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Abstract

The primary focus of this thesis is on representations of Germany and Germans in the sports pages of English newspapers from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, when EURO 96 generated press coverage that prompted much comment and criticism, both in England and in Germany. Studies focusing on media representations from the mid 1990s onwards, such as those by Maguire, Poulton and Possamai (1999), Garland and Rowe (1999) and Garland (2004) have been helpful in deconstructing the language used by football journalists and in identifying negative national stereotyping. More recently, however, Ramsden (2007) and Young (2007) have developed our understanding of Anglo-German cultural relations and how they have changed since 1945. In the light of these recent developments this thesis seeks, firstly, to analyse the discourses embedded within the ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup’ meta-narrative which has characterized press coverage of Anglo-German football since international fixtures between the two countries were resumed in 1954 and, secondly, to contextualize them in the broader history of Anglo-German cultural relations and how they developed over the forty years or so that followed.

Though drawing on some insights from both cultural and media studies the methodology employed is essential historical. This does not mean, however, that press reports and comment are regarded as unproblematic primary sources. Recent methodological approaches the history of sport, notably by Booth (2005) and Hill (2006), have pointed to the importance of viewing such sources as texts which are
thus open to deconstruction. A complementary emphasis on historical context is nevertheless justified, principally because it is important to explain variations that have occurred over time. Though there were some similarities in the way that Anglo-German football was covered in 1954 and 1996 – and at various points in between - there are also striking differences which it is argued here are primarily explained by conditions prevailing at the particular historical junctures at which representations were generated. The relationship which existed between Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was significantly different to that which existed between Britain and re-unified Germany in the 1990s. This was an important contingent factor and helps to explain variations in the deployment of journalistic discourses over the years. Thus this thesis breaks new ground in that it emphasizes the historical contextualization of representations over a long period and seeks to counter any tendency to look backwards from the viewpoint of the mid 1990s.

The discussion proceeds chronologically from the 1950s to the 1990s in order to demonstrate variations in the way that discourses were deployed over the years. Thus the representations generated provide a way of reading the state of underlying Anglo-German cultural relations at any given point. One chapter is devoted to representations of the 1966 World Cup Final on account of its significance in press discourses relating to Anglo-German football and in what in is popularly referred to in England as the ‘thirty/forty years of hurt’ that followed. Whereas academic attention in relation to football-related representations has previously concentrated on the downmarket tabloid press, this study is equally concerned with quality and middlemarket titles. Thus *The Times* and the *Daily
Express are considered alongside the Daily Mirror and the Sun. Finally – and in contrast to previous accounts which have considered the English press in isolation – a chapter on German newspaper coverage (principally Bild, Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) has been included to allow some comparisons to be made and to point to directions in which future research might be pursued.
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Throughout the last six years, my parents have always supported me – and not just financially – kept me going through their constant questioning. My sister Juliane Wagner deserves a special mention for providing me with sufficient
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Lastly, my biggest thanks goes to my partner Sandra Dillan whose patience was endless. It was her support that kept me going during the most difficult times. This thesis is as much her achievement as it is mine. And my son Matti whose smile offered some vital distraction.
**Glossary**

This glossary does not intend to decipher all positions on the football pitch or any rules, however there are some terms used in the text or the footnotes that need clarification. The acronym *FIFA* stands for *Fédérations Internationales des Football Fédérations*; the European continental federation, *UEFA* is a *Union Européens des Football Associations*. On the national level, the *FA – The Football Association* – represents the English game while the *DFB* or *Deutscher Fussballbund* is the largest single sports association in the world with more 6 million members who all play football in Germany. The competitions *FA-Cup* and *DFB-Pokal* describe the national cup competitions in England and Germany. The *World Cup* describes the premier tournament that is staged every four years by *FIFA* and should correctly be called: *FIFA World Cup*. The *European Nations’ Championship* is *UEFA*’s continental competition for national teams, also in football, also held every four years. Its shortened name was *UEFA* or *Euro* – followed by the corresponding year: *UEFA ‘88 or EURO ‘96*. Another term used frequently in this thesis for it is *European Championship*. There are a number of club competitions organized by *UEFA*; namely the *European Champion Clubs Cup* or the *European Cup* or the *Champions League* since 1992. The success of the European Cup led to another competition introduced in 1960: The UEFA Cup Winners’ Cup; it was abolished in 1999. The *UEFA-Cup* was initiated as the *Inter-City/Fairs Cup* before it was re-named *UEFA-Cup* in the early 1970s.
At some point in this thesis, British and German television channels are mentioned. The BBC is the British Broadcasting Corporation; ARD is the largest German association of German television channels. It is short for Allgemeine Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands. Germany’s second channel, ZDF carries its fate in the name: Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen.

**Terminology**

In the course of this thesis several terms will be used frequently and some explanations are necessary to highlight their usage in their respective ways. This concerns geo-political entities such as England, Britain, the UK and Germany.

There is a widespread misconception in Germany which equates Britain with England. While many English would not see a problem with this, other nations of the United Kingdom would certainly highlight their representative nationality. For the English, England is largely Britain. In football however, this is not the case. There is no British football team competing for the World Cup or the European Championship, but there are four home nations trying to qualify for each major tournament. Therefore, when England is mentioned in this thesis, it is the England football national team that is being written about, not Britain. Conversely, any political background that is given throughout this thesis refers to Britain. That is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Throughout this study, the term West Germany is used to describe the West German football national team as well as the country West Germany. This applies
to the period before October 3, 1990. Other terms to describe West Germany that may be used frequently are *Federal Republic of Germany* or *FRG*. The *German Democratic Republic* or the *GDR* will be labelled *East Germany* when it is mentioned specifically.

**Notes on Translations**

This thesis draws on a rich well of German primary and secondary sources. The translations necessary have been carried out by me. The German newspaper articles are listed in the bibliography at the end of thesis with the original headline. Any assistance translating came from an ordinary dictionary¹ as well as the website leo.dict.org, which acts as dictionary but also acts a community to discuss phrases that cannot be translated verbatim.²


² [https://dict.leo.org](https://dict.leo.org)
INTRODUCTION

In September 2001, roughly two weeks after the Munich debacle of the German national team against England, I arrived in Bath in order to spend a year at an English university as an Erasmus student. The first month was difficult as I tried to grasp the language and settle in a foreign country. After a few weeks my life in Bath became structured and I began looking for a student job as this would help to improve my English. Outside an employment agency I saw a sign offering such positions. Little did I know what to expect. The person greeting me and asking me for which post I was applying soon spotted an accent. It was not difficult then as I believe that even now my German accent is recognizable. He asked me where I was from and once he got the appropriate answer, he could not help but smile and mention THE score of THAT game: ‘5-1, eh, matey!’, he said, or something along those lines. My reaction was stereotypically German: I turned on my heels and left. I was left speechless by a remark that I now realise was in no way meant as an offence. I offer this recollection in acknowledgement of the importance of reflexivity ‘a heightened state of self-awareness’, when writing history. At the very least, to adapt the opening words of Douglas Booth’s The Field, in the hope that ‘[some] knowledge about the origins of, and influences on this [thesis] may help readers understand my arguments and conclusions.’

Was my response symptomatic of Germany or Germans more generally?

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Did my reaction simply confirm stereotypical British views of Germany and the people living there? It is often said in Britain that the Germans do not have a sense of humour and that therefore any joke or friendly banter is entirely lost to them. I would argue that is certainly not the case. Germans like a laugh; they have a sense of humour, though it is embedded in their own national culture and experience and is, therefore, rather different to that of the English. However, cross-cultural communication is a difficult matter and more often than not what may be regarded as humorous banter, such as the reference to the scoreline in Munich, is not perceived as such and thus not received in the way that it was intended. As Chris Young has noted: ‘Banter is unnatural for many non-English, particularly Germans […] Yet, this does not deter the English from using it as their natural mode of expression in cross-cultural communication.’

The English enjoy their humour and the Germans enjoy theirs, without necessarily understanding each other, though this was not always so. John Cleese of Monty Python was glad to hear a German addressing him in Hamburg with a famous line from his iconic television comedy of the 1970s Fawlty Towers: ‘Hey, Mr. Cleese, don’t mention zee war!’ This delighted him and confirmed that a German audience fully understood the message of the episode, though he wasn’t so sure about his own countrymen.

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4 Young, C., ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup: Humour, Trauma and the Asymmetric Relationship in Anglo-German Football’, Sport in History, 27 (1), (2007), 10.

‘Humour, as Young notes, is ‘one of the trickiest cultural transfers.’ However, the difficulties surrounding this particular cultural transfer are not the only sources of confusion and misunderstandings. Besides German bafflement regarding English humour, there is also consternation regarding what is seen as an unhealthy obsession with war, especially the Nazi period of German history (1933-1945) and World War II generally; and also with football, especially ‘1966’, when England won the World Cup for the first and only time, by beating West Germany in the final at Wembley. These obsessions are manifested most obviously in the media. The schedules for The UK’s ‘Yesterday’ channel, are indicative, being heavily dependent on re-runs of documentaries such as ‘The World at War’ series and ‘The Nazis: a Warning from History’. Much press coverage of football matches between English and German teams over the years has been characterized by battlefield metaphors. At one level this is understandable: descriptions of sporting contests are inherently loaded with militaristic terms in both languages: Attack – Angriff, Defence – Verteidigung, to mention just two. However, references in the English press, as we shall see, are often specifically located in the context of the two wars against Germany. As for Wembley 1966, as James Walvin has noted, it was impossible for the English to forget, ‘not least because the media recycled the whole affair whenever it seemed appropriate – that is, as often as possible.’ The way in which English sports journalists make use of the past, and particularly how they make the connections between ‘the war’ and football leaves many German observers baffled. However, as we shall see, the extent to which this has been evident has varied over time and

6 Young, ‘Two world wars’, 11.
it would be misleading to assume that what was typical in the late 1990s and early 2000s was typical of the whole post-war period. One of the main aims of this thesis is to explain why this might be so.

**Britain and Germany since 1945**

The histories of Britain and Germany could not be more different. Britain experienced its last invasion in 1066 while Germany, at the heart of Europe suffered centuries of war, invasion and destruction. As a consequence of the Second World War it was effectively occupied and divided. However, in some respects the histories of Britain and the Federal Republic in the post-war period from 1945 through to the early 1970s were similar. Both countries experienced austerity in the immediate aftermath of the war, though this was more intense in Germany given the extent to which its economic infrastructure had been damaged. However, both countries recovered during ‘the long boom’ which lasted from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, a period of sustained economic expansion for the world economy, which saw most developed industrial countries achieve high rates of growth and their peoples enjoy unprecedented levels of affluence. 8 This was very much what happened in England where, in 1957, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was able to claim with some justification that ‘Most of our people have never had it so good.’ 9 At the same time, it was noticeable that British growth rates were slower than those of most of industrial countries, especially

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West Germany and Japan, over whom military victory had been achieved in 1945. Thus while the British grew more prosperous in this period, they did not experience the equivalent of the German ‘economic miracle’. As its people became more affluent, the British lost ground in relative terms when compared to its major competitors.

