metaphors, which then represent a 'figure' as part of a 'scheme', is Quintillian's (Oratoria V111 vi, in J. McQueen 1970, 48-9). The very notion
of linked or extended metaphors implies the linguistic in allegory, even in visual form as previously suggested here. It is the recognition of the figure in visual metaphorical form which brings a change of meaning. And the 'figure' arises from the reference to the originating source or pre-text. The 'figure' in an architectural context is the accumulation of visual metaphor, both external and internal which as synecdochal tropes relate the parts to a consistent aesthetic whole. Naturally, in allegory as language, the originating text is revealed, and the subtext or allegorical 'other meaning', concealed. So the *Paradise Lost* of John Milton's poem is not only a biblical paradise in its source, but it also 'comments' as a subtext on the loss of the Republican ideal in the face of the Restoration of the Monarchy (Tom Paulin, *The Guardian*, November 19th, 2005). And Frank Gehry's own Santa Monica House, for example, comments on the 'ruin' of the original shingle house by the impositions of modernity and is discussed at greater length in Part Two.

The sense of a figural unfolding in which the beholder becomes increasingly open to and aware of the concatenation of figural parts within a larger metaphorical whole, brings the spectator to the threshold of the allegorical. But whereas Milton's subtext of mourning among the perceived follies of a restored monarchy is carefully concealed, in an architectural context, the 'clues' must be empirically there as part of the physical structure in the case of the building. The concealment here is in the relation between the parts which doubles up the meaning. The architectural threshold referred to here is plainly not the literal entrance to the building, although that in itself has fascinating Janus-like possibilities. The threshold to the architectural meaning is a figural doubling. That doubling (Jencks's 'double-code', Baudelaire's 'dedoublement') is part of the palimpsest-like nature of postmodernist reference. The *frame* of that reference governs what is 'inside' the allegorical. Inside the allegorical frame will be those elements inimitable to allegorical experience. The essence of allegory lies in memory and remembrance and mourning for, and loss of, some valued aspect of past time constantly sought in the tragic frame of redemption. The photograph, as both Barthes and Frederick Jameson have pointed out is, in being just a banal memento, the gatekeeper between past and present and as such the perfect cipher of the postmodern. Its very banality in
capturing some ordinary moment of a treasured past gives it the intense nostalgia of the allegorical.

Equally, a condition of the allegorical is that its figural imagery becomes language in a didactic commentary on its origin. The beholder’s response to the building has to be one of perception and recognition of the doubling [14]. The initial confrontation obviously involves the appearance of the exterior of the building. It may hold important prompts as Libeskind’s Berlin Museum demonstrates and as is also the case with the church and cathedral. (The symbolic significance of the church is discussed in Part Two.) The exterior may indeed be critically important and sufficient in itself to invoke the allegorical which is the case in Gehry’s Nederlanden Building in Prague.

In his section ‘Allegory and Trauerspiel’ in The Origins of German Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin cites the ruin as the archetypal signifier of the allegorical. The ruin ‘naturally’ symbolizes the temporal oxymoron of the past as an actual physical presence, although its existential condition is one of absence. The ruin, as either authentic or folly, becomes, as it were, the paradigm of decay.

‘The word ‘history’ stands written on the countenance of nature in the character of transience. The allegorical physiognomy of the nature-history, which was put on stage in the Trauerspiel, is present in reality in the form of the ruin. In the ruin history has physically merged into the setting. And in this guise history does not assume the process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible decay. Allegory therefore declares itself to be beyond beauty. Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things.’ (W. Benjamin 1977, 177-8)

In architectural terms, Frank Gehry’s House immediately assumes a prominent theoretical position as a manifestation of ‘ruin’ and is given added poignancy by the fact that ruins are usually architectural. In a wider sense, the recursive nature of Postmodernism, which reveals itself as historicist revisiting, makes what it visits and historically emerges from, in this case, a site of conceptual ruin. The postmodern haunts the ruins of Modernism
both as source and continuum; both part of the Modernism of modernity and a subversion of it.

Of course, what is ruined by the literal decay of the ruin as a remnant is an ideal beauty compromised by time, so that ruins become *memento mori*. In a sense, the ideal becomes ruined by the reality of decay. Kant's account of the beautiful in *The Critique of Pure Reason* is dependent on judgements of taste arising from the understanding united with the imagination (J. Derrida 1987, 70-71). However, Kant also addresses the problem of the parergon in relation to the beautiful. The parergon is a form of supplement or addition and raises the difficulty of whether it is then extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the beautiful object. As an example, Kant speaks of the drapery of a classical statue as a parergon. Is the drapery an essential quality of the piece or rather a kind of external adornment? The drapery then might supplement the statue but as an *hors d'oeuvre* (J. Derrida, 57).

What we might expect from this in respect of postmodern architecture is the addition of historicist traces, particularly on the outside, which act as rhetorical adornment, self-consciously and parodically applied, as in Michael Graves's Portland, Oregon building with its 'stick-on' pseudo-classical ornamentation signifying as a supplementary and very knowing parergon. And of course, what the 'ergon' or essence is, stripped of its postmodernist accoutrements, is nothing less than a version of Modernism. The historicist nature of the parergon, or supplementary adornment, relates the postmodern building to a Modernist past 'ruined' by time. The building then becomes vibrantly ironic in 'saying' one thing whilst implying its opposite, that is, its residual Modernism in the sense of the postmodern as being part of the modern.

From the moment that the ironic appears, it becomes difficult to separate it from the sardonic. It is a recurrent feature of postmodern architecture that its palimpsest between itself and its historicist past is in some sense a form almost of mockery, and that somewhere in the postmodernist historicist detail there is an echo of laughter. Although allegory and irony share the same structure of saying one thing, but meaning another (P. de Man 1996, 209), their respective imperatives towards the tragic and laughter require some reconciliation.
De Man acknowledges Baudelaire as the innovator of modernist irony (P. de Man, 174). Baudelaire’s essay in *The Painter of Modern Life* about irony – ‘On the Essence of Laughter’ deals with the disconcerting circumstance of the man who trips and falls. What the spectator should feel, which is a concern for the plight of the man who stumbled and fell, is overwhelmed by the irresistible impulse to laugh. In this moment of *Schadenfreude*, the potentially tragic invokes the opposite condition of the sardonic (Charles Baudelaire 1964, 149). The implication is that the fallen condition as a result of the biblical Fall is what Baudelaire might want to call ‘the heroism of modern life’. The sardonic observer must himself fall. It is only in metaphorically ‘falling’ that the modern man recognizes his inauthenticity and comes to laugh at it, and in doing so, laughs at himself. The man who has stumbled and fallen then becomes doubled (‘dedoublement’) into the authentic and the inauthentic (C. Baudelaire 154, de Man 1996, 214). As well as the allegorical, there is a key sense of *chiasmus* here. What enters as the comic in a figural sense exits as the tragic. In chiasmus, the relationship ABBA runs (R. Latham 1990, 33). Thus the comic [laughter] in reality is tragic [fall] and the tragic as fall is comic and produces laughter. This kind of metamorphosis applies to postmodern architecture. What, for example, may appear in Libeskind’s Jewish Museum as an oddly comic ‘sticking-plaster’ window, ironically implicates the tragic sense of ‘wounding’ and allegorizes between the dialectical opposition of the two. In much of early postmodern architecture, the theatricality of its punning and doubling takes the form of ‘loud’ historical referencing. This is the element of ‘clowning’ concealing the elegiac, but behind the rhetoric of self-annunciation is the also concealed ruin of history; a shift from major to minor (S. Langer 1953, 27); the sardonic laughter at the deceived spectator; the gaudy ironic parergon of architectural form dressing and covering the allegorical.

**INTERPRETATION**

The way in which any cultural object might be interpreted requires a distinction to be drawn between a literal text and a signifying object. A text, that is the writing of words,
can be thought legitimately as subject to interpretation because as a form of words or discourse, it can be thought to normally have a meaning. On the other hand, a cultural object such as a sculpture or building cannot be subject to interpretation in the same way because its objecthood precludes words and therefore direct textual meaning. However, such an object clearly signifies as Roland Barthes demonstrates in *Mythologies*, ranging from a Citroen car, the face of Greta Garbo or the Eiffel Tower. So it might be suggested that Daniel Libeskind’s Berlin Jewish Museum confronts the tragic, and that this is a major part of its act of signifying. The case then that has to be made, and is made here, is that the tragic impulse conveyed by the museum is a product of the metonymic and metaphorical relation which represents its visual metaphor. This significance is ‘read’ hermeneutically and phenomenologically as latent language from the philosophical underpinning developed in Chapter Four. However, the spectator who stands addressing the building cannot be allowed simply his own reading of it since that reading may be altogether too solipsistic. Some further kind of justification is required which has to be in the form of some theory of interpretation. That theoretical justification is best found in the interpretative practices of literary theory. This section traces the important movements in literary theory, principally from Practical Criticism to Reception Theory. This produces the justifying procedure of Stanley Fish’s ‘interpretive community’.

Works of art associated with the tropes of visual form identified here such as metaphor, allegory or irony and so on, are often spoken of as ‘having’ ironic or allegorical undertones – the *litotes* of ironic understatement. They do not. Allegory, for example, is not ‘in’ the building. ‘Where’ allegory ‘is’ remains deeply problematical. The vast literature concerned with how, say, a metaphor is not read simply as a literal meaning but is read as meaning otherwise continues to grow (W. Lycan 2000, 208). The questions associated with the nature of allegory in particular might be seen as category errors. Allegory does not have an existential ‘is’ or a locative ‘where’. In fact, the philosophical, cognitive or linguistic implications of what allegory might or might not ‘be’ are not of direct concern here. What is clear, however, is that metaphorical meaning does not inhere in an object but is a form of *response* which emerges from the matrix of authorial intention, readership and text. In the case of visual form, ‘text’ might be taken
as the equivalent of, or to subsume, visual form. The art object could be understood semiotically to be textual in some way since it yields meaning. But it has to be insisted that it does not ‘contain’ language inherently as the language ‘of’ architecture or whatever, because then we might just as well start talking about ‘the language of cars’ or ‘the language of toys’. Toys and cars may well signify in culturally important ways, but they do not have a language of their own. What they have is style and style is not a language. The textual nature of the art object, as Heidegger and Gadamer have proposed, can only be received hermeneutically and phenomenologically as immanence. Thus we have language from, but not the language of, architecture. And the source and origin of the reception of meaning of an art object is in visual metaphor and not in the so-called language ‘of’ that object. In the introduction to The Language of Images, W.J.T. Mitchell reminds us of the ‘enduring formulation’ of ut pictura poesis, and that despite the radical category error of conflating and mixing the visual and the verbal, critical discourse continues to insist on doing so (W.J.T. Mitchell 1980, 3). The tripartite nature of the sign, including the special sense of ‘text’, means that meaning is a relation and is not hypostacized into objectivity. And the tripartite sign, rather than Saussure’s binary sign, re-emphasizes the fundamental importance of Peirce’s triadic signifier discussed in Chapter One here.

The primary task is to introduce a proper scepticism about the term and the process of interpretation itself which might lead eventually to a statement about its nature and status. In Michael Fried’s criticism of Minimalism, the work became theatrical because it became an object, and because as such its space of address was a point of contact with spectatorship and its duration rather than the autonomous immediacy of the Kantian thing in itself (Yve-Alain Bois 1983 in R. Krauss et al, Eds, 1987, 369). This kind of autonomous criticism associates strongly with not only Modernism (as opposed to the essential referential nature of Postmodernism) but in the critical traditions of the twentieth century and earlier. It is striking how Fried’s identification with the simultaneity of the moment (‘Presentness is grace.’ The closing sentence of ‘Art and Objecthood’) allies his position with the symbol rather than allegory in the light of the earlier discussion. And it is the allegorical, not the symbol, which comes to typify the postmodern in what Craig Owens calls ‘the allegorical imperative’. Fried’s insistence that
the beholder respond to form and surface rather than subject almost mitigates the need for interpretation at all in the presence and experience of the work in and as itself. Interpretation on the other hand always implies the paraphrase or a new version of what was originally there in the work. And the paraphrase as what the work is about is of course a palimpsest as a discourse on an earlier text which gives it an allegorical resonance. Indeed, Northrop Frye contends that the logical resting place of criticism is precisely the allegorical itself (Northrop Frye 1957, 89). That allegory and what we are calling interpretation are sisters is clear. 'It is as though allegory is precisely that mode which makes up for the distance, or heals the gap, between the present and a disappearing past, which without interpretation, would otherwise be irretrievable and foreclosed...' Joel Fineman in R. Krauss et al. 1987, 375)

If we compare the postmodern critical imperative as a concern with the metaphorical, temporal and referential, condensing into the allegorical, with the Modernist preoccupation with significant form marginalizing content and at least resisting interpretation, then what is meant by 'interpretation' becomes highly ambiguous. Interpretation is evidently a fundamental human impulse which is unavoidable. The difficulty with it as a concept is that it comprises a centre of literary tradition which assumes that meaning is always interior to the text, somehow as a residue of authorial intention. Susan Sontag’s attempt in ‘Against Interpretation’ to cut through the accretions of interpretation in order that criticism of the art work, especially the literary, should ‘....show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means.’ (S. Sontag in E. Fernie, Ed, 1996, 222 original emphasis) returns us promptly to the problem of Kant’s parergon, and what the ‘is’ of the work really is. It seems though that interpretation in some fashion is inevitable. The source for a model of interpretation must lie in the familiar contours of literary criticism.

Modern criticism begins with T.S. Eliot, I.A. Richards, William Empson and F.R. Leavis (G. Watson 1973, 168-207). The indelible imprint of Richards (The Meaning of Meaning 1923, The Principles of Literary Criticism 1924 and Practical Criticism 1924) created the ground on which Leavis later established the modus operandi of modernist criticism as ‘close reading’. Known universally as Practical Criticism, close reading was
empirically technical and exegetical. The journal of Practical Criticism had the forensic title of Scrutiny. In many ways, Leavis's single most influential book remains *The Great Tradition*. It is unapologetically judgemental in establishing the canon of English novelists from Jane Austen to D.H. Lawrence. Apart from the canonical *ex cathedra* judgements about the moral seriousness of the authors included (F.R. Leavis 1962, 10), the book establishes the interiority and autonomy of the text. Leavis's successors in close reading, the New Critics, disparaged 'the intentional fallacy' (varieties of possible authorial intention) and 'readership' (varieties of possible readings) in favour of what is incontrovertibly present in the text as objective meaning. So supreme was the autonomy and hegemony of the text that both writer and reader were marginalized by the authority of the words as written.

The great change came with Structuralism in the 1950s and 1960s which dislodged the autonomy of the text as the keystone of criticism (D. Lodge 1979, 57-65). Structuralism, previously referred to here, established a second order of interpretation, another doubling, in which the presence of a cultural subtext subverted traditional views of autonomy by positing a semantic deep structure. Fried's defence of autonomy in painting, in particular as the apotheosis of surface over object, chimes historically as a parallel defence of interiority. The Structuralist practice of almost archaeologically exposing layers of subtext amounts to a kind of reinscription, another palimpsest, reinforcing Frye's position that the critical act as commentary is inevitably of the allegorical.

Poststructuralist criticism, such as Barthes's has already been considered here and will not be rehearsed again. However, the impetus of what has become known as Reception Theory as an account of criticism as readership (T. Eagleton 1997, 64) is considered to be highly significant for the kind of allegorical reading of postmodern architecture proposed here. Reception Theory as an account of readership not only destabilizes the central tenet of traditional criticism — that of the autonomous interiority of the text — but also renders meaning as subject to historical contingency. What Reception Theory emphatically does not dispense with, however, is a close attention to textual evidence, but hermeneutically derived as in the hermeneutical circle.

E.D. Hirsch's work *Validity In Interpretation* (1967) makes a distinction between 'meaning' and 'significance'. Following Husserl's phenomenological intentionality,
Hirsch proposes that meaning is synonymous with intentionality which then becomes transcedentally objective as the author’s ‘ideal’ position. However, that does not prevent a plurality of interpretations which may indeed cascade through time. What is current interpretation at different given points in time represents only that particular significance; the objectively original source, that of intention from the author, remains a constant through time and is the meaning (T. Eagleton 1997, 58). On the other hand, Gadamer, following Heidegger rather than Husserl, suggests that authorial intention does not exhaust the possibilities of meaning [25]. Gadamer, unlike Hirsch, insists that interpretation as conversation between reader and author is not only historically specific, but valid for and in its time as meaning, not simply significance. The line drawn in the sand here between interpretation prior to and subsequent to Gadamer is highly significant. The distinction is between an objective reading of the words as written and the alternative that meaning may indeed be subject to historical change.

Gadamer’s Heideggeran concern with historical interpretation, however powerful and inspirational, restricts his attention to works of the past, whereas a fully-fledged interpretative model needs to be able to deal with contemporary new work. Reception Theory moves modern theory and criticism to the reader where the previous focus had been, as in Practical and new Criticism, exclusively on the text. Reception theory incorporates Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics. Barthes’s rhetorical Death of the Author has the destination of the text as the reader, and Wolfgang Iser’s The Act of Reading (1978) has the text as multi-layered codes, which in deciphering, readers effectively ‘read’ themselves (T. Eagleton 1997, 67-71). This underlying notion that ‘critical understanding proceeds through the ways of self-consciousness’ (J. Culler 2001, 132) is arguably adopted most radically by Stanley Fish.

Fish is not the only radical voice of poststructuralist criticism. Others, such as Stephen Greenblatt in The Forms of Power and the Power of Forms (1982) introduced the notion of ‘New Historicism’ in criticism, and specifically reinvented the place of biography as emblematic of the cultural milieu in which the work was produced, it seems almost in defiance of his teacher, the New Critic W.J.K. Wimsatt, creator of the Intentional Fallacy. Critics such as Fish and Greenblatt may represent an eclectic critical moment after the impact of French Poststructuralism and which Eagleton characterizes as ‘After Theory’
Fish asserts that readership is interpretation. He denies the possibility of a fixed, timeless meaning of the work derived from authorial intention. Instead, what a work means is nothing more than the cumulative discourse of previous, present and future accounts of the work. The meaning then becomes historical and diachronic rather than paradigmatic and synchronic. In a sense, the meaning, as an accumulation of readings, evolves (T. Eagleton 1997, 74). There is another fascinating sense of chiasmus here. Barthes’s ‘Death of the Author’ implies not only the resurrection of the reader, but also that authors, in being ‘written’ by their accumulated cultural baggage, are in fact, ‘readers’ in that sense and that readers of texts, in ‘inscribing’ their interpretative strategies on to the text, become ‘writers’. In accordance with what has already been said here in relation to Heideggerian immanence, Fish proposes that a text in itself has no determinate meaning and only becomes meaningful on being read through the strategies of the reader. This meaning is phenomenologically in potentia (J.A. Cuddon 1999, 726). Fish’s objections to the Omniscient Author, the deus ex machina, echoes Michel Foucault’s representation of the author in ‘What Is An Author?’ as an ideological construct which reverses the historic role of the author as ‘discourse’ into an individual rather than part of an available collective meaning, as in a writer called ‘Homer’ for example. ‘We are used to thinking that the author is so different from other men, and so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely. The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works....One can say that the author is an ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function’. (C. Harrison and P. Woods, Eds, 1995, 927)

The sense of cultural meaning being the product of a public rather than a private process is reinforced by Stanley Fish’s concept of ‘interpretive communities’. In order to meet the charge against Reception Theory of critical solipsism – that any interpretation is as valid as any other by any reader – Fish’s interpretive communities allow readers to align themselves into appropriate reading strategies prior to any act of interpretation. Naturally, there are other competing reading strategies, schools and communities with rival accounts. What a work means is the accumulated discourse of informed readership rather than a single oracular origin from the Omniscient Author. Far from meaning
remaining a private product, it becomes instead publicly accountable and open to sustained revision (T. Eagleton 1997, 74).

'Reader' here means beholder, and 'text' architectural form, or other forms of the plastic arts, and not simply the reader of a literal text. In an important way, this correlates with the distinction between 'the allegorical' and specific allegories in either images or words. The photograph, for example, is an immediate temporal palimpsest inviting the nostalgic presence of a vanished past and as such doubles and other-speaks as allegoria and as an aspect of the allegorical. 'The allegorical' is a version of allegoria as lost time and is non-exegetical and only 'becomes' allegorical in the presence of empathic and complicit readership. It will be noted that reading the allegorical begins with close attention to detailing — in architecture as in any other context. Such close attention to detailing is analogous with the 'close reading' of New Criticism or Leavis's Practical Criticism, and reading within an 'interpretive community' certainly does not preclude the need to establish careful empirical evidence on which acts of readership can be based. What an appreciation of the presence of the allegorical avoids is in fact the belief that intentional input from an author requires an equal and opposite extraction of something called 'the meaning' by a reader. Texts signify differently at different historical periods, and the collection of those significations as historical layering is what the meaning can be developmentally thought to be. A final and objectively ideal meaning from intention as what the work ontologically represents, is deferred by meaning as being understood as process rather than end-point. **Explanation**, (as one more kind of interpretation of course), is marginalized by **understanding** (J. Culler 1981, 6). Understanding rather than explaining is the empathic response to the immanence of the work of art as part of its metaphorical 'other-speaking' nature which is realised in its incipient language. This might represent an available as against a definitive meaning.

Meaning as developed here, especially in an architectural context is part linguistic, part meaningful pattern (S. Fish in J. Culler 1981, 134), part rhetorical and self-annunciation, part metaphorical and figural, part semiotic signifier and part gestural and allegorical. It is also an act of reading. Meaning, as will be argued in Part Two, is also powerfully cultural.
and social, and dependent on the context of use. Meaning as a single representation of an
authorial intention within the interiority and autonomy of the text is neither necessary nor
sufficient. The scepticism about interpretation which introduced this section nevertheless
has to acknowledge that as an act of reading, interpretation is inevitable; but
interpretation as objective meaning is by no means inevitable, and certainly in response to
architectural form, would deny the essential ambivalence with which the allegorical
dissembles.

CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR PART ONE

It needs to be re-emphasized that the chapters of Part One do not prosecute an
unfolding causal argument. One central unifying strand, the relation between the aesthetic
object and language and the meanings that makes available is developed throughout and
is concluded in Chapter Six in Part Two with an extended discussion of ‘The Language of
Architecture’ question. In producing a theoretical model of the interpretation of
poststructuralist architecture, the constituent features of that model have to be sufficiently
developed to become a basis of justification for the process of reading and interpreting
specific poststructuralist buildings, particularly in Chapter Seven, which then necessarily
becomes subject to the strictures of the interpretative community. Part One therefore
represents in total not only a theoretical model of interpretation of architectural
Postmodernism, but also a theory of justification in itself, much as its final section,
Interpretation, suggested. Although there are important linking themes which spiral
forwards such as theatricality or the word and image relation, each chapter of Part One as
an examination of a constituent component is theoretically stand-alone. Chapter Two
deals with the linguistic and metaphorical nature of the sign, Chapter Three examines the
shape of Postmodernism and its crucial relationship with its own antecedent Modernism,
Chapter Four assesses the philosophical justification underpinning the model and Chapter
Five looks at the qualitative nature of Rhetoric and its tropes such as allegory and the
available scope of literary theory. Another enormously important strand crossing chapters
and which is established in Chapter One, and which reappears extensively in Chapter
Five and forms a continuous basis for interpretation in Part Two, is the formative allegorical imperative at the very centre of the postmodern. It is also important to reassert, particularly in the early chapters, that in order for the model to represent a viable form of theoretical justification, architecture itself is not necessarily directly implicated initially as such. Thus the establishment of the metaphorical nature of the sign, for example, which is a powerful requisite for later metaphorical interpretation of postmodernist buildings, is in itself not an aspect of architecture at all, but nevertheless is essential for its interpretation. It is only by establishing principles of interpretation, which are necessarily abstract and non-subject specific in Part One, that the architectural interpretation of Part Two in practice can take place. A naïve question such as ‘What has the metaphorical nature of the sign actually got to do with architecture?’ would then be revealed as simplistic.

These first four chapters have not offered an accumulative argument which causally reach a conclusive end-point. The characteristics of an argument are substantively different from that of the constituent theoretical model. ‘An argument involves putting forward reasons to influence someone’s belief that what you are proposing is the case (Hinderer, 1992). Whichever way someone makes an argument they are attempting to convince others of the validity (or logic) of how they see the world and convince us that we should see it the way they do.’ This quotation from Doing A Literature Review (C. Hart 2000, 79-80) makes clear that the constitutive process of the theoretical model, which comprises its constituent parts, is substantively different from the argument which in an adversarial manner constructs a new position which contests the ground of previous arguments. The theoretical model on the other hand establishes one set of interpretative criteria among many other sets of possibilities. In this sense, unless the selection criteria are erroneously based, the theoretical model presents one means of interpretation which is as viable as any other. It is not necessarily so. The same subject area could generate other and different models of interpretation. What the present model offers is distinctively different from other models of architectural interpretation found in the literature because it establishes allegory as a basic category of postmodernistic architectural meaning with all its concomitant attributes of metaphor, rhetoric and literary association. The fact that the allegorical as well as being always temporally recursive says one thing but means
another implicates architectural 'parlante', or speaking. And this language which emerges from allegory as architectural speaking, concealed, hidden and latent as it is, is a very different kind of architectural discourse from the modish chic of 'the language of architecture' and its absurd assumptions about the relation between architecture and language. Poststructuralist architecture is full of tropes, figures and references which constitute an essential element of its significance and meaning, and which is the principal concern here. Its meanings, which emerge from architectural visual metaphor, must become linguistic, but it should be clearly understood that this emergent language is only 'manifest' at the behest of the beholder. It is only within the accordance between architectural intention, built form and spectator response that architectural meaning can appear. And the fact that this represents another Peircean triangulation of the sign and as Peirce himself suggested, means that each interpretation is itself subject to interpretation ad infinitum as infinite regress, then suggests that this process of scrutiny involved in the interpretation of interpretation is precisely Stanley Fish's 'interpretive community' in action.
PART TWO

CHAPTER SIX

THE ARCHITECTURAL TRACE

This chapter discusses the key developments in architecture which resulted in the dominance of theory in poststructuralist practice in particular, and what distinguishes it from earlier postmodern building. The shift is one from simile to metaphor, from flagrant historicism to poststructuralist modified Modernism and from the inherent rationalist classicism of the modernists to the chiaroscuro-like influence of the baroque. The historical importance of the grid is traced to its postmodern violation and also how Modernist architecture became postmodern, and in turn how architectural postmodernism evolved into the architecturally poststructural. And what might be called ‘The Poststructuralist Neo-Theatrical’ is examined for the trace of early Modernist architecture which informs it. The chapter is in four sections: The Modernist Grid, The Trajectory From Modernism Into Postmodern Architecture, From Postmodernism To Poststructuralism: From Simile To Metaphor and Poststructural Architecture And The Neo-Theatrical.

THE MODERNIST GRID

‘Surfacing in pre-War cubist painting and subsequently becoming ever more stringent and manifest, the grid announces among other things, modern art’s will to silence, its hostility to literature, to narrative, to discourse. As such, the grid has done its job with striking efficiency. The barrier it has lowered between the arts of vision and those of language has been almost totally successful in walling the visual arts into a realm of exclusive visuality and defending them against the intrusion of speech.’
(Rosalind Krauss 1997, 9)
Rosalind Krauss in *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*, above, discusses the imposition of the grid as a key feature of modernism. The founding movements of twentieth century Modernist aesthetics – Cubism, de Stijl, Bauhaus – all arranged form around the grid, none more so in architecture than Rietveld’s *Schroeder House*. It is again striking how modernism deferred meaning and discourse from form and elevated the moment of visual perception as the characteristic instantaneous response at the expense of language. In the light of the earlier discussion, the ‘silence’ of modernism contrasts conspicuously with the ‘noise’ of earlier postmodern architecture as self-consciously rhetorical. In contrast with Charles Moore’s postmodernist *Piazza d’Italia* for example, Mies’s pared down rational grids in, say, *The Barcelona Pavilion* or *The Seagram Tower*, seem positively self-effacing, examples of mute *decorum* in the denial of reference or meaning, and a kind of refusal to be manifest but also avoiding the suggestion of latent meaning. Architecturally, the grid as three-dimensional, becomes the lattice (R. Krauss 1997, 210). The grid in modernist and earlier architecture as the lattice imposes its rigid and logical rationality on the arrangements of the building and thus makes the spectator’s traversing of it essentially a *tour*, with the grid or lattice as ‘conductor’, an important feature of Le Corbusier’s *Villa Savoye*, noted in Chapter Three here. The visitor is chaperoned by the building’s function. Contrariwise, the postmodern violation of the rationalist grid is forecast in Gehry’s use of the free-flowing ground plan of Frank Lloyd Wright’s prairie houses in his own Wright-inflected early California houses, discussed further in Chapter Seven [26]. It is interesting to note that the idea of the right-angled lattice is conspicuously de-formed by several prominent postmodern buildings such as Foster’s ‘gherkin’ at St Mary Axe, London, (2000-4) Rem Koolhaas’s *CCTV* building, Beijing (2003 and after) and Herzog and de Meuron’s Olympic Stadium, also Beijing (2004-8). All these buildings curve and bend the lattice almost beyond recognition, and Herzog and de Meuron’s Olympic Stadium has defaced the conventional logic of the lattice into structurally complex basketwork (C. Jencks 2005, 112-3).

Chapter Three also discussed the important continuities and discontinuities between Modernism and Postmodernism. In architectural terms, this section tries to identify the
fracturing of the modernist rational grid and the appearance in its place of postmodern deconstruction, and more recently, especially at Bilbao, the radical implications of folding and bending for the displacement of the grid; what Gilles Deleuze calls Le Pli (the fold). This discontinuity is the reversal of the grid and results in the implicit ‘chaos’ of in-folding. Much of that trace begins with Robert Venturi’s ground-breaking book, *Contradiction and Complexity in Architecture*. The word ‘complexity’ itself (Latin ‘entwine’, ‘braid’) is one of Deleuze’s pli words such as ‘complicate’ (from plicare, to fold). The collocation of terms associated with bending or folding is directly linked to radical poststructuralist architectural practice such as Gehry’s at the Bilbao Guggenheim (J. Rajchman in G. Lynn, Ed, 1993, 61-3).