The problem of a comparatively weak economic performance, especially as it was happening at a time when the British Empire was diminishing year by year as former colonies achieved independence and when Britain’s global political influence was shrinking, eventually forced decline to the forefront of public debate. Tony Judt has pointed out that the discussion of decline in post-war Britain had an ambivalent character. The British had fought and won a war against Germany (the ‘mortal enemy’) within the living memory of most of its people, ‘yet cultural commentators were absorbed by intimations of failure and deterioration.’ Other historians of post-war Britain have argued similarly. For the economic historian Barry Supple, writing in 1997, there was ‘an assumption that things are going from bad to worse when things are actually getting better.’ Later, reflecting on the prevalence of this state of mind in twentieth century Britain, Peter Hennessy described ‘declinism’ as ‘almost a disease of the mind.’ Perhaps the strength of its hold on public and academic opinion owed something to its long history. Jim Tomlinson observed that the idea that Britain was a nation

in decline had been an issue since the 1870s when ‘the first industrial nation’, having achieved dominance of the world economy, found itself challenged by newly-industrializing nations, with Germany prominent among them. As relative economic decline inevitably set in the discussion was prolonged and intensified.\textsuperscript{13} In particular, in the post-Second World War era the British tended to compare themselves unfavourably with the Germans. Britain was standing still, noted economist Donald Macrae in 1963, using a significant metaphor, ‘as the \textit{autobahnen} of other societies thunder by.’\textsuperscript{14}

West Germany’s economic performance was not entirely unproblematic. The mid-1960s saw a temporary pause and a jolt to confidence which led to the resignation of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the successor of Konrad Adenauer, and the person most closely associated with the ‘economic miracle’ in West Germany. At about the same time Britain’s relatively weak economic performance began to impact on the value of its currency, leading to the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1967. When Prime Minister Harold Wilson appeared at Wembley to watch the England-West Germany final in 1966, he had just returned from talks with the President Lyndon Johnson in Washington on ‘among other things, the growing economic crisis in Britain.’\textsuperscript{15} Despite some similarities in the experience of the two countries, however, two contrasting narratives came to dominate

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historical writing. West German historians are obsessed with the economic miracle just as British historians were with decline. The reality of the economic miracle was important for the young democratic Federal Republic in that it helped to popularize a new state with a form of government that aimed to prevent the excesses of the past. When the long boom ended with the oil crisis of 1973 there were consequences for both countries. In West Germany, the protracted economic miracle had generated an expectation of ever-increasing levels of prosperity.\textsuperscript{16} In Britain, the new economic climate, as Hobsbawm has pointed out, made it ‘impossible any longer to overlook the seriousness of the British economy’s problems.’\textsuperscript{17} In the 1970s and 1980s it was West Germany that appeared to adapt more successfully to the new conditions, while Britain entered a period of economic and social crisis that led some to label it ‘the sick man of Europe’. In this situation the complexities of Britain’s long-standing ‘love-hate’ relationship with West Germany were intensified. Whereas there were aspects of the West German model that were admired, the success of its old rival also fuelled resentment.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Anglo-German Relations: the wider context}

Several works serve as a starting point for this research. Anglo-German relations for much of the twentieth century were at best uneasy and at times were characterized by outright hostility. The origins of this uneasy and often unhappy

\textsuperscript{14} Wehler, H.-U., \textit{Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Bundesrepublik und DDR} (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2010), 63.

\textsuperscript{17} Hobsbawm, \textit{Industry and Empire}, 253–254.

relationship may be traced to the antagonism generated by the growth of German economic power and political influence after 1870, to German militarism leading to the First World War, and to its continuing aggression in the 1930s. This put Germany on a collision path with Britain as the interests of the two states were so often opposed to each other. One consequence in terms of how Germany and Germans have been viewed in England is that much of the published historical literature, whether aimed at an academic or a popular readership, has focused on the First World War and especially on the Third Reich and the Second World War. Arguably, the particular concentration on the 1930s and 1940s has helped to underpin certain negative stereotypes. Thomas Matussek, the German ambassador to Britain, during a state visit of then chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 2000 referred to the ‘nazification of history’, claiming that English media and public were imprisoned by Germany’s Nazi past. 19 This is problematic as the German history to which the English public has become most familiar has been reduced to the period of twelve disastrous years between 1933 and 1945. They remain largely unaware of Germany’s medieval and early modern history as a Central European power and, crucially, have been left largely in ignorance as to the course of German history since 1945. Patrick Major argues that large sections of the British media are still in denial of the changes in Germany since 1945. 20 In Germany, where there has been a corresponding emphasis on the ‘de-nazification’ of history, the British are not assigned the same burden of residual war guilt. Thus stereotypes of the British in Germany tend to be underpinned by the experience of war and occupation but to revolve around English eccentricities – obsession with

19 Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 392.
the weather, strange-tasting food and, of course, their peculiar sense of humour. Albert Einstein once remarked that it is much harder to crack a prejudice than an atom. These stereotypes have become firmly established over time and have provided a prism through which football between the national teams of England and Germany has been viewed, helping to shape the language in which they have been described.

However, it is important to view the Anglo-German relationship as dynamic rather than static, as subject to change over time and shaped by contingent circumstances. This is very evident from the work of John Ramsden who has taken the long view, surveying the relationship between England and Germany since the 1890s. His monograph provides an invaluable starting point for this discussion in that it includes an important chapter on football since the Second World War in which he argues that high-profile international matches between England and West Germany generated little in the way of antagonism in the 1950s and early 1960s, despite the war being very recent history and fresh in the memories of the British and German people. Ramsden uses the example of the English response to Bert Trautmann, captured while serving in the German armed forces and taken to England as a prisoner of war, to illustrate the relatively benign aspect of the Anglo-German relationship at this time. The story, as we shall see later, is complex but in the end Manchester City’s supporters were prepared to be persuaded by Trautmann’s exceptional ability and his heroics in the 1956 FA Cup Final when he played part of the match after sustaining what turned out to be a
broken neck. The warm glow surrounding Trautmann by the end of the 1950s was enhanced by the reception accorded by Manchester United fans to Professor Georg Maurer and the medical team that attended the victims of the Munich air crash in 1958. Invited to a match at Old Trafford, ‘the doctors and nurses of the Munich hospital received a reception from over 63,000 people such as is unlikely to have been the lot of any medical staff before’, reported the *Manchester Guardian*. One of the few positive outcomes of the disaster, it was noted, was that it had promoted ‘Anglo-German friendship.’

Trautmann and Maurer supplied the English press with human interest stories which could be used to keep the underlying tensions of Anglo-German relations at a safe distance in the 1950s and 1960s. It was not unusual for politics to influence the way in which international matches were covered in this period. Before England played Hungary at Wembley in 1953, Peter Wilson, previewing the match for the *Daily Mirror*, expressed the fervent hope that England would win, ‘because I have visited Hungary and I know how they, like other totalitarian states that I have seen, regard a sporting triumph as a justification of their “superior” way of life.’ It is possible that the Cold War dimension of international sporting relations in the 1950s and 1960s may have brought England and West Germany closer together and inhibited expressions of hostility or

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21 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 325-340.

22 *Manchester Guardian*, 10 March 1958; 12 April 1958; see also Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 342-344.

prejudices inherited from the war. It is important to contextualize sport within the broader context of international politics. For Sabine Lee the Cold War, the partition of Germany and the development of the European Union have all helped to define and shape of post-1945 Anglo-German relations. Her starting point is VE Day, as it is known in Britain, or Stunde Null as it is known in Germany. In comparing the different paths taken by Britain and Germany from that point onwards she notes that whereas Germany was forced to reinvent itself as a peace-loving nation, the British had no pressing imperative to change their ways seeking instead to capitalize on Great Britain’s status a country that had emerged victorious from the war and still had an empire to govern. Lee points out that whereas the Germans managed to re-invent themselves after the war, the British did not, preferring to cultivate their glorious past. ‘Whenever post-war Britain built a new museum, Germany built a new factory,’ she argues. 24 Though this is something of a caricature and underestimates the extent to which Britain has modernized its economy in the post-war era, there is an underlying insight which points to the importance of differing national historical contexts in framing English attitudes to Germany and German attitudes to England, whether expressed on the sports pages or elsewhere.

After 1945, as Germany struggled to shake off its Nazi past, outward expressions of nationalistic fervour were seen as problematic and sometimes actively discouraged. John Ardagh observed that the celebrations following West Germany’s World Cup win in 1990, ‘were probably less fervent than they would

have been in many countries, such as Britain’. It is perhaps understandable, therefore, that Thomas Kielinger, writing from a German viewpoint, should have focused largely on the cultural restraints that have ensured that the Anglo-German relationship has survived intact, despite persistent difficulties. He emphasized what the British and the Germans have in common, concluding that:

‘… there is little likelihood of the German and British cousins becoming identical twins. They are extremely compatible, without being interchangeable and derive their particularly close relations from some classic contrasts.’

Here the idea that a re-invented Germany was bound by a certain affinity towards Britain and voluntarily subjected itself to various constraints is an important factor in explaining how the Anglo-German relationship remained intact throughout the post-war years. It helps to explain why the various crossroads and roundabouts encountered along the way were successfully negotiated. Chris Young has also argued that the English, at least as represented by their sporting press, were happy for many years to comment and report on Anglo-German football matches without resorting to the sensationalism that later characterized tabloid coverage in particular. Up to 1966 – and even in 1966 – as Chris Young notes, English newspapers ‘though letting through the odd war reference, remained largely free

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26 Kielinger, T., Cross Roads and Roundabouts: Junctions in German-British Relations (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1997), 248.
It was only to be expected that the representatives of the Federal Republic should be met with some distrust after two atrocious wars but, until the 1970s at least, there were good reasons to keep this in check. At the same time, there was an undercurrent of envy, growing stronger in the last two decades of the twentieth century, when the economic miracle left ‘declining’ Britain behind in relative terms.

Anglo-German Football Rivalry: recent work surveyed

Charting the course of the international football rivalry between England and Germany is, at one level relatively straightforward. As might have been expected, England, where the association game was first developed, enjoyed early superiority winning 11 of the 12 matches played between 1899 and the World Cup Final of 1966. Not surprisingly, English football was held in high regard by Germans in this period. England’s World Cup Final victory of 1966, however, may be seen in retrospect as a turning point. Thereafter, Munich 2001 aside, Germany has been largely dominant. The more aggressive tone in the English press that becomes increasingly apparent in the period after 1966 may be partly explained simply by what has happened on the field of play. However, it is important to remember that Anglo-German football matches have been weighted with a political significance that went beyond mere sporting rivalry since at least the inter-war period. The match in Berlin in 1930 was regarded as an important step towards the re-integration of Germany into the world of international sport. The outcome – an honourable draw – seemed appropriate as both sides had reason

to claim a moral victory. The German amateurs came within ten minutes of
beating a team of English professionals who, nevertheless, could draw some
satisfaction from a draw achieved when playing with only ten men due to an
injury.\footnote{Blenkinsop, B., ‘Football Against the Enemy’, \textit{Soccer History}, 6 (2003), 29.} While the 1930 match was played under the banner of reconciliation, the
games in 1935 and 1938 took place under very different circumstances. Sport
became increasingly important to the Nazi leadership for propaganda purposes
and was subject to political exploitation; the idea that sportsmen representing
Germany could be politically neutral became ‘unthinkable’. It has to be said that
the English FA went more than half way to meet the requirements of their hosts.
The game in 1938 became notorious when the England team saluted the \textit{Führer’s}
box with their right arms outstretched. In this way English football made its
contribution to the pre-war appeasement policy while the fixture was intended to

It may or may not still be the case that historians of sport struggle to be
taken seriously by historians working in more traditional areas who have viewed
sport as ‘an irrelevant sideshow’.\footnote{Porter, D., ‘Sports History and Modern British History’, \textit{Sport in History}, 31 (2), (2011), 181.} That what some may consider irrelevant is
indeed relevant has been argued by Peter Beck who locates the Anglo-German
football rivalry in the context of international relations. He argues that even
though diplomatic relations between Britain and Germany, both members of the
European Union, were generally amicable, this does not tell the full story and that what Ramsden calls the ‘people to people’ relationship may be rather different. This is more likely to be accessible to historians through studying in Anglo-German cultural exchanges involving sport and the arts, areas once considered ‘irrelevant’ by historians of international relations but which are capable of deeper insights into a nation’s cultural framework than traditional archive-based research into the making of foreign policy, for example.31 Chris Young’s article ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup’ marks a significant shift in this direction setting his analysis of the Anglo-German relationship within the context of cultural misunderstandings relating to humour. Too much emphasis, he argues, has been given to the political and xenophobic aspects of media coverage of Anglo-German football. Instead, he sketches a model in which humour plays a much more prominent role. He argues that much of the English press coverage is best understood as a modern manifestation of the pantomime tradition in its purest and finest form in which the stereotypical heroes and villains are cheered and booed respectively by a knowing audience. Corny jokes reminding readers that the match kicks off at 1945 (‘Time for Victory!’) are ‘the journalistic equivalent of running up behind the pantomime villain and sticking your tongue out for the audiences amusement.’ However, Young admits that this kind of humour is often misunderstood by those at whom it is directed and this leads to a good deal of uncomfortable friction. Tabloid newspaper editors excuse themselves by pointing out that their excesses were meant to be funny but how are Germans, who are popularly believed in Britain to have no sense of humour, to make sense of all

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Although humour was used to explain what some critics regarded as crass populism, it remains an open question whether the editor of the *Daily Mirror* was seriously trying to be funny during EURO 96 or whether he simply overstretched limits that he considered elastic.

As much of what follows, while remaining sensitive to the particularities of context and contingency, is an attempt to interpret and deconstruct the ways in which Anglo-German football matches have been represented in the press of both countries, the research undertaken by Maguire, Poulton and Possamai has been especially useful. Their article on ‘The War of the Words’, published three years after the event, examines English and German coverage of the EURO ’96 tournament in five English (*The Times/Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph, Guardian/Observer, Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror* and *The Sun/News of the World*) and two German papers (*Die Welt* and *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*). Their findings were that the English press, with some exceptions, tended to approach the event differently to its German counterpart. There was evidence of anti-Europeanism, or at least a suspicion of ‘Europe’ that was not evident in Germany, much of it focused on the so-called ‘Beef War’, after exports of British beef had been suspended on account of ‘Mad Cow’ disease (BSE). This provided a space in which latent anti-German sentiment could be expressed, albeit indirectly. When focusing specifically on football the English press tended to look backwards to previous encounters with their opponents while the German press focused on the present and rejoiced in Germany’s current position. There was a hint of

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Schadenfreude in the German press towards Britain/England as a country that had to seek consolation revel in past glories.\textsuperscript{33}

This was reinforced in a second article by the same authors focusing specifically on the coverage of the England-Germany semi-final at the same tournament and on the role of sport as mediated for mass consumption in ‘perpetuating national habitus’. Maguire \textit{et al} built their findings on the theoretical platform provided by Norbert Elias’ concepts of sleeping memories, imagined charisma and fantasy shields, applying them to provide insights into Anglo-German cultural relations. Whereas the tensions between the English and the Germans had once been expressed in warfare, they were now being expressed politically and also through sport. Thus, in terms of the confirmation of national identity, EURO 96 was a ‘potent occasion’, which the media represented accordingly. The English press used nostalgia and ethnic assertiveness to deflect attention from Britain’s present condition while the German press seized the moral high ground, claiming to be ‘dismayed by the warmongering’ and seeking ‘symbolic ascendancy over the English’ by referring to the BSE crisis and ‘the general decline of British/English power.’\textsuperscript{34}

Garland and Rowe were similarly concerned with what the press coverage of the tournament revealed about English identity. Utilising George Orwell’s


famous contention that international sport could best be characterized as ‘war minus the shooting’, they pointed to confused attempts to reclaim Englishness via journalism based on positive stereotypes of the English (‘bulldogs on steroids’) and negative stereotypes of foreigners, notably the ‘Führers of thuggery’. The confusion was caused by a longing for glories from years long past as well as an attempt to put ‘the Great back into Britain.’ They concluded that the press was not solely responsible for the excessive display of xenophobia during the tournament, rather ‘it is important to recognize the broader social implications in the press coverage.’ The deconstruction of the press reports on which these analyses rested was then refined by Liz Crolley and David Hand who noted the emphasis on stereotypes of Englishness based on references to ‘the bulldog spirit’. The combination of ‘the tenacious and pugnacious qualities’ of that particular breed with the ‘patriotic and belligerent spirit of the British’ featured routinely in descriptions of English football and footballers and, in addition, ‘the lion roar[ed] regally in the pages of this island’s football writing.’ Stereotypes of foreign players were also commonplace in the English press and were readily applied to those plying their trade in the Premiership. Italians had style and flair, but were also ‘white-booted fairies.’ Germans were associated with all things militaristic but were praised for their efficiency. These insights were useful but were largely derived from the specific context of Anglo-German football rivalry at the very end of the twentieth century. It remains to be seen whether they are helpful in

shedding light on the preceding decades, from the 1950s onwards, when circumstances were very different.

**Methods and Sources**

The central sources for this thesis are newspapers from England and West Germany. These have been accessed through various channels: notably the British Newspaper Library at Colindale (now relocated), the French National Library in Paris and the Prussian National Library in Berlin, the online press archive ukpressonline.com and the Institute for Newspaper Research in Dortmund. By suggesting that newspapers help to shape our view of the world, Jeffrey Hill has argued that they are an essential source for historians seeking to understand modern sport. He notes that the sub-discipline of sports history has developed largely thanks to the press. Yet he also warns of an overreliance on newspapers alone and urges sports historians to use them with discrimination; too often they have been regarded as ‘an unblemished source of plain fact’. These arguments were further developed by Douglas Booth. ‘It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that sport history rests on newspapers as historical sources’, he noted. He was, however, critical of sports historians who, in their efforts to ‘reconstruct’ the sporting past, used them in an uncritical way. ‘It is probably fair to conclude that few sports historians pay enough attention to interrogating newspaper sources’. On one level newspapers, constitute a source of useful, verifiable ‘facts’. The facts in this thesis are a number of football results, details of the teams selected, and the size of the crowds that attended matches. They are drawn from a number of

English and German daily newspapers and their Sunday equivalents. Beyond that, however, it is important to recognise that newspapers are complex sources which require careful interpretation. Booth cites Leonard Koppett, a sports journalist, who pointed out that ‘every story starts with a perspective’. Thus, for example, when a team representing England beats one representing Germany, an English reporter will write about England’s ‘victory’ while a German journalist will write about Germany’s ‘loss’. In these circumstances it becomes possible to argue that football, as played between England and Germany, is effectively a mediated text ‘given that most people experience sport indirectly via the media’.

The discussion that follows seeks to interrogate newspaper reports and comments with this in mind.

It is important to recognise that there are differences between the national press in England and in Germany that may have impacted on the way in which football has been reported. Tabloid newspapers have a stronger presence in England; currently there are five daily tabloids (*The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Star*), whereas in Germany only *Bild-Zeitung* is published in this format. This contrast is also evident in the Sunday papers. Whereas England has ten national Sunday newspapers (four ‘quality’ and six tabloids), Germany has only three – *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung* (quality), *Welt am Sonntag* (middlemarket) and *Bild am Sonntag* (tabloid). Esser contends that British/English journalism has a stronger tendency towards sensationalist stories, while the Germans prefer thoughtful analysis. One reason

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for the prevalence of rather sober journalism is the high percentage of newspaper subscriptions and home delivery in Germany which in the 1990s accounted for between 75 and 90 per cent of all sales. By contrast, British newspapers were mainly sold at newsagents or by street vendors in the period under consideration. Arguably, this meant that it was imperative to grasp the attention of readers with their front pages and headlines in order to sell copies.\textsuperscript{39} There may be other reasons, notably the intensely competitive market conditions that have influenced the way in which news has been presented, especially by middlemarket and downmarket newspapers in Britain over a long period. As Kevin Williams has pointed out, ‘The roots of “junk journalism”… had been set down long before the arrival of the \textit{Sun}, in the newspaper wars of the 1930s.’ Since the \textit{Sun} first appeared in tabloid form in 1969, however, competition has tended to promote sensationalism and ‘the steady erosion of popular journalism as papers moved further down market to compete with the \textit{Sun}.’\textsuperscript{40}

The newspapers relied on most heavily in this thesis have been chosen to represent each segment of the English and German markets. The English quality section is represented principally by \textit{The Times} and \textit{Sunday Times}. As a self-styled ‘newspaper of record’ with a high opinion of itself, \textit{The Times} represents the upper market segment, drawing most of its readers from the well-off and the well-educated. For many years it was considered the voice of Britain’s ‘Establishment’. The \textit{Daily Express} and \textit{Sunday Express} were popular and

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\textsuperscript{40} Williams, K., \textit{Get Me a Murder a Day! A History of mass communication in Britain} (London: Arnold, 1998), 220-225.
successful papers during the 1950s and 1960s covering the middle of the market. During the period covered by this thesis the *Daily Mail* gradually achieved victory over the *Express* in the battle for readers in this sector. The *Daily Mirror* and *Sunday Mirror* represent the tabloid section throughout this thesis. These titles have drawn most of their readers from the skilled and unskilled working class.\(^{41}\)

The German newspapers focused on here are principally *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, (*FAZ*) *Die Welt* and *Bild-Zeitung*. The *FAZ*, one of Germany’s most respected and influential newspapers, represents the quality segment of the market; its Sunday edition is the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung* (*FAS*). Not only is this paper one of the best in Germany, it is also one of the oldest, established in 1949. In its first issue the paper expressed aspirations to be ‘Germany’s foreign secretary’. There was no such position within the German government at the time and, in the editors’ view, it was necessary to give the Federal Republic a voice.\(^{42}\)

Originally conceived as a competitor for the *FAZ*, *Die Welt*, published since 1946, was selected to represent the middlemarket in Germany, while *Bild* represents the downmarket tabloid section. Here *Bild* operates alone, unlike its English counterparts. Both, *Die Welt* and *Bild* are published by Springer, Germany’s biggest newspaper publishing company, Axel Springer AG, which has been essentially – and sometimes controversially – a conservative influence in post-war German politics.\(^{43}\)


\(^{43}\) Kruip, G., *Das “Welt”-“Bild” des Axel Springer Verlags* (München: Oldenbourg, 1999), 57-70.
One more striking difference between the English and German press needs to be pointed out. The British national press is based in London. Historically, they were all located in Fleet Street, making this area the press centre of Britain. Although some papers had local editions, the heartbeat of the British Press was Fleet Street. Interestingly, once Rupert Murdoch successfully moved his newspapers to Wapping, the rest of the British press followed suit. The situation in Germany is again very different in comparison to England. Even before 1945 the press was not concentrated in one city like it was in Britain but instead there was a strong regional and local focus due to Germany’s federal nature. There were papers published in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfurt and Munich to name the most important cities. Largely this stayed the same after 1945 and helped to avoid press concentration in one locale and under the control of a few conglomerates. Berlin no longer had its own paper. Though Springer had a publishing house in Berlin after 1966 there was no paper of importance in the western part of the city. The East German paper *Neues Deutschland* was the paper of the Socialist Unity Party produced in East Berlin. Despite its name suggesting a local paper, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* is a national paper published in a city with a long newspaper tradition – even before 1933.

As Colin Seymour-Ure has pointed out, the ownership of English newspapers has often been highly significant in determining what appears on the page. The press ‘barons’, he notes, ‘were often supreme egotists: flamboyant, assertive, idiosyncratic, ostentatious, ruthless – yet inspiring great loyalty and
affection. Roy Greenslade, in his insider’s history of the British press, suggests that Lord Thomson was unusual in giving his editors ‘an entirely free hand as long as they didn’t come out against God or the monarchy.’ In Germany, however, as Harry Pross has argued, the editorial content of newspapers was more likely to be subject to official intervention from the state and other agencies. After 1945, for example, newspapers were subject to a licensing system introduced by the occupying powers as part of the de-nazification and re-education programmes, with the aim of ensuring that editors and journalists who had been closely connected to the NSDAP or any organisation controlled by the national socialists were denied positions of influence in the press. It proved, however, difficult in practice to fulfil this policy completely and the principles underlying it were diluted from the start.