What is being violated here is the logic of the grid and plan, foundational to the very idea of the development of western civilization and its built environment, centred as it is on the primacy of the right angle and its geometry. In *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*, Martin Heidegger proposes that the existence of ‘building’ presupposes clearance and the creation of ‘place’ as a prerequisite for dwelling. In Heidegger’s celebrated example, a cleared space by a river is characteristically a location. However, once the river is bridged, the location becomes a place (with its own genius loci) in which ‘dwelling’ can ‘become’. The bridge ‘gathers together’ the banks and a place emerges (M. Heidegger in N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 100-9). The dwelling in a place is always predicated on the two experiences, however simple or complex, of first entrance, and the subsequent experience of organized space within and beyond. The one is encounter and the other exploration. The dovetailing of entrance and the developed space behind which together constitute the building as design and arrangement supposes that the organization of that space will be logico-rational. The prototype of rational entrance, and inward progression with rooms and functions off is the Graeco-Roman domus or villa. Arranged as portico, vestibule, the (open) space of the atrium and empluvium leading to the aedicule and peristyle with its loggia linking the rear garden, it represents a progression from front to back, from public to private (J. Curl 1999, 42). Its sense of conduct from front to back is essentially through logically arranged division and space. Arguably, this prototypical form of rational division has prevailed since, and right into modernism itself, only to be defiled by the
postmodernist spatial revolution. Apparent exceptions such as amphitheatres or the Albert Hall with multiple entrances remain geometrically coherent from outside to inside. Significantly, both Venturi and Deleuze identify the Baroque as a perturbation of logical arrangement and view that period as analogical to the change in architecture after modernism (R. Venturi 1966, 58-63). In the classical period, the geometry of arrangement of course extended from the house to town and city with its walls pierced by four gates and producing the cruciform arrangement with right-angled streets and ways off (N. Pevsner 1958, 30). The cruciform shape continued through the mediaeval period but it is precisely the ad hoc, idiosyncratic nature of development off which Jane Jacobs identified as the combination of old and new, producing 'place' and 'dwelling' as against the almost ideologically zealous grid-arrangement of, say, Corbusier's Ville Radieuse, engendered as it was on the inexorable progress of the planned right-angled zone and vertical lattice (D. Harvey 1990, 180).

The persistence of classicism from its renewal during the Renaissance right up to the deformations of the postmodern is singular. Indeed, it is argued here below that in terms of both building form and town planning, that the underlying imperatives of Modernist architectural practice could be categorized broadly as classically derived (R. Scruton 1979, 226-7). The persistence of the grid and row is of course easily understandable, both in locations such as the mediaeval linear village (M. Aston 1985, 75) to Chicago in the nineteenth century and in the post war British New Towns and in individual buildings themselves. Classicism subsumes the grid and despite variations in historical style, layout remains a powerfully linear version of its arrangements with dominant axes and right-angled extensions. The assertively dominant axis, as in the Champs Elysees, Paris, running from The Louvre, is not simply a line of communication, more an intimated axis of power. The dominant axes of the grid in planning produced public buildings seen largely as facades as the public face of the building. The portico, vestibule and aedicule 'progress' of the Roman triumphal building is often replicated in public buildings with a dominant corridor with corridors off, the whole simulating the axis of power of the main street which the building fronts. Thus the façade and the inner grid both mimetically signify in terms of grandeur and authority.
However, Roger Scruton, as a classical revivalist, proposes in *The Aesthetics of Architecture* that buildings as public things which beholders cannot choose to ignore as they can with a poem or a painting, potentially act as moral signs.

‘The architect must be constrained by a rule of obedience. He must translate his intuition into terms that are publicly intelligible, unite his building with an order that is recognizable not only to the expert but also the ordinary uneducated man.’

(Scruton 1979, 250-256)

Buildings thus bestow order and continuity, and the architect has a responsibility to forego individualistic expressionism and unite his building into the tradition and repertoire of style as a continuum; a linking thread through the vicissitudes and idiosyncrasies of genre in history. In fact, a kind of ideal. Style, especially classicism, is embodied in the façade (Scruton 1979, 253-6). Although Scruton does not say so, the façade has traditionally articulated style as an indicator not simply as ornament, but also function. So that fenestration, sections, projections, bays and string courses reveal resonance and rhythm; an architectural version of harmonious euphony and the mellifluous. The idea of the beautiful as proportion and arrangement inevitably hovers nearby although compromised as adornment by Kant’s parergon. The harmonious and the beautiful confer an aesthetic morality on to the street, and the public appreciation of the aesthetic sensibility becomes not only possible, but a duty of architectural composition. In order to promote what might be called ‘the moral ontology’ of the building, the architect submits to style and in so doing, rejects any conspicuous personal expression. The fact that many previously industrial buildings are now converted into highly desirable apartments and lofts amplifies the view that public buildings on the public street had a responsibility to create a context of built refinement. Although far outside the present remit, these are powerful arguments for a perceived need for an architecture which respects place, materials and human scale for an informed version of the public good. As may become clearer, it is a version of the kind of revivalism promulgated by the Prince of Wales at Poundbury and other contemporary revivalists of traditional facadism such as Quinlan Terry or Rob Krier. Despite Scruton’s rejection of Modernism (and
Postmodernism), it can of course be argued that Modernist architecture such as that of Mies is precisely a version of order and arrangement that can be broadly described as 'classicist'. Mies's Seagram Tower is rejected by Scruton as a minimalist object conspicuous in its avoidance of ornament and moulding. Its façade is unarticulated, and therefore cannot be beautiful (R. Scruton 1979, 226-7). Alternatively, this is by no means a universally accepted view, and the Seagram Tower is now regarded as internationally iconic (J Glancey 1998, 203 and C. Jencks 2005, 192).

The self-conscious 'Stuckism' and almost militant revivalism of commentators such as HRH or Roger Scruton is inevitably another kind of mourning for traditional form in the face of what is understood to be the anarchy of architectural innovation. It is change itself which represents the threat of the new. What is mourned and lost here is nothing less than the pre-industrial landscape of English pastoral [27]. The Stuckists who also favour the presence of figurative painting over Conceptualist or Installationist art are representative of an anxiety and unease about the genius loci of public spaces. The point here is of course documental, not judgemental. But the contrast between contemporary revivalism and Postmodernism, let least Modernism, is extraordinarily vivid. The rhetorical expressionism, deconstructed 'beauty' and parodic and ironic violation of historical genre of poststructuralist architectural theory demonstrates the fundamentally radical and 'schizophrenic' embrace of 'catastrophe' and deferred meaning in its practice. The rational organization of space from the classical period, through the various forms of entry during the mediaeval period (J. Brunskill 1978, 98-119), and on past Renaissance and Enlightenment into nineteenth century eclecticism and arguably reaching its post-Renaissance apogee in Modernism, suddenly undergoes deformation with the inception of the postmodern. Not only is shape and arrangement deformed, the ancient sanctity of the dispositio of classical rhetoric profaned, but also the shape of space itself. Daniel Libeskind's proposed cubist Spiral extension to the Natural history Museum, London, if ever built, is the acme of the poststructuralist deformed versus the ideal. The deformed as a 'monstrous' (monstrum, portent and monere, to warn) intrusion into the harmony and order of the built environment would only seem able to increase the apprehensions of the Stuckists. The dislocation of the grid was hugely affected by the bending and folding which emerged during the nineteen nineties and the emergence of curvilinear structures
which had appeared conspicuously, for example, in the undulating façade of James Stirling’s *Neue Staatsgalerie*, Stuttgart (1984). The curvilinear building almost by necessity must disrupt the quasi-triumphal floor plan of the gridded building with its signifying entry point and directed flow within. Approached from across the Manchester Ship Canal, Libeskind’s *Imperial War Museum of the North* appears to be entry-less. In fact, the entrance must be sought, and it turns up opposite the car park, modestly inconspicuous, and giving access to multiple choice flows within rather than the assumed authoritarian ‘rightness’ of the directed flows of the traditional grid.

Rosalind Krauss in the earlier quotation refers to the incompatibility of Modernist form with discourse and ‘the intrusions of speech’ as a result of the exclusive visuality and silence of the grid. The refusal of high Modernism of any overt kind of allusion within visual form and the consequent quietude and denial of referential meaning has already been discussed here in the first two chapters. What replaces ‘language’ in Modernist practice is instantaneity such as Michael Fried’s ‘presentness’, or Clement Greenberg’s ‘flatness’.

Charles Jencks’s two early and highly influential books, *Meaning In Architecture* (1969) and *The Language of Postmodern Architecture* (1981), represented a radical disjuncture with the precepts of architectural Modernism by insisting that architectural form and meaning mutated after Venturi’s *Complexity and Contradiction* and with the symbolic end of Modernist architecture in the demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe apartment block in 1972 (C. Jencks 1981, 9). The explosive end of the Pruitt-Igoe block is suggested by Jencks to demonstrate not only the demolition of Modernist mass-housing, but the demise also of centralist planning and zoning as an aspect of the Enlightenment tradition. Jencks’s achievement in identifying what came to be known as Postmodernist Architecture was an outstanding contribution to the theoretical and typological debate. At the centre of Jencks’s position are the twin characteristics of code (1969, 20) and language (1981, 40-64). Both concepts are developed further in the later *The Language of Postmodern Architecture*, but already in *Meaning In Architecture* there is a reductionist account of architectural meaning as *linguistic*.
‘Now if the linguist tries to discover what basic units communicate verbal meaning and finds such things as phonemes and morphemes, then it would be highly appropriate if the architectural explorer found ‘formenes’, ‘funcemes’ and ‘techemes’ – those fundamental units of architectural meaning....The new field, naturally following linguistics, would be called ‘architistics’’. (C. Jencks 1969, 17)

Drawing as it does on Saussure rather than Peirce, this may in retrospect sound semiotically modish and rather far fetched. But the underlying notion, elaborated much further in The Language of Postmodern Architecture, that architectural meaning emerges, albeit as metaphor, as a consequence of architectural form having a direct linguistic form and equivalence, has largely gone unchallenged. This position of course prompts a causal debate: does architecture prompt its ‘language’ or be prompted by it? The second option, that language instantiates ideas and therefore form is positively Whorfian [28], and one which is endorsed in Meaning in Architecture (1969, 18), but which disappears from The Language of Architecture. The fraught causal relation between architectural form and ‘the language of architecture’ is produced by the use of the preposition ‘of’, causing architecture to ‘have’ language as a constituent feature, or even ontologically to be a form of language. The distress created by this formulation disappears if what is proposed is, say, ‘the language of Shakespeare’ because the sonnets and plays are already language. The difficulty arises when something which is demonstrably non-linguistic such as architecture or sculpture is treated as language. It has been consistently argued here that any theoretical model of architectural meaning has to dispense with ‘the language of architecture’ as a serious category error. Chapter Four in Part One in particular tries to formulate a coherent account of a particular model of language as inherently latent in architectural form and which becomes manifest through a process of phenomenological ascription by the beholder-come-reader; language ‘from’ rather than ‘of’. The authenticity of that reading is then subject to justification by Stanley Fish’s ‘interpretive community’ in much the same way that the present text is itself subject to scrutiny as part of discourse. The fact that the interpretation by an interpretative community is itself subject to interpretation in a Peircean infinite regress is precisely the kind of ‘trace’ that
the present chapter is seeking and does not represent an unwelcome paradox. Chapter Two establishes the building as semiotic and as essentially a metaphorical sign, and Chapter Two diagnoses its particular postmodern characteristic. Chapter Four dispenses with 'the language of architecture' in favour of language from form, and Chapter Five identifies the signifying aspect of visual metaphor as initially metonymic rather than linguistic. All of this represents an explicit rejection of Jencks's formulation.

It may be that Charles Jencks's greatest contribution has been to equate postmodernist architecture with metaphor rather than more famously proposing that buildings have or are language (C. Jencks 1981, 40-52). Nevertheless, as an extension of that position, Jencks goes on to three linked sections called 'Words', 'Syntax' and 'Semantics' (52-64). Unfortunately, this approach represents a kind of literalism; that postmodern buildings signify as metaphor because they, as it were, as tenor literally resemble the metaphorical vehicle. Put simply, this is metaphor as simile. In his section on 'Metaphor and Metaphysics' (1981, 112-118) Jencks says:

"The most renowned metaphorical buildings - Ronchamp, the Sydney Opera House, TWA [Kennedy Airport] - vary in their coding from implicit to explicit, from mixed metaphor to congruent simile. An architectural 'simile' is, as in writing or speech, the formal and explicit statement of a metaphor - the hot dog stand that has so many other cues such as mustard and bun that one can say that it is explicitly intended."

In the light of Chapter Five here and the nature of visual metaphor as potentially poststructurally allegorical, this insistence on the physical resemblance of the whole rather than the metaphorically symbiotic relation between metonymy and metaphor, part and whole, seems rather limiting. Jencks's term 'code' has no sustained definition and appears to mean 'dual-coding' (1981, Introduction) which in turn implicates metaphor and hence the assumption that in Postmodernism, architecture is actually language. ('So the term 'Post-Modern' has to be clarified and used more precisely to cover, in general, only those designers who are aware of architecture as a language - hence one part of my title.' (C. Jencks 1981, 6, original emphasis) In many ways, the great accomplishment of The Language of Postmodern Architecture lies not in conflating postmodernist
architecture with language but in recognizing that its 'double-code' is a version of what is called here rhetorical metaphor where meaning oscillates between the actual physical present of the building in its empirical form and some stylistically implied historicist past. However, it is Jencks's literalist and reductionist tendentiousness which leaves him dwelling simplistically on metaphorical simile. Thus in *Late Modern Architecture* (C. Jencks 1980,) Roger's Pompidou Centre, Paris, and Foster's Willis-Faber Building, Ipswich, are designated respectively as simply 'exoskeleton' and 'amoeba' rather than generating an after-Modernism ambience which helped to make problematic not only the conventional use of space in the grid, but the relation between inside and outside itself. Equally, the slight treatment of Ronchamp as merely a simile for a peasant hat or ship's prow and so on ignores the much deeper sense of nostalgia for Modernist rationalism shown in the still Purist walls amongst the almost revolutionary metaphorical referencing emerging within the larger context. Ronchamp as the defining precursory postmodern sign is discussed further below.

Despite these important caveats, Charles Jencks succeeded in not only defining the initial postmodern architectural field, but also in introducing a semiotic procedure which in turn generated the concern for meaning and language and its embeddedness in 'code'. Although he does not specifically say so, Jencks's use of the term 'code' is in fact a version of the metaphorical palimpsest producing meaning as a form of doubling. The new is made 'old' by the recursive act of collage and mixing current and previous forms such as Tschumi's play on Russian Constructivism at *Parc de la Villette*, Paris. The link is of course time. It has to be emphasized that 'code' is necessarily a system which has its own syntactic or regulative rules ('code' from Latin *codex*, book). So there is again an unstated underlying assumption that architecture as 'coded' must be a linguistic type of regulated system. (Roman Jakobson's development of the term 'code' is in an exclusively poetic context, or possibly in the sense of genre. The later examples of substitutive and contiguous relation [metaphor and metonymy] such as Cubism as metonymic and Surrealism as metaphorical (D. Lodge 1971, 81) do not signify as 'code'). In what has been an influential work, *Function and Sign: The Semiotics of Architecture*, Umberto Eco
attempts to characterize primary and secondary functions respectively as denotative and connotative. He suggests that there are varieties of architectural code such as technical, syntactic and semantic (Umberto Eco in N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 193-5). But this again assumes that an architectural code is linguistically formulated. Roger Scruton, from a sceptical viewpoint in ‘Language and Architecture’ in The Aesthetics of Architecture (R. Scruton 1979, 164-5) effectively breaks the architecture/language link, although from an anti-semiotic position. ‘Acceptability in language is connected to the possibility of truth, and there can be no explanation of linguistic meaning which does not show its relation to truth.’ From the position of Analytical Philosophy, language comprises sentences that contain propositions which can be falsified and therefore bear a relation to ideas about truth. ‘Yet it is precisely that relation which semiology ignores, and must ignore if it is to generalize the concept of ‘meaning’ from language to art and architecture.’ Scruton’s position is ultimately transcendental in suggesting that truth rather than language inheres in classical architecture as harmonious beauty, a view far outside the present argument, but one which effectively marginalizes the ‘language of architecture’ formula. Despite poststructuralist scepticism about architecture as language, Adrian Forty in Words and Buildings (2000) maintains that the linguistic metaphor remains a viable and useful descriptive tool (A. Forty 2000, 84).

Once the hegemony and prerogative of the grid has been suspended on the one hand, and its modernist silence on the other, then it becomes possible to identify the postmodernist trace. However, it should be clear by now that the imperative of meaning in postmodern and particularly poststructuralist architecture is not a product of the language of architecture, but rather the semantic significance of Heideggeran ‘unconcealing’, or language emerging from architecture as part of its allegorical symbolizing.

THE TRAJECTORY FROM MODERNISM INTO POSTMODERN ARCHITECTURE

This section, relying on the treatment of mimesis in the first chapter, distinguishes between the notion of copy implicit in Eclecticism or Revivalism and common in
architecture before the twentieth century and the rise of Modernism and the parody which is characteristic of Postmodernism. Thus there would be an enormous difference between the parodic neo-classicism of Charles Moore, for example, and the veneration Lord Burlington showed for Palladio and the Villa Rotonda. The trajectory of the development of Modernism is briefly traced from Arts And Crafts to archetypal Modernists such as Corbusier. As a turning moment towards the postmodern, the work of Jane Jacobs and Robert Venturi is discussed, the one in regard to the landscape and the zone-planning of cities and the other as the instigator of the opposition to Modernism in Contradiction And Complexity as the celebrant of American vernacular as a potential paradigm in Learning From Las Vegas.

The transition of Modernism to Postmodernism and the continuities and disjunctions involved as movements has already been established by Chapter Three. The relationship is deeply complex with Postmodernism being part of Modernism and yet outside it, and at the same time collaged or layered back over it in a temporal fold. The nature of this temporal recursion is characterized by both nostalgia and mourning, the result of the touch of the ruin of the past and which makes the absent presence of the past elegiacally allegorical. However, the recursive momentum is by no means an exclusive attribute of the postmodern. The postmodern, certainly in its deconstructive aspect, always seeks to defer origin and cause as Barthes showed in Myth Today (R. Barthes 1997, 98-9). The postmodern reference to earlier historicist styles is a form of mimesis. All movements are to some extent regressive in the sense that whatever is ‘new’ emerges or even evolves from some stylistic past. ‘Origin’ is always deferred. The trabeated post and lintel architecture of the Paleolithic such as Stonehenge as well as beam-loading in Egyptian and Greek structures aped and mimicked examples of load and support in natural rock formation (V. Gibberd 1990, 11-13). Roman architecture although archeated and vaulted rather than trabeated, retained the Greek Orders and the use of post and lintel construction in porticoes and facades. It would obviously be possible to go on. The Romanesque which followed the Roman was similarly derivatively archeated, and the expressive
innovations of Gothic conceal the fact that its central structural feature remained the arch, albeit pointed and externally supported by the buttress.

Deliberate revivalism is deliberately mimetic. The Renaissance revives and reinvents the classical. In England at the opening of the eighteenth century Lord Burlington invoked Palladianism at Chiswick with the reinstallation of Palladio's *Villa Rotonda*, Vicenza, in a revivalist classical wave that spread across and through the century, reaching as far as Thomas Jefferson's version of Palladian Rotonda at Monticello, Virginia. At the end of the same century, Gothic was being revived at Fonthill and at Hugh Walpole's *Strawberry Hill*, London.

What distinguishes Revivalism from Postmodernism is that the revival is an act of veneration, the reassuring presence of a past authenticity. The postmodern of course prevaricates and parodies and in that sense denies the very idea of the authentic and celebrates its own inauthenticity. The paradigm of Revivalism as the reinstatement of the authentic is eclecticism. In Britain, once the conflict of styles between Classicism and Gothic subsided in the second half of the nineteenth century, many different architectural forms which deformed the original, such as debased Egyptian, became respectable (N. Pevsner 1958, 272-77). In appearance, the very inauthenticity of the supposedly authentic revival is a vivid precursor of the postmodern itself. What separates them is a pre-Modernist failed attempt at revivalist authenticity preceding the deliberate postmodern mockery of historicism as a denial of originality. The overwhelming ubiquity of eclecticism led to a vital historical moment. William Morris, initially as a follower of Pugin and Ruskin, accepted the authenticity of Gothic as in Ruskin's *The Stones of Venice* and the need for truth and simplicity, argued in Ruskin’s *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849). The twin principles of truth and the simplicity of craft led Morris to reject mass-production, but in ‘Truth To Materials’ to have ‘laid the foundations of the Modern Movement’ (N. Pevsner 1958, 277). Morris’s own revivalism was of the perceived simplicity which in a Pre-Raphaelite way preceded the Renaissance. The enormous influence of the Arts And Craft movement as a kind of up-to-date Mediaevalism produced, in the British Vernacular Revival from Norman Shaw to Lutyens, an informed eclectic revivalism from Shaw’s ‘Queen Anne’ to Lutyen’s version of sixteenth century houses, an achievement perhaps unprecedented in its
accomplishment. Although historically referenced, the houses built by the Vernacular Revival seemed of their time and convincingly ‘modern’, especially Voysey’s pared-down elevations at Bedford Park (J.M. Richards 1981, 231-43). It was from the heightened design quality of Arts And Crafts and English vernacular houses that Herman Muthesius produced Das englische Haus (The English House). Muthesius’s transfer of the principles of simplicity and truth to materials to the German context of the Deutscher Werkbund in 1907, but to include concrete, steel and glass and mass-production rather than stone and red brick, has been well documented (W.J. Curtis 1999, 99-100). From Werkbund to Bauhaus is a very short and a very German step. So it was out of the furor of eclecticism that Modernism emerged. However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that it is the example of eclectic revivalism, rejected by the Modern Movement, which has been an inspirational source and is an important trace in postmodern architectural sensibility, and particularly in its New Historicist dimension. What also bears repetition is that although pre-Modernist ‘eclecticism’ is in some ways equivalent to postmodernist ‘pluralism’, it is to the structural and stylistic motifs of Modernism itself that poststructuralist architecture returns in its parodic way.

The key developmental moments in the dissemination of the Modernist ideology from the Bauhaus to CIAM and the influence of Corbusier and Mies and the International Style up to 1960 as an arbitrary end-point are a Modernist narrative which has been extensively rehearsed (W.J. Curtis 1999, 257-73). Corbusier’s use of his Dom-ino structural grid allowed the emancipation of form in the five principles of Five Points of a New Architecture (1925). The use of the grid facilitated the development of pilotis, the free plan and the flat roof for example. Immediately the pitched roof is dispensed with, the previous vertical emphasis becomes lateral, and the use of strip windows, allowed by the hung glass curtain walls of the Dom-ino, creates the effect of lateral striation which was an effect copied and parodied by James Stirling at the Neustaat Galerie, Stuttgart and in countless ‘developments’ during the 1980s as a chic postmodernist sign. Walter Gropius, Corbusier and Mies may all be understood to be residual classicists in laying down the epistemes of architectural modernism in the presence of the rational grid, avant-garde social planning and the restriction of ornament in favour of function. As form, the representative Modernist building is a version of the ideal (W.J. Curtis 1999, 169),
especially in Corbusier's Purism, which in some respects may be seen as analogous to Platonism. Following Krauss's argument, Gropius's Bauhaus, Corbusier's Villa Savoye and Mies's Seagram Tower all shed reference and allusion and in their mute silence, resonate essentially visually as ideal geometrical forms. The implacable geometry and shape of the modernist ideal is caught by Corbusier in *Vers Une Architecture*. 'Reinforced concrete has brought a revolution in the aesthetics of construction.... with the accent running not from top to bottom, but horizontally, from left to right.' (Le Corbusier 1923, 61) It was the striated fenestration of Modernist construction that Robert Venturi parodied in his mother's Vanna Venturi House by exposing a floor showing through a window, and thus introducing the complexity and contradiction he writes of, and contradicting specifically Corbusier's dictum in *Vers Une Architecture*; 'The Plan is the generator....The house is a machine for living in.' (Corbusier 1923, 43-108)

Robert Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, 1966 and Jane Jacob's *The Death And Life Of Great American Cities* 1961, are both foundational texts in the transitional trace from International Modernism to postmodernist architecture. Jane Jacobs wrote mainly about Modernist cities, districts and planning, whereas Robert Venturi's direct concern was with the architectural provenance of actual building rather than the built environment itself. Both books had revolutionary implications, and in retrospect may be seen to be risk-taking and daring in the face of the then dominant International Style.

Jane Jacobs wrote about American cities because, like Chicago, they are planned grids, which despite the logical advantages, impose uniformity above all and which a European sensibility might find endlessly monotonous (J. Jacobs 1994, 393). European cities because of their greater age and diversity are frequently characterized by the ad hoc of *bricolage*. Instead of the relentless uniformity of the grid, representative of rational modern planning and zoning, Jacobs argues for 'subsidiary irregularity' (1994, 394) which would introduce the complexity of the local with parks and additional routing, so introducing the possibility of frequent turning rather than the endless vistas of the grid. Diversity, not uniformity, would be created by irregularities and visual interruptions (1994, 395). Within the city, Jacobs suggests that two principles vie with each other for
dominance. The arrangement of the city declares itself as ‘a visual announcement’ and
either recedes into the vista of repetition and infinity or is fore-grounded into local close-
ups characterized by diversity. Modernist planners favour the first option of clearance and
uniformity and are suspicious of ‘city diversity, freedom and life’ (1994, 392-3). Jacobs
suggests that there are four ‘generators of diversity’ (1994 162-3). These are variety and
mixing in primary functions such as work and leisure, blocks must be short and streets
and turns frequent, districts must retain old buildings rather than resort to clearance and
redevelopment and there must be concentrations of people, including residence rather
than sterile business zones which exclude residential and mixed use.

Robert Venturi’s Vanna Venturi House, Philadelphia 1962, predates Complexity and
Contradiction. On the main façade is a loggia-type entrance which has an artificial
trabeated lintel over, which in turn is transected by an equally artificially non-functional
‘arch’ (‘archeated’ being the opposite of ‘trabeated’) which in turn is bisected by a large
aperture as the ‘break’ in the false ‘broken pediment’ which is the whole main façade. To
the right of the main entrance is an essentially Corbusian strip-window. In architectural
parlante, the façade acknowledges, even salutes, Corbusier but with such declared
Historicist allusion traduces the tradition of Modernist Purism [Fig 12].
This is what Charles Jencks has called the ‘radical eclecticism’ of the double
code (C. Jencks 1981, 127-32) which has metamorphosed into what Jencks
in describing conspicuously
postmodern public building calls the iconic building (C. Jencks 2005, 20) and which here
is accounted for in Chapter Seven as a version of the theatricality established in Chapter
Two. The wholly artificial mouldings and columns (faux Greek classical) in the Vanna
Venturi House, representing as it inevitably and self-consciously does a resolute
inauthenticity, become a first sounding, an ‘enonciation’ in which the rhetoric of play and
parody establishes a dangerous proximity to kitsch.

Venturi later wished that the title of Complexity and Contradiction had been
Complexity and Contradiction in Architectural Form (R. Venturi 1966, 14). But the term
Form was omitted because at the time of writing, ‘form’ was a Modernist episteme which had been resonating since Roger Fry and Clive Bell but one to which Venturi was opposed. ‘Significant Form’ had been first formulated by Clive Bell in Art, 1914 (Harrison and Wood Eds, 1995, 113-116). ‘Form’ in its Modernist incarnation was an ontologically complete, but equally instantaneous, visual experience which suspended meaning and reference and deferred what Venturi calls ‘symbolism’. To have used ‘form’ as a term at the height of international modernism would have been to declare himself a Modernist, the very process with which he was in dispute. It reinforces the point that where Jacobs’s critique centred on place, Venturi’s focused on the significance of built forms, and that they independently launched a twin attack on both Modernist building-type and its social context. The Vanna Venturi House introduces notions of complexity which contradict themselves by, for example, including on the outside a dado rail which clearly belongs conventionally inside (R. Venturi, 1966, 119) thus anticipating Derrida’s later epigram that the outside is the inside (see Chapter Four here). Mies’s earlier Farnsworth House is often cited as a glass cuboid which relates the outside to the inside by virtue of the transparency of its glass walls. This may be so, but it certainly does not represent an inversion or doubling in meaning which would make it postmodernistic; that it is not referential but formal makes it essentially Modernist. In fact, the external structural expression of the inside on the outside represents a dual point of view rather like Picasso’s inclusion of both full face and profile at the same time, thus making this not only Modernist, but Cubist. Venturi’s ‘Gentle Manifesto’ (1966, 16) does indeed sound revolutionary.

Having dismissed incompetence, the picturesque and expressionism, he says:

‘Architects can no longer be intimidated by the puritanically moral language of orthodox Modern architecture….I am for messy vitality over obvious unity. I include the non-sequitur and proclaim the duality…. But an architecture of complexity and contradiction has a special obligation toward the whole: its truth must be in its totality or its implications of totality. It must embody the difficult unity of inclusion rather than the easy unity of exclusion. More is not less.’

171
In the light of the earlier discussion of visual meaning as constituted by the relation of the metonymic to the metaphorical as constitutive of holistic meaning, Venturi’s formulation of truth in totality may seem rather innocent now. Nevertheless, the famous riposte to Mies’s ‘Less is more’ as ‘Less is a bore’ exactly parallels the Greenberg/Fried debate discussed in Chapter One here as the crucial moment of defeat for formalist Modernism. As was suggested, the attack from Clement Greenberg and particularly Michael Fried’s Art And Objecthood against the Minimalists in the nineteen sixties was in reality the defence of Modernism against the nascent postmodern. The equivalent of Jackson Pollock’s Lavender Mist as a total holistic experience in the visual instantaneity of form is Mies’s Seagram Tower, New York. This was initially a very American conceptual contest in which Venturi rivalled Mies just as Rauschenberg and Johns subverted the Abstract Expressionists and in which Installation and Performance violated the sculptural purity of David Smith and Anthony Caro. At the very centre of the debate was the Modernist critique from Greenberg of what was clearly becoming an ‘after-Modernist’ state as a version of kitsch and which Fried characterized as a form of theatricality. It is Venturi who answers in the midst of this secessionist crisis by asking at the end of Complexity and Contradiction ‘...is not Main Street almost all right?’ (1966, 104) The Strip, Main Street and the commonplace Pop icons of Andy Warhol and Richard Hamilton celebrated precisely banality and low ordinariness against the high sublime of Modernism. The Strip and Main Street carry semiotic language at the gaudy sharp-end of transaction of the front whilst it is the unseen back which actually functions with deliveries and waste-disposal and so on. In Learning From Las Vegas (1972), Venturi celebrates American low-life frontage architecture as a kind of legitimate American vernacular (W.J. Curtis 1996, 562) in the shape of the ‘decorated shed’ which is used in contrast with, and to disparage the expressive Modernist concrete form such as Saarinen’s TWA Airport as a giant bird which is dismissed as a ‘duck’, or Utzon’s Sydney Opera House which expresses structure and function as decoration (C. Jencks 1981, 45).

Venturi now seems the architect who pushed at the Modernist dam to release the developing flow of architectural and other forms of Postmodernism. The Vanna Venturi House stands equal in importance with Charles Moore’s Burns House, Santa Monica, 1974. Moore’s own House, Orinda, California, (1962) is wildly eclectic and swings from
Regionalist painted exterior to absurdist classical moulding and a shower which is mimetic of the *impluvium* of the Roman Villa (G. Allen 1980, 24). This is the ruination of the grid. Roman grid-logic is transmogrified by the collage of different architectural effects imploding contiguously. The regional ad hoc and collaged *bricolage* of the Burns House and the Moore House announce the death of the rational organizing grid-form as decisively as Pruitt-Igoe or Ronan Point declared the decease of Modernism as a principle in its own terms.

**FROM POSTMODERNISM TO POSTSTRUCTURALISM: FROM SIMILE TO METAPHOR**

As a means of pointing up the transition from first-phase Postmodernism into architectural Poststructuralism, this section compares the showy historicism of postmodern architecture from the nineteen sixties to the nineteen eighties and its ‘noise’ with the more restrained neo-modernism of the poststructuralists. The transition is characterized by the move to an engagement with ‘Theory’ and the discussion of the nature of that change depends heavily on the account of the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in Chapter Four. The suggestion is that architectural form transmogrified from a physical resemblance to the metaphor it referred to, such as Roger’s Pompidou Centre actually *resembling* an exoskeleton, and is therefore metaphorically a simile, to buildings which implicated meaning by the means of visual metaphor inside allegory’s ‘other-speaking’ such as Frank Gehry’s suggestions of ‘ruin’ at his Santa Monica House. Architects whose work is deeply influenced by theory such as Peter Eisenman or critics and theorists like Christian Norberg-Schulz within the phenomenological tradition are discussed.

By the nineteen seventies the architectural context was characterized by a spreading eclectic revivalism. On the one hand there were straightforward traditional revivals of post-Renaissance classicism such as Quinlan Terry’s Richmond-Upon Thames, begun at the end of the decade and which contrasted with the deliberate Historicism of Venturi and
Moore or the more observed continuities of modernist refinement among the New York Five, especially in Eisenman and Meier. Almost immediately the historicists became known as 'the greys' because they dallied with Pop, low life and kitsch. Their sources were Mannerist, Baroque and Rococo, just as Paulo Portoghesi had revivified Borromini. The Five, in contrast, became known as 'the whites' because of attachment to the intellectual economy of Corbusian Purism (W.J. Curtis 1996, 565). Meier's houses were essays in the white antiphonal exchange between verticality and horizontality. Eisenman's Houses 1–10, equally white, were intensely theoretical deconstructions in concrete of both the grid house and conventional domestic space. The rejection by the Five of mannered revivalism eventually led, particularly in Eisenman, to an architectural poststructuralism. What characterized this moment was the appearance of theory quite separately from ideas specifically about architecture, but which nevertheless powerfully influenced its subsequent practice.

The confusion which surrounded new forms of eclecticism and 'revival' represented the appearance of the postmodern as an imperative. The importance of the Greenberg/Fried debate discussed in Chapter One underpins the present discussion as the account in Chapter Two similarly treats the transition from Modernism to Postmodernism. Underlying notions of 'revival' and 'eclecticism' is the temporal recursion of Postmodernism away from Modernist ideological dogma whilst yet remaining part of it as architectural practice as 'The Five' demonstrate. The shift to the postmodern is a movement away from Modernist progressive leftism and its social ideology to an architecture of theoretical formalism (W.J. Curtis 1996, 565). Where the modern had breathed the air of utopian progress and improvement and the powerful planning achievements of World War Two, the postmodern embraced linguistic semiotics, Chomskyan deep structure and the metaphorical significance of gesture. The legacy of conjecture about the relation between gesture and meaning and between the visual and the linguistic, *ut ars poetica*, left by Lessing in the Laocoon was never more relevant.

The opening, overt, first phase of postmodernist architecture lasted from the nineteen seventies to the early nineteen nineties. Michael Graves's startling Disney Centre,
California, matched the innovative audacity of Moore’s Piazza d’Italia, New Orleans. Both the Piazza and the Disney Centre, completed in 1990, typify the theatrical rhetoric of Historicist self-announcement previously discussed here. Both of these buildings might be characterized as examples of what could be described as ‘Romanism’. Another conspicuous example of what Charles Jencks calls ‘Postmodern Classicism’ (C. Jencks 1991, 121) would be Philip Johnson’s AT&T Tower with its vast Baroque broken pediment. Moore’s Piazza contains an extraordinary melee of classical allusion from chrome Ionic to neon-lit Corinthian. His fascination with the aedicule (C. Jencks 1991, 67) and impluvium as Historicist tropes create an architectural context of considered excess. The Doric metopes, which in the Piazza deliver water, Moore called ‘wetopes’ in the spirit of parodic subversion. Graves’s Disney Centre has, extraordinarily, a ‘classical’ façade with dwarfs from Snow White as caryatids supporting the pediment itself. It also contains a ‘Roman’ rotunda and barrel vaults. Both of these buildings, as exemplars, work referentially as similes. Both literally represent what they are branding, Italianate redevelopment and corporate logo. Both have wit. But neither would make any claim to metaphorical, or indeed, metaphysical, seriousness in the sense that metaphor has been discussed earlier here. What these edifices represent as the self-evident sensibility of bad taste is the rejection of what Robert Venturi called ‘the puritanically moral language’ of the seriousness and earnestness of Modernist architecture and its classical antecedents. They are the Nietzschean Dionysian overturning the Apollonian; the triumph of ‘Stylistm’ and the defeat of architectural reverence. In sharp distinction, Peter Eisenman, for example, has always disclaimed this kind of irreverent simile-based postmodern reference and looked instead for theoretical accounts of form which led in his case to deconstruction, but certainly in the case of other late-phase postmodernists such as Koolhaas, Hadid, Tschumi and Libeskind, for example, towards poststructuralist theory.

In terms of Venturi’s typology in *Learning From Las Vegas*, both the Piazza d’Italia and the Disney Centre are decorated sheds; building and space with external signage. In this sense, they are highly postmodern because they avoid Modernist expressive form as a decorated version of their function. However, in an intriguing juxtaposition, it is Frank Gehry at Bilbao who introduces the drama of the folded, gestural building becoming sculptural, and in that sense reiterates the modernist duck. The clip-on signage of
Venturi’s decorated shed, semiotically liberating as it was in the past (C. Jencks 1991, 159) has itself been superseded as merely collagist décor by buildings begun in the nineteen nineties and beyond which are philosophically existential (not, obviously, in the sense of Sartre’s Existentialism) and have something of Heidegger’s ‘Being’ as well as ‘Dwelling’. The proximity of Moore’s Piazza to a self-declaration of kitsch, not only puts it into a different universe of sensibility from Greenberg’s Modernist epiphany, but also from the new sobriety of the Poststructuralists. It is almost as if the Puritanism that Venturi rejected in his Gentle Manifesto as the unacceptable face of Modernism, returns in poststructuralist form as a kind of restrained pluralism after the self-imposed stylistic excess of the previously emergent phase of postmodern architecture.

The ‘noise’ of first-phase postmodernism as rhetorical historicism as a form of ironic posturing and parody which here is characterized as theatricality, bears comment in William Curtis’s Modern Architecture Since 1900, now widely regarded as the standard reference text.

Despite the noisy proclamations of ‘postmodernists’ in the early 1980s about the end of an era, their actual vocabularies involved little more than the sticking-together of pre-existing pieces of modern architecture, with appliqués here and there of skin-deep historicism. This scarcely amounted to a basic critique; it was rather a change of clothes. By contrast, the inventions of the masters, of Le Corbusier and Wright in particular, altered the very special anatomy of design and constituted a fundamental reorganization of the deep structures ....of the medium itself. (W.J Curtis 1996, 687)

This commentary might well be a form of disapproval, and is reminiscent of the position of David Harvey in The Condition of Postmodernity that Modernism retained an authentic centre (D. Harvey 1990, 359) or that of Jurgen Habermas in Modernity – An Incomplete Project (J. Habermas in Harrison and Wood, Eds 1995, 1000-1008) that modernity is not yet worked out. Similarly, Peter Eisenman initially held an important position between the remnants of Modernism and the emergent Postmodernism of the nineteen seventies and eighties. As a member of the New York Five, Eisenman’s Houses 1-X1 played on a deconstructed Cubism in a similar way to Richard Meier’s Neo-Purism.
of Corbusian white form. Eisenman has argued that Modernism represented an Hegelian authenticity which created the dominant historical term from dialectical and binary opposition such as function and form or structure and decoration (P. Eisenman in C. Papadakis, Ed, 1988, 6). He suggests that since Modernism cannot address the complexity and pluralism of new postwar culture, then architecture, like film, music or literature must find its own post-Hegelian foundation. Instead, Postmodernism (that is of the nineteen eighties) has avoided the post-Hegelian challenge, the challenge of avoiding the dialectical either-or in favour of a search for historical authenticity. ‘Each [literature, film, music and so on] has reconceptualized the world in its own way in what might be called post-Hegelian terms. What has been called Post-Modernism in architecture, a blatant nostalgia for the lost aura of the authentic, the true and original, has specifically avoided this most important task.’(C. Papadakis 1988, 7) Eisenman’s prescription is to penetrate metaphor for a state of catachresis; that is to instantiate the trope of the condition of ‘the between’ of the similar but ‘incorrect’ term as a means of destabilizing the dialectical nature of Hegelianism. This is, of course, a form of ‘deconstruction’. In fact his nineteen eighties signpost building, the Wexner Center, Ohio, (1983-9) contains strong elements of the Modernist grid, but deforms and defaces its modernism with the historicist castellated forms which refer to the historical context of the site [Fig 13]. In fact, in terms of praxis, Eisenman’s state of catachresis was only arrived at by being historically derivative. His ‘atopia’ or ‘placelessness’ (W.J. Curtis 1996, 665) turns out to be temporal, as the Wexner Center demonstrates. Eisenman’s critique of a postmodernist ‘search for historical authenticity’ and ‘blatant nostalgia’ results in affirming the inevitably temporal and recursive, and hence allegorical, nature of the postmodern palimpsest. And in fact, what has emerged as ‘authentic’ in later poststructuralist architecture is its acknowledgement of its Modernist origins as a kind of
ironic ‘Truth To Materials’ rather than the florid eclecticism of the earlier Moore and Graves period.

Eisenman’s ‘between’ invokes a condition of atopia or ‘placelessness’ on either ‘side’ as the particular result of refusing the validity of the Hegelian dialectical opposition of either-or. The erosion of ‘place’ as part of identity and meaning sounds appropriate for a postmodern Nietzschean or nihilist deferral of Enlightenment rationalism. Christian Norberg-Schulz characterizes Eisenman’s ‘between’ as the Janus-like two faces of Postmodernism. One face inevitably contemplates the Modernism from which it is descended, whilst the other confronts the Nietzschean drama that ‘..... the Post-Modern condition is characterized by a general loss of intrinsic meaning and that all knowledge is ‘interpretation’’. (C. Norberg-Schulz in A. Papadakis, Ed 1988, 11-15)

Norberg-Schulz suggests in a familiar way that the Cartesian dualism of mind versus body created a separation between ideas and feelings. The synthesis which will reintroduce meaning into form, Norberg-Schulz proposes, is art.

Art can embody meaning phenomenologically as suggested here in Chapter Three. But it is through Heidegger’s sense that art in conferring a particular meaning must withhold others. It is then through 
alethia
or ‘unconcealing’ as ‘revelation’ that the visual image disgorges its latent language from which meaning becomes manifested. It has to be said that Norberg-Schulz’s Heidegerran emphasis on 
alethia
as a source of spiritual understanding rather than language can sound both mysterious and transcendent (C. Norberg-Schulz in A’ Papadakis, Ed 1988, 13). Despite the enormously important contribution of Norberg-Schulz to the tradition of Heidegerran phenomenology, especially in 
Existence, Space and Architecture
(1971), his oeuvre remains limited [29]. His position is one where ‘significance’ in architectural form does not necessarily implicate language. When he does speak of language, he does so in Jencks’s terms as a language of architecture, a position irreconcilable with that proposed here (A. Papadakis 1988, 14).

The avoidance of the clip-on eclecticism of the nineteen seventies and eighties with its showy theatricality and thinness of meaning was achieved by a concerted theoretical concentration which can be broadly represented as poststructuralist. What characterizes
this most aptly is the development of a pluralism of non-gridded architectural design in
the nineteen nineties and beyond involving free-flowing curved or deformed space. If
'tpluralism' and Poststructuralism broadly equate, then what poststructuralist theory
involves varies from Deconstruction, Phenomenological Hermeneutics, the Monad of
Liebnitz (the fold), the Allegorical Impulse, the Semiotics of the Metaphorical Sign,
Language and Visual Form, Visual hermeneutics, Literary Theory, Linguistics and The
Philosophy of Language and perhaps much else besides. Certainly what is taken to be
distinctive here is that this proliferation of theory has at its centre a concern for the
relation between the form of the art-work and language, and how that transmits
significance and meaning. The plurality of positions which represent 'theory' are all
subsumed by the allegorical in the sense that the temporal fold which opposes the very
notion of avant-garde Modernism is essentially a postmodern imperative involving
always the backward glance and the elegy of a lost past. The position of Terry Eagleton
in After Theory that Theory has un-theorized itself into embodiment nevertheless still
requires a Theory of No-Theory (T. Eagleton 2003, 23-41). The present concern here is
with meaning in postmodern architecture where 'postmodern' equates with 'theory'.
Whether it is possible to know from within the postmodern as actual members of its
cultural agency if 'theory' is being superseded into a condition of the post-postmodern is
a different intellectual inquiry.

POSTSTRUCTURAL ARCHITECTURE AND THE NEO-THEATRICAL

Theatricality, it will be recalled, is derived from Michael Fried's defence of optical and
retinal instantaneity in art, a project parallel to Clement Greenberg's Kantian teleology
leading to painterly abstraction which denied narrative and attempted to cut out the
picture plane as in Jackson Pollock's Lavender Mist. Theatricality as the art of
contrivance can be readily understood as a self-conscious form of rhetoric which is
inseparable from the self-regarding concept of conspicuous display. The movement away
from abstraction towards objecthood and the display of the installation we now recognize
as part of the impetus towards the postmodern. In architecture, there could be no similar
movement towards objecthood since the building is clearly already in its state an object.
Architecturally, display took the form of opposing the *decorum* of modernist building by dressing the early postmodern building in flagrant Historicism tropes. This first phase of postmodernist theatricality which initiated the possibility of architectural rhetoric is represented here by the exaggerated gestural characteristics of Corbusier’s Ronchamp. However, the qualitative nature of later theatricality changed as architects became interested in the possibilities of Poststructuralism and its supporting theory. The rhetoric of display became a form of revivified Modernism and was no longer wilfully Historicism in the sense that it ceased to be a kind of eclectic stylist. This difference is examined with an account of Bernard Tschumi’s Villette, Paris.

It will be readily understood that the meanings of the theoretical components of the postmodern such as the Hermeneutics of Visuality, Deconstruction and so on have already been extensively discussed in Part One and do not therefore require further rehearsal or exposition.

An important part of theatricality is that experience of it takes place both in time and space, like the installation. And it is in the duration of beholding that the theatrical object announces its self-rhetoric. Emergent postmodern architecture (Venturi, Moore, Graves) took the notion of excess, in contrast to the quietism and *decorum* of Modernism, and made it a version of eclectic Historicism. Its rhetoric is essentially mimetic such as Moore’s Piazza d’Italia and formed around the parodic copy. But what it conspicuously did not do was to acknowledge within its rhetorical display its debt to its parent, Modernism itself. Although it remained technologically modern, its ‘stylism’ was eclectic in source ranging from classicism to the Baroque and Rococo and to the typological excesses of nineteenth century Romanticism. In contrast, the poststructuralists (Libeskind, Koolhaas, Hadid, Eisenman, but Gehry needs placing in his own typological drawer) explicitly acknowledge Modernism, and their rhetoric lies in the impetus to explode and extend its form but not its ideology. The drama of the exploded Modernist form as rhetorically *gestural* and hence *expressive*, makes it, paradigmatically, what is here designated as neo-theatrical. The newness of this poststructuralist theatricality is identified in its play around the morphology of Modernist design; we expect in this respect, and indeed find, much steel glass and concrete reminiscent of the modern.
Charles Jencks et al. have described the drama of later postmodern architecture as ‘Ecstatic’ (C. Jencks 1999, 8-20). The paradigm of the ecstatic according to Jencks is Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum which is said to inaugurate ‘Bilbaoism’, a term initiated by Peter Eisenman. In a later configuration, Jencks further characterizes such architecture of the conspicuous as ‘The Iconic Building’ (2005) and which is discussed later in Chapter Seven.

The ecstatic in architecture summons up of course Mannerist rule-breaking such as Michelangelo’s Laurentian Library, Florence, or Palladio’s giantism at San Giorgio Maggiore, Venice. Its historical apotheosis is perhaps Bernini’s statue *The Ecstasy of St Theresa* (N. Coates in C. Jencks 1999, 66-77) amidst the Baroque swirls of Santa Maria della Victoria, Rome. It is the Baroque which both Paulo Portoghesi and Robert Venturi have identified as a postmodern source (R. Venturi 1966, 38-9) and which prefigures the Deleuzian fold. The difficulty with ‘architectural ecstasy’, although it makes a good theme, is that it is of the essence transitory and palpitated. This does not appear to be the natural characteristic of, say, Gehry’s Vitra Design Museum, and the unease which accompanies this designation of the ecstatic surely arises from the fact that pluralist iconic buildings which are Late Postmodernist are inflected by Modernism which obviously resists the very idea of architectural spasm and perturbation. It is proposed here, that offering an explanation rather than simply an account and one which is based on the theatricality of rhetoric is more likely to accommodate the gestural expressionism of the iconic poststructuralist building. However, as may become clearer in the next chapter, the ascription of the iconic to later postmodern buildings makes a useful link with the Peircean sign discussed here in Chapter Two.
In fact, the Guggenheim plan shows [Fig 14] Bilbao as the perfect example of the postmodern palimpsest where the Modernist white cube in a rectilinear block so redolent of the Bauhaus, is floriated by the titanium-clad ‘petals’ which emerge from the core, producing the central dramatic ascent of the atrium. This building as an ‘event’, literally overlays the postmodern on to its Modernist foundations as the curve and fold arising from the white right-angled Purism of the rectilinear lower galleries which seems to suggest that when it comes right down to function, Modernism still has a foundational role. Jencks draws an interesting distinction in relation to this building between the ‘self-sameness’ of Modernism and the ‘self-similarity’ of the postmodern. A Modernist building such as Mies’s Seagram Tower replicates its geometry in a self-repeating rule. Postmodernism will seek to deform this inherently grave classicism by replacing classical geometry with ‘fractal geometry’ (‘...fractals, irregular fractured forms that have a dynamic mixture of order and chaos known as self-similarity.’ C. Jencks 1999, 170-1 and also 1997, 11-12). Self-similarity as rhetorical ‘enonciation’ is, like the postmodern novel (D Lodge 1977, 226), a text deliberating on its own textuality; writing which postulates its own conclusive inconclusiveness and architecture deferring end-point architecture. In other words, and in terms already established in Chapter Two, it is meta-architectural. The arrangements of Modernism incorporating the gridded right-angle and horizontal striation – think of Denys Lasdun’s National Theatre, London - defy the conventional aphorism that there are no right-angles in nature, only curves, undulation and fold. In this sense, Modernism has always been an episteme of the artificial. In contrast, Poststructuralist architecture in violating the Modernist grid, anticipates disorder and displacement in form, and in contrast to the artificial, looks to the natural in bends and curves, as Gehry does in spectacular fashion at Bilbao. But it is clearly not the case that all Poststructuralist buildings curve, as Zaha Hadid’s Science
Centre, Wolfsburg, Germany 2004 shows in equally dramatic straight-line fashion. And yet in the same breath compare Hadid’s Science Centre with her Ordrupgaard Museum, Copenhagen 2005 whose curved embodiment seems to engender the feminine and it becomes clear that ‘pluralism’ means precisely a synthetic inclusiveness [Figs 16 and 17]. This, then, is an architecture which retains the artificiality of modernist reinforced concrete, steel and glass, but which equally, and in one sense defiantly, opposes the artificial with the curve as the paradigm of the natural. The fact that Pluralism can enfold both the artificial and the natural in one form becomes a familiar, and ‘double-coded’, anti-dialectical postmodern trope.

The almost startling neo-theatricality of Gehry’s Bilbao contrasts strongly with the earlier and more contained gestural expressionism of his Vitra Design Museum where the curved folded form in his oeuvre first substantially appears. The semantic significance at Bilbao however is confined to the simile rather than to the full metaphorical resonance at Vitra and the quite extraordinary references of the Nederlanden Building, Prague, both discussed in Chapter Six. As what has become the exemplar of postmodernist rhetorical self-inflection and theatrical drama, Bilbao has produced the reservation that it signifies itself rather than the whole point of the museum, the art that it contains (C. Jencks 1999, 19); that its very self-annunciation of form disparages its avowed functional intention to be a museum of art. The predisposition of postmodernist architecture to tendentiously express its rhetorical theatricality so overtly and so to exaggerate form over function does not require a value-judgement about its merits as architecture. There is no possible basis for saying that Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, Berlin for example, is a ‘better’ building than Gehry’s Bilbao, merely that it is a differently enriched form of cultural context and experience. The variety in the richness of that cultural experience in terms of
meaning and the semantic resonance of the two buildings is represented by the observation that the Jewish Museum engages profoundly with the allegorical as remembrance, whereas the dominance of the form at Bilbao makes the building allegorical only in the sense of being Historicist. That is, it represents the temporal palimpsest of the postmodern folded back over (literally) the modern. Its imagery and iconography is that of the simile such as ‘flower’, ‘petals’, ‘ship’ ‘cathedral’ and so on (C. Jenks 1999, 168). In the light of the earlier discussion here of the abyss apparently separating the visual from the semantic, image and word, it is tempting, if speculative, to characterize the Modernist inflection in poststructuralist architecture as visual silence and the postmodern element as the sound of the address to referential meaning. As if the right-angled white Cubism of Gehry’s lower galleries at Bilbao signify as silent Vitruvian decorum whilst the ‘ecstasy’ of the flowering titanium above almost demands the language of the analogue.

The Pluralism which associates with poststructuralist architecture does not seem to represent one coherent theoretical position, let alone any commonality of build. But although internationally important architects such as Foster and Rogers have abjured theory in favour of Late Modernist simile-based Hi-Tech, what at least links poststructuralist practice, with the important exception of Frank Gehry, is an underpinning reliance on theory itself as the point of inception. The demands of unit costs, materials and site will always be principle considerations. But the emergent form is no longer produced by the demands of function. Indeed, the resultant forms may be in an almost Dadaist fashion ‘anti-architectural’ in generating deformation and ‘bad space’, neither of which are functional, and both of which may be considered to be anti-humanist and anti-utilitarian in the sense that beholders of and participants in the building as an event are necessarily required to negotiate it rather than be conducted through it as in the Corbusian or Modernist grid (Anthony Vidler 1992, 140-3). In many ways, the influence of the Architectural Association, London, and the Institute For Architecture and Urban Studies, New York, has proved to be decisively important. Both Tschumi and Koolhaas (who in turn taught Zaha Hadid) taught at the A.A. and in New York, the I.A.U.A. was directed initially by Eisenman who in turn was an influence on Libeskind (Aaron Betsky 1990, 61-2).
The influences here are highly heterogeneous. Peter Eisenman has moved through Chomskyan syntactic structures, Deconstruction and Deleuzian fold-theory. Libeskind has derived much from Heideggeran hermeneutics, and Zaha Hadid, like Bernard Tschumi, has been powerfully influenced by Russian Constructivism. Both Koolhaas in Delirious New York and Tschumi in The Manhattan Transcripts dealt phenomenologically with the experiential chaos and non-rational character of the city. Neither were practical building projects, both were expositional theory (A. Betsky 1990, 64-8). The experience of dislocated and deformed space, particularly in the urban setting, becomes another version of the uncanny. It was previously noted that Baudelaire represented the ironic moment as a form of doubling in which an involuntary Schadenfreude uncannily asserts itself. Equally, Walter Benjamin's characterization of the ruin as quintessential embodiment of the allegorical always has the capacity to disturb (A. Vidler 1992, 4-5). Ruins represent not just memory, but dangerous memory. In an insistent memory of Modernist Cubism, the deformed poststructuralist architectural volume is apt not only to produce a sense of strangeness, but also displacement and Marxist alienation. Libeskind's large void at the Jewish Museum is disturbing and dark at the same time, both darkly disturbing and disturbingly dark. It would seem that the experience of the allegorical as the metaphorical ruin of time is also an encounter with the uncanny. Hal Foster's location in Compulsive Beauty (H. Foster 1993) of the uncanny in the frightening presence of 'something else' as Freudian Unheimliche or the un-homely, finds its ground in the tales of Hoffman or Grimm.

When two historical imperatives become oppositional and co-present in the same context, the impact on the spectator of disturbance and the uncanny is inevitable. It is also a temporal disturbance, such as two historically different modes inhabiting the same space at the same time. Time, for a moment, is metaphorically ruined. In considering the trace of the postmodern architectural imperative, the opening assault on Modernist Purism, which in its Brutalist manifestation was becoming international by 1950, came from the author of the architecturally pure himself; no less than Corbusier. Ronchamp (1950-4) was suddenly the drama of a violation of origin and de-canonization. If any one building may be said to announce the postmodern, it is Ronchamp. It is the doubling of
the familiar in Corbusier of the white stucco and typically Corbusian forms such as the vestigial *campanile* compared with the gestural reference of the roof and ground plan which both astonishes and unsettles. The conflation at Ronchamp of past and present is in a sense, the ruin of and nostalgia for earlier forms defaced by the sudden rhetorical gesture of the new shape. It is Ronchamp which first rhetorically synthesizes the old Modernist planar Cubism with new folded and curved forms. The ground plan which at one end is amoebic and at the other pointed and prow-like [30], defies the Modernist grid by being ‘hollow’ (W.J. Curtis 1996, 420) and containing an unsettling floor which slopes rhetorically towards the east end. Once the beholder has realised that the physical gap between wall and roof allowing the entry of light is a further parody of and play on Functionalism, then the building emerges ever more strongly as gestural sculpture. There may indeed be the residual silence of modernist restraint present, but there is also the unmistakeable presence of theatricality when the physical form becomes theatre-like not simply as an arena for Catholic liturgy, but as architectural drama. Once the tenuous relation between wall and roof has been appreciated as a play on a Modernist base supporting the roof simile, then Ronchamp becomes proleptic for the flowering of Frank Gehry’s roof on its Modernist galleries below at Bilbao. Ronchamp also hints at Historicism. The pierced wall fenestration which exposes the thickness of the wall and doubles as niches at the expense of the typical Corbusian strip window, suggests the Romanesque, rather like the deliberate textural roughness of the concrete stucco. The amoeba-like form of the east end further prompts reference to the apse and ambulatory, while the side chapels which are a requirement of Catholic liturgy, might also pun on the side aisles of the Carolingian basilica-form. Although there may be other Historicist instances (Curtis 1996, 421-2) suggestive of an ancient place (the similarity to the approach to the Parthenon), Ronchamp is innovative of postmodern reference in a strictly simile-based way. It may represent the allegorical as a Christian building (see also Chapter Six) but it does not dissemble temporally between absent presence and present absence. Nevertheless it is part of the immense significance of Ronchamp that it abrogates Modernist straight-line, right-angled grid forms and announces the possibility of Baroque drama and theatre. It is also the case that Ronchamp so profoundly displaces Modernist ideology that the experience of it as a building by Corbusier creates both
cognitive and aesthetic confusion verging on the disquiet of the uncanny. Not for nothing did James Stirling, architect of the modernistic iconic Leicester Engineering Building but later himself a leader of British Postmodernism, question the ‘mannerism’ and ‘conscious imperfection’ of Ronchamp and wonder whether it ‘should influence the course of modern architecture’. (Curtis 1996, 420) Extraordinarily, it is Ronchamp as Corbusian self-inversion, literally ascending from its Purist foundation, which ushers in the era of theatricality in architecture.