Comparative studies of the British and German press are rare and two works stand out. First is Frank Esser’s Die Kräfte hinter den Schlagzeilen in which he compares English and German journalism in depth. Esser highlights three major issues: firstly, he compares the field of activity of journalists in Britain and Germany and the factors influencing it; secondly, he aims to highlight what journalism in Britain could eventually learn from its German counterpart and vice versa; and lastly, he identifies the elements that give journalism its particular national and cultural identity in Britain and Germany respectively. This includes

44 Seymour-Ure, The British press, 34.
the relation between the state and the press and the freedom of the press more
generally. Susanne Höke’s work focuses on the tabloid papers. In her study “Sun
vs. Bild”, she concludes that, despite the very different histories of the English
and German press, the similarities between the two tabloids are striking. Both use
simplified language and try to engage their readers’ emotions: moreover, both
recruit their core readership from the least educated sections of society.47

In addition to newspaper accounts of Anglo-German football, the principal
primary sources used are published books by sports journalists and other
commentators who were close to the events described here or who have made
their own contribution to the history of football, such as David Goldblatt,
Jonathan Wilson and Uli Hesse, who has written the only book on the history of
German football in the English language.48 Other published sources consulted
include journalists’ memoirs which often provide reflective comment on
journalism in general. For example, Brian Glanville’s memoirs are rather more
than a rehearsal of matches reported and personalities encountered while working
for quality newspapers, such as the Observer and the Sunday Times, as well as for
the Sunday tabloid, The People. It provides an opportunity to reflect on the nature
of sports journalism and, in particular, on ‘British sports writing, with its quality-
popular dichotomy’. In the quality press, Glanville argued, the journalist was free

47 Esser, F., Die Kräfte hinter den Schlagzeilen. Englischer und deutscher Journalismus im
Vergleic. (München: Verlag: Karl Alber, 1998); Höke, S., Sun vs. Bild. Boulevardpresse in
Grossbritannien und Deutschland (Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr. Müller, 2007), 57-70.

48 Goldblatt, D., The ball is round: A global history of football (London: Viking, 2006);
Wilson, J., Inverting the pyramid: A history of football tactics (London: Orion, 2008), The
anatomy of England: a history in ten matches (London: Orion, 2010); Hesse, U., Tor! The Story of
German football (London: WSC Books, 2013); see also Brändle, F. and Koller, C., Goal! Kultur-
and Sozialgeschichte des modernen Fussballs (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 2002).
to write what he wanted about football and other popular sports, because he was addressing a minority audience; in the tabloids, however, ‘he was rigidly confined to a highly stylised, ultimately patronising form of journalism, which treated its readership with implicit contempt.’\(^{49}\) The (usually ‘ghosted’) autobiographies of players and managers have been used carefully with reference to the period in which they were written as well as the recollections of events which they contain. Sometimes, as different editions of the same memoirs indicate, views change over time. The work of Joyce Woolridge, who has traced the evolution of ghosted football memoirs as a genre, has opened up ways of reading these texts, which ‘present particular difficulties in […] use and interpretation.’\(^{50}\)

The time frame of the thesis, 1954–1996, requires some explanation. This 42-year-period covers all matches played between English and West German (later German) national teams. After defeat in the Second World War, Germany was not allowed to participate in international sporting events until 1950. It was another four years before a friendly between England and West-Germany was played in December 1954. Thus this match marks the resumption of the Anglo-German football rivalry after the hiatus of 1939-1945. In roughly the first half of the period under consideration, especially before 1966, references to the darker side of the Anglo-German relationship are conspicuous for their absence. However, by the end of the period under consideration this had changed considerably and the Anglo-German wars of the twentieth century wars were


frequently referenced, especially in the English tabloids. My decision to conclude with the coverage of EURO 1996 was determined primarily by the idea that it was a significant juncture in terms of press representations. The *Daily Mirror* seems to have crossed a line in its coverage of that event – it was much criticised at the time for its bad taste – and has not been inclined to do so since. Another reason is the advent of the internet. The late 1990s saw the World Wide Web spread but EURO 96 was probably the last major tournament not covered by online media. The papers examined had existing websites at the time but these resembled static pages and were scarcely updated as the main reader traffic was generated in the print versions of the papers. With the arrival of the web 2.0 in the early years of the new millennium football writing has mushroomed. As Jonathan Wilson has observed: ‘We live in a golden age. There has never been so much football journalism of such high standard as there is now.’

Research beyond 1996 would have necessarily involved not just the websites produced by the various newspapers but also social networks such as twitter, facebook and google+ and many more. Only an online repository will suffice to cover all this material sufficiently.

The methods applied to draw conclusions from a vast amount of newspaper reports and comments might best be described as discourse analysis embedded in an awareness of historical context. Formal techniques of content analysis, requiring some form of quantitative measurement of articles related to Anglo-

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German international football matches appearing in English and German daily and Sunday newspapers have not been systematically applied though, where the extent of coverage or its position in the newspaper appears important, this has been noted. For example, it is clearly significant to observe that coverage of England’s World Cup victory in 1966 appeared prominently on the front pages of the *Sunday Express* on the day after the match as well as on the back page and that it included a special four-page supplement especially designed to commemorate the ‘historic’ occasion. The match also featured on the front page of *The Times* on the Monday morning where sport did not often feature (see pp.121-123). To note that this was so simply underlines the importance assigned to the event at the time and its place related to the other stories comprising the news agenda. Conversely, the relatively sparse coverage of England’s 3-1 victory over West Germany in Mexico City in 1985 – a match played largely to allow players to gain experience of playing in the conditions they could expect to meet in the World Cup finals a year later – reflects growing indifference to non-competitive ‘friendlies’ to which less importance was attached in the 1980s than the 1950s. Unlike the 1966 final this match was in no way ‘historic’ and this is reflected in the paucity of the coverage. Significantly, however, as we shall see, even within the limited space allowed to cover this match, the *Daily Express*, found a pretext to represent Germany in a negative fashion (p.213).

However, it is important to dig a little deeper. As Jeffery Hill has pointed out, historians of sport should be aware when analysing match reports and other comment appearing in the press that they are essentially texts. Moreover, though
they are important sources of evidence through which it may be possible to reach tentative conclusions about what may or may not have happened on the field of play, they are texts in which certain discourses are embedded.\footnote{Hill, Sport and the Literary Imagination, 117–130.} Thus, as far as this thesis is concerned, the emphasis is on discourse analysis rather than content analysis. Systematic reading of the texts generated by newspapers in response to Anglo-German football encounters over a long period from the mid 1950s to the mid 1990s makes it possible to identify, firstly, overarching tendencies in the way in which England and German were represented and, secondly, particular discourses or meta-narratives that were transmitted via the banalities of match reports. Heinz Bonfadelli has argued that the aim of discourse analysis is to unveil ideologies embedded in the text which exist to maintain the status quo. While this indicates an intention to analyse texts from a Marxist position, it is not intended here to politicize the football coverage in English and German newspapers but rather to identify and explain the discourses that are present and they way in which they have been deployed at particular times.\footnote{Bonfadelli, H., Medieninhaltsforschung: Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen (Konstanz: UVK-Verl.-Ges., 2002), 80–81; 134–136.} Thus, through systematic reading of press coverage on and around the dates of each senior international fixture between 1954 and 1996, it has been possible to identify a general tendency in the English press over the period to locate Anglo-German football rivalry within a continuous meta-narrative embracing ‘two World Wars and one World Cup’. It is also clear that this meta-narrative embodies various discourses involving representations of Germans as militaristic, arrogant, untrustworthy, lacking a sense of humour, inclined to cheat or to complain and – more positively
It is important, however, to contextualize the meta-narrative and the discourses associated with it within the history of Anglo-German relations as they have developed since the end of the Second World War in order to explain how and why they have been applied in different circumstances. The aim here is to provide a historically informed discourse analysis which acknowledges the importance of explaining why things happened in a particular way at a particular time. For example, in 1966, as Helmut Schön’s team progressed towards the final at Wembley and were increasingly regarded as a threat to England’s chances of winning the tournament, negative representations of Germany and Germans predominated, especially after their semi-final against the Soviet Union. These comprised references to the Second World War, reminders of German militarism and accusations that they had cheated by provoking opponents in order to get them sent off. After the final – and England’s victory – the tone of press coverage quite was different. It was then safe to represent Schön’s team as ‘good Germans’, heroic and worthy opponents, not least because this reflected so well on the English team that had beaten them. More generally, it is suggested here that there were underlying conditions, fluctuations in Anglo-German cultural relations, which explain the varying intensity with which negative discourses were consciously or sub-consciously applied. Thus it is important to recognize that conditions in the 1950s, with both sides anxious for various reasons to put the recent experience of the war behind them, were very different from the 1990s when deep-seated English anxieties regarding German re-unification after 1990
supplied a context which the tabloid press could indulge in a kind of pantomime warfare against Germany in which discourses built on negative stereotyping were very much to the fore.

**Thesis structure and chapter summary**

Set in the context of two brutal and destructive wars the state of relations between Britain and Germany now appears relatively healthy, whatever differences exist regarding issues relating to the European Union. However, though leading politicians, such as Tony Blair, fifty years on from ‘VE Day’, could claim that Anglo-German relations had ‘never been better’, a perusal of the sports pages suggests that what has been called ‘a people to people’ problem has been a persistent undercurrent throughout the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.\(^{54}\) This thesis surveys the course of Anglo-German football relations over a long period as represented indirectly on the sports pages of newspapers. Much of the research recently has been based on discourse analysis of coverage relating to particular tournaments from 1996 onwards. This tends to obscure the extent to which the characteristics of coverage have changed over time in response to specific historical circumstances. This thesis seeks to correct this imbalance and also to provide some kind of framework in which a comparative perspective might be developed.

Chapter One focuses largely on the first two international matches in the post-war sequence, played in 1954 and 1956, and on the way that they were

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\(^{54}\) Young, ‘Two World Wars’, 1-2; Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 364.
reported. These matches represented an important step in normalising relations between Britain and West Germany, especially as England had not played Germany since 1938, an occasion long associated in the minds of the English public with its players giving the Nazi salute before kick-off, a gesture that signified appeasement and the failures of foreign policy in the 1930s. With the Second World War fresh in people’s memories and Germany morally discredited after committing crimes against humanity, there was reason to anticipate some hostility in the British press. It was especially ironic, given the two defeats that had been inflicted on Germany in 1918 and 1945, that its national team came to Wembley in 1954 as world champions, even though the importance of FIFA’s premier competition did not resonate as powerfully then with the English public as it does now, such was the overwhelming interest in domestic, rather than international football. Yet, the response to these matches was generally characterised by restraint, despite the fact that only a few years had passed since the English and the Germans had been at war.

The World Cup Final of 1966 provides the main focus for Chapter Two. In football terms the match was a turning point. It occurred at a point when, in terms of the playing strength of the two national teams, a delicate balance had been reached. ‘What the statistics show is that the 1966 World Cup final was the fulcrum between two very different periods: England dominant until 1966 but Germany afterwards’, as Ramsden pointed out.\(^\text{55}\) Whereas the matches in the 1950s were largely overshadowed by the Second World War, the two encounters

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that preceded the Wembley final, ‘friendlies’ played in 1965 and 1966, and all the matches that followed, were overshadowed by the prospect and reality of what happened at Wembley on 30 July 1966. As it happened there were also other important matches at club level, especially two finals of the Cup Winners Cup competition in 1965 and 1966, that underlined the theme of Anglo-German rivalry. Sports journalism, moreover, was changing in this period so that it was not just the extent but the content of the coverage that differed from the 1950s. As coverage, especially in the middle-market and downmarket newspapers became more gossipy and personality-centred it was possible to underestimate the technical advances being made by the German team, especially in the light of what has been described as England’s ‘fatal victory’ of 1966, which reinforced, for a time, a sense of complacency in and around English football.