Theatricality as the drama of the unexpected surprise is most obviously present in the rhetorical pose of earlier Postmodernism in architects such as Moore and Graves. This impetus towards posture and display would presumably to have led eventually to an architecture of both the preposterous and the Disneyfied. It was of course the rise of theory in what here is classified as Poststructuralist Architecture which nullified the more extreme populism of the nineteen eighties and before. The demise of the nakedly Historicist postmodern building has led some to suppose that this closure represented the end of the postmodern itself (W.J. Curtis 1996, 602). In fact, as Chapter Three here proposes, what took place was not death but transfiguration. The distinction is between what was earlier established as latent rather than manifest; between immanence rather than concupiscence, or even between the Nietzschean Apollonian rather than the Dionysian.

It then becomes important to identify what it is about ‘theory’ that allows us to even consider representing later postmodernist architecture as Poststructuralist and to establish among the individual strands of ‘Pluralism’, some commonality. At the Parc de la Villette, Paris, (1984-90) Bernard Tschumi effectively declared a manifesto. And the fact that Villette involved both Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman indicated what kind of theory might prevail and become superordinate. The superimposition of
Tschumi’s points, lines and planes in a form of spatial palimpsest [Fig 15] creates what Anthony Vidler in *The Architectural Uncanny* (1992) calls the ‘Villette-board’. The allusion here is to ‘game’ and ‘play’. Part of the layering is a grid of red-painted steel constructions in the form of cubes which obviously refer to Russian Constructivism and which are therefore in a manner of speaking historical plagiarism and which are recursive in a familiar postmodernist way. But part of the ‘play’ here is that in direct contravention of Constructivist principles of praxis, they are self-consciously ‘useless’ and non-functional. The grid of these ‘follies’ creates the template of the ‘board’ and ‘game’, but then ruins the rationality of the grid by rendering it purposeless and traversed by paths and walkways which go nowhere in particular and which are therefore ‘aimless’. If Villette is a kind of bizarre architecturally conceptual board game, then among the follies (French *folie* ‘mad’) as ‘pieces’ are the empty spaces – *les cases vide* – required for ‘play’. The play here is on absence among presence; Constructivism as both absent and present temporally (A. Vidler 1992, 101). In turn this of course implicates the allegorical, but in a wider sense what is invoked here is Heidegger’s ‘unconcealing’ as an aspect of Deconstruction. It is Deconstruction which has been an underlying common attitude which unites the Poststructuralist response in architecture and which has generated theoretical views about actual form rather than being simply a version of fashionable radical chic. The frozen formalist gesture of the Villette follies creates an almost eerie uncanniness. Time, in its Newtonian sense as flowing inexorably from a past and through a present to some future is suspended (A. Vidler 1992, 102) and becomes a personal experience of the uncanny as an aspect of Bergson’s ‘duration’ in which the predilections of the follies to disturb becomes palpable. The psychological unease in the presence of impractical gestures in the ‘absent presence’ of Constructivism is a result of the forward temporal flow of Constructivist ideology violated by the ‘blind’ backward glance of the follies. There is a persistent deferral of definitive meaning. The follies are not beautiful by design, but pun on the engineering of the girders which, in an obvious Constructivist reference, constitute them. There is no parergon of embellishment and ornamentation, only an apparent functionality that is wholly non-functional; anything resembling Kantian beauty is bracketed by the sheer embodiment of the steel.
In citing Hassan’s model of conceptual antinomy in Chapter Three, it becomes clear that Postmodernism does not simply establish dialectical opposition between modernist and postmodernist principles. There is as a procedure fundamental to the postmodern involving a different ordering of priorities and a reversal of established imperatives. Thus Modernist metonymy and contiguity is replaced by a postmodernist emphasis on metaphor, the allegorical replaces the simile and famously, Derrida reverses the polarity between the Saussurean tradition of the domination of speech, including historical rhetoric, and writing. In one conceptual sense, then, writing carries the characteristic of silence where speech is necessarily of the audible. However, it is of the greatest importance here to note that it is indeed through, as it were, the rhetoric and ‘noise’ of speaking that postmodern architecture means [31]. Nevertheless, it is clearly the case that Theory is a form of written discourse, and in that sense Tschumi’s reversal of the functional nature of Constructivism into the empty presence of the non-functional follies at Villette is a form of inscription. The inscription is not a form of narrative, but Tschumi’s historical Constructivist ‘ruin’ seems to be the site of the site of the uncanny as a kind of temporal ‘haunting’.

If Postmodernism necessarily contains Modernism, in the way, for example, the follies at Villette ‘contain’ Constructivism, then the epistemological imperative for the postmodernist ‘text’ must be for the audibility of rhetorical speech to be overlaid on to the silence of inscription. The reversal of emphasis in Deconstruction is not the ideological exclusion of one episteme to be totally replaced by that which supersedes it. This leads to the non sequitur of either/or which cannot be since Postmodernism both contains and is contained in turn by Modernism.

Derrida addresses indirectly the problem of meaning in architecture in ‘Force and Signification’ in Writing And Difference (J. Derrida 1978, 3-30). Derrida’s position which reiterates that of Paul Ricoeur, is that philosophy, by which he means the metaphysics of the Analytical Tradition, cannot escape metaphor, especially architectural metaphor like ‘structure’ because its language is itself irredeemably metaphorical; that the terms philosophical discourse must use to defeat metaphor are patently metaphorical themselves, such as ‘support’, ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ and ‘ground’ and ‘foundation’, an embedded attribute explored extensively in Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By
Mark Wigley in \textit{Derrida's Haunts} also makes this point \cite{Wigley1993}. 'Derrida's work would go on to repeatedly demonstrate that metaphysics constitutes itself with the very metaphors it claims to have abandoned as 'mere' metaphors....Philosophy can only define a part of itself as non-metaphorical by employing the architectural metaphor'. (M. Wigley 1993, 18) The deconstructive architectural metaphor par excellence is the play between absence and presence which always inaugurates the trace of the temporal and the dissembling appearance of the allegorical. In speaking of meaning inherent in the follies at Villette, Derrida acknowledges that 'historicism' is a form of nostalgia but that the follies inevitably 'dislocate' origin (J. Derrida in N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 327). He speaks of a postulation:

'...architecture must have a meaning, it must present it and, through it, signify. The signifying or symbolical value of this meaning must direct the structure and syntax, the form and function of architecture. It must direct it from outside, according to a principle (arche), a fundamental or foundation, a transcendence or finality (telos) whose locations are not themselves architectural.' (\textit{Point De Folie – Maintenant L'Architecture} in N. Leach 1997, 326-7, original emphasis)

It is noteworthy that Derrida in coupling 'syntax' with the 'function of architecture' subscribes to the view opposed here that function is somehow architecturally linguistic. However, in another and important sense, Derrida catches the 'theory' in poststructuralist architecture by insisting that the form and function of architecture is externally mediated by a foundational argument that is not of itself architectural. Derrida further proposes that what follows must embrace Heidegger's 'dwelling', with both nostalgia and architectural order, and what is more, 'Regardless of mode, period or dominant style, this order ultimately depends on the fine arts. The value of beauty, harmony and totality still reigns.' (N. Leach 1997, 327) Despite Derrida's sometimes gnomic expression, it is interesting that what emerges is not a wholesale deconstruction of the binary pairing of the beautiful versus the ugly; that the ugly, or at least the banal and non-beautiful, necessarily comes to subsume the beautiful as a reversed result of 'deconstruction'. It may do as an aesthetic procedure rather as Emin's \textit{Bed} does, and thereby express
conceptual meaning as an installation rather than dwell on formal arrangement, but the possibility of beautiful form in architecture remains intact, and within the poststructuralist sensibility. Thus the widespread appreciation of Gehry's Bilbao Guggenheim does not only represent an almost sublime awe at the building's rather breathtaking meta-architectural self-reference, but also an appreciation of the aesthetic, or beautiful, quality of its natural forms. Although it has become an event, it remains significant form. In speaking of beauty and harmony, Derrida is invoking the Vitruvian classical value of order, and specifically, architectural order. In this he opposes no less than Kant, who in *The Critique Of Judgement* relegates architecture to the inferior as art because of its dependence on *utilitas* and materiality which is aesthetically transcended by the inherently superior content of painting. Architecture then is understood by Kant to be utilitarian and dependent on embellishment and ornament rather than being intrinsically aesthetic (M. Wigley 1993, 12).

So what is being suggested is that there is a loose and highly varied kind of deconstructive architectural theory which may well be approximate but which nevertheless is a unifying thread in poststructuralist practice. Just as it is impossible to detect an underlying architectural imperative which somehow bonded together all the competing revivals of the mid-nineteenth century, so it might seem equally tentative to accord to poststructuralist architecture a deep-structural organizing principle which is characteristically deconstructionist. Nevertheless, the nineteenth revivals were highly eclectic and essentially mimetic - simulations and copies of previous and admired styles such as classicism or gothic. Barry produced both the effusive gothic of the Houses of Parliament and the severe Greek-Revival classicism of the Reform Club. It might be possible to say that the period was eclectic precisely because it was revivalist and therefore non-innovatory and regressive. The broadly acknowledged 'pluralism' of poststructuralist architecture, rather like nineteenth century eclecticism, has a revivalist aspect. The revivalist element in Poststructuralism is the explicit acknowledgement of stylistic Modernism, if not always its spatial organization, such as Gehry's ordered lower Bilbao galleries rising in an increasingly deformed rationalism to the 'bad spaces' of the atrium. Arguably, the presence of the modern in architectural Poststructuralism brings
with it a Modernist decorum, and to complete the earlier point concerning Kant’s relegation of architecture to utilitarian function rather than aesthetic form, it connects later postmodern buildings to what Derrida characterizes as the continuum of architectural order. The Moore-Graves period was conspicuously ‘bad-mannered’ with its self-conscious violation of good taste and it was this flagrant theatricality which mocked the quietism and ordered restraint of Modernism.

The procedures of deconstruction — a deferral of the either/or, the possibility of inversion within antinomies and the temporal oscillation between presence and absence for example — become variants in a practice in which ‘trace’ and ‘play’ form an organizing practice. Thus Peter Eisenman deconstructively dislodges the familiar idea of ‘location’ into the more dangerous territory of ‘dislocation’ as a working method (Andrew Benjamin in N. Leach, Ed, 1997, 294-5). This is emphatically not a destructive procedure in which previously dominant architecture is disinterred and shaken apart. Rather, it involves the interrogation of existing models of form in order to ‘unconceal’ their concealed assumptions and contradictions. It then becomes a process of revelation from disfigurement; a violation of the sanctity of the architectural norm, and whilst still according it respect, or even veneration, nonetheless profanes it. Part of the destabilization of architectural ‘location’ is the dislocation or dislodging of meaning. In the sense of the allegorical, commissions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries such as the Berlin Jewish commemorations by Libeskind and Eisenman and Libeskind’s original design for the New York ‘Freedom Tower’ are overtly concerned with remembrance and memory. And of course, museums such as the Vitra, Frankfurt, and the Guggenheim, Bilbao, by Gehry are in themselves ‘cabinets of curiosities’ and as such repositories of memory and commemoration. Museum objects are semblances of an absent past which is beyond redemption but whose absence is constantly recalled by the presence of the artefacts of the museum, and like commemorative buildings, the site of mourning (Stephen Bann in L. Cooke and P. Wollen, Eds, 1995, 28-9). Amongst the most powerful allegorical sites of remembrance and mourning in the built environment are Christian churches and cathedrals. The iconography of the church and the postmodern museum are discussed in the next chapter. The conceptual process of shaking and loosening architectural structures are aspects of ‘trace’ and not demolition.
Deconstruction as an underlying architectural paradigm, albeit complex in its individual variety, has been a dominant connective tendency within the 'Pluralism' of the Architectural Poststructuralists, a pluralism which has increasingly acknowledged the Deleuzian fold and its implications for curved architecture.

‘The unbuilding that is deconstruction is not a form of demolition. It establishes the conditions of possibility of the ‘tradition of architecture’ rather than staging its fall. To make a building tremble is precisely not to collapse it by subjecting it to some external force, but to explore it from within, even to consolidate the structure, imitating its every gesture, faithfully repeating its operations but in a way that exposes its limits, opening up its structures or, rather, finding the openings that are already there, the concealed points of weakness.... this is an appropriation of structures that identifies structural flaws, cracks in the construction that have been systematically disguised, not to collapse those structures but, on the contrary, to demonstrate the extent to which the structures depend on both these flaws and the way they are disguised. That is, it identifies the structural role of what traditional philosophy would identify as structural flaws and, in so doing, displaces rather than dismantles that philosophy.’

(M. Wigley 1993, 42)
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE READING OF BUILDINGS

This chapter attempts to read postmodern and poststructuralist architecture in the light of the theoretical chapters of Part One which establish the constitutive elements of the interpretative model. The themes which have spiralled forward are those enshrined in the set of principles enumerated in the Introduction. Thus, for example, the condition of gesture, metaphor, allegory and rhetoric, theatricality as a conspicuous aspect of rhetoric, the importance of Modernism for the recursive palimpsest of the postmodern as an instance of the allegorical, the central importance of phenomenological embodiment for linguistic 'unconcealing', and above all, the insistently difficult relation between aesthetic form and language instituted by *ut ars poetica* form the basis of interpretation of actual buildings in this chapter. It is divided into five sections: Sculptural Gesture As Origin, Frank Gehry And Remembrance, The Architectural Curve, The Reinscription Of Modernism In The Fold and Daniel Libeskind And Building On The Past. What Fish's interpretative community might make of this interpretation of significant postmodern buildings would depend largely on the assonance and fit between the running theoretical themes and the way they are seen to reveal meaning in poststructuralist architectural form.

SCULPTURAL GESTURE AS ORIGIN

The shape of a building creates its attitude ('a theatrical pose created for effect, a position of the body indicating mood or emotion'). Substituting 'building' for 'body' in the dictionary definition would not substantially alter the meaning. Shape or pose then represents gesture. Gesture then indicates mood which is an important aspect of meaning. It was the theatricality of shape and seen with drama in the Baroque which was suppressed by Modernism but which re-emerged in Postmodernism. After the initial decorative and ornamental historicism of early postmodernist building in the form of its
typical clip-on stylism became largely marginal, postmodernist architecture became increasingly sculptural in form and therefore increasingly gestural. That meaning attaches to architectural gesture is first demonstrated by the emergence of the definitive shape and orientation of the Christian church with its powerful allegorical inflections and significance built into and embodied in its east-west alignment. This section looks at the huge importance of the church and its implications for the postmodern and further seeks to elaborate the significance of gesture as meaning by assessing Susan Langer's theory of gesture in *Feeling And Form*. There is also an important distinction drawn between commemorative buildings which instantiate the allegorical and the buildings of the 'Bilbaoist' tendency which do not.

Ronchamp is widely recognized as the precursive postmodernist building (C. Jencks 2005, 56-63). It is highly significant that Corbusier, in introducing sculptural expression, did so by embodying that process in the form of a church. The church is the prequel for the postmodern building as a semantic signifier. It is the church which as a built form first establishes in its richness of reference and symbolism the possibility of a building embodying the allegorical. And 'embody' here has a literal connotation with the constant allusion to the presence and body of Christ. It is the church, as Corbusier acknowledges at Ronchamp, which prefigures and creates the possibility of a building as a form of meaning. The earlier basilica-form from which it emerged was classical and pre-Christian and acted as a public building from which justice was dispensed (W. Fleming 1995, 128-9). Pre-Christian classical buildings of course might contain metaphorical elements such as Corinthian columns as mimetic of trees and other similes such as caryatids, but it is the church in which the whole building resonates semantically. The original entrance to the Roman basilica was the narthex, a kind of public vestibule for gathering, and later the main entrance to the Christian church prior to the establishment of the Romanesque tradition of a southern porch entrance (J. Curl 1999, 58-9). The apse of the Roman basilica was originally located on one of the long sides with a lateral transept at the end opposite to the narthex. It was from the apse that the Roman magistrate presided and dispensed justice. In an act of dramatic transformation, the church moved the apse to the centre of the transept, thus creating a 'head' looking west towards the darkness of the
setting sun (Son) and creating the church building as a representation of the body of Christ with the outstretched arms of the transept as mimetic of the crucifixion. Christ as Pantocrator, the universal ruler, emerged from the prior judicial magistracy of the Roman apse (E. Griffiths, The Guardian, 24.12.05).

The allegories enshrined in the metaphorical themes of the building in its east/west orientation of light and darkness and death and rebirth, constantly met at each dusk and dawn, created the precedent for the building to mean and signify as built visual metaphor. It will be noted that the building as a ‘body’ with the apse as ‘head’ and transepts as ‘arms outstretched’ is, in terms of visual metaphor, metonymic and simile-based in the sense that the old modified basilica-form physically resembled the prostrate Christ. It is the initial physical appearance, rather like Libeskind’s fenestration in the Jewish Museum, which is metonymically contiguous and prompts the reading of death and resurrection, despair and hope as language emerging allegorically as a metaphorical overlay from the building-form. It is conspicuously not the case that this emergent language is an example of a Charles Jencks-like ‘language of the church building’. In a further contiguous arrangement, the ‘body’ of the church, or nave, is the public aspect of the building. Beyond the transepts and crossing in the choir, or originally the sacristy, the public are excluded in the intensely private moment of consecration of the Host. In Anglo-Saxon churches such as Bradford-Upon-Avon, the chancel arch is deliberately narrowed in order to exclude the laity from the central mystery the more effectively. The gesture of outstretched arms can of course signify embrace and welcome as well as crucifixion. There is therefore a perhaps unintended irony in that the arms of the transept also represent the crossing between choir and nave, public and private, and that the welcoming arms secondarily form the barrier between the two in a reversal of meaning which speaks of exclusion rather than welcome. And it was at the crossing, under the rood screen, that the sacrificial drama [33] of the Mass was confirmed by the present absence of bread and wine as ‘body’ and ‘blood’, finally made public in the act of communion. What is consecrated is sacrifice and remembrance, which makes the church oscillate temporally between absence and presence, and it is its commemorative function which makes it monumental. In this sense, an important distinction needs to be drawn between commemoratively monumental buildings in the postmodern such as the Jewish
Museum on the one hand and buildings of the ‘Bilbaoist’ tendency on the other such as Rem Koolhaas’s CCTV Building, Beijing. Although both are examples of the postmodern imperative of the recursively allegorical, one contains the tendency to allegorize and ‘preach’, and the other, as an exemplar of the ‘propaganda of branding’, not. The distinction between the commemorative in buildings and those that are iconic because visually they represent theatrical spectacle, is the basis for distinguishing buildings which allegorize and those which are stylistic members of the general postmodern imperative towards the allegorical. The foundation for this general tendency in postmodernism towards the allegorical remains Craig Owens’s ‘The Allegorical Imperative’. The one has intrinsic inner meaning, like the church, and the other, extrinsically, becomes representative and may be associated with a particular neighbourhood, city, region and even a nationality such as Utzon’s Sydney Opera House. Although it might be expected that buildings which allegorize might be characterized by a formal modesty, this is far from the case as cathedrals demonstrate. An intrinsically allegorizing building such as Libeskind’s Imperial War Museum of the North, Manchester, nonetheless, and in the same way, signals a particularly powerful iconic presence. The allegorizing building has to assume a dual existence, an oxymoron both of memory and matter, idea and substance. It metaphorically commemorates and transmogrifies absence into presence.

Pre-Christian ‘religious’ buildings such as the pyramids or the Parthenon, for example, do not dissemble about an absent presence, but were literalist. The Parthenon contained an enormous statue of Athena in its naos, and the pyramid was essentially a mausoleum containing physical accoutrements to serve in the afterlife (V. Gibberd 1990, 12-16). Whether the source was the rectilinear cross-shape of the western church building or the central dome with four apses off in the eastern Byzantine tradition, the cross became the present symbol of the allegory of death and resurrection. The Byzantine tradition of the dome was of course conspicuously followed during the Renaissance with Brunelleschi’s Duomo at Florence, during the Mannerist period with Bramante’s St Peter’s, Rome, and in the Baroque at St Paul’s, London. The extraordinary achievement of the symmetrical cross, achieved with central dome with attached apses, is realized notably at Santa Sophia, Constantinople, by the use of pendentives (V. Gibberd 1990, 25). At any rate,
whatever the tradition, and whatever the synthesis between east and west, what remained essential throughout was the powerful iconography of the cross, expressed in the church building as commemoration and memory. And the Gothic achievement of greater height afforded by the buttress and the pointed arch not only facilitated the vertical symbolic thrust of ‘uplifting’, but allowed the creation of the glass wall fenestration of stained glass which visually depicted the narratives of faith and belief for an illiterate laity.

Significantly, the cruciform disposition of the church emphasizes the importance of shape as gesture. We are reminded of Lessing’s theory of gesture as a form of meaning in his insistence that Laocoon does not cry out, but expresses a stoic resignation and heroic suffering as qualities emerging from the statuary. And to reinforce an earlier point, Lessing’s insistence on Laocoon’s very silence indicates that there is no ‘language of sculpture’ as William Tucker proposed in *The Language of Sculpture* (William Tucker 1974, 7) but only language that proceeds from the gestural suggestion of the form. In the same way, the shape of the building, particularly in its postmodern forms, and constitutive of its gesture, is an important part of its rhetorical meaning.

In a neglected passage in *Feeling and Form* (1953), Susan Langer produces a complex theory of gesture as meaning, and in her case, particularly in relation to dance and movement. Buildings like dancers, then, may be said to pose. Any pose reveals an underlying attitude. Forward-leaning gesture may be understood as representative of assertion or even aggression, whereas reclining gesture suggests acquiescence or even submission, and so on. Gestural meaning may well be characterized by ambiguity, which then becomes in postmodernist architecture at least, what Charles Jencks calls ‘the enigmatic signifier’ of the familiar double-code (C. Jencks 2005, 21). Such enigmatic signification then becomes subject to readings by interpretative communities. ‘Attitude’, as suggested by gestural configuration, is recessive in Modernism as anti-referential and anti-metaphorical, and emergent and dominant in postmodern architecture. Fairly obviously, gesture suggests movement, or at least the end-point of movement, or a ‘frozen’ moment in mid-gesture such as Laocoon’s. Equally, Modernist sculptural assemblages such as Anthony Caro’s or the content of Abstract Expressionist painting such as Jackson Pollock’s flicks and drips are representative of such frozen moments. It is
worthy of note that Langer locates gestural meaning securely within dance which of course is highly theatrical; it therefore comes as no surprise that gesture correlates strongly with theatricality. Thus in architecture we should expect to find that highly gestural buildings tend to be versions of the theatrical in Michael Fried’s specific sense [34]. It has been noted that the highly gestural content of the Abstract Expressionists’ action painting initially drew on the ‘autonomic gesture’ of Surrealism but that later their expression became intensely personal and became characterized instead by ‘autographic gesture’, almost as personal signature (H. Foster, R. Krauss et al, Eds 2004, 351).

‘Signature buildings’ such as Gehry’s ‘Bilbaoism’ may indeed appear to defy historical or genre tradition in favour of idiosyncratic form gesturally and are therefore sculpturally formed. In photography, the frozen moment is exemplified by Cartier Bresson’s invocation of ‘the decisive moment’ as caught gesture. In architecture, Frank Gehry’s Nederlanden Building, Prague, embodies dramatic reciprocal gesture in the interlocked ‘Ginger and Fred’ forms. There is implied movement, but as in conventional pictorial painting, the figures and shapes must necessarily be ‘caught’ at one virtual moment in time. The ‘attitude’ in architectural gesture varies from the apparent sardonic air of Ginger and Fred to the potentially disconcerting lightning-form of Daniel Libeskind’s Berlin Jewish Museum as redolent of Nazi insignia. Langer says:

‘Suffice it to say that as soon as a characteristic gesture is strikingly exhibited to someone who is not completely absorbed in its practical purpose.... it becomes a gestic form, and like all articulate forms it tends to assume symbolic functions. But a symbol-seeking mind (rather than a purposive, practical one) must seize upon it.’ (S. Langer 1953, 179, original emphasis)

She proposes to distinguish between actually apprehended gestures and gesture which is prior and virtual. Prior does not mean a priori and therefore transcendental. It means that what is expressed as gesture ‘begins’ as an aspect of the imagination which when expressed as gestural form becomes symbolic of the imaginative act from whence the gesture originates. Thus we necessarily have virtual and actual gesture, the one as originate and the other as successive, but symbolic. The ‘attitude’ of which the gesture is
symbolic is nothing less than feeling. 'Real gesture springs from feeling.' (S. Langer 1953, 183) Form, then, as gesture, comes from feeling. However, gesture as symbolic feeling, is not simply a version of some personal or idiosyncratic expression. 'The conscious will that seems to motivate or animate him [the dancer, that is] may be imagined to lie beyond his person, which figures as a mere receptacle or even momentary concentration of it.... (1953, 183) The dancer no more spontaneously invents his expressive gesture as just private feeling than does the architect. Both are heir to a repertoire of significant form as 'history' which places their respective shape and gesture firmly in a public, rather than a private sphere in terms of its origins. Gehry's billowing curvilinear forms at the Disney Hall, Los Angeles, refer to the landscape, natural forms and 'nature' as much as to his own sculptural imagination. But as Gehry's own Vitra Design Museum shows, it is the church in its cruciform gesture which resonates across the passing of time and genres and haunts the new gestural and sculptural signification of the architecturally postmodern.

FRANK GEHRY AND REMEMBRANCE

In terms of trace, the theme of this chapter, it is Frank Gehry first and foremost who instigates architectural bending and folding, and so in a sense, anticipates the theoretical movement away from simplistic Deconstruction towards the Deleuzean fold and its Baroque implications. But Gehry has never been theoretically driven, and is certainly not to be considered as a poststructuralist, since this means in essence a kind of architectural practice in which the form of the building is influenced directly by theoretical consideration. His intuitive influence, however, has clearly been profound. Gehry's design practice can be broadly divided up into three phases. The first, given his current reputation as author of postmodernist 'Bilbaoism', seems in retrospect to be insistently and perhaps surprisingly Modernist. This opening period stretches from 1958 up to the work on his own Santa Monica House in 1977. The second phase, which largely represents an engagement with architectural Postmodernism, extends to 1987 and the Vitra Design Museum. From the Vitra Design Museum onwards, Gehry's development has been towards an ever closer approximation of architecture to sculptural expressionism.
and is characteristic of his third and on-going phase. It is scarcely an exaggeration to suggest that it is Gehry’s Vitra Design Museum which extends the gestural qualities of Ronchamp and almost single-handed, establishes the sculptural as emblematic of architectural Poststructuralism.

His first commissions were not only perceptibly Modernist, but were clearly derivative. One of his opening commissions, the Steeves Residence, Brentwood, California [Fig 18] of 1958 is obviously predicated on Frank Lloyd Wright’s Prairie House style with its long, low flat laterals and Japanese inflections. Gehry has acknowledged that the model for his early house designs was Wright’s Robie House (F. Dal Co and K. Foster, 1998, 66). The Robie House, 1914, is an internationally acknowledged source of the architectural modern and it is not only its functionally-driven laterality to minimize the effects of wind in the Illinois and Chicago districts which affected Gehry, but also its free-flowing interior space. Wright’s model of hearth and circulating space was an essentially American version, and one which subverted the grid-rationalism of the European International Style, and one which later mutated into the ‘bad space’ of Gehry’s sculptural form. The exaggerated cantilever as a conspicuous Modernist sign, and which appears frequently in his early designs, not only derives from Wright but was a means by which Gehry could announce the American tradition to which he subscribed rather than the European influence of Loos’s ‘Ornament is crime’ edict. Like the American Abstract Expressionists with whom he was contemporaneous, Gehry was looking to develop and evolve a characteristically American architectural repertoire, whilst the Expressionist painters such as Jackson Pollock produced what Clement Greenberg called ‘American-Type Painting’. Later houses such as the well-known Danziger Studio, Hollywood, California of 1964, were severely Modernist and ironically, distinctly Loosian, with non-articulated rendered exteriors and in places minimal
fenestration and blank walls. Gehry’s first large-scale success, Santa Monica Place, California, 1972 is extraordinarily idiosyncratic and eclectic. On one facade of this immense shopping mall is a vast glass curtain wall, hung and suspended in orthodox Miesian fashion rather like his Illinois Institute of Technology. The main facade of the building however is rendered in pure white stucco, suggestive both of Meier’s Late Modern Slick-Tech (C. Jencks 1980, 152) and Corbusier’s Purism. The supporting piloto-like squared off columns make historicist reference to both Modernism and conventional classicism at the same time. But in a further sign, the facade is skewed at an angle to the main axis of the building and so disrupting the rational grid; another conspicuous example of the skew as a postmodern signature can be found in the disjunction between the entrance and galleries within Robert Venturi’s National Gallery extension, London. Santa Monica Place, then, is partly what Charles Jencks in *Late-Modern Architecture*, 1980, describes as ‘Late Modernist’ in retaining Modernist referencing, but at the same time is also double-coded for what emerged as postmodern Historicism; it becomes an oxymoron, punning on style and dating (C. Jencks 1980, 50-54).

Gehry’s second phase runs from the transmogrification of his own Santa Monica House in 1977 up to, but not including, The Vitra Museum which opened in 1989. The Gehry Residence, Santa Monica, has now reached iconic status, but there were the precedents discussed earlier, especially Venturi’s Vanna Venturi House and the Charles Moore House. The Vanna Venturi House plainly deals in ironic parody by the dedoublement of entailing both the Modernism from which it emerged and what amounts to a satire of it in the familiar palimpsest of absent presence. As a further decisive influence on Gehry’s Santa Monica House, Moore’s Orinda House, which was nearby, was already an established source for the disruption of Modernism and was already in the nineteen sixties becoming a postmodern paradigm. The Moore House puns vigorously on the inside/outside polarity by containing not one but two skewed aedicules. The important point here is that the aedicule as part of the Roman villa was an internal reserved space as a shrine or inner house within the villa. Moore’s appropriation of it as a shower unit was candidly humorous and at the same time, frankly a form of affable mockery. The trace here is interesting because Moore hit upon the aedicule as inside the inside from Sir John Soane’s House, London, which has become a postmodern shrine in itself (C. Jencks 1980,
What Moore was doing at Orinda, and what the architectural postmodern has continued to do since, was to make the relationship of parts to whole deeply problematic, in direct contrast to the logical and rational grid-form of Modernism, by what Venturi would have called ‘contradiction’.