The following chapter surveys representations of Anglo-German football in the late 1960s and 1970s when German superiority was becoming apparent: England was beaten four times by Germany in this period, with only one draw and one victory. There was some compensation at club level with English clubs dominating in the European Cup competition, though this tended to emphasise the underlying tension between the interest of club and country, a power struggle which has often been said to hamper the progress of the English national team. Press coverage in this period tended to see the Germans in a different light to the 1960s. The valiant losers of 1966 admired for their machine-like efficiency in 1966 became stylish opponents to be admired for their flair and for their ability to discard outdated methods. This tended to reflect the British pre-occupation that
they were a nation in decline, especially as events on the field seemed to reflect what was happening to Britain’s economy which provided a dismal contrast to West Germany’s post-war ‘economic miracle’.

Chapter Four focuses on the 1980s and the early 1990s when press coverage of Anglo-German football expanded enormously and changed radically. The tone in the English press now became increasingly chauvinistic, not just towards Germany but towards foreigners in general. This observation applied not just to the sports pages but to editorial content more generally, especially in newspapers that were politically aligned to the right. English football was now subject to its negative association with hooliganism, a major concern for the media and the football public. The Falklands War of 1982 saw jingoism reintroduced as an element of British popular journalism and this overspilled onto the sports pages, especially in the tabloid press, where it remained a prominent feature until after EURO 96. The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany may have helped to refocus residual anxieties about German domination of Europe, though it is just as likely that the tabloid excesses on the sports pages in 1996 were a consequence of the circulation war between the Daily Mirror and the Sun at the lower end of the daily newspaper market. Football coverage continued to be indicative of a persistent undercurrent of hostility in Anglo-German cultural relations. The question that needs answering is why the tone of reporting was now so different to the immediate post-war period?

The final chapter surveys sports journalism in Germany as it has developed
between 1966 and 1996. Of the fifteen matches played in this period, five have been selected for special consideration: the World Cup Final of 1966, the European Championship quarter-finals of 1972, the World Cup semi-final (won by Germany on penalties) in 1990 and the semi-final in EURO 96. The intention here is to supply some basis for comparative work on the English and German coverage in the future. It will indicate that representation of Anglo-German football in the German press has followed a different path, especially in relation to the prevalence of stereotyping, which became very much the stock-in-trade of the English tabloid press in the 1990s. Football might appear to be an ‘irrelevance’, as Beck has argued.\(^56\) A grasp of these issues, however, is clearly relevant if we seek a fuller understanding of Anglo-German cultural relations across the second half of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

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CHAPTER ONE: Post-War: Anglo-German

Football in the 1950s

It is important to establish the broader context in which Anglo-German football relations have taken place. The history of armed conflict between the two nation-states was, of course, a very important factor. Sports writers often reach for military metaphors to describe the ‘battles’ that take place on the field and the First and Second World Wars supplied a limitless source of references of which they were to make good use, helping them to frame each match in the context of recent Anglo-German history. War had seen hardship, suffering and loss inflicted by Germany on Britain and by Britain on Germany. Many on both sides found it difficult to forgive and forget. The idea that Britain/England was in decline was also very important, especially as Germany – or West Germany at least – was seen to be more successful, in terms of economic performance. This became evident after the Suez crisis of 1956 had exposed the idea that Britain was still one of the world’s great powers as an illusion, though it really took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to a prevailing intellectual climate of ‘declinism’, described by Hennessy as ‘almost a disease of the mind’.\(^{57}\) It did not seem to matter that the British people had ‘never had it so good’, as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, famously stated in 1957, or that its economy was growing – albeit at a slower rate than that experienced by many of its rivals. It was the impression that Germany

was moving ahead more quickly that seemed to count. The title of a BBC Television documentary broadcast in December 1960 asked Why are we falling behind? and reflected on the comparative performance post-1945 and what it signalled for the future. The programme’s producer observed:

‘In less than ten years’ time the people of Western Germany will be enjoying a standard of living twice as high as they have today. Yet it will be over thirty years before we double our standard – unless there is a radical change in British industry.’

These perceptions and the hard facts underlying them helped to make football matches between England and Germany more important than most.

Tony Judt has pointed out that the discussion of decline in Britain had an ambivalent character: The country had just fought and won a second war against its ‘mortal enemy … yet cultural commentators were absorbed by intimations of failure and deterioration.’ He cited a pessimistic comment from the poet and critic T.S. Eliot who had noted decline everywhere around him in the 1950s: ‘that our own period is one of decline, that standards of culture are lower than they were 50 years ago, and that the evidences of this decline are evident in every department of human activity.’ The idea of decline was deeply lodged in the British/English psyche and was often evident even when there was evidence that suggested that

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those fears were ill-founded and exaggerated. According to economic historian Jim Tomlinson, ‘declinism’ — at least as far as the economy was concerned — had a long history. It had been a recurring theme for over a hundred years dating from the period when Britain’s industrial supremacy peaked around 1870 and other countries, especially Germany, began to undermine the lead it had established as the ‘First Industrial Nation’. It was true, as economic historian Barry Supple has pointed out, that Britain’s major industrial rivals were experiencing higher average annual growth rates after the Second World War. Between 1950 and 1983, for example, Japan’s annual growth rate was 7.9%, while Germany’s was 4.5% and Britain’s only 2.4%. What this indicated, however, was relative rather than actual decline. Also much depended on the perspective from which it was viewed. During the period 1951 to 1973, for example, essentially the period of the great post-war boom in the world economy that was brought to an end by the oil crisis of the mid 1970s, the British economy grew at 3% annually on average.

What most British people experienced over this period were the benefits of a period of sustained full employment, along with greatly improved provision in areas such as education and health and growing affluence. Indeed, it has been argued that decline ‘simply did not happen, that post-1945 growth rates were higher than at any previous period in the life of the British Isles and that the life of those who lived upon them, were dramatically richer and better in consequence.’

This may have reduced the potential for Anglo-German hostility in the 1950s and 60s.

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early 1960s despite growing awareness that the Federal Republic was forging ahead.

This is not to deny that some major adjustments were required to come to terms with the new circumstances in which the British found themselves in the first twenty years after the end of the Second World War. Eric Hobsbawm is one of many historians who have pointed to deep-seated problems in this respect.

‘Clearly, the British did not adapt to new circumstances. They could have done so. There is no reason why British technical and scientific education should have remained negligible (…) It was no doubt inevitable that British pioneer industries should lose ground relatively as the rest of the world industrialized, and that their rate of expansion should rise; but this purely statistical phenomenon need not have been accompanied by a genuine loss of impetus and efficiency. (…) Britain then failed to adapt to new conditions, not because she could not, but because she did not wish to. (…) [T]he British capitalist aimed at eventual absorption into the socially more respected and higher stratum of the “gentlemen” or even the aristocrats, and when he achieved it … he ceased to strive.’

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However, in the 1950s and early 1960s, declinism, was more likely to be prompted by signs that the sun had set on the British Empire and that Britannia no longer ‘ruled the waves’. By the end of the 1940s India, the largest territory under British rule had achieved independence. By the end of the sixties, the Empire had been completely replaced by the Commonwealth of Nations. When Britain and France, two old imperial powers, had flexed their muscles and invaded Egypt after its government had announced that the Suez Canal would be nationalised they were rebuked by the USSR, the United States and the United Nations and forced to withdraw. There was an angry response to this humiliation in some quarters, especially from those who remembered when Britain had been more powerful. ‘Let the Russians just start something that’s all’, was a said an old man in a Gloucestershire pub, ‘and then they’ll have us to face. Like Hitler did (…) and the bloody Kaiser.’ 64 But, though this suggested that the English working class had long memories as far as Germany was concerned, the old enemy could not be blamed directly for these post-imperial problems.

For this study, the comparative condition and performance of Germany in the same period is of particular interest. While some in England were beginning to show concern about decline in the early 1950s, the picture in the Federal Republic was very different. In the late 1940s, following defeat in war and with a prevailing ‘culture of shame’, its future had seemed particularly bleak. However, even as early as 1953, Germany’s post-war recovery was attracting considerable attention.

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in Britain. Prompted by the German challenge to British trade in Asia, a continent where British influence was clearly diminishing after India had won independence in 1947, the *Daily Mirror*, in December 1953, headlined an article by its star columnist ‘Cassandra’ under the headline ‘Lookout! There is a German close behind!’ The article traced the economic progress made by England’s former enemy since the war under the further sub-headings ‘1945: How are the Mighty Fallen!’ and ‘1953: How Mighty are the Fallen!’65 A few months earlier, in the same newspaper, Paul Whitcomb had reported from St Pauli, Hamburg, making the same point in a different way when he compared St. Pauli with New York’s Broadway. The comparison was misleading – St. Pauli is a notorious red light district in Hamburg – Broadway the centre of American theatre – but the point was that the Germans were making progress. Whitcomb was also surprised that he met so few former Nazis. This was hardly surprising as it was unlikely that any German would have admitted this to an English journalist just eight years after the war.66 In this respect what Whitcomb probably experienced was a collective denial of their recent past and as such was symptomatic of the so called ‘Great Silence’ that characterised the Germans at this time.67 In some ways this may have been easier for the English to deal with than the underlying realities. The anonymity allowed by an opinion poll in October 1951 which asked Germans to state in which period of the recent past they had fared best saw 42% opt for the era of National Socialism, with only 2% favouring democracy as the best model

65 *Daily Mirror*, 1 December 1953.
66 *Daily Mirror*, 2 October 1953.
for welfare and security. It was only after ten more years had passed that, when the same question was asked, the post-war Federal Republic achieved the same level of support.  

Allied efforts to re-educate and de-nazify only succeeded up to a point. The USA had actively prosecuted German war criminals between 1945 and 1949 with 5,000 put on trial, 4,000 successful prosecutions and 806 death penalties. The German prosecution service followed a different policy. An amnesty throughout the decade led to the release of many of those previously imprisoned. In addition, article 131 of the Grundgesetz allowed the re-employment of public servants who had been employed by the National Socialists before May 8, 1945. Moreover, any collective guilt was refuted. Rudolf Großkopff, a German journalist, has described the 1950s as a decade of ‘conflicts, cultural plurality, joie de vivre and dramatic developments.’ Yet the Nazi past, the war and its dire consequences were hard to shake off. Germany in the 1950s was still an occupied country divided between East and West. West Germany only just beginning to gain recognition in its own right by the mid 1950s.

This meant that Anglo-German relations after 1945 were difficult at best. Britain had fought against Germany in both world wars from the first day to the last and its people had become accustomed to regarding Germans as enemies.  