Gehry’s Santa Monica House has become both an icon and a definitive postmodern source because the difficult relation of the parts deny the possibility of a unified and coherent whole. Increasingly in Gehry’s practice, the expressed importance of the part destabilizes the sense of the building as a discrete, singular and whole thing. The way, for example, ‘roof’ seems to signify as the building at Bilbao and Disney Hall is a distinct break from the inherent Cubism of the earlier Danziger Studio. And ‘roof’, often with its atrium and inner galleries or functioning spaces, no longer means what ‘roof’ traditionally did, which Libeskind’s Spiral would also demonstrate should it be built. The difficulty in addressing the relational parts in the Santa Monica House lies in the fact that this is not one house at all; but then nor is it two, although it is certainly aedicular. Its aedicular form is of such fractured extremity that what counts as unity is a semblance of parts. It is a denial of the totality that dominates. Because the parts are so visually and conceptually powerful, each distorted and de-contextualized synecdochical part is a metaphor for the distorted whole. The violation of the old shingle house by the new might be understood to be deconstructive in some way. But Gehry does not do this. His basic position is aesthetic and not theoretical. Gehry does not do Theory. In his introduction to the 1992 Vienna Architecture Conference, ‘The End Of Architecture?’ he hopes the contributors such as Zaha Hadid ‘...will make beautiful buildings and will not have to sit around and worry about the end of architecture.’ (P. Noever, Ed, 1992, 13)

Deconstructive theory inverts conceptual polarities within the frames of reference of language. Gehry’s ‘re-statement’ of his House is less a deconstruction than a reconstruction; a physical process of imposition. However, whatever Gehry’s intention, non-theoretical or otherwise, the imposition of one stylistic time-frame on another represents a temporal palimpsest and as such has intimations of the allegorical.

His House was originally a shingle-type. This was the vernacular form that Vincent Scully argued represented an American simplicity and modesty of a Jeffersonian kind, derived from Jefferson’s Palladian Monticello Residence, when vernacular and popular
forms were being dismissed as naïve or kitsch by Modernism. Gehry enclosed and extended the shingle house so that the postmodern extensions created the aedicule. Essentially, the Gehry House is wrapped [Fig 19]. This is a significant act which contradicts the possibility of ‘originality’ in the shingle house which was itself a form derived from previous forms and which precipitates the trace into another poststructuralist-type infinite regress. But Gehry’s wrapping, like that of the Land Artist, Christo, is an act of concealment (H. Foster, R. Krauss et al 2004, 434-5). What is concealed, and metaphorically denied as presence, is nostalgic remembrance, a suburban sentimental attachment to historical architectural forms which in Britain has led to the Tudorbethan suburban sensibility. Gehry’s deployment of materials on the house also carries significance. Typically he used corrugated metal, chain-link, and plywood and cedar for raw wood-frame construction. These are the materials of the garden shed and the lot and by extension, found objects of a Duchampian and Dadaist inception, a possibility he picked up from Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns. Gehry’s later development of sculpturally embodied natural forms was certainly influenced by his contacts, not only with Rauschenberg and Johns, but also with sculptors such as Richard Serra and Claes Oldenburg (O. Boissiere 1990, 29). The invocation of tropes like synecdoche and oxymoron and other metaphorical devices such as ‘wrapping’ or the Dadaist-signifying of commonplace materials indicate that Gehry’s own expressionist tendency was acquiring a distinctly postmodernist referential rhetoric. Whatever Gehry’s own intention may have been, his own procedures do not exhaust the semantic possibilities which may be legitimately overlaid on his own.

'I wanted to preserve the iconic quality of the existing house and became obsessed with having it appear that the existing structure remained intact, captured inside the new structure and interacting with it. It was my idea that the old and the new could
read as distinct strong, self-conscious statements which could gain from each other without compromising themselves....I decided to expose that idea further as I cut open the old house and built new sections.’ (www.archinform.net/23.01.06)

Once the original shingle house had been ‘violated’ and had become part of a transformation into something else, then in an important sense it became a metaphorical ruin. The original house which was ‘cut open’, then had its shingle-form quite literally ruined, but Gehry was clearly anxious to preserve the memory of the original house which as an ‘aedicule’ became in a certain manner a shrine. This is of course a restitutive process which is deeply curatorial, almost turning the original house into a museological site of display. (To amplify this point a little, Gehry has had to remodel the front in order to preserve some privacy from passing cultural tour busses; F. Dal Co and K. Forster 1998, 153.) The apparent preservation of the original then becomes temporally a retrieval from the past. And the affection for the original and now irretrievable past is a kind of, or at least it can be represented as, a type of mourning; almost in fact a kind of expiation and atonement for the violated and cut open original, its innocent modesty still preserved inside the new form. The shingle house as an object of curiosity then becomes something like an object in a museum display case and conforms with Stephen Bann’s formulation, discussed earlier.

Gehry’s formation of the aedicular structure, that is two doubled as one, by extending and wrapping the original house may be seen as a form of commentary. The doubling creates two texts; ancient and modern, past and present. The fresh postmodernist text inscribed on the older and previous one requires a constant oscillation between the two and across time. The new text values the old by keeping, not obliterating it, which is a palimpsest-like act of preservation. The old text (shingle house) becomes a ‘curiosity’ inside a metaphorical cabinet, or site of display which is the whole (new) house itself. The act of preservation is critical, because what is invoked by such an act is either nostalgia or mourning. Nostalgia involves an emotively intuited recovery of the past. The nostalgic is constantly veering beyond the frame of nostalgia itself into sentimentality. Proust’s recreation of the past when, for example, he eats the madeleine is an example of recovered memory, the past as Bergson’s ‘duration’. However, his retrieval of the past, in
itself an impossibility of course, always has a tendency to move away from the affection for time regained towards the maudlin nature of time lost, which is effectively sentimental. Gehry’s response to his shingle house indicates an element of nostalgia which remains only an aspect of his already marginalized ‘intention’. But what is crucial is that the commentary by the new house on the old is parodic – that is, for example, that the extensive woodwork of the new mimics, not venerates, that of the original. The relational term between the two is ironic. And, as Baudelaire has amply demonstrated, irony is inimitable to kitsch or sentimentality. This oscillation between layers of meaning involving past and present with an attitudinising commentary by the latter on the former is the condition of the allegorical. Others, more theoretically inclined, such as Venturi and Moore, had already made the relationship of inside and out theoretically ambivalent, and the window and the wall were assuming the status of Kant’s parergon. The postmodernist discourse was already ‘out there’, and the ambiguity and contradiction of the intrinsic and the extrinsic which it generated is clearly and obviously exploited by Gehry in his Santa Monica House. Despite his intentions, or perhaps rather his lack of them, the formal conditions of the allegorical are made available by the latent discourse which emerges from the structure. Despite his intentions, the formal conditions of allegory are made available by the structure’s ‘discourse’. The nature of that discourse centres on the notion of the ruin.

By creating the temporal palimpsest, which Craig Owens has established as the basis of allegorical postmodernism, as the imposition of the new structure cut into the old, Gehry has literally ruined the original. The earlier discussion here of Walter Benjamin’s Trauerspiel established that the ruin always creates the condition of allegory. In the sense of another paradox or oxymoron, the ruin maintains the illusion of the permanence of decay. What is conferred on to the Baroque drama or the landscape setting of the park is a kind of faux antiquity, another required suspension of disbelief in which the ruin signifies as a visual metaphor which inevitably embraces the tragic. The ruin exemplifies a lost and irretrievable past. What Benjamin, in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ called ‘aura’ (W. Benjamin in C. Harrison and P. Wood Eds 1995, 512-520) might attach to the ruin as nostalgic ambience. The ruin, or its more contrived analogue, the folly, obviously unites another past to some present and comments
morosely on the inevitability of decay whilst at the same time defeating it by making decay permanent in the contrivance of the folly. In this sense, Gehry’s House, in a manner of speaking, is a folly. And like the folly, it inevitably commemorates remembrance, and equally, like the tomb, the pyramid, the ziggurat, and the memorial, it enshrines memory. The fact that Benjamin locates the ruin in seventeenth Baroque drama makes the dramatic aspect of the ruined antique folly seem inevitably another aspect of Fried’s theatricality. In ‘Letter To Peter Eisenman’, Jacques Derrida comments on Benjamin’s Trauerspiel:

‘Benjamin’s concept of the ruin, which is also the concept of a certain mourning in affirmation, indeed the salvation of the work of art.... if all architecture is finite, if it therefore carries within itself the traces of its future destruction, the future perfect of its ruin, according to modes that are original each time, if it is haunted, indeed signed by the spectral silhouette of this ruin, at work even in the pedestal of its stone, in its metal or glass, what would bring the architecture of ‘this time’ (just yesterday, today, tomorrow; use whatever words you want, ‘modern’, ‘postmodern’, ‘post-postmodern’ or ‘amodern’ etc) back to the ruin, to the experience of ‘its own’ ruin? (J. Derrida in D. Neuman et al, Eds 1994, 26)

Benjamin emphasizes the fact that the disparate elements of the ruin cannot constitute a whole by virtue of being a ruin, and in the Gehry House, such a unity or totality will be equally impossible, not only because of the fragmentation of the voids, but because in this case, the metaphor of the ruin is only called up by the presence of the new build. Part of the rhetoric of the Gehry House is that the presence of the shingle house – the implied ruin – must suggest the decay of the new postmodern element too. Much of Gehry’s materials are persistently shiny, right down to the aluminised corrugated sheeting, chain-link and the very nuts and bolts. The irony here of course is that shiny materials in modernist or postmodernist buildings signify; they are not merely functional, but indicate permanence and the defeat of decay, so that a building which shines declares the permanence of its newness. On sunny days in Bilbao and Los Angeles, the visitor is dazzled by the symphonic quality of the titanium which flows across the external forms
of the Guggenheim and Disney Hall. This paradox, the permanently new, exists as a trope and would seem to oppose its antithetical temporal trope, the permanence of decay. The allegorical punning and oscillating between past and present, the ruin and the new, destruction and permanence in the Gehry House, must mean that the allegorical commentary must be both past and present at the same time, and yet also between past and present in some unwritten frame of reference, the nature of which remains, perhaps, permanently elusive. At both Bilbao and Los Angeles, the shining curvatures are comprised precisely of titanium or stainless steel shingles or tiles equally hand-applied and overlapping, suggestive of the fact that like the retrospection of the Gehry House, the newness of the Guggenheim must succumb to what Derrida calls ‘the future perfect of its ruin’.

Gehry’s most radical phase began with the Vitra Museum, Weil am Rhein, which opened in 1989. There is a good deal of the personal, even biographical, present in the design. In front of the building is a large, brightly coloured sculpture by Gehry’s long-time collaborators, Claes Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen. It was Oldenburg who designed the enormous pair of binoculars which constitute the entrance to the Chiat/Day building, Venice, California built in 1985. The sculpture, which pre-dates Gehry’s museum design for the site, originally fronted the pre-existing Nicholas Grimshaw factory complex. The factory makes furniture and the Design Museum exists to house the Fehlbaum family collection of chairs, and furniture production continues in the Grimshaw building. Gehry has been a furniture designer of course, the most famous of which is the ‘Easy Edges’ series of cardboard chairs, one of which is in the Vitra Museum. Gehry’s use of
compressed card for furniture manufacture is a typically iconoclastic insistence on using the familiar in unfamiliar contexts, and as at the Gehry House, incorporating and appropriating commonplace or found material in a crypto-Dadaist or Duchampian way. The reference of the Oldenburg sculpture [Fig 20] is clearly towards Russian Constructivism, and the piece then becomes an appropriate, if ironic, metaphor for construction work in the factory. But in a series of fascinating synecdochal and metonymic tropes, Gehry in turn sited the new design Museum directly in front of the ‘Balancing Tools’ sculpture so that there is a contiguous relation between building and sculpture. By implication, Gehry’s building becomes ‘sculptural’. Metonymy, as used here, means that one term represents the attributes of another – as in ‘bottle’ representing ‘alcohol’. The physical contiguity of sculpture and building confers on the building the attribute of the object it relates to, and so for the first time, ‘sculptural’ enters Gehry’s vocabulary. The series of gestures in the forms which constitute the building do not yet flow as they do at Bilbao and Los Angeles into a sculptural unity. Vitra comprises discrete parts which have the appearance of assemblage, and in this sense, it might be said that in terms of its construction, the building is Cubist. That Gehry had not yet evolved away from Cubism and its Modernist associations, is further suggested by the white stucco which seems to resonate with Corbusian Purism.

The Vitra Design Museum is full of puns and double meanings. It declares itself rhetorically as both architecture and sculpture, both function and art (O. Boissiere 1990, 25). Its outward references are to Eric Mendohlson’s Einstein Tower, Potsdam 1917 and, almost inevitably, to Ronchamp (M. Tiller in O. Boissiere 1990, 19-21 and also K. Forster in F. Dal Co and K. Forster Eds, 1998, 15). Both of these are of course paradigmatic Modernist buildings, although Ronchamp, as the previous discussion demonstrated, was incipiently anthropomorphically referenced. But Ronchamp, like the Vitra Museum, is highly expressionist, which became an evolving Gehry trait. So Vitra hints at Modernism, but as an evolving postmodernist trope. At one point Gehry said, ‘I am the last functionalist!’ (Boissiere, 25) Its stark whiteness is not just of the Deco and Moderne of California or Florida, but is principally a vestigial touch of Corbusian Purism. Under Modernism, in the oppositional pairing of ‘straight’ and ‘curved’, the dominant term of the Modernist grid would be ‘straight’. But here the weighting is
reversed, so that 'curved' supersedes right-angled straightness as the weighted term. Gehry may not be an overt Deconstructionist, but the reversing play of the Vitra between acknowledging the pristine Modern and the punning metaphors of Postmodernism begins to place his terms of reference as 'poststructuralist' in a fairly loose sense. Certainly Gehry's practice as emerging from, but still indebted to Modernism, places his architectural context at some distance from the patent Historicism of earlier postmodern architecture. Gehry's postmodernist text is a commentary on Modernism which is simultaneously an acknowledgement and a deliberate act of subversion. The spiralling staircase is a case in point. It is powerfully sinuous and is a clear pun on the mediaeval spiral staircase. However, in a further play, it is also serpentine. The spiral staircase then becomes synecdochical and as such metaphorically signifies as part for the whole. The larger building can then be seen as spiralled and coiled. And in a startling and poetic way (the use of a literary term here is deliberate), the building spirals and coils up to a cruciform atrium which instantly invokes the Christian iconography of the church. The associations thrown up here are inevitably linguistic. As synecdoche, the staircase connotes the serpentine 'snake' and a particular garden while the cruciform atrium invokes the attributes of the church. The poetic nature of this visual metaphor (*ut ars poetica*) is a further example of language 'uncoiling' from visual form as metaphorical meaning, and is another defiance of the naïve simplicity of 'the language of architecture'.

The snake and the fish assumed a considerable importance for Gehry since both demonstrated a natural flexibility in shape. The overlapping scales of both express curvature. Hence the shingles of The Gehry House later become scales, conspicuously at Bilbao and Los Angeles. Venturi's 'duck' is any building which expresses its function by its shape. 'Ducks' are of course similes; a doughnut-shaped building which sells doughnuts is a 'duck'. Gehry does not normally do ducks. But in order to test the practicality of shingling a contemporary building with scales in order to express curvature, Gehry built the The Fishdance Restaurant, Kobe Japan, 1987 as, and in the literal form of, a fish. As part of the restaurant complex, next to the seventy feet high Fish is a coiled copper-clad and upwardly spiralling building called The Snake (F. Dal Co and K. Forster, 1998, 327). There is an odd metaphorical collocation here because the fish and snake are obviously powerful western Christian symbols and equally both are deeply
mythical, whilst the fish is emblematic of Gehry’s own Jewishness, and all this is situated in Japan in a seaside harbour restaurant. This deliberate ‘appropriate inappropriateness’ is a recurring aspect of Gehry’s oeuvre and receives its fullest expression in Prague in the Nedelanden Building. Within this deliberate confection of Christian and mythical fish and snake in a Japanese setting is the conceit of the punning satire with shades of Baudelaire behind.

The snake reappears centrally at Vitra and incidentally at the Bilbao Guggenheim in the form of Richard Serra’s vast steel sculpture ‘Snake’. At the Vitra, the snake association triggers the allegorical presence and absence of the remembrance of the church itself.

‘You could smile for a moment about the incongruous idea – that the serpentine coils of the Vitra writhe two paces away from a row of apple trees.... You will also make use of a mediaeval spiral staircase.... You will stop, as if struck by an invisible force and raise your eyes to the great cruciform expanse of stained glass.... You will make use of a mediaeval staircase. Then you will be in what the artist calls his ‘crypt’, a great white space with a vault with cruciform beams.... You will amuse yourself with the idea that this museum is designed like a church with nave, choir, crypt, and ambulatory, and if you have a facetious eye, even a sacristy and presbytery’. (O. Boissiere 1990, 31-33)

Gehry’s juxtaposition of the snake metaphor next to the nearby fields of apple trees conjures up images of the apple, the serpent and some implicitly mythic Eve. That this is set in the context of a building which invites itself to be read as ‘church’, makes deciphering it a puzzle, almost a rebus even. The constant oscillation between the commentary text and the historicist text, between past and present, and within parts such as the ‘mediaeval’ spiral, doubling as it does as snake and serpent, makes this an allegorical experience. Despite Gehry’s propensity for punning satire, the allegorical inflection at Vitra cannot be ‘amused’ because it must ‘mourn’ a ruined past beyond recovery and which can only be touched continguously by metonymic remembrance, like Proust’s madeleine. It might be that in establishing the sculptural as a poststructuralist
episteme of the fold that Gehry has instituted the efficacy of the gesture as the embodiment of semantic visual metaphor, and perhaps nowhere more effectively than at the Vitra Museum.

Both the fish as ‘body’ and the snake as spiralling atrium reappear, although perhaps in a formulaic way, at the Bilbao Guggenheim. The Guggenheim, 1991-8, has become a ravishing success and the source of local economic and cultural regeneration and now further signifies as an economic indicator precisely as an iconic building. In many ways it repeats the stylistic mannerism of the Vitra Museum and deploys similar rhetorical tropes. Thus we are not surprised by the central metaphor of a flower with its associated expanding petals rising and undulating around a central atrium. However, Gehry’s previous sharp irony and reference may have become modified by the presence of metaphorical petals, although the rhetorical anthropormorphism of the dominant ‘boat’ is perhaps more successful given the Guggenheim’s marine setting. In a Spanish context, the petal/flower form will naturally be read as a rose, the attribute of the Virgin Mary, and the building then mimics Vitra with its cruciform internal bracing (Coosje van Bruggen 1997, 113). The Guggenheim has a more clearly defined ‘nave’ than the Vitra, and its more linear layout leading to the transept-like structure of its ‘east end’ suggests once more the presence of church – but here as a pagan temple of the visual arts. However, there is an element of the populist and formulaic about the Guggenheim which is perhaps insistently disconcerting. If the building does contain properties of kitsch, then by definition, its populist attributes and mannerisms should be naïvely unforced. There is nonetheless something mimetic at Bilbao, that the spectator is in the presence of a unique copy, and the mimesis and second-handness issues from The Sydney Opera House and its branding as a national icon [35]. Despite the Modernism of its lower galleries which defer display and theatricality as Modernist form, the Guggenheim has abandoned some of the inherent modesty and decorum of the Vitra Museum. Be this as it may, the critical and popular success of the Guggenheim is beyond dispute, and its influence as paradigmatically sculptural makes it omnipresent and eponymous. Its sculptural properties insist that it was designed outside-in as much as inside-out, and so reversing the form follows function premise of Modernism, but still noticeably incorporating the
steel and glass Hi-Tech shine and reflectivity of Late Modernism. The distortion to the internal space that ‘outside-in’ imposes on inside articulation produces what Louis Khan called ‘bad space’ or voids. Daniel Libeskind has spoken of the intense metaphorical compression of voids at his Berlin Jewish Museum (see below) and voids and bad space have become congruous with Deconstructionist Architecture. Peter Eisenman has similarly produced distortions to inner space in his sequence House 1-10. There is a significant play on absence and presence. In terms of ‘differance’, Derrida has written of ‘the metaphysics of presence’ in a familiar way here and in abolishing the conventional weighting in oppositional or Hegelian pairing, producing what he is apt to call ‘present absences’. In the Guggenheim, Gehry’s huge voids in the atrium and elsewhere clearly subvert the rational isotropic space of Modernism, and so the double code of absent but present previous forms makes the subversion of the modern a ‘present absence’.

The Nationale-Nederlanden Building, Prague 1992-6, known variously as ‘Ginger and Fred’, ‘The Dancing Building’ and also as ‘The Wave’ in Gehry’s practice office, is dramatically different from both Vitra and the Guggenheim [Fig 21]. The building is vertically expressed and its Corbusian pilotti are an Historicist Modernist reference. The entire structure is designed around waves and curves. It undulates longitudinally but also curves differentially in its vertical plane. The waves of the cornice are echoed horizontally by the sweeping Art Deco striations of the façade and by the wave-motion of the fenestration at each floor level. The windows are expressly pushed out from the façade, and the shadows so caused identify the vertical ripple and rhythm of the building.
Along each wave of windows, each one has its glazing bars inverted alternately. ‘Ginger’ has an exaggerated concave curve which seems to make the structure lean both backwards and towards ‘Fred’. The vertical perspective of ‘Ginger’ is broadly conventional whereas ‘Fred’ is also curved concavely but has reversed vertical perspective. As an office building, it seems precipitously non or even anti-functional. The colonnade and plaza created by Ginger’s legs do so at the expense of the sidewalk and pedestrian traffic. Ginger has a transparent glass ‘skirt’ where Fred comprises reinforced concrete; in this way, gender is announced. Its restaurant is on the roof. In its context, it seems perverse.

A member of Fish’s interpretative community at this point suspects double meaning. Allegory at its simplest level of definition says one thing but means another. Irony also says one thing but instead means its opposite. But it is within the ironic play between part and whole, between synecdoche and metonym and text, that allegory is located. On the face of it, the doubling here between an apparently trite figural reference to two movie stars of yesteryear in two structural towers in an office building seems irredeemably trite and even conspicuously kitsch. But when the reader of this building reconsidered, then there is an incontrovertible reference on its roof [Fig 22] to the ruined dome of the Hiroshima Peace Building (Joseph Pesch, Kunst & Kultur 4.5, 1997). And immediately, the suspicion arises that what appeared to be a trite architectural gesture of self-conscious display in fact masks a much more serious intent. The fact that this building signifies one thing but means another within its ‘double code’ is the clue to the presence of the allegorical, and the suspicion grows that the deliberate presence of the
Peace Dome as an overt signature of remembrance and commemoration is an invocation of the tragic. Gehry's audacity here in using the Fred and Ginger trope to mask a more serious and deeper meaning might even trigger that involuntary intake of breath that announces the sublime. The temporal palimpsest instigating the dissembling allegorical commentary accompanies that other distinctively postmodern conceit, the oxymoron, in which in this case an apparently trivial appearance conceals a tragic reality. Allegory is available. It does not necessarily announce itself as part of its other-speaking. It inheres in a text as a result of a reciprocal part/whole relation which will be synecdochal or metonymic in character. Thus allegory may be read as a form of narrative by the unsuspecting reader, outside the 'interpretive community'. The allegory only comes into play the moment the reader realises that the parts and whole exist in places in time present but also past. The allegorical will 'inhabit' or 'exist' in both the past parts and the present whole, and in an extraordinary and perplexing way, in and between both. This act of understanding by interpreting the meaning of parts and whole is a feature of allegoresis discussed earlier. It cannot be said that the Nederlanden Building 'contains' allegory; an allegorical interpretation becomes available when parts and whole are related, and in the case of architecture, set in their socio-historical context. The intrusion of this building into the traditional architectural setting of the historical locale is the imposition of the infelicitous on the felicitous. It is architectural risk-taking that dares to chance the possibility that its appearance, which disguises a deeper reality, might nevertheless infringe taste and sensibility.

The Nederlanden Building has received sustained criticism within Prague. Very little new building has been allowed within the inner historical core of the city. The only recent new building has been the large blocks of flats erected under the previous Communist regime around the city. The site of Fred and Ginger is within the conservation area and overlooking the river. It seems perverse to the local inhabitants because it breaks the rules of what is seen as a sensitive site bordering on a shrine in an historical city context. Any redevelopment which has been allowed by the planning authorities has had to acknowledge the eclectic Baroque of the surrounding buildings. The side façade does actually mimic the local buildings in its fenestration. It does after all have glazing bars. The proportions of the windows are quite conventional. The striated articulation and
waveform fenestration is not. Part of the sharpest criticism has related to the fact that, taking the façade for example, it is so heavily mannered in Deco and Moderne that it would be far more appropriate in an American setting. But given that Gehry, unlike Venturi for example, does not normally do Historicist and especially Art Deco rhetoric, and given also that the Nederlanden Building is so different from his more famous predecessors such as the Guggenheim or Disney Hall, it becomes necessary to ask why this conspicuous change was necessary, and why in Prague where it has received such vociferous objection from its inception.

If the side elevation is parodic and satirical, Fred and Ginger themselves are anthropomorphic in a heavily accented and mannerist way. They are incontrovertibly mimetic of the human body and manifestly gendered. Ginger is expressly female and seen from the side, the extruded balcony represents a coquettish hands on hip gesture. And Ginger of course has legs – dancing legs. And so, ineluctably, we come to Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers and the nineteen thirties Hollywood musical. At one level this celebrated carefree escapism. At another level altogether, what these films escaped from was precisely the reality of that decade itself, of persistent mass unemployment and the rise of Fascism and the growing threat of war. Fred and Ginger date the historical referencing of the building explicitly to the thirties. In Prague, there was a systematic Nazi destruction of Jewish cultural life and later the enormities of the Holocaust. Gehry has become increasingly conscious of his own Jewish ethnicity and the Jewish inflections of the fish-form (O. Boissiere 1990, 30-1) so that this building in Prague suddenly becomes for him a poignant and an autobiographical memorial. Prior to the construction of the building, the site had been a bombsite since the end of world War Two, when a misplaced American bomb destroyed the pre-existing house. It had been carefully preserved for nearly fifty years as a ruin and a commemorative place as well as a ruined folly; ‘folly’ in a double sense of a ruined place commemorating the follies and losses of war itself, but also as an ideological aversion to, and signpost of, the American folly of ‘friendly fire’. Then, seen from a slightly different angle, Ginger’s apparently coquettish gesture means very differently. Ginger becomes crushed like a discarded coke can, and what was merely a balcony expressing a flirtatious hip-movement becomes and doubles as an evisceration and becomes ‘wound’, an invocation of the tragic reminiscent of
Libeskind's at Berlin, and metonymic of the history of the site. And of course, what this carefully preserved bomb-site meant to the citizens of Prague was hallowed as recovered memory, a memorial displaced by an apparently insensitive modern building. The previous ruined site was an example of what Anthony Vidler called a case vide at Villette, an empty place with its own distinctive memory. In fact, the ruined Peace Dome at the top of the building represents the worst destruction the world has seen as it mimics the single remnant of mass extermination, both in Hiroshima, but also in the Holocaust. The Nederlanden Building cannot, and defies interpretation as if it were, some inconsequential example of postmodern architecture as a foible or folly. The building presents the unpresentable in an oxymoron of sinister gaiety.

'Furthermore, Gehry reminds us that his building is a memorial which indicates via Ginger and Fred that we cannot do without dancing or poetry after the Shoah; that more than ever before we need the fictions of the good life that the makers of celluloid illusions gave us, that we need the harmonious dream of a dancing couple like Ginger and Fred, if we do not want to freeze or despair when we face those other film documents shot in Auschwitz and Buckenwald and Dachau and all the other places of organized mass-murder – or pictures of bombed out cities like Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It may well be that such monuments always have to be doubly encoded so that we can bear them.' (J. Pesch, Kunst & Kultur 4.5 1997)

Fred and Ginger evokes a demonic past with an innocent present. Compared with the dazzling crypto-modern white of the Vitra or the shining titanium and glass of the Guggenheim, the Nederlanden Building has a soft pink, symbolizing not only Ginger herself, but also her 'dancing years' apparently so innocent and yet so prescient, and that its achievement is in its allusive grace which can only be appreciated in the light of the 'dark conceit' of its rhetoric.

THE ARCHITECTURAL CURVE

The theoretical justification of the curve in postmodern building has largely been derived from Gilles Deleuze, and especially his formulation of the fold or 'le pli'. If the
curved form is taken to its logical extreme, then its resting place emerges as the ‘isomorphic polysurface’ or BLOB, a structure which abolishes the wall/roof interface and results in one total indivisible shape covered by one continuous ‘skin’. Whether such ‘total’ buildings are, in terms of metaphor, able to mutate beyond signifying as simile into more elaborated forms of meaning remains to be seen.

Frank Gehry established bending and folding as an architecturally institutional process with the ‘event’ of the Vitra Museum. Curvature was of course not new as Saarinen and Utzon had already demonstrated among others. At both Vitra and Bilbao, Gehry developed curvature in the roof in discrete Cubist forms, but ‘placed’ the roof collage on to orthogonal, right-angular grid-constructions which formed the galleries. In both of these signature buildings, Gehry inevitably creates an ‘event’ at the junction of orthogonal wall and curved-form roof. In a sense, this is the poststructuralist fold sitting then in a slightly artificial way on the modernist grid. But at Disney Hall, Gehry comes close to abolishing the roof-wall distinction by enveloping the still grid-form galleries with a ‘roof’ which cascades virtually down to ground level. The enveloping roof-form retains its Cubist differentiation into distinct elements, so that there is still the mutual separation and integration of parts within a whole which facilitates the metonymic and metaphorical transfer of symbolic meaning in form, and not instead simply by the intention implied in the internal content. Once the building is seen to completely abolish the roof/wall, part/whole differentiation however, it mutates into what has become known as an ‘isomorphic polysurface’ (J.K. Waters 2003, 8), an entirely folded building such as the Birmingham Selfridges 2003, by Future Systems which is constituted by one continuous exterior skin. Greg Lynn as a theorist of biomorphic design has characterized such a buildings as a ‘Binary Large Object’ or BLOB (J.K. Waters 2003, 59). These ‘bioforms’ begin as virtual CGIs (Computer Generated Images) within computer programs in 3D modelling [36]. Once a building becomes biomorphically constituted by one continuous skin, it inevitably becomes holistic and signifies as a total unified entity. It is no longer constituted by the relation of part to whole and so resists metaphor and is therefore in Peirce’s terms indexical rather than symbolic in that it can only signify as form as simile. Such biomorphic or blob-form buildings signify as meta-architecture; as
architecture about itself in which ‘the building is the sign’ (C. Jencks 2005, 15). The only references this kind of building can make are ones aimed at commercial or cultural branding associated and identified with an iconic form, and in this case, the symbolism is extrinsic and social and not derived from the building’s inherent formal suggestions such as visual metaphor. It is likely, but not necessarily probable, that entirely folded BLOB isomorphic polysurfaced buildings will be appropriated into a repertoire of available and poststructurally eclectic architecture that Charles Jencks in The Architecture of the Jumping Universe, 1997, has characterized as ‘Waveform’ (C. Jencks 1997, 49-52). The Herzog and de Meuron Olympic Stadium for Beijing begun in 2004, is such an example of BLOB-form architecture being incorporated into mainstream architectural practice (C. Jencks 2005, 112-3). If it is assumed that all buildings mean in some way and are always subject to interpretation, then the semantic paradox of Modernism enters the BLOB-form. How is it possible to interpret a building that has no meaning, but only form?

Jencks suggests that architectural folding and bending is subsumed under ‘Waveform’, particularly where the fold is understood to be a twist in a linear form and thus a bifurcation, representing what Rene Thom has called Catastrophe Theory (G. Lynn in A. Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 8-15). In a fundamentally important way, folding in architecture should be seen not only as the definitive defeat of what Corbusier called in Modernism The Poetry of the Right Angle, but also as an essentialist element of what might be called the neo-avant-garde of poststructuralist architecture. It is in the folded curve-form, initiated by Gehry principally at Vitra, that Poststructuralism establishes its ‘differance’. This proposal requires very careful qualification when it is recalled that poststructuralists such as Hadid, Koolhaas and Eisenman and Libeskind although incorporating folding and bending in their design, also retain the sharp crease of the roof/wall event as a particularly acknowledged Modernist trace. Within the complex inversions of poststructuralist theory, Modernism is both defeated and celebrated. Although Gehry may have initiated the fold, he is not known as a reader of Gilles Deleuze but it is with his Le Pli that folding as an incorporated practice receives its theoretical justification. It was shown earlier that in what represents a previous incorporation and appropriation, that of Derridean Deconstruction and Difference, poststructuralist architecture refuses the binary opposition of old and new in the oxymoron that embraces both the ‘post’ and the ‘ante-’ at the same
synchronic moment. As a theoretical position, the fold now curves away from Deconstruction but is equally layered on it in another palimpsest (G. Lynn in A. Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 9-10). In the tradition of the Phenomenologists traced here earlier such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze rejects the straight-line optical geometrical formations of Descartes which implicate the fixed point and interstice. Instead, Deleuze rejects this kind of fixed-point space in favour of the metaphor of the rhizome. The rhizome has no obvious beginning or source and spreads indefinitely, constantly transforming itself, constantly subject to change, transmogrification and movement. The fold is similarly always a fold within folds. He derives the idea of the fold as a kind of explanation from Leibniz and the Baroque imperative towards curves and folds as part of the suggestion of movement.

‘...a flexible or elastic body still has cohering parts that form a fold, such that they are not separated into parts of parts but are rather divided into infinity in smaller and smaller parts that always retain a certain cohesion. Thus a continuous labyrinth is not a line dissolving into independent points, as flowing sand might dissolve into grains, but resembles a sheet of paper divided into infinite folds or separated into bending movements, each one determined by the consistent or conspiring surrounding....A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold not the point which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line. That is why parts of matter are masses or aggregates, as a correlative to elastic compressive force. Unfolding is thus not the contrary of folding, but follows the fold up to the following fold.’ (G. Deleuze in A. Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 18)

THE REINSRIPTION OF MODERNISM IN THE FOLD

Deleuze cites Leibniz and his invocation of the allegory of the upper room. Below is the common room of the senses and above the dark windowless room of the soul and the complex epistemological folds of knowledge like drapery (G. Deleuze, 1993, 19). Similarly, architecture which is folded inevitably contains folds within folds and therefore a built complexity. There have been objections to Deleuze and poststructuralist
theory (G. Doy 2002, 151-2 and P. King 2005, 10-16), but the fact remains that in a documentary sense the fold as a theoretical construction has been widely influential. Nor is it simply the case that the fold applies only to the form of a curved building. At Rebstock, Frankfurt, Peter Eisenman folded his scheme into the existing built landscape context whilst retaining the sharp edges of the Modernist inflection in his built forms. Eisenman makes it clear that the fold is temporal. Rebstock is seen as a ‘singularity’. ‘Singularity is not something that emerges from a ground or a figure form. It is the quality of unfolding in time that allows the possibility of singularity.’ (P. Eisenman in A. Papadakis, Ed, 1993, 25) Eisenman’s scheme, which he calls ‘Folding In Time’ (1993, 23), folds in time because it acknowledges the presence of the existing siedlung. The siedlung was the Modernist linear housing which became inappropriate in postwar Germany but whose presence as an absence is folded into the site. This folding back in time and in a sense on the pre-war Modernist context, obviously implicates memory and remembrance and is, palimpsest-like, much in the way that Gehry’s roof forms fold on to the orthogonal vestigial Modernist grid below. Eisenman’s Rebstock plan destroys the presence of the old Modernist setting like an archaeological excavation, but allegorically commemorates its memory. Craig Owens’s hugely influential ‘allegorical imperative’ as temporal palimpsest, is now supplemented by the idea of the temporal fold. That this is a case of folding back and not simply generating curvilinear architectural form is made clear by the consistent presence of Modernist reference in poststructuralist architecture. It is a generalization worth making that since Vitra, poststructuralist architecture involves bending and folding not just as aesthetic curved form, nor simply as nostalgia, but as a declaration that it is nothing less than a historical component of the modern. The overt ‘postmodernism’ and New Historicism of Moore and Graves have simply been superseded. Eisenman’s Rebstock folds the new into and on to the old and in so doing folds over the original site of the siedlung, but collides with it in the process. Folding in this conceptual sense does not necessarily involve the smoothing normally associated with the fold, but instead may initiate conflict, perturbation and violation.

Henry Cobb, who built the iconic Hancock Tower, Boston USA in 1973, distinguishes between part and whole. ‘Bending is a manipulative strategy of objects. Folding is a manipulative property of surfaces.’ (A. Papadakis 1993, 95) So structures bend and
surfaces fold. Eisenman as an incipient Modernist avoids conspicuous curvature with its imperative towards expressionism and the sculptural and retains the sharp crease between plane surfaces as ‘event’. His large holistic structures such as his Japanese towers have parts that are broadly folded into the whole (‘in-folding’) but which are then subject to deformation (‘unfolding’). The Alteka Office Building, Tokyo, (P. Eisenman in A. Papadakis 1993, 28-29) is significantly bent, almost as an acknowledgement of Thom’s catastrophic event, and mimics falling and the eruption of its parts. In Japan this is of course a direct reference to the always impending real-life catastrophe of earthquakes, as in his Nunotani Headquarters, Tokyo, 1992 (C. Jencks 1997, 57). Eisenman’s metaphor of collapse in a Japanese setting echoes Gehry’s placing of Christian and Judaic symbols also in a Japanese setting at Kobe in his Fish Restaurant. (‘Yes, a building has to stand up, but it does not have to look like it stands up.’ P. Eisenman in P.Noever 1991, 38) This is not folding as smoothing; it is folding as the conscious violation of a cultural context. Eisenman’s towers in a Japanese setting also inevitably commemorate previous disasters, and like Gehry’s Fred and Ginger in Prague, dissemble and hover over the tragic. The Jewish Memorial, Berlin, 2005 comprises 2,751 concrete blocks. All the blocks are slightly different and resemble the minimalist objects of Donald Judd and Robert Morris, and in a deliberately ambivalent way, the Memorial oscillates between the sculptural and the architectural in another example of Eisenman’s ‘in-betweeness’. The blocks seem to acquire the properties of both sculptural plinths and coffins and are arranged and both disarranged in a distorted grid. This is not a maze but a labyrinth, but which defies, unlike the maze, entrance and exit. Seen from the side, the grid of blocks ripple and undulate. The sense of being lost in the middle of the labyrinth of course represents an entire lost generation in an act of German expiation, because this act of remembrance is called Memorial To The Murdered Jews Of Europe. The allegorical intensity of the Memorial as moral commentary on national guilt speaks for itself. It is typical of Eisenman’s interest in rhetorical tropes such as catachresis in which the wrong use of a term sets up ‘in-betweeness’ that it not only establishes the pleasure of ambiguity, but also defeats the bipolarity of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus The Jewish Memorial as oxymoron summons the attention as either sculpture or architecture, or both at the same time.
Zaha Hadid, like Eisenman, insists on acknowledging her debt to Modernism. Unlike Libeskind's conceptual shards at The Imperial War Of The North, Hadid's shards are derived from Russian Constructivism. 'We felt at the time that although it was very important to be able to invent new programs and to rewrite the program for architecture, and although the spirit of the early twentieth century was that of optimism, we were confronted, in the seventies, with this notion that there was no progress in architecture and that we could only go forward by looking to the past. We felt that we had to examine this culture of twentieth century Modernism very carefully – for example, by looking at the very early projects done by Leonidov.' (Z. Hadid in P. Noever 1991, 48) Architects of course draw and do not build which is the business of engineering and construction. In the case of Hadid, she not only produces architectural rendering, but also paints in advance of the architectural drawing which may well be in part at least, the product of digital CAD. At her Vienna Exhibition, 'Architectur' 2003, the paintings assumed an enormously important presence as preludes to form (P. Noever, Ed, 2003, 43-6). The shards, fractals and fragments which constitute the paintings as abstract forms are not so much instances of Deconstruction as sometimes assumed, but rather emerge as the design and 'significant form' of the Bauhaus tradition or from Malevich's Suprematist painting. Like Eisenman, the engendered forms converted to digital program renderings can be accepted as provocative accidents in CGI. Hadid's determined recourse to early Modernist procedure and practice and to Suprematist hard edge and line represents another poststructuralist temporal fold. And it is the paintings which help to generate the design interface between the hard-edged Modernist shard of her oeuvre and its folding into built form. The postmodern palimpsest is ever present. 'This idea of juxtaposition of the new and the old became very interesting to us. One could almost see it as a kind of contextual architecture but it had to do with a superimposition of the new on the old so that both could coexist.' (P. Noever 1991, 48) She is less interested in theorizing time than some others such as Eisenman and Libeskind, and rather seeks to embed Modernist-inflected form into landscape. However, it is significant that in embodying Modernist form in her design and in seeking the 'new' from the old, she confronts in a neo-avant-garde and adversarial way, architectural norms and assumptions in much the same spirit as the original Modernist avant-garde did. One consequence of a concern for an
architecture of heavily inflected Modernism is that like Modernist architecture itself, there is less emphasis on symbolism and reference, and more on the presentation of form in which ‘….formal characteristics of landscape in general are brought into the ambit of architectural articulation.’ (P. Schumacher in P. Noever 2003, 25). This is not so surprising when it is recalled that Corbusier’s villas and the Marseilles Unite could not celebrate their being other than in landscape.

Hadid’s first major commission, The Peak 1982, Hong Kong, is not simply expressed laterally as a formal reference to Modernism, but is stretched longitudinally in an exaggerated and striated form that she describes as ‘geological’ (P. Noever 1991, 49). As in many other of her buildings, there are large volumes of poured concrete which in this limited metaphorical sense makes them consonant with rock formation and metonymically links them to the natural. In a monolithic and aggressive shard-form building like the Wolfsburg Science Center, the association of the building with natural rock strata is arguably a version of the sublime. The inside blatantly contradicts the outside. Instead of horizontal floor-levels that would echo the external striation, the interior is expressed vertically with large inverted ‘cones’ which create both voids and draw upwards traffic through the building. In contrast, but still using poured concrete as a Modernist inflection, the Ordrupgaard Museum flows and undulates in folds and with its glass curtain wall approximates to BLOB-form architecture. The folds and curves here are almost gendered. The fact that within these internationally recognized buildings Hadid can modulate between hard monolithic cantilevered forms as a constant in her design, but can also mould and fold as an invocation of ‘the feminine’, demonstrates the eclectic but always retrospective aspect of architectural poststructuralism.

Hadid’s most celebrated building to date is both ‘Corbusian’ and ‘….one of the few convincing iconic buildings after Bilbao.’ (C. Jencks 2005, 158) The Rosenthal Center For Contemporary Art, Cincinnati 2003 has conspicuous, even startling, Modernist references. The ground floor lobby brings the street into the building like the portico at Mies’s Seagram Building and being comprised all round by glass curtain walling, appears to float just like the Seagram or the Villa Savoye. There are squared off structural concrete pilotis announcing ‘frame’. The building’s external concrete is not stuccoed, but is laid in light grey blocking that has the effect of establishing its lateral as well as its
vertical emphasis and which contrasts dramatically with the black glass and extruded forms above. Occupying a constricted corner site, the building is a straight-edged cuboid of interlocking geometrical forms apparently rationally obeying the Form Follows Function edict. [Fig 23] The building is elegantly referenced towards Corbusian Modernism, including the internal ramps lifted from The Villa Savoye. But actually, the form does not follow the function. The internal volumes do not correspond with the external interlocking forms and the back-wall is a continuation of the street through and up in a sudden curve and fold that Hadid calls an ‘urban carpet’. The internal ramps mimic those at The Villa Savoye and which Rem Koolhaas deploys within the Dutch Embassy, Berlin. There is an intense irony that is produced by the Modernist Cubism of interlocking forms. Picasso extended his Analytical Cubism by developing the three-dimensional texture of the collage with objects pasted on to the surface. Collage is an aspect of Cubism. The external texture of the Rosenthal Center is both Cubist in its interlocking forms and collagist in its textured exterior surface [37].

The notion of urban architectural collage is best known in Colin Rowe’s Collage City of 1978 (W. J. Curtis 1999, 609). It belongs to the tradition of Jane Jacobs and Kenneth Frampton’s ‘Critical Regionalism’ (K. Frampton 1982, 288-9) in resisting Modernist assumptions about clearance and zoning and the need for historical architectural forms in the city. The idea of collage arises from ‘pasting on’ new build within the traditional nuances of the urban fabric without resorting to zoning or erasure. The irony in Hadid’s building arises from its Cubist collage. What is ‘pasted on’ here is defiant Modernist form but which is poststructurally inflected. Instead of the postmodern pastiche which emerges from Rowe, Frampton and the Kriers, for example, Hadid subverts faux Historicism with an insistent double-code of ironic retro-modernity. This hortatory instance of the allegorical commentary would seem to be in a cryptic way a criticism of the anti-Modernism that emanated from Venturi’s plea for complexity in architecture. The poststructural architectural impulse subsumes Venturi’s complexity, but not at the expense of its origins.

Like Eisenman, Zaha Hadid [Fig 23] has been uncompromising in her attachment to the foundational nature of Modernism. ‘We, the authors of architecture, have to take on
the task of reinvestigating Modernity. An atmosphere of total hostility, where looking forward has been, and still is, seen almost as criminal makes one more adamant that there is only one way and that is to go forward along the path paved by the experiments of the early Modernists.’ (C. Jencks and K. Propf, Eds, 1997, 280) Eisenman is clear that time is an indispensable element of architectural practice. ‘Current post-structuralist thought questions both vision and structure, and thus the diagram also questions the sedimented anteriority of vision at the same time that it invokes it.’ The architectural diagram or drawing as essentially historical not only implicates time and makes past moments singular, but is also the present and critical invocation of past practice in what Eisenman calls ‘Diagrams of Anteriority’ (P. Eisenman 1999, 40) The drawings he cites are Modernist; Corbusier’s Maison Domino and The Villa Savoye. Poststructuralist architecture is reinvented Modernism and has to be clearly separated from earlier New Historicist versions of Postmodernism which denigrated Modernism in architecture. Zaha Hadid worked for Rem Koolhaas at OMA for several years which reinforced her belief in the foundational nature of Modernism at a time when castigating it was distinctly de rigueur. A pattern of poststructuralist architecture then becomes discernable in which Modernism plays a key and recurring part in the design of Eisenman, Koolhaas, Hadid Tschumi and Libeskind with Gehry as sui generis, the unique initiator of folding and the author of Bilbaoism and the Iconic Building but whose practice is deeply embedded in the modern.

Rem Koolhaas’s painting and multi-media disseminations are well known, as is his interest in the Russian Constructivists such as Leonidov. The influence of such Revivalism and its hostility towards early decorative postmodernism was an important source of Zaha Hadid’s own repertoire of fragmented form which she developed at OMA (Office of Municipal Architecture). Koolhaas also taught Hadid at the Architectural
Association. There was further interest in Russian Constructivism from Tschumi, particularly his play on Chernikhov at Villette. The large wedge of black glass in his National Dance Theatre, The Hague 1981 seems to pun on the Suprematist sign of the Red Wedge, making the building play on the possibility of ideology. Koolhaas's primary concern has been with the urban context and the need to layer or superimpose new build on or around the old. Such layering was a central theme of Delirious New York. When Koolhaas wrote, 'Since the urban is now pervasive, urbanism will never again be about the 'new', only about 'the more' and the 'modified'.’ (C Jencks and K. Propf, Eds 1997, 306), he anticipated the way such collage would work in practice in Berlin in the shape of the city's 'Critical Reconstruction' and the manner in which his signpost Dutch Embassy Building would layer in as retrospective Modernism. Part of what he calls 'urbanism' is characterized by 'Bigness' and Bigness involves both complexity in itself and between its constituent parts. He suggests that Delirious New York implied a 'Theory of Bigness' based on the parts as discrete architectural gestures:

'Beyond a certain critical mass, a building becomes a Big Building. Such a mass can no longer be controlled by a single architectural gesture, or even by any combination of architectural gestures. This impossibility triggers the autonomy of its parts, but that is not the same as fragmentation: the parts remain committed to the whole. (C. Jencks and K. Propf, Eds 1997, 308)

The parts remain autonomous and the building does not become holistic since it enshrines both deconstructive and poststructural imperatives. So the punning 'black wedge' at the National Dance Theatre connotes Constructivism as a discrete form that is nonetheless incorporated into the larger building. This consistent denial of the classical unity of form and an insistence on the collision and contiguous contact of autonomous elements implying a potential chaos, not only 'deconstructs' the conventional notion of a building, but also the unity of Modernist function and form itself, the very trope it puns on. Given that Hadid's and Koolhaas's references tend to be Modernist, then the reference is inevitably towards stylistic rather than metaphorical devices. The acts of subversion here are located in the interlocking and collage of fractured elements rather than latent
semantic meanings that emerge from visual metaphor. That a Big Building becomes sufficiently complex to require separate parts that function autonomously whilst retaining linked coherence of services within each part is demonstrated by Koolhaas's Lille Congreexpo 1994. As a vast ovoid, it contains three disparate parts containing auditoria and exposition space, and externally is dressed in cheap-looking but modern materials such as corrugated metal and in places, plastic. Such self-contained but contiguous parts not only defy the Modernist unity of function and form, despite being Modernist in inflection at least, but also deny the possibility of holistic design, and in particular, BLOB architecture. By definition, BLOB-form is holistic and without parts and its references are restricted to simile, so that Roger's Millennium Dome, for example, seems to signal 'circus tent' or something similar. Whatever Koolhaas's different buildings may signify, as in the Modernist references to Mies's National Gallery, Berlin and Rietveld's Schroeder House in his Kunsthalle, Rotterdam (W.J. Curtis 1999, 667), like Hadid, the ontology of his buildings depends on the play between the independence and self-cooperation of their parts.

Much of the deformed Modernism of his method, certainly in the later buildings, is expressed as a kind of almost deliberately reckless or 'delirious' misappropriation of planar geometric volumes in a difficult relation of parts [Fig 24]. As a deformed cube, Koolhaas's Seattle Public Library 2004, is constructed around massive and exposed concrete cross-bracing reminiscent of Foster's Shanghai Bank and covered in a continuous lattice and skin of darkened glass. The building is patently cubist, and the deformed planar surfaces are multiple views of the central cube. This collocation of Picasso and Leonidov, Cubism and Constructivism, might suggest in a public library, the
collective power of knowledge and the presence of leftist ideology suggestive of the fact that in the West, knowledge is inevitably fractured; a hint of old time avant-garde progressivism concealed by the poststructuralist cynicism of the Neo-Avant-Garde. However, this building constitutes one of Charles Jencks's Iconic Buildings — structures that since Bilbao are attention-seeking and which brand whole institutions or locales (C. Jencks 2005, 102). In the present terms here, it may be that the intense theatricality of this building is revealed in the drama and rhetoric of its deformation. Koolhaas's previous building, The Dutch Embassy, Berlin 2003 is also centred on a cube and the sharp creases and bends of the linked diplomatic residence building retain his Neo-Modernist inflections as does the 'trajectory' of the ramps which like Hadid's in the Rosenthal Center invoke the Corbusian promenade architecturale. Compared with the formal extravagance of Seattle, the Dutch Embassy is seen from the street-view as an unassuming glass cube (OMA/R. Koolhaas 2004, 30). The roofline accommodates nearby vernacular building, and although indisputably a modern building on completion, its impact consists in an essential modesty compared with the 'statement' of Seattle. The dominant reason for the comparative understatement of the building is that its situation in the old East German sector made its site one of some sensitivity, and its imposition or layering into the existing fabric was a requirement of Berlin's Critical Reconstruction programme. Here Rowe's collage of urban development with the new layering over the existent built strata of time seems to synchronize with Koolhaas's own deliberations on urbanism. It is an aspect of this building's Modernist plainness that it has an aura of decorum. The space between the Embassy and the residence assumes the character of 'a court' and a 'park' according to OMA, and the whole is meant to constitute the characteristics of 'a villa', and the embrace of the residence around two sides of the cube is 'a theatrical backdrop' (www.oma.nl).

But there is an impossible conflict of interest on the one hand between urban collage, layering and superimposition in which The Dutch Embassy succeeds and on the other Koolhaas's predilection for the Big Building which does not accommodate as a form of remembrance the archaeological strata of the built environment but imposes upon it. Hence Koolhaas's CCTV Building, Beijing which in 2008 will be an immense international monolith not far short of The Eiffel Tower in height and likely to be the
largest non-tower structure built. An essential component of Modernist zoning and erasure was the imposition of the new on the old not as a temporal palimpsest but as the eradication of memory and the familiar that seemed to associate with ideas about slum conditions, particularly for working people. It was therefore with the best of intentions that mass clearance and rebuilding and the central planning lessons from World War Two aimed to guarantee that hygiene and health replaced poverty and ill-health in the great modern stride forward. The old and its memories, like a hovering allegory, far from being preserved and restored, became an enemy to be erased. So what Modernist building ‘meant’, because it avoided metaphor, was sociological in that it represented utopian progress. It embodied the opposite of collage in the imposition of the shining new. Retrospectively of course, that meaning has significantly changed, just as Gadamer suggested that meaning must, and the large modern perimeter block and towers of welfare housing are now widely felt to represent a failed experiment rather than social progress. Part of the rejection of the Modernist housing ideology, and perhaps Modernist architecture in general, has been its insistence upon imposition rather than collage and its violation of the *locus genii* as an architectural texture. There has also been a popular rejection of Bigness as an authoritarian failure of scale as David Harvey among others has shown and which was discussed earlier.

Koolhaas’s Big Building is meant to dominate its context and signify in a local, national, international and globalist way as a form of branding within the ideology of advertising. The Iconic Big Building now associates with economic regeneration and power. But it has to be acknowledged that if the Iconic Monolith, like the ascent of Everest because it is there, (R. Koolhaas in C. Jencks and K. Propf, Eds, 1997, 307) erases and dominates its context as Modernism did before it, then the previous unease at Modernist Bigness may indeed accompany it. In *The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Frederick Jameson characterizes the Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles, as a vast shining simulacrum of international capital and with the advent of Bigness, that analysis seems prescient. Meaning is both synchronic, the symptom of a particular moment, but also diachronic and subject to change across time. If, as suggested earlier here, that Wittgenstein was right in attaching meaning in language to use, then a shift in the social use of a building over time, like a redundant church, may change its meaning. Of course,
it is not possible to know how Koolhaas's Chinese CCTV Building may signify when it is used, but in a Derrida-like play that Koolhaas might well enjoy, as a vast act of deformation, it might well contain that gene of the sublime, the *monstrous*. Certainly, despite its infelicity, the CCTV Building is Modernist in its ambience, rather like a colossal skyscraper bent into a Mobius strip and perhaps in its gesture reminiscent of Tatlin's forward-leaning and aggressively revolutionary Constructivist *Tower* (Jay Merrick, The Independent On Sunday, 6.08.06). [Fig 25]

**Fig 25**

**DANIEL LIBESKIND AND BUILDING ON THE PAST**

One of the recurrent and conspicuous features of Postmodernism has been its mistrust of traditional epistemological boundaries which separated different discourses. In many ways, the Deleuzian 'rhizome effect' of the poststructuralists has invaded neighbouring epistemologies so that instead of remaining autonomous, disciplines have become 'connected' by cultural studies. Peter Eisenman, for example, expropriates 'deep structure' from psycholinguistics in much the same breath as he invokes concepts from classical rhetoric as an explanation rather than an account of his procedures. And it has been consistently argued here that theoretical models derived from philosophical, linguistic and literary theory form an essential component of architectural meaning. It is only by the application of such theory that a model of interpretation can emerge because meaning has to implicate language, and language itself must be derived from architectural form, and in the case of architecture, as visual metaphor. This section looks at the theoretical complexities of Daniel Libeskind's early pre-architectural thinking as well as the architecture itself, and in particular, the Jewish Museum, Berlin as an exemplar of the allegory of absence and linguistic meaning immanent in built architectural form.
One example in architecture of the dissolution of autonomies and boundaries has been the decisive poststructuralist engagement with sculptural expressionism that has developed from the deconstruction of the classical grid into folding. There is a powerful chiasmic movement between art and architecture where art has become increasingly architectural as installation, and architecture has become art-like in the development of sculptural form. As architecture has folded into sculptural form, it has necessarily placed a new premium on the efficacy of drawing. Of course, architects have always produced drawings, but typically in elevations of the final empirical dimensions of the building. More recently it is noticeable that Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid, Will Alsop and Daniel Libeskind for example all paint as a preliminary exploration of form and idea. Equally, Frank Gehry’s exploration of configuration for important buildings like the Vitra or Guggenheim Museums began as intuitive, and indeed almost autonomic, frottage. However, as buildings have become increasingly sculptural, the architectural drawing that underpins the structure has assumed an overwhelming complexity in order to enable structural engineers to verify the structural integrity. And that complexity of the architectural drawing has become resolved by the use of CAD programs such as Catia which Gehry’s practice used for Bilbao or even more complex systems such as Alias/Wavefront’s Maya (J.K. Waters 2003, 58-9). What drawing and painting do is to retain touch and texture that is embodied in experience and which might be broadly described as phenomenological. The earlier discussion of ocularcentrism, opposed as retinal and Cartesian by Merleau-Ponty, established that the singular visual paradigm reinforces the hegemony of vision at the expense of meaning and marginalizes the interaction of sensory perception. In fact, the growth of sculptural forms in poststructuralist architecture is always analogous to gesture and therefore to human embodiment. This is not simply retinal, but instead in a multi-sensory way is haptic.

But the influence of computer modelling in BLOB architecture, and which could conceivably represent a new architectural paradigm of holistic retinal Minimalism, and which defers meaning rather like Donald Judd’s ‘specific object’, clearly emphasizes the visual over embodiment. In a little book which remains influential, The Eyes of the Skin, Juhani Pallasmaa says:
'Computer imaging tends to flatten our magnificent, multi-sensory, simultaneous and synchronic capacities of imagination by turning the design process into a passive visual manipulation, a retinal journey. The computer creates a distance between the maker and the object, whereas drawing by hand as well as model-making put the designer into a haptic contact with the object or space. In our imagination, the object is simultaneously held in the hand and inside the head, and the imagined and projected physical image is modelled by our bodies. We are inside and outside of the object at the same time.' (J. Pallasmaa 2005, 12-13)

Greg Lynn, the acknowledged doyen of biomorphic three-dimensional modelling, accepts that the computer program is capable of, and is used to innovate, design from within its own design repertoire independently of the architect who is traditionally the deus ex machina in the design (J.K. Waters 2003, 70-71).