68 Großkopff, Unsere 50er Jahre 64–65.


70 Großkopff, Unsere 50er Jahre, 11.
Memories and recent experience underpinned attitudes that made it difficult for politicians on both sides to move forward in unity, despite common antipathy to the Soviet Union after the start of the Cold War. While politically it was difficult, on a personal level there were problems, too. Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic’s first Chancellor, was no friend of the British because he had been removed from his office of mayor of Cologne by British Forces in 1945. Adenauer was, ‘alienated by the attitude displayed’ and ‘irritated by the inherent self-confidence of the British political class.’\textsuperscript{71} Ernest Bevin, British foreign secretary between 1945 and 1951 felt uncomfortable in the company of Germans, once admitting: ‘I tries ‘ard … but I ‘ates ‘em.’ As late as 1967, Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister from 1957 until 1963, observed while observing the guard of honour at Adenauer’s funeral, ‘they haven’t changed.’\textsuperscript{72}

**British sport and international competition in the 1950s**

As Martin Polley has suggested in relation to sport in post-war Britain, ‘Defeats on the playing field … represented … a kind of litmus test for the nation’s decline.’\textsuperscript{73} In reality, there was no logical connection between sport and the end of empire or an underperforming British economy but in a climate in which declinism was beginning to establish a foothold, the connection was often made. International football played a part in this process simply because the game

\textsuperscript{71} Ramsden, J., Don’t mention the war: The British and the Germans since 1890 (London: Abacus, 2007), 239.

\textsuperscript{72} Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 266-268.

\textsuperscript{73} Polley, M., Moving the Goalposts. A History of Sport and Society since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1999) 36.
itself was so popular. As Ross McKibbin has noted, it had originated in England and was played and watched by more English people than any other sport; at the same time it was ‘the world sport, and that enhanced its status, even if the English half-despised the foreigners who played it’. Moreover, because the eleven men in white shirts represented England, the national team was often seen as a metaphor for the nation and for the qualities popularly attributed to Englishness. All this was assisted by the fact that most people – unless they attended matches at Wembley – experienced only a mediated version of international football. Thus, as Dilwyn Porter has suggested, ‘international football, as experienced by newspaper readers, radio listeners and television viewers, provided a point of access to the complex of anxieties encapsulated by declinism as an ideology.’

However, just as it is important not to overstate the failings of the British economy in the early 1950s or the extent to which the English sensed that they were a nation in decline, it is important not to exaggerate the role of sport at this particular juncture. The British in general and the English in particular had much to be cheerful about. There was full employment, the end of food rationing and a heady air of optimism about the ‘New Elizabethan Age’, heralded by the Coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953. This was very much to the fore in what Peter Hennessy describes as ‘the fleeting having-it-so-good patch between the

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Coronation [1953] and Suez [1956]. Though it soon evaporated, there was enough evidence of success on the sporting scene to convince the doubters that all was well. Indeed, sport delivered a great decade of British successes in the 1950s. In cricket, still considered by many to be England’s ‘national game’, the Ashes were won back from the Australians in 1953 and retained in 1954-55 and 1956. In rugby union England won the Five Nations tournament four times in 1953, 1954 (jointly with France and Wales), 1957 and 1958. A British and Commonwealth expedition succeeded in climbing Everest, reaching the summit on the eve of the Coronation, and Roger Bannister famously became the first man to run a sub-four minute mile in 1954. ‘AT LAST –THE 4-MINUTE MILE!’, ran the Daily Express headline, followed by the sub-heading, ‘English victory beats world’. In this context defeats on the football field, like the one inflicted on England at Wembley by the Hungary in November 1953 could be regarded as setbacks rather than national disasters. Moreover, in the mediated world of sport symbolic defeats could be relatively easily reversed. When Wolverhampton Wanderers, the English champions, defeated Honved of Budapest in December 1954, there were press claims that English football was back on top of the world.

There were, however, clear indications of a crisis in English football at this time. The domestic game in the 1950s was afflicted by the problem of falling attendances after the boom of the immediate post-war years and this became

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76 Hennessy, Having it so good, 240-242.
77 Daily Express, 7 May 1954, cited in Hennessy, Having it so good, 275.
worse as consumers became more affluent in the 1950s and found new ways of spending their leisure time. Rising admission prices probably did not help. Attendances at English football League matches fell by a total of 11.25 million in the period between 1949 and 1962. Like most spectator sports, professional football found that it could no longer rely on the cloth-capped fan to turn up week in and week out, especially as television, outings in the family car and home improvement (‘Do-It-Yourself’) now provided alternatives to spending a cold Saturday afternoon on the terraces. ‘Many people … had both a better home environment and a higher level commitment to the domestic space’, as Dave Russell has explained.\textsuperscript{79} For the 92 full-time professional clubs which relied heavily on gate money this was a problem especially as they were often identified as part of the problem when it came to disappointing English performances in international competition. As Richard Holt later observed:

‘English football was too self-absorbed to give itself whole-heartedly to the national cause. Club loyalties were too strong and the League programme too exhausting. Moreover, the rulers of the game did not encourage it. English football remained proud and insular.’\textsuperscript{80}


Witness to this stance was the decision by the Football League in 1955 to deny Chelsea, who had won the First Division, the chance to participate in the newly-established European Cup. In track and field athletics Roger Bannister had achieved success by combining ‘old British habits with new scientific pacing methods and training’; he had even taken advice from a Hungarian coach.81 English football preferred to adhere to its old habits. As Stanley Matthews, England’s most famous footballer of the period later reflected, having encountered resistance to the idea that the ball should be used more in training, ‘…the people who ran our game regarded anything new with suspicion … the hierarchy of English football clung on to the old methods, still believing we were the football masters of the world.’82

If Britain had to undergo re-adjustment politically in the post-war period, this was paralleled on the football pitch, especially by the England national team. England had left FIFA in 1928, returning only in 1946. This meant that England missed the first three World Cups and did not enter the competition until 1950, qualifying for the final stages in Brazil by winning the Home International tournament. According to the Swedish football journalist Seve Linde, writing before the start of the competition, the FA’s decision to end England’s isolation made the 1950 finals ‘the most important event in international football history’. He described the decision as ‘courageous’ because it meant that England was prepared ‘to test her strength in a fight for football world supremacy, [having]

81 Holt, Sport and the British, 279.
82 Matthews, S., The way it was (London: Headline, 2001), 336.
always claimed to be the first’.\textsuperscript{83} England’s preparations, however, suggested that the FA had no conception of the importance of the occasion. Squad member Eddie Bailly later recalled that the England party had travelled to Brazil without a doctor: ‘It was typical,’ he commented ‘… we were going off to a strange country of which we know very little and there wasn’t anyone we could turn to if we were sick or injured. Backward wasn’t the word for it.’ In the event England failed to qualify for the knock-out stages having suffered a shock defeat to the USA – ‘a mongrel team of no-hopers’ according to Jonathan Wilson – when they had fielded a side picked not by the manager, Walter Winterbottom, but by Arthur Drewry, a senior FA committee-man. Reaction to this defeat was surprisingly muted, however, with no television or radio coverage and little interest in the press. It was thus possible to discount the defeat at Belo Horizonte as ‘a freakish result at a distant South American venue.’\textsuperscript{84} Stanley Matthews later claimed that the FA’s response was simply to ‘bury their heads in the sand’. To them, the World Cup was ‘a gimmick’ while all that mattered was ‘our domestic game’.\textsuperscript{85}

One of the reasons why Linde had described the decision to play in Brazil as ‘courageous’ was that he was convinced that England’s claim to world football supremacy was already an illusion. However, the shock had to be delivered closer to home – where England remained undefeated by foreign opposition - to have any effect. A match between England and a FIFA XI at Wembley in October


\textsuperscript{84} Kynaston, David: \textit{Austerity Britain, 1945-1951} (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 514–515; Porter, ‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’, 38.

\textsuperscript{85} Matthews, \textit{The way it was}, 337.
1953, organised to celebrate the 90\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the FA, indicated the shape of things to come. England was to escape with a draw thanks to a late penalty converted by Alf Ramsey. A month later, they took on Hungary, the reigning Olympic champions, and were beaten 6-3. As George Robb, who gained his only England cap on this occasion, later recalled: ‘We weren’t the governors anymore.’\textsuperscript{86} This is possibly the second-most researched and written about match in English soccer history, after the World Cup Final 1966 yet why it had taken so long for the illusion of English supremacy to be shattered remains a mystery. In reality, Wilson argues, England had not been the ‘masters of football’ since 1929 when they had been beaten by Spain using a deep-lying centre-forward. England’s adherence to a 2-3-5 formation meant that they had struggled to pick him up and the same weakness had been exposed by the Austrian \textit{Wunderteam} when narrowly defeated at Stamford Bridge in 1932. More than twenty years later the same tactical flaw was exploited mercilessly by Hidegkuti, used by Hungary in the same withdrawn role, both at Wembley and a few months later in Budapest when England were beaten 7-1.\textsuperscript{87} The grandly-titled ‘Association Football Correspondent’ of \textit{The Times}, Geoffrey Green, thought that the Hungarians had re-invented the game. Drawing on his match report of twenty years earlier, Green later recalled:

‘Now came the game which has a place of its own in every book about football: England 3 Hungary 6. It showed 100,000 people


\textsuperscript{87} Wilson, \textit{Anatomy of England}, 75-78.
at Wembley, and millions of TV watchers, a new concept of football

… With a wonderful understanding of the basic principles of the game, the Hungarians combined long and short passing, cutting open the defence with majestic ease. 88

The post-match headlines in the English press made readers aware that a significant event had occurred with references to ‘England’s world turned upside down’ and the ‘twilight of the soccer gods’. 89 That the defeat had been inflicted by a team representing a Communist state seemed especially significant in the context of the Cold War. ‘Sport was one manifestation of the “Cultural Olympics” in which the Cold War protagonists were more or less permanently engaged.’ 90

Germany had been excluded from all international sports competitions in the immediate post-war years including the London Olympics of 1948 and the World Cup of 1950. Later that same year the German football national team began to play international matches again; the first game was against Switzerland in November 1950. At the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 Germany achieved a respectable fourth place in the football tournament while Great Britain’s amateurs were embarrassingly eliminated by Luxemburg in a preliminary round. Having entered the World Cup, the national team progressed in what would later be


89 Kowalski and Porter, ‘England’s world’, 27.

recognised a ‘typical’ German manner, qualifying for the final stages of the 1954 competition in Switzerland. ‘Typical’ as their displays against Norway and Die Saar were anything but promising. Commentators stated that Rahn’s place in the side had become ‘untenable’, that Kohlmeyer was ‘a hopeless case’ and that Turek was ‘too heavy.’ Eventually, all three were to play in the final, Helmut Rahn scoring twice. If the World Cup Final of 1966 has become the most researched and written about in England, the final of 1954 is its German counterpart. Yet this is a relatively recent phenomenon as much of the research dates from the period after unification when East and West were seeking common sites of memory which could be celebrated. The so-called ‘Miracle of Berne’, a reference to Germany’s 3-2 surprise win in the final against Hungary, thus came to serve a very useful cultural purpose. What mattered more in 1954, however, as England and Germany prepared to resume their long-standing football rivalry was that Germany, as Geoffrey Green explained to readers of The Times, ‘come to Wembley wearing the crown of world champions – a hard-won success which was certainly given some political overtones in the excitement when it happened, by some Germans.’ The spontaneous celebrations after the ‘Miracle of Berne’ had seen German supporters singing the first verse of their national anthem.


93 The Times, 1 December 1954.

**Wembley Stadium, London, 1 December 1954**

England and Germany were about to meet on the football pitch for the first time since 1938. Since the last encounter, much had changed in both countries. However, whether or not the game could be regarded as a measure as to how the English felt towards Germany remained to be seen. Writing before the match in 

*The Times* Geoffrey Green’s tone was conciliatory, though his assumption, that in Britain, sport and politics were unconnected, now seems a little naïve.

‘The appearance of Germany’s international football side at Wembley Stadium this afternoon adds its bit to Anglo-German relations. It is true that sport in these islands – though not by any means always overseas – holds no political significance, but there could be no more appropriate guest of honour at this particular match than the Foreign Secretary [Anthony Eden]. If the presence of 12,000 or more Germans transplanted across the Channel to the Wembley terraces, may have no particular
import, it at least shows that sport and time can be great healers’.  

Given the history of Anglo-German relations generally and the fact that memories of the Second World War were still fresh, it seems reasonable to ask whether this would have reverberations on the pitch, at the stadium and in the newspapers. Would the English let their emotions show at a football match? Would the German national team be treated with sporting respect and fairness? Could England and Germany set the past aside and start a new chapter?

Though the Germans were world champions, the signs were not promising. The form which had won them the World Cup earlier in the year had slipped and they had recently been defeated by Belgium and France. More than half the team that had played in Berne was unavailable due to injuries or sickness; only three of the championship winning team – Posipal, Kohlmeyer and Liebrich – were to play at Wembley. The English press conceded that Germany would not be at full strength: Green noting that ‘England to be sure would rather have had it otherwise’.  

In the middlemarket *Daily Express* and the downmarket *Daily Mirror*, however, this was regarded with suspicion. Desmond Hackett in the Express, opened his match preview by suggesting that ‘Germany have already organised their excuses … sickness, injuries and all that … in the event of defeat at...

95 *The Times*, 1 December 1954.

96 *The Times*, 1 December 1954.
Wembley this afternoon and, make no mistake England will beat the World Soccer champions.'

Bob Ferrier, writing in the Mirror, took a similar line:

‘Poor old England! They never seem to be given a fair and square chance. If it isn’t one thing it’s the other. Here they are today, going in against West Germany at Wembley and in footballer’s language they are on a hiding to nothing. For if England beat Germany they have “merely beaten a team with eight reserves”. And if England fail to beat Germany, why, they “couldn’t even beat a team with eight reserves”.'

Ferrier, however, was less hostile than Desmond Hackett who picked up on a story in the Daily Herald which had linked the fact that so many of Germany’s unavailable players were suffering from jaundice to rumours that the world champions’ performances had been drug-assisted. Hackett, interviewing manager Sepp Herberger at the pre-match reception, asked directly if the team would be given ‘pep injections as they did before the World Cup final with Hungary’, only to be told ‘brusquely’ that this was entirely a matter for the German team and officials. This was enough for Hackett to label him as ‘the old

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97 Daily Express, 1 December 1954.

98 Daily Mirror, 1 December 1954.

99 Downing, D., Best of Enemies: England v Germany, a century of football rivalry (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), 73-74; Thomas Kistner, sports editor at Sueddeutsche Zeitung, wrote for the German Times that after the final, needles and syringes were found in the German dressing room. See: http://www.german-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1834&Itemid=74; accessed 25 April 2013
Herr Hush Hush.' To be fair to the *Express*, Hackett’s suspicious attitude was balanced to some extent by a human interest story in an adjacent column reporting a kind gesture by Herr Eberhard Wittig of Berlin who had asked them to pass on his spare ticket to an English schoolboy whose father had been killed in the war.

Hackett’s aggressive questioning of Herberger typified his approach to football journalism. Brian Glanville, in his memoirs, describes him as ‘the jaunty, shameless Desmond Hackett of the *Daily Express.*’ He aimed to sensationalise and liked nothing better than to put himself at the centre of a story. His questions to Herberger on the eve of the match were part of a bullish campaign that he and fellow *Express* football correspondent Bob Pennington had been waging for a few days. Having travelled to the German training camp he complained that ‘Herr Hush Hush’ had tried to have him removed. The underlying message was that the Germans were secretive and unfriendly, though he managed to get a quote from Herberger praising English football - (‘I must still regard England as the teachers of Soccer’) - which justified the use of the headline ‘Herr Hush Hush admits … England are the masters.’ A day later, he revealed that Herberger was planning to use substitutes, described in the headline as a ‘switch trick’. This was ‘the Continental method’ and therefore highly suspicious. ‘So when Herr Herberger

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100 *Daily Express*, 1 December 1954.

101 *Daily Express*, 1 December 1954. Alf Passmore, the 14-year old recipient, whose father had died at El Alamein, was quoted: ‘I don’t remember Dad. I don’t know much about Germany. But I reckon England will win 2-1’.


starts his team shuffle it does not mean that a player is injured if he is taken off,’ he explained, implying that there was something unsportsmanlike about such tactics. In the same article he described Herberger as Germany’s ‘Football Fuhrer’, with its obvious negative connotations. This appeared on the same page as a picture of the German team departing for England with a caption reading ‘Rolling along to the invasion port’ and an article by Pennington, commenting on England’s team selection and urging the players to ‘shut their ears to the tear-jerking yarns about Germany’s catastrophic list of casualties.’ He stressed the importance of the occasion and the opposition. ‘They must say: “We are playing for England against Germany. That is enough – we must fight until we drop.’\footnote{Daily Express, 29 November 1954.} Hackett kept the pressure on until match-day, referred to as ‘Der Tag’ on the \textit{Express} sports page. After reporting that the two teams had met amicably at pre-match receptions he hoped ‘that this fraternity will now end and that England will come out fighting and keep on in there fighting until they win by around 4-1.’\footnote{Daily Express, 1 December 1954.}

There could be no doubt that England took this friendly very seriously. After the disastrous defeats by Hungary and another disappointing World Cup campaign in 1954, there were signs that some lessons had been learned.\footnote{For England’s 1954 World Cup campaign see Glanville, B., \textit{The Story of the World Cup} (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), 75-76; Green, \textit{Soccer in the Fifties}, 152-54.} England’s selection committee had been reduced from nine to just three, one of whom was the team manager, Walter Winterbottom. ‘This approaches more closely the effective direction to be found in Hungary, Germany, Austria, Sweden and
elsewhere’, The Times explained. The England team was also better prepared with ‘periods of training and tactical planning together, of longer duration than ever before.’\textsuperscript{107} It was Winterbottom’s intention to take the long view by driving through necessary reforms, building a team for the future by including more under-23s in the senior squad.\textsuperscript{108} However, on this occasion, the approach was more pragmatic. As Pennington observed in the Express, ‘England are taking no chances by putting experience before youth; form before future promise.’\textsuperscript{109} From a twenty-first century perspective, with international friendly matches having been somewhat devalued in status, this match appears to have offered opportunities to experiment. It is a mark of the importance with which the match was regarded by the FA that England picked a team with the idea of winning comfortably against an obviously weakened and inexperienced German side. The radical new departure that Winterbottom might have wished for was deferred.\textsuperscript{110} Thus the experienced Bert Williams and Tom Finney were brought back into the side at the expense of younger players. Stanley Matthews, 38 years old, who had first played for England against Germany in 1935, was also included. As The Times pointed out, Uwe Seeler, the German centre-forward in 1954, had not been born at the time.\textsuperscript{111} The average age of the England team for this match was almost 30.

\textsuperscript{107} The Times, 1 December 1954.
\textsuperscript{108} Downing, Best of enemies, 70.
\textsuperscript{109} Daily Express, 29 November 1954.
\textsuperscript{110} Downing, Best of Enemies, 73.
\textsuperscript{111} The Times, 2 December 1954.
It was hardly necessary for the match reports to remind readers of the most recent Anglo-German conflict. A few days earlier Sir Winston Churchill had celebrated his 80th birthday and the press – with the populist, right-wing *Daily Express* to the fore – wallowed in nostalgia as they paid tribute to the man who had led Britain to victory over Germany in 1945. Even the left-of-centre *Daily Mirror* published a special souvenir edition to mark the birthday of the ‘Greatest Living Englishman.’\(^{112}\)

On the day after the match the *Express* published five photographs on its front page featuring near misses by the England forwards to back up the claim that England should have scored nine. The headline (‘Englad win 3-1 but it should have been 9-1’) was in smaller type than the main story on the front page which concerned a dispute between Churchill and Field Marshall Montgomery concerning an order that had been issued during wartime to stockpile captured German armaments for possible use against the Soviet Union.\(^{113}\) Indirectly, of course, it served to remind readers that the Federal Republic was now a Cold War ally.\(^{114}\) However, though it seemed impossible for the *Express* not to mention the war, coverage of the match was generally more limited and more restrained than it would become in later years. The *Express*’s front page pictures were unusual in that sport rarely featured on the front page. *The Times* in 1954 still used its front page for small advertisements as if the nineteenth century had never ended;

\(^{112}\) *Daily Mirror*, 30 November 1954.

\(^{113}\) *Daily Express*, 2 December 1954.

Green’s match report appeared with other items of sports news on an inside page, taking up the best part of two columns out of a total of eight. Most of the remaining six columns were filled with reports of middle-class sports in which *Times* readers might have been expected to take an interest, such as rowing and squash, though the ongoing test match between Australia and England in Brisbane also received its due share of attention. Even in the *Mirror*, the match at Wembley was confined to the sports section towards the back of the paper.

The language of the match reports, at least in the *Mirror* and *The Times*, was generally mild, with few battle metaphors or war references. Peter Wilson’s report in the *Mirror* was headed ‘Massacre Match: But why didn’t we finish them off’ but in terms of content his main focus was that England should have done better. Why hadn’t England scored more? According to Wilson it was ‘because we were what some people would call too gentlemanly. What I would call too dam swollen-headed, pig-headed, complacent, smug – what you will.’ Green in *The Times*, a broadsheet, had the space to make a more measured assessment. England’s performance had been impressive: ‘All they truly failed in was the reaping of a fuller harvest of goals to which much of their delicate approach play entitled them’. He made a point of praising the Germans, particularly goalkeeper Herkenrath and defender Liebrich. At times the German defence had been ‘a veritable Siegfried Line’, he observed, but the reference was intended as a compliment. Germany were ‘full of youthful determination, speed and spirit’; ‘they produced many a cleverly angled and quick triangular movement in midfield.’ England’s win pleased him but he remained realistic. Acknowledging that
Germany had been forced by injuries to field an under-strength side, he observed that England’s triumph ‘does not by any means elevate us to the topmost heights among the nations.’ Inevitably, Hackett’s match report struck a slightly different tone, praising Stanley Matthews for his ‘one-man blitzkrieg against Germany’ and abandoning almost all restraint in celebrating England’s victory.

‘Cheer this England side because we at least did win. We did beat the World Champions. Forget about the tearful German plea that they have lost all their players. They had 1,500,000 players from which to pick.

We beat them, spanked them soundly, and should have put them out with a Test-match score. But for all this England success it was not a glorious sight to see.’

On the same page a series of cartoons depicted their three goal-scorers Bentley, Allen and Shackleton, writing letters of remorse for having behaved so nicely towards the Germans. The message was clear. England should have won more emphatically.

The players’ accounts of the game were similar to those of the papers but differed in tone. Matthews, by far the oldest player on the pitch, had been lavishly praised by all three newspapers. ‘Here was a tour de force from the greatest player

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115 The Times, 2 December 1954.
116 Daily Express, 2 December 1954.
in English football’, was Green’s assessment in The Times.\textsuperscript{117} The veteran later recalled in his ghosted memoirs: ‘The English press were also full of praise for my performance…I had been up against a good full-back in Kohlmeyer and had led him a merry dance. I never felt fazed by the fact that some players I was up against were twenty years my junior.’\textsuperscript{118} Some were inclined to be generous to their German opponents. Shackleton, whose ghosted memoir appeared within a year of the events, agreed that England should have scored more than three. Germany had been ‘poor’ but the goalkeeper’s performance had been under-rated.

‘Roy Bentley put England one goal up in the first half. The Germans were so poor that we would have won the game by the interval, had all the scoring chances been turned into goals. I give a lot of credit to the visiting goalkeeper, Fritz Herkenrath, for keeping us out when we threatened to overrun Germany, and although some critics claimed he blocked shot after shot more by good fortune than good judgement, I think they did him an injustice.’\textsuperscript{119}

Years later, England’s captain Billy Wright criticised newspapers that had overestimated England’s achievement in beating Germany in 1954. His

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} The Times, 2 December 1954.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Matthews, S. The way it was (London: Headline, 2001), 459.
\end{itemize}
biographer quoted him as saying: ‘I have to confess that they picked only three of the players who helped them win the World Cup’. However, ‘that did not stop some of the newspapers declaring that we were the new world champions!’ This is interesting in the light of the reservations in the match reports and warns us that players’ memories gathered years after the event may not always be an accurate recollection of what happened at the time.