Daniel Libeskind on the other hand remains firmly inside the phenomenological and heuristic imperative of design and form from art and drawing. And experience and embodiment as an aspect of spectatorship is lodged in the form. At the Jewish Museum, Berlin, the void and the Holocaust Tower command an intuitive hush – 'the sound of silence' as it were, and at the Imperial War Museum North, Manchester, the floor of the earth shard physically curves in a metaphor of disorientation and disintegration. Libeskind's concept of an 'architectural drawing' can never be assumed to be an orthodox rendering of orthogonal elevations, although clearly these have to appear at some point in the design presentation. Nor are his 'drawings' simply sketches or paintings. After leaving professional music, his early work is highly conceptual and gnomic - 'When the once-potent truth of architecture is reduced to a sign of its absence, one experiences a parching, suffocating dryness: 'The psyche lusts to be wet.' (Chamberworks: Architectural Meditations on the Themes from Heraclitus 28 Drawings. 1983 [Unoriginal Signs].) Although it might be improper to quote out of context, much of the early work, including 'Chamberworks', seems to have an inflection of Futurism or Surrealism: 'Poetics for Millionaires: Synonymous with rehabilitation, stenography will
be only for aristocrats. Amputated hands cannot recover stolen treasures, yet can be dipped into the circulatory system, which is, on average, 60,000 to 100,000 miles long.’ (D. Libeskind 2000, 50) Or alternatively, Libeskind’s presentation for the Berlin Jewish Museum Extension was produced as text between the spaces of the staves on music parchment. And the City Edge Competition, Berlin 1987, contained mixed media, including an architectural book containing a photograph of Mies bolted and screwed down on to a base. It is interesting that the slash fenestration of Libeskind’s signature building, The Jewish Museum, appears first in the earlier ‘City Edge’ as an isolated surface or wall-like object which is completely penetrated by the incision and which hence is made into a signifying event within the mixed media installation. The sense that the early conceptual work represents a rehearsal for the built forms to come is reinforced by his drawings, particularly ‘Micromegas: The Architecture of Endspace’, 1979. The combination of ‘micro’ and ‘mega’ has a suggestion of an oxymoron of the large within the small. The drawings although computer-rendered, are not computer-generated. [Fig 26] Libeskind says:

‘There is a historical tradition in architecture, whereby drawings (as well as other forms of communication) signify more than can be embodied in stabilized frameworks of objectifiable data. If we can go beyond the material carrier (sign) into the internal reality of a drawing, the reduction of representation to a formal system – seeming at first as void and useless – begins to appear as an extension of reality, which is quite natural. The system ceases to be perceived as a process whose coherence is supported by empty symbols, and reveals a structure whose manifestation is only mediated by symbolism. An architectural drawing is as much a prospective unfolding of future possibilities as it is a recovery of a particular history to whose intentions it testifies and whose limits it always challenges.’ (D. Libeskind 2000, 84)
The phenomenological influence is confirmed by the impact of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* (2000, 87) on the geometrical nature of the drawings which Libeskind regards as 'researches'. The apparent randomness and implicit chaos of the Micromegas series is not an empty violation of order but an attempt at the resolution of conflicting impulses rather than presenting a particular meaning. 'These drawings seek to reflect on a deeper level of consciousness the inner life of geometrical order whose nucleus is the conflict between the voluntary and the involuntary.' (2000, 87) Like Gehry's 'frottage' drawing, it seems that geometrical form generates further geometrical form, not all of which is 'intended'. Libeskind's 'drawings' which range from conventional imagery to computer-assisted shapings to mixed media installation, do not privilege *vision* in a Cartesian or retinal sense, but instead emphasize cross-sensory perception in both the designer's concept of form and the spectator's experience of it. In Part Two of *The Eyes of the Skin*, Pallasmaa suggests that not only is the reading of a building a profoundly sensory as well as a conceptual process, but that in reality, the spectator's conceptual reading and response to architectural meaning and significance depends on a prior and initial sensory response; ultimately this latent process manifests itself as language. The totality of the experience engages all the senses ('acoustic intimacy', 'silence, time and solitude', 'the shape of touch', 'mimesis of the body' and so on; J. Pallasmaa 2005, 5). Libeskind's buildings actively subvert 'the hegemony of vision'. The raw concrete of the voids at the Jewish Museum or the dislocated forms at the Imperial War Museum or the equally exposed concrete in the long two-metre wide form at the Felix Nussbaum Haus, Osnabruck 1998 (also known as 'Museum Without Exit') in which space and experience is powerfully compressed, all demand nuances of touch and texture as well as vision. Merleau-Ponty's version of the glance as a kind of extenuated touch as a contiguous contact between directed vision and the surface seen is an ever-present feature of the
ambiguity and contradiction of Libeskind's buildings. The multiplicity in his drawings represents not only a rehearsal and research into future built form, but establishes the phenomenologies of embodiment as a prerequisite of the central theme of his architecture: meaning.

But if buildings mean and signify in some way, that is not necessarily directly a result of authorial intention, and in *Breaking Ground* 2004, Libeskind insists that it will result in an expression of some kind.

'Since the modernist era began, buildings have been designed to turn a neutral face to the world, to be immune to expression. The goal has been to produce objective, not subjective, architecture. But here is the truth of the matter: No building, no matter how neutral it is supposed to be, *is* actually neutral. Le Corbusier may have insisted that 'a house is a machine for living in', but....it is still an expression of your personality, and hence not a neutral space.' (D. Libeskind 2004, 121 original emphasis)

Libeskind proposes that even a version of Venturi's 'dumb box' like Mies's New National Gallery, Berlin signifies precisely in its defacement of form which suggests a kind of violence and aggression which strips decoration and articulation down to a state of nakedness and which in turn is a kind of 'assault'. If all buildings mean or express some kind of feeling, then the architect is not restricted to one form of that expression, but may vary the building form in order to avoid 'the Gehry' or 'the Libeskind' formulaic design (D. Libeskind 2004, 109). Which is exactly what he does. Hence a comparison of the Jewish Museum, the Imperial war Museum Manchester, the Denver Art Gallery Extension and the proposed Boiler House Spiral at the Victoria and Albert Museum, London for example [Figs 27, 28, 29, 30] produces fractured shards and fractals, curvilinear sweeps, dramatic folding, incisive creasing and angles and everywhere the violation of the grid (D. Libeskind 2004, 125). There is a wide spectrum of poststructuralist eclecticism here which reflects Libeskind's admiration for the kind of radical Victorian eclectic he found at the V&A. ('When the Victorians built the Museum 150 years ago, they didn't erect what had been in fashion 150 years before that, in the
Georgian era. The Victorians were brave and radical, shocking even. They built a contemporary building.’ (2004, 194) But despite the disparity of built forms, the underlying imperative is always towards an expression of feeling in form. It becomes necessary to distinguish between ‘universal’ and ‘particularistic’ or contextual meaning. In architectural terms, a particularistic meaning will associate with the context of a specific site. A universal meaning on the other hand invariably involves an abstract noun at the point that the meaning becomes linguistic. Thus the universal sense or state inherent in the Jewish Museum is widely recognized as relating to ‘the tragic’ (R. Patterson, Ed., 2000, 66-75). The particularistic sense at the V&A on the other hand emerges from the fact that the proposed building unites two earlier existing buildings and therefore suggests a unity of culture and learning across time; the building would be physically contiguous, linked. The fact that Libeskind’s Extension is so radically a modern building (although not Modernist other than by inflection) creates a temporal flow between the new and the old, replete with its sense of remembrance of things past. The connecting flow of time between the old and the new is derived from the physical, contiguous link between the new building and the pre-existing older ones. The Boiler House Extension puns and plays on its own past with its apparent chaotic deconstruction of Cubism, as does the Denver Extension in a similar context. But the dominant note which the V&A sounds relates to the fact that this is a fractured Cubism which spirals. The particular meaning in the context of the museum is that there is almost a gothic-like rise of optimism which is spiralled upwards and which is celebratory of learning and culture and its continuity. As architectural form, the spiral achieves its rising emphasis without any curves, but through ‘layers’ of deformed cubes which concatenate vertically. Libeskind’s themes or ‘dimensions’ at the V&A are ‘the spiral movement of art and history’, ‘the interlocking of inside and outside’ and ‘the labyrinth of discovery’ (D. Libeskind 2000, 156). Such ‘dimensions’ reinforce Libeskind’s devotion to concept as well as built form, and the reciprocal relation between the two and the ever-present seeking and demand for meaning. Even a building which is so conspicuously deformed contains its own parlante and would speak in a commentary of cultural continuity through and because of time. It is in fact, its own temporal allegory.
Large public buildings are of course not new, but since Bilbao there is now a powerful globalist imperative to deploy iconic buildings as a definition and a sign of urban or national identity. Such buildings are inevitably monumental, and monumental buildings apart from being publicly large and conspicuous, are always commemorative. Commemorating something is always an act of remembrance, always implicating memory and always instigating absent presence. So the monumental building is a form of reminder, a temporal prompt and a kind of advice. ('Monument' from Latin *monumentum*, to remind, advise.) The monumental building in other words is always didactically tendentious and however disguised, hortatory. These have already been established here as the conditions of allegory. A Victorian Museum, for example, might well deliberately and overtly signal its didactic function through the ideology of 'improvement', but the museum in a poststructuralist age shuns 'improvement', but nevertheless contrives to say one thing but mean another. It does so by studiously avoiding being seen as museum-like or institutional but yet providing uplifting experience. Zaha Hadid's acclaimed Wolfsburg Science Center looks more like what Charles Jencks calls 'large-scale horizontal sculpture' (C. Jencks 2005, 160) than a centre for the dissemination of knowledge. Where the Victorian museum was a showcase of improvement, its poststructuralist counterpart represents what Stephen Bann has called 'a cabinet of curiosities' commemorating past as well as current achievement. Because the museum commemorates and remembers, it always provides, like the church, sadness as well as celebration and is another allegorical oxymoron.

The sadness and veneration which attaches to relics such as reliquaries in the church and cabinets of curiosities in the museum has been theorized in Deconstruction and Poststructuralism as absence, and since deconstructive procedures are now an incorporated *sine qua non* of poststructuralist theoretical construction, the relative solemnity which surrounds poststructuralist architecture is accounted for by the critical seriousness of its underlying and foundational theory. There is inevitably a marked contrast with the rhetorical theatricality of the New Historicism which so characterized early postmodern architecture of the Graves and Moore variety. Nevertheless, the later iconic building continues to be rhetorical by definition of being iconic and also theatrical.
in the contrivance and expressionist drama of its sculptural declaration. The essential
difference would seem to be in the openly acknowledged Modernism of the
poststructuralists conferred by theory, compared with the earlier architectural ‘noise’ of
the postmodernists expressed in the parodic and ironic laughter of historicist quotation.
Certainly the on-going and completed commissions of Daniel Libeskind, rather like Peter
Eisenman, show a moral seriousness and gravitas, as demonstrated by several buildings
in different countries commemorating the Holocaust. It is perhaps surprising to speak so
naturally of architecture as exemplifying ‘moral seriousness’, but Libeskind has shown
consistently in his first building, the Berlin Jewish Museum, a capacity to engage tragic
and elegiac meaning into architectural built form.

‘In effect, Libeskind evolved a complex political metaphor in space, light, matter and
dematerialization to evoke the universality of Jewish civilization, and the void left in
Western culture by the destruction of the Jews in the Second World War. Far from
being an exercise in neo-modernist formalism, this was a work of chilling authenticity
drawing together in its lines of thought both grave, apocalyptic themes, and radical
reassessments of the meaning of human destiny.’ (W.J. Curtis 1999, 667-8)

Libeskind has called the vast and still on-going project at the former S.S. Barracks at
Sachsenhausen, Berlin ‘Mo[u]rning’. In Libeskind’s submission for the project, the letter
‘u’ is crossed out in a move clearly derived from Derrida and Husserl. Bracketing out the
letter ‘u’, of course leaves ‘morning’; light and rebirth from darkness and death. The
original project involved the actual rebuilding of the ruined Nazi buildings which
Libeskind objected to along with the mass housing which was proposed for the site.
Although there is to be no housing, some of the buildings have been restored as part of
the commemorative nature of the site, and others have been razed and flooded and
preserved as ruins. Allegorically, the flooded buildings have received what Libeskind
calls ‘a new baptism’. (D. Libeskind 2000, 91) The submerged buildings as trace and
memory are seen from viewing platforms and constitute as ruins what could be described
as the preservation of decay. Libeskind’s own distinctive buildings for the site contain
spaces for social use such as unemployment training as well as a library and museum and
continue the metaphors of hope and rebirth of the larger site. 'Its aim is to bring people to this place, to reveal, disclose, and remember. At the same time it must be a place for hope, a place where those who are trying to rebuild Germany can find a workplace, an employment future, the growth of new nature, the quietude of contemplation, the rehabilitation of the physical and mental spirit: the dawn of a new Mourning....' (2000, 91)

It may be no exaggeration to suggest that Libeskind's Jewish Museum has already become recognized as an experience of the sublime, and that it has joined Ronchamp and Gehry's Vitra as a signpost building of the architectural postmodern from the second half of the twentieth century onwards. ('In fact, the Jewish Museum has already been called the last architectural masterwork in twentieth century Berlin, and its foremost building for the twenty first.' B. Schneider 1999, 58) Indeed, it may be seen as one of the great accomplishments of modern architecture and the Modernism it embraces. What makes it utterly distinctive in the terms discussed here is its unrivalled power to condense and focus meaning.

'And equally, Libeskind certainly pays formal homage to modernism. The echoes and traces of Le Corbusier are evident everywhere in the work, not least in the transformation of the spiral museum....into the zigzag museum, as well as in the deeper epistemological attitude to the city and its inhabitants registered in the spatial movements of the urban projects. The powerful imagery of the avant-gardes is ever-present, transformed and displaced, re-formed and replaced....Beyond this, however, when confronted by the withdrawn exteriors and disturbing interiors of the Jewish Museum, we find ourselves in a phenomenological world in which both Heidegger and Sartre would find themselves, if not exactly 'at home' (for that was not their preferred place), certainly in bodily and mental crisis, with any trite classical homologies between the body upset by unstable axes; walls and skin torn, ripped, and dangerously slashed, rooms empty of content and with uncertain or no exits and entrances. What Heidegger liked to call 'falling into' the uncanny, and what for Sartre was the dangerous instrum-
antity of objects in the world as they threatened the body and its extensions, is for Libeskind the stuff of the architectural experience.’ (A. Vidler in D. Libeskind 2000, (222-3) Anthony Vidler’s ‘Afterword’ to Libeskind’s book, The Space of Encounter, calls the Jewish Museum a ‘Museum of the Voice’. That is, the building speaks its meanings and demands to be heard in the phenomenological tradition. Libeskind himself in Breaking Ground, 2004, explains that his initial conceptual procedure involved three processes. The first was the collection and gathering of names, including Schleiermacher, the founder of the Hermeneutical Method (A. Kenny, Ed, 1994, 230-1) much admired by Libeskind (D. Libeskind 2004, 92) and discussed here earlier. The second involved reading Walter Benjamin, and the third was the influence of Arnold Schoenberg’s unfinished opera, Moses and Aaron.

The collection of names and the lines and connections between notable Berliners gave Libeskind both the zigzag shape which had to accommodate its site, but also the configuration of windows. As discussed earlier, the fenestration is metaphorically symbolic and each point of each window is numbered and accords to one of the names in the Holocaust Memorial Book from which Libeskind began. It might be tempting to read the window slashes as a biblical ‘writing on the wall’; in fact, Libeskind describes it otherwise. ‘The windows are the ‘writing of the addresses by the walls of the Museum itself.’” But the biblical is persuasively inscribed into the text of the building. (‘I had always imagined the building as a sort of text, meant to be read....’ D. Libeskind 2004, 94.) Just as Moses led the Jews in the flight from Egypt both in the Bible in Schoenberg’s opera, so did many attempt to escape from the Shoah. And the idea of flight and expulsion is commemorated in the Museum’s
Garden Of Exile [38], perhaps as the ultimate ejection from Eden and the loss of innocence itself paralleled in the building’s invocation of the Holocaust. And although Libeskind does not appear to say so, the building’s zigzag plan can be interpreted not only as a deformed Star of David or as Nazi insignia, but also as a coiled serpent [Fig 31].

The spatial metaphor of the entrance is particularly important because having entered via the original Baroque building, Libeskind’s extension is confronted only by going down; the experience of meeting the Jewish Museum is subterranean. Compared with the experience of the garden above, there is something chilling and unnerving, hellish even, about entering the museum and its labyrinthine confusions of voids, corridors and the ‘streets’ leading to the garden, the rising staircase and ominously, to the Holocaust Void. The physical presence of the vertical void which runs the entire length of the building instantiates the metaphorical presence of absence and seems to summon up a disturbing nihilism in its bare concrete. But the brilliance of this device is that to fully experience the enormous physicality of the void, the beholder must look up, and looking up is looking towards the light, because the fenestration becomes larger and more expressed at the top of the building and as it rises. Absence and presence, darkness and light, realised in spatial and visual metaphor, is a powerful and compelling embodiment of allegory. The void is crossed at sixty places by sixty bridges and these correspond to Libeskind’s reading of Walter Benjamin’s *One-Way Street* which Libeskind describes as ‘urban apocalypse’ (D. Libeskind 2000, 27). The dislocation, alienation and disorientation of the steel and glass architecture of Berlin that Benjamin addressed in both *One-Way Street* and the *Arcades* project, is reproduced in the Jewish Museum in its fractured fenestration which violates floors and confuses inside and out and in the complexity of its ‘streets’ and their rising and falling levels. Libeskind’s adoption of the term ‘streets’ is a direct reference to Benjamin’s vision of pre-war Berlin as dystopian.

From Barthes we might expect that any interpretation of a writer’s intention by a reader will be a form of reinscription. Benjamin, in ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1923) suggested that any interpretation is in fact a form of translation (J. Lechte 1994, 205). It is the original which has to remain in a state of permanence and stasis as form in order to continue to ‘exist’. But it is the translation of the meaning which becomes subject to change because as translation it becomes another kind of reproduction, but never as a
literal process. (Benjamin of course also wrote the influential ‘The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction’.) A literal interpretation and translation ‘demolishes the theory of the reproduction of meaning and is a direct threat to comprehensibility.’ The richness of Libeskind’s visual metaphor will always defeat literalism, but at the same time always itself become subject to over-interpretation. This is an inevitable and acceptable condition. There is no ‘remedy’ to interpretation, and over-interpretation is both inevitable and necessary as the test to destruction of allegorically concealed meaning. Only the default position of falsification within Stanley Fish’s ‘interpretive community’ remains as the restraining order of the discourse. Libeskind’s intentions at the Jewish Museum are of course an essential component of its potential significance, but like the redundant church, its allegories and symbolisms may change according to social use or indeed, disappear. Just like Wittgenstein’s ‘meaning from use’, architectural meaning is dependent on the way any building functions in its social, economic and cultural context. A change of context inaugurates a change of meaning. Is it possible to imagine some point in the future when the immediacy of the Holocaust has receded that the stylistic infelicities of the Jewish Museum could become transformed into say, perhaps, a museum of German Expressionism and Noir in film? When the gouges and slits of its skin represent not the atrocities of suffering, but the excesses of the slasher movie?

The Jewish Museum has become paradigmatic of embedded meaning not only in poststructuralist architecture and has become iconic not as representative of some particular form of ‘branding’, but as a built structure which encodes a difficult common experience of the tragic and its possible redemption. In this sense it moves from the particular to the universal. For many, the experience of it ushers in an unexpected solemnity that is comparable to the symbolism of the church or cathedral which also invokes the mourning of darkness and its meaning, and the redeeming aspect of light. Libeskind’s early Neo-Dadaist influences are subsumed by his rejection of Enlightenment Reason discussed in Chapter Two here. ‘Thus to speak about architecture....is to speak about the paradigm of the irrational. In my view, the best works of the contemporary spirit come from the irrational, while what prevails in the world, what dominates and often kills, does so always in the name of Reason.’ (D. Libeskind in P. Noever, Ed, 1991, 244)
The rhetorical ‘absence’ of the Holocaust Tower dramatically signifies the horror of a particular event and is an insistently chastening experience. In the voids running the length of the building, the distraught angles of the structural members continually play on a connotation of ruin, that what at times seems to be the suggestion of imminent physical collapse also represents the ruin of taste and sensibility as an insane end-point of the ideology of Enlightenment Reason. It is perhaps here in these great ruined and empty spaces that Libeskind has most powerfully embodied the tragic. He has called his thoughts on the Jewish Museum ‘Between The Lines’.

‘These are the two lines of contemporary dichotomy, the lines which create the rift between faith and action, between political belief and architectural response. These lines develop themselves, because they have a logic. They also fall apart: you can’t keep them together, because they become completely disengaged, there’s no way to keep them mutually intertwined. Therefore, the lines show themselves as separated so that the void, which has been centrally running through what is continuous, materializes itself outside as what has been ruined, or rather as the remnant or residue of independent structure. I call this the ‘voided void’, a void which has itself been voided, a deconstruction which has itself been deconstructed. Fragmentation and displacement mark the coherence of the ensemble in this type of operation, because the thing has come undone in order to become accessible, both functionally and intellectually.’

(P. Noever, Ed 1991, 69-70)

Of course, reading ‘Between The Lines’ is an act of literary interpretation, (R. Patterson Ed, 2000, 73) and Libeskind has said that he considers the depth of metaphorical meaning in the Jewish Museum as representative of a text. The gap between denotation and connotation is reader inference. It is the building’s physical form which hints and prompts the spectator to suspect a subtext where something as mundane as bare concrete of the voided space might connote the raw experience of suffering when compared to the pure white walls of the rest of the museum. And it is the architectural skill expressed as aesthetic form which allows the building’s gestures to become language and which allow Libeskind to speak of ruin and fragmentation, deconstruction and displacement and
others to speak of the tragic as presence. And reading the external fenestration as 'wounding' is amplified from the inside when the windows can be seen as significant incisions into the very structure of the building and not simply as a rhetorical device patterned on to the exterior [Fig 32].

Whether or not it is part of Libeskind’s intentions, ‘wounding’ becomes an integral part of the experience of the spectator at the Jewish Museum as an essential element of its phenomenological substance; the texture of its surfaces and the arrangement of its spaces. This act of spectatorship is distinctly that of distanced observation, what T.S. Eliot called ‘the objective correlative’, and is quite separate from the experience of the exhibits which inevitably transform the role of the visitor from spectator to participant. When confronted by ‘wounding’ so consistently, the spectator role, in an act of readership, seeks out its associations. And what wounding connotes with is the classical idea of *trauma*. Aristotle makes clear that contained within the Greek notion of the tragic plot is the resolution of the fatal flaw in the heroic fall, understood to evoke suffering, pity and fear in an audience but which confers the redemption of catharsis. In the eyes of the spectator, the physical suffering and mental agitation of the fallen hero is the confrontation of what Kant and the Romantics later called the sublime. Although it may not be an over-interpretation to characterize the experience of the Jewish Museum as a version of the sublime, it does need careful limiting. For someone like Burke, for example, the sublime was so overpoweringly phenomenological that the experience of awe marginalized both cognition and language as a form of resignation to the drama of fate (R. Patterson, Ed 2000, 38-9). At the Jewish Museum, the constant cascade of visual metaphor, on the contrary, is the precisely the mechanism which transmogrifies significant form into language. It becomes difficult to resist the idea that the transformation of visual metaphor into linguistic discourse represents a second-hand version of the building-form, as when a
window summons up notions of wounding and the tragic implications of Greek *trauma*,
and that then the ‘discourse’ doubles and becomes a disquieting kind of *reproduction*.

Aristotle’s depiction of tragic plot naturally consists of certain requirements of
narrative as the unfolding movement towards tragedy. And of course, a building, unlike a
narrative, is an entity which is abstract and does not contain narratives or representations
but has to have its meanings coded in form. It was suggested earlier that buildings
ultimately mean by virtue of the social and cultural use to which they are put. Since the
museum must always embody the process of commemoration, it must equally enshrine
memory. It is only in memory that history itself is remembered and revived. There may
be no narratives in architecture, but there is the collective memory, *ut ars poetica*, of the
past which is the semantic analogue of Aristotle’s plot. It is the contact of the
spectatorship of the Jewish Museum with the enshrined memory of a terrible historic
moment which approaches the sublime. But it has to be said that this touch of the sublime
does not confer Aristotle’s catharsis as a form of cleansing or emotional evisceration
(Greek *katharsis*, to purge or purify). Although the sense of the tragic is palpable, the
central and dominating void is almost nihilist in that it represents *absence* of a
particularly agonising kind, and is a monument to mourning rather than the redemption of
catharsis.

As well as oscillating between a present reflecting in some way on some past, a present
absence, allegory says one thing but means another. The Jewish Museum is not, as
Libeskind has insisted, a Holocaust Museum, but instead is the history of Jewish culture
in Berlin and in Germany. This is what it says. But once its signs have been read, and its
parts holistically reconciled, what it means has more to do with the tragic recollection of
suffering. Allegory is not only a temporal palimpsest which folds a present back on to a
previous history, but is also a rhetorical trope which is both hortatory and didactic. It is
not only a present which mourns the ruin of the past, but it also uses the past to moralize
about the present. The figural symbol of allegory can be thought of as the pointing finger,
sometimes in Christian iconography as God, but equally as History itself (R. Wittkover
1977, 173-188).

Rachel Whiteread’s Holocaust Monument, 2000 at the Judenplatz, Vienna is called a
‘Nameless Library’. It is a room-sized cast made in dental plaster with walls made up of
rows of opened books. Although the cast is Whiteread’s principal sculptural procedure, the fact that the Nameless Library is cast in dental plaster recalls a deeply disturbing association with the concentration camps and insists on reviving memories which have lain dormant. The open books recall the symbolic burning of Jewish culture when books by Jewish authors were publicly burned by the Nazis on May 10th 1933. In other words, the Vienna monument allegorically points a finger implying guilt and complicity. Allegorically it prompts an underlying moral response of atonement. For the same reason, the Jewish Museum is an uncomfortable experience, not simply a cabinet of curiosities, more expiation than redemption. It is part of Daniel Libeskind’s extraordinary achievement that the singular visual and aesthetic quality of the Jewish Museum converts so powerfully into language and meaning. The underlying components of architectural meaning which have been established here in terms of the relationship between visual form and language and expressed as rhetoric and allegorical metaphor are represented most completely in the Jewish Museum. In one obvious sense, the building stands as a test of the application of the theoretical model of Part One here to the reading of poststructuralist buildings as embedded and coded meaning as well as iconic form. The linguistic, philosophical, textual, metaphorical and theatrically rhetorical aspects of the postmodern form an essential interpretative backdrop. This is not an attempt to cram such meanings into the Jewish Museum as some kind of repository of theory, but rather the proposition that the experience of this building exemplifies most fully and paradigmatically the imperative of postmodern architecture to mean and to mean as language.
CONCLUSION

FORMALISM AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

Charles Jencks effectively began the discussion of architectural significance as an aspect of the postmodern with his book, Meaning In Architecture (1969). That book, and particularly The Language of Postmodern Architecture which followed it, established the now familiar position that the semantics of architectural Postmodernism would involve the decoding of meaning within the semiotic configurations of building form. This aspect of semiotic interpretation implying the presence of language, or the postmodern building as 'discourse', was never fully worked out — a lacuna the present work attempts to address. Nevertheless, Jencks's formulation seemed to imply that architectural meaning would be located within architecture as an interior sense generated by the puns and parodies of the double form. This might be understood to represent, albeit in a loose sense, the proposal that meaning inheres inside particular genres in an almost autonomous way, much as F.R. Leavis and I.A. Richards had suggested and discussed here in Chapter Four. There is no doubt that primarily postmodern buildings mean by virtue of being architecture. The rhetorical tropes indicated here, however 'architecturally intertextual' they might be, work as meaning precisely because of their architectural historicism. It will be noticed immediately that this apparently reverses the equally familiar 'base and superstructure' model that assumes that it is the cultural context which determines the meaning of the art-object. The opposition between these two positions, often characterized as intrinsic versus extrinsic, or formalist versus contextual, is antithetical and dialectic, and one which Peter Eisenman has attempted to dissolve with his 'in betweeness'. It surely seems almost a truism now that the work of art, and particularly so in the case of architecture, means by virtue of both its intrinsic and extrinsic properties and by both its formal and cultural significance. Thus the deconsecrated church ceases to allegorise because of its change of use and because it functions differently. And it is at the Nederlanden Building or the Jewish Museum for example that concealed meanings emerge because of both the spectator's extrinsic knowledge of the tragedies of the Second World War as well as the construing of the architectural tropes in the buildings' form.
THE LITERARY THEORY OF POSTMODERNIST ARCHITECTURE

The focus here has been consistently one of documenting the conditions of meaning. And clearly statements of meaning are non-evaluative and abjure judgements of value. What meaning must have of course is interpretation, although not as a process of revealing a fixed authorial intention favoured by Leavis or the absolute authority of the text insisted on by New Criticism. The sign is, as Chapter Two proposed, irrevocably metaphorical in Peirce's triadic formulation. Understanding metaphor implicates the relationship of part to whole, often the metonymic generating the metaphorical. The mechanism of yoking part to whole as one thing representing something else or some other state is characteristically synechdochal; one part contiguously touching and prompting the larger metaphorical meaning which in the building assumes the proportions of visual metaphor. And it is only through visual metaphor that the trope of saying one thing but meaning another can be instantiated as an example of Craig Owens's fundamentally important condition of the allegorical imperative which underlies the postmodern. The source of interpretation, architectural or otherwise, is inevitably literary. And in the case of poststructuralist architecture, where, it is proposed, that built form becomes language, it is particularly important to establish a semiotic and linguistic model of interpretation of the kind produced in Chapter Five. The literary interpretation of architecture may initially sound rather odd, but in fact emerges as an essential requirement. What follows in terms of rhetoric and metaphor, allegory and metonymy or synechdoche and chiasmus is the metaphorical nature of poststructuralism which only becomes revealed through this kind of tropic scrutiny. Equally, terms such as 'unconcealing' or 'revealing' may give an impression of obscure or even biblical exegesis. But if the proposition here holds that the fundamental nature of the postmodern is allegorical, then the poststructuralist building must say one thing but mean another; it must in other words be construed by acts of empathic reading. What those potential meanings could become will always be subject to the process of public discourse in the shape of Stanley Fish's interpretative community.
THE RHETORIC OF POSTMODERN THEATRICALITY

One constantly re-emerging theme has been that of theatricality as a form of rhetorical display that separates the minimalist decorum of Modernism from the historicist contrivance of the postmodern. In the Graves-Moore edition, early Postmodernism flagrantly subverted Modernism precisely by being conspicuous. In its later poststructuralist manifestation, theatricality becomes embodied in Bigness whilst the Modernism which is part of its salient features is re-emphasized. The disputes between Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried and the Minimalists during the nineteen sixties continue to be understood now not merely as a disagreement between the art movements of Abstract Expressionism and Minimalism, but also as the epistemological divide between Modernism and Postmodernism itself. Fried’s argument in *Art and Objecthood* that the transmogrification of painting into installed objects which become increasingly sculptural/architectural and so create the condition of theatre between genres, is ironically and parodically celebrated by the postmodern sensibility that delights in the presence of the oxymoron, rather like Peter Eisenman’s ‘in-betweeness’. In poststructuralist architecture, the persistence of contrivance and display becomes the rhetoric of meta-architecture; the self-referential iconic building seen at Bilbao, Berlin and Beijing and at the site of Yamasaki’s Twin Trade Towers in New York. Part of later theatricality has been the violation of the Modernist rational grid in favour of architectural folding and the emergence of the sculptural building which allows not only a new expressionism, but also stylistic autobiography in architecture. Thus, it is assumed here, that as long as buildings continue to display the features of rhetorical theatricality, then we may assume within the almost impossible debate about Post-Postmodernism, that we remain within a postmodern sensibility. Deleuze’s ‘rhizome’ with its self-imposed uncertainties continues to generate the infinite regression of the interpretation of interpretations. This contextualized situation arises from the condition of the art object or text implying a meaning which can never be exhausted by authorial intention alone as Gadamer, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have argued. Meaning will inevitably be diachronic as well as synchronic, historical as well as contemporaneously authorial, and is subject to change over time through acts of readership. But whatever is made of it in some future, it is the astonishing
theatricality of that gap between wall and the event of the roof at Ronchamp that initiates the metaphorical into architecture.

**THE MODERNISM OF POSTMODERNISM**

Part of the layered structure of architectural Poststructuralism that has included deconstruction, and the Deleuzian *Pli*, folded and curved into sculptural expression, has been the essential component of Modernism itself. The kind of retraction of early postmodernist architecture from Modernism represented a difficult disengagement that evolved into a process of separation. Wilful stick-on Historicism subverted Modernism with the collage of eclecticism almost as a denial or camouflage of modern steel and glass that amounted to the recriminatory gesture of the retort. (Venturi’s derisory ‘Less is a bore’ in response to Mies’s eponymous ‘Less is more.’) But the founding elements of modern design of concrete, steel and the glass curtain wall which allowed industrial mass-production rather than hand-crafted materials, could only literally be concealed behind the rhetoric of inauthentic periodization. Now, nobody does what is often considered to be ‘Postmodernism’ and faux-inauthentic periodization except perhaps the supermarket superstore in its barn-like invocation of the vernacular encasing the dumb box within. In contrast, the Poststructuralists use the constructional elements of Modernism to facilitate sculptural form and expressionism rendered virtually in CGI. The kind of Modernist inflection seen, for example, in Zaha Hadid’s Cincinatti Contemporary Arts Center is neither parodic nor recriminatory, but is contrariwise, a form of veneration. The temporal palimpsest created by this, as it were, re-inscription within Modernism and its materials is almost a kind of ‘truth to materials’, albeit Modernist, both an open acknowledgement and ‘play’ on Modernism as a source and origin but one indefinitely deferred. Craig Owen’s postmodernistic ‘allegorical imperative’ initiated the concept of Postmodernism as instituting a Duchampian appropriation of extrinsic and historicist ‘found objects’ in the form of earlier artistic style. In the case of architecture, this appropriation, or indeed, expropriation of earlier historical elements, including the Modernism from which it emerged, created the architectural definition of the trope of the oxymoron which is so powerfully characteristic of the postmodern building. Frank Gehry’s Santa Monica House becomes paradigmatic of apparently diametrically opposed
elements constituting one form as a conspicuous example of 'double coding' into an architectural oxymoron. Despite the flagrantly rhetorical Historicism of emergent architectural postmodernism in the nineteen seventies and eighties, it is to the incipient Purism of Modernism that the poststructuralists consistently return.

BUILT FORM AS VISUAL METAPHOR

Buildings can only mean as metaphorical form because they have no language. Although the beholder is not in any sense part of what might be called the ontology of the building, the spectator must be prepared to partake of the building’s ‘parlante’ which emerges from the rhetorical style of architectural detail. In this sense, the role of the reader is both one of spectatorship and participation, both of visual discrimination and the act of construal. The spectator as reader rather than merely an observer in an architectural context inevitably confronts something that can only be addressed as ‘visual meaning’. The metaphorical nature of this kind of sign, like Libeskind’s ‘suturing’ in the fenestration of the Jewish Museum mentioned earlier, represents what H.P. Grice called ‘implicature’, or the condition of ‘as if’; as if, that is, a rivet signifies a stitch. The contiguous juxtaposition of ‘stitch’ and window slit as ‘wound’ as visual double-coding later participates in the linguistic process of generating abstract nouns such as ‘tragic’ in instances of holistic meaning. The implicature of ‘as if’ immediately suggests something other than something said. And this doubling of meaning, once it is realised that it has a temporal context of a present form implicating a context from the past, becomes part of the allegorical. The cognitive processes underlying interpretative readings of architectural visual form are clearly complex. There is a metaphorical transfer from the visual to the linguistic. At least there has to be an initial association between visual tropes such as simile and synecdoche which ‘touch’ metonymically and which prompt the realization of larger and holistic metaphorical meaning which is produced as language from form. Reading the poststructuralist building becomes ever more complex when it is recalled that as form and meaning it both subverts and venerates its modernist influences. The palimpsest of the postmodernist reinscription on to Modernism is in another sense a violation, and the violated remnant of the modern both discarded and retained represents
an act of architectural performative infelicity. The associative elements of figural contiguity and 'touch' reinforce the view that the experience of the building is, in a full sense, embodied and that even the retinal or Cartesian 'look' is a form of contact or 'touch', much as Merleau-Ponty proposed. And the fact that the interpretation of the building as form is nonetheless experiential and historical rather than a search for the transcendentally ideal places an emphasis on the phenomenological tradition and 'unconcealing' of Heidegger rather than the Kantian formulation of the beautiful favoured, say, by Roger Scruton. At all events, without visual metaphor in architecture, there could only be a severely marginalized presence of meaning, or indeed in terms of built form rather than societal or economic significance, an entire absence of meaning as the semiotic emptiness of Mies's Seagram Tower demonstrates as part of its Modernist episteme.

**LANGUAGE AND MEANING FROM FORM**

Donald Davidson and other philosophers of language argue that since metaphor does not and cannot produce logical propositions, it is incapable of discursive meaning. Metaphorical meaning at best is connotative rather than denotative. Metaphorical meaning, equally, is essentially comparative, and expresses one thing in terms of another different but in some way similar thing. Since architectural meaning is the result of metaphor locked in form, philosophers of language are incapable of response to architectural metaphor because they can detect no propositions. This of course is not very helpful because it dispenses with the very idea of response itself. Response in its full sense is embodied and multi-sensory, perhaps even synaesthetic. The later sensation of an echo, for example, may recall an earlier experience of resonant footsteps in a church building which then associates strongly with a sense of colour, derived possibly from the earlier sight of stained glass. Without such a cognitive response to figural associations and connections, the metonymic and metaphorical linkages in Libeskind's slash windows discussed earlier in terms of visual metaphor might be missed completely. And it is the linkage and association between metonymy and metaphor, 'suture' to 'gash', part to whole, that generates the linguistic sense of 'wounding' and which in turn leads to the
elaborated language of the allegorical, generating in turn, the larger sense of the presence of the tragic. This is insistently language from architecture. The composite theoretical model of Part One with semiotic (Saussure, Peirce and Barthes), theatrical (Fried), philosophical (Heideggeran phenomenology), literary (Gadamer) and interpretational (Fish) elements, amongst others such as the fundamental importance of sculptural expression and gesture, is the basis of architectural meaning as construed by the beholder as reader. The model permits the embedded discussion of such meaning in the context of buildings in Part Two because such constituent meanings have already been established by the model itself. In many ways this is the opposite of ‘The Language of Architecture’ formulation based on the naive assumption that buildings inherently contain a meaning by virtue of architecture having a language. They and it do not. The language that associates with architectural meaning is nothing less than the language of the spectator responding to the ‘langue’ to be derived from architectural visual metaphor. However naive ‘The Language of Architecture’ might appear in the light of the model of meaning proposed here, it remains powerfully ubiquitous and creates a lacuna of elaborated meaning which the present proposal has attempted to address. It is important to realize that the theoretical model upon which interpretation can be based, as argued in the Introduction here, represents neither a hierarchy nor a structural system, but instead is a matrix of relatively independent elements all of which are considered to be essential aspects of the holistic problem of postmodern architectural meaning. No one element is prior. Although the metaphorical nature of the signifier is fundamental, there is no reason to suppose that it is ‘prior’ to hermeneutics and phenomenology or the nature of interpretation. What unites the composite elements of the model is the demands of response. And it has to be equally insisted upon that there is nothing distinctively architectural about such elements of response. The literary theory of meaning is not at all architectural, but is an absolute requirement of architectural interpretation. Each component of response, in the sense of being genre-like, has a propensity to dissociate from other genres. But in another much more important sense, in the model proposed here, the disparate elements of genre such as ‘the philosophical’ or ‘the allegorical’ do actually combine or synthesize in the form of the familiar Venn Diagram. Here, distinctive and essentialist considerations of genre overlap subject boundaries and
produce an exchange of meaning. The closing sense, then, is of an appropriation of Gadamer’s ‘conversation’ in which a conversation between beholder and building presupposes a conversation between the genres of response.


BANHAM, R. (1971) *Los Angeles*. London; Allen Lane


262


EISENMAN ARCHITECTS (1991) *Unfolding*. Frankfurt/Berlin: Ernst & Sohn


HEIDEGGER, M. Building, Dwelling, Thinking in LEACH, N. ED (1997)


268


MINNIS, N. ED (1973) *Linguistics At Large*. St Albans: Paladin


NOEVER, P. ED (1993) *The End of Architecture?* Munich; Prestel-Verlag

271


ORTONY, A. ED *Metaphor And Thought*. Cambridge: CUP


QUINE, W.V.O. (1953) From A Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press


WILLIAMS, R. (1950) Reading And Criticism. London: F. Muller Ltd


SELECTED JOURNALS


FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE (1976) International Journal of Language And Philosophy Vol 14 No 4


277


THE OPEN UNIVERSITY (1981) *Philosophical Problems* Unit 14-16


279
NOTES

1 A modern painter like Francis Bacon occupies a position wholly opposite to that of Lessing. Winckelmann and Lessing both agree that Laocoon’s mouth gesture is not a scream; ‘...this pain expresses itself without any sign of rage either in his face or posture. He does not raise his voice in a terrible scream, which Virgil describes his Laocoon as doing; the way in which his mouth is open does not permit it.’ Although Lessing thus quotes Winckelmann in his opening chapter in order to show the absurdity of speculating about the volume-level emitted by a marble sculpture, he does agree fundamentally that Laocoon’s capacity to move and exalt the beholder arises from what Lessing describes as Winckelmann’s recognition of ‘noble simplicity and quiet grandeur’. Arguably, there is nothing of ‘quiet grandeur’ about Francis Bacon’s ‘Screaming Popes’ sequence for example. Bacon began the sequence from an earlier fascination with clinical mouth disease. (See ‘Three Figures For The Base Of A Crucifixion’, 1947, and Velasquez’s ‘Portrait Of Pope Innocent X’.) [Fig 2] The Screaming Popes series is typically understood to connote with anxiety, alienation and existential terror, and the fracturing of discourse. Bacon’s practice often depicted figures in extremis almost as part of his painting practice. Yet Bacon’s painting is frequently described critically as having its own sense of beauty, although overall his oeuvre may not be understood to be concerned with traditional notions of the beautiful. Lessing’s ascription to art of a restrained ideal and transcendent beauty through expression is in fact modified and made contingent by such familiar oxymorons as ‘deformed beauty’ which attaches to Bacon’s work. Bacon’s acknowledged status as an artist coupled with his frequent depiction of extremis compromises Lessing’s assertion that imagination and sensibility are deferred by such depiction of extremis. The fact that Lessing’s aesthetic was produced in an eighteenth century Enlightenment context which elevated the transcendentally ideal against the natural and real does not alter the fact that transcendent beauty should be context-free, universal and literally outside time, or in some sense, timeless, a position contradicted by Laocoon’s expression of terror. For the visceral in Bacon, see N. Miller, the Fugitive Body: Bacon’s Fistula in ‘The Body’, Journal Of Philosophy And The Visual Arts, Andrew Benjamin Ed, 1993.
2 Leonardo's iconic image of the ideal man circumscribed within the circle conforms to Vitruvius's rule. 'For if a man be placed flat on his back, with his hands and feet extended, and a pair of compasses centred at his navel, the fingers and toes will touch the circumference of a circle describes therefrom...Therefore, since nature has designed the human body so that its members are duly proportioned to the frame as a whole, it appears that the ancients had good reason for their rule, that in perfect buildings the different members must be in exact symmetrical relations to the whole general scheme.' (Book Three, Chapter One)

3 Prior to the Reformation, and beginning in the Eastern Church in the eighth century, iconoclasm began under Emperor Leo III and was ended in 843 AD by the Empress Theodora when image-breaking was proscribed.

4 The conflict of interpretations surrounding the origins of the English Civil War such as R.H. Tawney's *Religion And The Rise Of Capitalism*, need not be of direct concern here. But what remains important about the emergence of 'modern times' or 'modernity' is its intimate association with capitalism, causal or not. Relationships between 'Base and Superstructure' are discussed here in the section 'Cultural and Socio-Economic Transition' in Chapter Four.

5 The importance here of Clement Greenberg's treatment of the picture plane and its essential flatness in Modernist art cannot be exaggerated. Constable, but primarily Turner, had already roughed up their painted surfaces with scumbles and in Turner's case, impasto. The French impressionists were then heirs to this fascination with the very qualities of the physical, painted surface. In France, the official procedures of the Salon declared the surface to be essentially smooth, precisely in order to 'enter' the depicted subject in History Painting and other genres. The presence of the surface was then perceived as a failure of technique and sensibility. In this art, the picture plane, in an act of suspended disbelief, was deep and led the eye of the beholder into the picture's narrative. The Impressionists reversed this and celebrated the physical presence
of the surface paint. The effect was to bring the picture plane 'closer' to the surface of the picture.

Greenberg argued that the end-point of this historical process would be an art which had no subject, would be abstract, avoided narrative and the literary and would be fundamentally optical. Such art, which ignored the picture plane (but never figure and ground of course) in favour of all-over flatness was perceived to be realised by the American Abstract Expressionists, with Jackson Pollock as its apotheosis.

6 Perspective was the discovery (or re-discovery) of the depiction of deep space 'underneath' the picture plane. The depiction of such deep space was primarily achieved by the introduction of the vanishing point, and the sensory realisation that empirical objects appear to be smaller when viewed from a distance. Hence lines drawn towards the vanishing point went 'in' diagonally towards that point and in effect determined the 'height' of any object depicted so as to suggest distance 'inside' and 'within' the picture and not on the surface.

Once established, perspective became the dominant mode of western art during and after the Renaissance and Reformation, a convention which remained wholly hegemonic literally up to Picasso's cubism and the advent of Modernism in the 20th century.

It was nothing less than this all-powerful dominance of deep space which Greenberg contested in the 20th century.

7 The modern novel is largely thought to begin with Proust's In Search of Lost Time which was begun before the First World War. Proust's recall of past time is Bergsonian in its quality of compressed and arbitrary narrative passages interrupted by various kinds of intellectual speculation separate from the narrative and which declared the book(s) non-realist.

The 19th century novel of social realism stretches in Britain from Dickens, through George Eliot and into Henry James and Joseph Conrad in the early 20th century. The break with realism is most obvious in Joyce, and Ulysses deploys Greek Myth as the structure of the book and so denies narrative realism. Ulysses, more than any other early 20th century novel opens the modern novel.
8 Peter King The Room to Panic: An Example of Film Criticism and Housing Theory 2004. For hostile responses to Bachelard as cited see Morley, D. 2000 Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity.

9 The structure of Spiral Jetty itself, which embodies allegory and myth, has become recognized as the primary emblem of ruined time in Conceptual Art of the postmodern (H. Foster et al 2004, 506).

10 The realist instantaneity and therefore Modernism of Cartier-Bresson’s ‘decisive moment’ is in sharp contrast to the contrived photographic procedures of postmodern photographers such as Cindy Sherman. Such photographic contrivance no doubt conforms to Fried’s account of theatricality. Sherman’s ‘impersonation’ of historical characters by adopting their persona such as Marilyn Monroe takes a feminist position, (R. Krauss in D. Hooker, 1989, 439) but is still nostalgic retrieval and therefore part of the postmodern allegorical imperative as Craig Owens’s treatment of Sherman makes clear.

11 The Russian Formalists such as Bakhtin distinguished between ‘fabula’ and ‘syuzhet’ as approximating to Aristotle’s account of the representation as ‘story’ and the story’s representation as ‘plot’. For example, see David Bordwell, Narration In The Fiction Film, 1985, Chapter Four, ‘Principles Of Narration’.

12 There has perhaps been a certain suspicion, perhaps even hostility to ‘Theory’ from Feminism as a version of hegemonic male identity; if so, this is quite different from Anti- or After Theory which is at base, culturally informed.

13 Speaker/author intention as negotiable by the recipient/reader is a position taken up by critical Reception Theory and is dealt with in Chapter Five here under ‘Literary Theory’.

14 Heidegger’s account of the sign as implicitly concealed and hidden and unavailable to scopic interrogation and which only ‘unconceals’ as language from object to text should be aligned with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s metaphorical treatment of the sign.
15 The capacity of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to suggest that the physical senses impinge on objects such as ‘hearing’ the building or vision as an aspect of indexical ‘touch’ can be disconcerting and might seem obfuscatory or mysterious. In fact, these perspectives emerge from a thorough-going phenomenological approach which demands sensory input constantly in the moment of the beholder’s response. The resulting insights might then be construed as epiphanies arising from the radical change of viewing-point. Such insights, or ‘qualia’, may indeed be revelatory, but are emphatically not so in any religious sense.

16 Alethic or aletheic (from Greek aletheia: truth). The word, used adjectively, suggests possibility (or the grammatically subjunctive) and contingency. That is, Gadamer suggests, that in any exchange in a conversation, the emergent meanings from the impact of contrary positions generates a new synthesized meaning from both, but which is wholly dependent on the context from which the newly available meaning emerges and is not a priori.

17 Chiasmus ‘crossing’; under Commutatio (change/interchange) in rhetoric. The logical pattern of this rhetorical figure is ABBA. There is a sense of a scissor-movement and the transitive ‘crossing over’, and reversing on the other ‘side’. In one sense that may be extrapolated from chiasmus, the state of entropy is implied in that the first term is ‘ruined’ by the reversal. As a figure, it is typically associated with punning wit. Francis bacon, the 20th century painter, (referred to in note 1), in a well-known chiasmus said: ‘Champagne to all my friends and pain to all my sham friends’.

18 Barthes’s ‘enonciation’ is distinguished from ‘enonce’ in that it is considered with the act of utterance rather than what is actually depicted. Semiologically, practically all the examples in Mythologies and Camera Lucida announce or ‘utter’ potential connotative meaning.

19 Austin’s use of ‘force’ seems to hinge on the felicity of the ‘hereby’. The difference between ‘I support the proposal’ and ‘I hereby support the proposal’ is its force in the
sense of the appropriateness of its felicity. In the present architectural context, a building such as Libeskind's Berlin Jewish Museum which is self-consciously infelicitous in the fenestrated slashings of its 'skin' would lack (deliberately so) force in its felicitous sense.

20 The Picturesque was, of course, a rhetorical context. It was concerned with how the disposition (Dispositio) of external landscape 'affected' the inner reception by the beholder (C. van Eck in J. Birksted, 2000, 246). The inner, private response to the external landscape was the Romantic response to the sublime which supplanted the Picturesque at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

'But given the rhetorical context for the Picturesque argued here, its location of the meaning of architecture outside itself [that is on the beholder], and the various uses of painting in architecture and language design, may both be also understood as expressions of the rhetorical concern to situate all works of art firmly within human life and passions.... works of art that do not in some way refer to the life and history of the community for which they are made do not possess any meaning.' (Added parenthesis, C. van Eck 2000, 256)

21 The distinction between 'showing' and telling' as connotation and denotation respectively is found in The Rhetoric of the Image in Barthes 1977, 36-37.

22 The nine distinctive features of visual metaphor under 'Salient Features of Visual Metaphor' are of foundational importance here. From the 'profanity' of Charles Moore's shower in his House doubling as an aedicule to the 'sacred' in Frank Gehry's instigation of the Vitra Museum as a metaphor for the church, postmodern architecture signs as metaphor, and since the building's 'text' is imminent or 'invisible' in Merleau-Ponty's terms, it is visual metaphor which indicates potential meaning. The proposal of number five of these salient features that visual metaphor subsumes a shift from the metonymic to the metaphorical, producing the instance of contiguity is of itself fundamental and further, relies heavily on Jakobson’s studies of aphasia and the mutual interdependence of these two figures.
23 'Sir, knowing how doubtfully all Allegories may be construed, and this book of mine which I have entitled The Fairie Queene, being a continued Allegory, or darke conceite...'

24 There is an intriguing historical reversal here. In the early 19th century with the opening of Romanticism the allegorical figure, which had been a dominant rhetorical trope from the Graeco-Roman period right up to the 18th century, becomes marginalized in favour of the symbol. Symbolist poetry (Mallarme, Rimbaud, Verlaine et al) then persists into the 20th century and into the opening of Modernism. During the opening of the postmodern in the mid-20th century, allegory once more assumes an imperative, albeit radically transmogrified, in the manner discussed here of the allegorical postmodern, and completes this historical volte-face.

25 'In the course of our reflections we have come to see that understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter’s present situation.' (Gadamer 1993, 308)

‘All understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own language...The linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically effected consciousness.’ (389, original emphasis)

‘To think historically means, in fact, to perform the transposition that the concepts of the past undergo when we try to think in them. To think historically always involves mediating between those ideas and one’s own thinking. To try to escape from one’s own concepts in interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly absurd. To interpret means precisely to bring one’s preconceptions into play so that the text’s meaning can really be made to speak to us.’ (397, original emphasis)

Gadamer’s points here are obviously fundamental to the model of interpretation which this dissertation proposes.
26 Frank Lloyd-Wright’s iconic house is often assumed to be Falling Water because of the drama of its setting, but in fact the earlier Robie House, Chicago, has been a much greater influence on earlier Modernist architecture. Its extended and exaggerated cantilever created the long, low building favoured by early Modernism, and in conjunction with Wright’s low Prairie Houses heavily influenced early Gehry.

27 Although outside the present scope, the landscape setting of architecture is itself ‘coded’ between the commonplace ‘scenic’ and a complex previous history which actually produced it. Thus an attractive arrangement of trees and water may be the remnant of the Picturesque in what was an eighteenth century park. Or an arrangement of fields apparently constituting ‘the scenery’ may be what is left of a mediaeval open field system. Such a list could indeed be comprehensive and represent another ‘doubling’ in which a lost landscape, hidden under a modernizing present, becomes the site of the allegorical in a way which invokes the temporal palimpsest. Chapters like ‘The Landscape Today’ in Hoskin’s groundbreaking The Making Of The English Landscape (W.G. Hoskins 1955, 298-303) or ‘What Does It All Mean?’ in Michael Aston’s Interpreting The Landscape (M. Aston 1985, 149-154) although not addressed to allegorical interpretation, nevertheless implicate nostalgia for a lost past which still signifies in a present characterized by intense change.

28 Benjamin Lee Whorf proposed that it is language which is the shaper of ideas. In terms of language and thinking, cognitive processes do not become tangible in language, but are causally produced by language use. Thinking is determined by language; this usually known as The Whorfian Hypothesis (Max Black 1972, 96-100).

29 Christian Norberg-Schulz, although only writing marginal comments on the relation between architectural form and language, nevertheless denies the autonomy of architectural meaning. His method is then to introduce phenomenologically different viewpoints from different genres. Hence we are surprised to meet both poetry and references to painting and sculpture. It might be suggested that Norberg-Schulz’s cross-
genre referencing as critical theory is a precursor to Gilles Deleuze’s later formulation of the rhizome.

30 It is not clear, in terms of similes, why Ronchamp should be considered as boat-like. Nevertheless, *nave* originally signified ‘ship’ (Latin *navis*, ship). W. J. Curtis asserts that the roof-form was derived from a crab shell (W. J. Curtis 1990, 657), so that the nautical similes apparently persist.

31 The concept of architectural ‘parlante’ which is associated with Ledoux and the Revolutionary Period involved the idea of ‘architectural speaking’ as simile. That is, the shape and form of the building indicated its function. Architectural parlante then becomes in Robert Venturi’s typology in *Complexity And Contradiction* another version of ‘the duck’. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Architecture_parlante 17.12.05)

32 Objectively, ‘philosophy’ would reply that the ‘part of itself’ which is non-metaphorical is the logical proposition itself, even though its terms may well be metaphorically inflected.

33 The consecration of the bread and wine in the Roman Catholic tradition is as ‘real presence’ (transubstantiation) and in the Anglican tradition as a shared meaning (consubstantiation). That these rituals are vestigial pagan remnants is a speculation outside the present remit.

34 The link between gestural expression in Abstract Expressionism and theatricality has been made specific by one of its principal practitioners, Mark Rothko. ‘I think of my pictures as dramas; the shapes in the pictures are performers...Neither the action nor the actors can be anticipated, or described in advance.’ Quoted in Foster, Krauss et al 2004, 350.

35 The statement here that Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim is mimetic is not qualitatively normative and judgemental. It simply documents the fact that the building is a pretty
spectacular exemplar of Fried’s theory of contrivance and theatricality. It is most important to re-emphasize that a model of interpretation is uninterested in comparative judgements, but is able to comment on significance, which represents an altogether different category.

Despite the earlier sculptural curvi-linearity of the Vitra Museum, it is the phenomenal branding power at Bilbao that gets bending and folding and the curve into an international context and becomes hegemonic.

However, the concealed and hidden references in Ginger and Fred in Prague are aesthetically more daring and risk-taking and amplify powerfully the elegiac and parodic irony which is such an insistent theme in poststructuralist architecture.

36 Virtual computer-generated buildings are created by software such as Photoshop and other CAD programs such as ‘3-D Synthesizer’ or ‘Alias/Wavefront’. See J.K. Waters 2003, ‘Waveform Architecture and Digital Design’, 50-85.

37 Zaha Hadid’s practice is multi-form. For example on the one hand is the geometrical wedge of the Wolfsburg building and on the other, the extruded bending and folding to be seen in the Olympic Pool, Stratford, London. As a celebration of ‘difference’ both buildings might be seen to pun on gender where the Woffburg’s assertive ‘masculinity’ compares with the more ‘female’ flowing forms at the Olympic Pool which could also be seen as commensurate with the flow of water.

38 The obvious reference in the Garden of Exile at the Jewish Museum is not only to the Jewish biblical exile in Egypt, but equally of course to the garden of Eden and the loss of innocence. Here the serpent as Corruptor inflicts not only the loss of innocence but also the incalculable horrors of the holocaust and where ‘loss of innocence’ assumes an almost mythic poignancy.

Another example of the form of the building generating allegorical meaning is the Beijing Olympic Stadium. Its vast lattice roof represents not just a simple popular simile such as ‘bird nest’ according to its Chinese architect in collaboration with Herzog and Meuron,
but is emblematic of the emerging openness of Chinese society itself and as such therefore casts a commentary and a kind of allegorical exegesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


Fig 2: Francis Bacon *Head VI* 1949. The Guardian 09.08.05
Fig 3: *Laocoon*. The Guardian 27.04.05

Fig 4: Anthony Caro *Early One Morning* 1962. A. Causey 1998, Sculpture Since 1945

Fig 5: Robert Smithson *Spiral Jetty* 1969-70. A. Causey 1998, Sculpture Since 1945

Fig 6: Le Corbusier *Ronchamp* 1950-54. W.J. Curtis 1999, Modern Architecture Since 1900

Fig 7: Charles Moore *Piazza d'Italia* 1975-9. W.J. Curtis 19999, Modern Architecture Since 1900


Fig 9: *Duck-Rabbit*. W.J.T. Mitchell 1994, Picture Theory


291

Fig 16: Zaha Hadid *Science Centre Wolfsberg* 2000-4. C. Jencks 2005, The Iconic Building

Fig 17: Zaha Hadid *Ordrupgaard Museum* 2003-5. The Guardian 03.10.05


Fig 22: *Prefectorial Hall, Hiroshima* 1945. The Guardian 20.07.05


Fig 24: Rem Koolhaas *Seattle Public Library* 2000-4. C. Jencks 2005, The Iconic Building

Fig 25: Rem Koolhaas *CCTV Building, Beijing* 2002; incomplete. C. Jencks 2005, The Iconic Building


Fig 31: Daniel Libeskind *Berlin Museum Plan*. D. Libeskind 2000, The Space of Encounter

Fig 32: Daniel Libeskind *Jewish Museum Berlin; fenestration*. Kenchiku Bunka Vol 50, 1995