Thus the first match after the Second World War brought England a fifth victory in seven matches against Germany. Evidence gathered from The Times, the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror suggests that the tone of the reporting was relatively mild; the odd war metaphor was used but not in the excessive fashion that became commonplace, at least in the tabloids, in the 1980s and 1990s. However, three days after the match, Peter Wilson in the Mirror, wrote an ill-tempered review of German press coverage. He claimed to be outraged by comments in Die Welt which had dared to suggest that a full-strength German side would have beaten England whose victory could be attributed largely to the brilliance of Stanley Matthews. The headline – in large bold capitals – was ‘STAB IN THE BACK FROM GERMANY!’, a reference which would have resonated with anyone familiar with the history of the First World War. Wilson’s tone was venomous. His article opened by reminding readers that ‘Sir Winston Churchill once said that the Germans are always either at our feet or at our throats.’ Die Welt’s refusal to acknowledge an English victory was used to explain


why he had been so critical of England’s failure to win by a bigger margin. ‘It is because of exactly this sort of comment that I was so enraged that England did not rub Germany’s nose in the mud when for long periods we had them groggy and reeling.’ Wilson’s intervention brought England’s two best-selling daily newspapers of the time into line and was a salutary reminder of a powerful undercurrent of hostility towards Germany which had not been so vehemently expressed until this point. It is interesting to speculate on how the press would have reacted in the event of an English defeat.

**Olympic Stadium, Berlin, 26 May 1956**

In retrospect, the England-Germany match in December 1954 signified ‘the passing of an era.’ When the return match was played in Berlin eighteen months later, only three of the players from 1954 still wore their country’s shirts: Byrne and Wright for England and Herkenrath for Germany. Walter Winterbottom’s reforms seemed to be producing results; England was undefeated in seven matches when they arrived in Berlin, a run which included a 4-2 victory over Brazil at Wembley a few weeks earlier. The long-term project to nurture youthful talent was beginning to bear fruit with Johnny Haynes, and two of Manchester United’s ‘Busby Babes’, Duncan Edwards and Tommy Taylor, making a big impression. The German team was certainly stronger than the one England had faced at Wembley though recent results had not been good. Seven of the World

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122 Daily Mirror, 4 December 1954.

123 Downing, Best of Enemies, 80.
Cup-winning team were selected and the forward line featuring Max Morlock and Hans Schäfer and the two Walter brothers had been restored. Robert Schlienz, who had lost an arm in a motor accident, was picked to play in Germany’s midfield. This provided Desmond Hackett with an opportunity to make mischief. ‘The players say it is embarrassing to charge a man crippled by injuries’, he explained. Reg Leafe, an English referee who had refereed Germany’s recent match against Holland in which Schlienz had played was quoted as saying that it was ‘an unfortunate choice’. Nevertheless, in Berlin, England were said to be 3-1 favourites in the pre-match betting.

Apart from the minor controversy surrounding Schlienz there was little in the English press in the days before the match to suggest that Anglo-German relations were likely to be undermined in any way. Much of the gossip from England’s training headquarters was focused on whether right-back Jeff Hall and centre-forward Tommy Taylor would be fit to play. When Hall was eventually picked Archie Ledbrooke, writing for the Mirror, suggested that the fact that substitutes would be allowed had helped Winterbottom and trainer Jimmy Trotter to persuade themselves that he should start. England had used a substitute in their previous match against Finland in Helsinki, Nat Lofthouse coming on to score twice. Perhaps they were becoming more open to ‘continental’ ideas and practices. The football reporters certainly found much to admire in the new West

126 Daily Mirror, 26 May 1956.
Germany that was beginning to take shape by 1956. Desmond Hackett in the *Express* raved enthusiastically about the Centre of Excellence at Barsinghausen where England prepared for the match. *The Times* compared the facilities favourably with what was available in England; it was the ‘somewhat advanced equivalent of Bisham Abbey and Lilleshall’. Nearby Hanover was a city that had been rebuilt since the war like a ‘Phoenix risen from the Ashes’. Impressions of Berlin were also very favourable. Green wrote of the warm welcome that England had received and the enthusiasm of the autograph hunters who waited patiently for the England players, yet he also referred to ‘battle stations’ and of England and Germany who were about to ‘go to battle on a football pitch’, inevitable, perhaps, considering Berlin having been the place of heavy fighting at the end of World War II and the city’s embattled Cold War status. Archie Ledbrooke, meanwhile, was impressed by ‘the new Berlin which breathes prosperity and well-being.’ The idea of West Germany as a country that England might want to emulate was establishing a foothold.

As with Wembley in 1954, English newspapers left readers in no doubt that the match, though a friendly, was important. According to the *Mirror*, it was going to be ‘one of the noisiest, toughest, most exciting games of the century.’ Ledbrooke added, ‘Germany has never beaten us’, but predicted that England would win. Hackett, in the *Express*, pointed out that match tickets were in great

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demand, while indirectly making a point about living standards under Communist rule. Always keen to feature in his own stories, Hackett reported: ‘In the wrecked and desolate centre of the Eastern Zone of Berlin where I strolled today, tickets for the match were worth more than the fantastically priced tea and coffee, which is still the No 1 Black Market commodity.’ He also drew attention to how much an England win would mean to the 10,000 British troops stationed in Germany who were expected to attend the match.\(^{130}\) This was a theme that was to reappear in the match reports filed after England’s 3-1 victory. In *The Times*, the emphasis in the match previews was on what a win would mean in terms of England’s improved standing in world football. Beating the world champions on their own soil would underline the renewed and rejuvenated status of English (and British) football at home and abroad.\(^{131}\)

The match in Berlin marked a satisfactory end to England’s season and to a European tour which had seen them draw with Sweden and beat Finland before beating Germany. The account of the match in *The Times* rejoiced in an excellent England performance, Geoffrey Green noting that ‘the final score is sufficient, a gift in itself in a world where, for better or worse, sport has come to play a part of such significance in wider affairs.’ The literary quality of Green’s writing was much in evidence. Duncan Edwards ‘moved about the field like an express train’; Johnny Haynes, in scoring England’s third goal, ‘stroked the ball past Herkenrath with the air of somebody stroking a cat contentedly at the fireside.’ On the German side Fritz Walter was ‘a master of footwork and design’ but as a whole

\(^{130}\) *Daily Express*, 25 May 1956.

\(^{131}\) *The Times*, 25, 26 May.
the German attack ‘lacked ingenuity.’ Perhaps it was the presence of so many servicemen in the crowd that made him reach for an extended military metaphor. It had been ‘a team victory’.

‘Yet, above all one must point to Wright at the heart of the defence, the experienced warrior of almost 80 international matches, a captain who as far as could be detected from the rim of the struggle, made only one slight mistake the whole way through. With him were his young lieutenants who now give hope for the future – Edwards at left-half and Taylor and Grainger in attack.’

They had proved themselves, not against their German opponents, but from ‘a hard and experienced enemy.’ Green concluded: ‘England this day had something to cheer.’

Not surprisingly, Desmond Hackett’s match report in the Express found warlike and military metaphors hard to resist. He was even using them before a ball had been kicked.

‘There was the ordeal of the march-out and a salute to the Germans from the packed stadium.'
It rolled thunderously into the slate grey sky and 4,000 British troops bombarded back bravely with cheers for England.’

For Hackett, the ‘finest moment’ came at the end of the match when Wright led his team over to the corner of the stadium where ‘they had cheered and chanted “England, England” for 90 minutes.’ As far as the match itself was concerned, Hackett was convinced that England were worthy winners, not least because of the manner in which they had played. Wright, had been ‘strong and scrupulously fair’. This was ‘a lesson to the Germans who indulged in jersey-tugging, arm-grabbing and savage tackles after English players had parted with the ball.’

According to Ledbrooke in the Mirror England had ‘simply crash-tackled Germany out of a grim game with no frills.’ This physical approach was apparently unproblematic, as opposed to Germany’s efforts as described in the Express. Like Hackett, he emphasised the contribution of the ‘Tommies’ in the crowd to England’s victory. Indeed, it was the major feature of his report which said little about the match itself.

‘This was an encouraging phase indeed when England began to settle into some shape and order as a side’, Green later recalled. The World Cup, in which England had once shown so little interest, now seemed a more enticing prospect, with the finals in Sweden only two years away. Britain might have been entering a period of relative economic decline with its economy unable to match the Federal

133 Daily Express, 28 May 1956.
134 Daily Mirror, 28 May 1956.
135 Green, Soccer in the Fifties, 97.
Republic’s annual growth rate but it was performing better than its old enemy in international football. As Green put it: ‘England, then, seem on the way back into the picture with their young men at a time when Hungary and Germany, the world champions, are going over the hill with their stars. So the cycle of football is changing once more.’¹³⁶ The Hungarian uprising in the autumn of 1956 helped to ensure that at least part of this prediction would be proved correct; Germany recovered to reach the semi-finals in Sweden. England’s improvement was to be halted when Byrne, Taylor and Edwards died in the Munich air crash in February 1958.

**Other aspects of Anglo-German football relations in the 1950s**

Though the Anglo-German football rivalry was intense and press representations of Germany and Germany could sometimes reflect a negative view, there were other aspects of the cultural relationship between the two countries that were more positive. Probably the best-known German footballer at this time, as far as the English were concerned, was Bernd (‘Bert’) Trautmann, Manchester City’s outstanding goalkeeper, who was never chosen to represent the country of his birth at international level. At the time it was not DFB policy to consider ‘legionnaires’, as Germans playing in other countries were called, as eligible for selection. Trautmann’s story reads like a Hollywood tale of a prisoner-of-war, who survives and prospers while living amongst his former enemies; his ability as a footballer helps him to gain respect and to overcome hostility by

¹³⁶  *The Times*, 29 May 1956.
proving that he is not a stereotypical German. Moreover, he falls in love with a local girl – though he later married a German – and becomes a national hero when he continues to keep goal for City for the full 90 minutes of a Wembley Cup Final after sustaining what turns out to be a life-threatening injury. It is indeed surprising, considering these ingredients, that no-one has come up with a script for a movie about Bert Trautmann’s life.

Trautmann, in a ghosted autobiography published at the height of his popularity in 1956, just after he had broken a bone in his neck while helping Manchester City win the FA Cup, claimed that when he had first signed for City after playing non-league football for St Helens Town, reactions had ranged from ‘City must be mad to think of signing this man’ to ‘send that … … back to Germany where he belongs.’ Trautmann himself had wondered if the people of Manchester knew anything at all about their counterparts in Berlin, Dresden and Hamburg who had suffered far more in the war as a result of Allied bombing than they had.137 As both John Ramsden and Stephen Wagg have revealed the numerous myths have attached themselves to Trautmann over the years but there is no doubt that the German ex-paratrooper was generally popular.138 The fact that he was working-class helped him to integrate into what was then very much seen as ‘the people’s game.’ On receiving the prestigious ‘Footballer of the Year’ award in 1956 he stated:

Whatever success I have enjoyed in English football could not have been achieved without the co-operation, tolerance and sympathetic encouragement of the man who represents the backbone of your national game – the chap on the popular side with his cloth cap and muffler … Thank you to supporters all over the country for their many kindnesses to a German stranger in what was once an alien land.’\(^{139}\)

Trautmann owed his popularity to the fact that he was an outstanding goalkeeper who earned the respect of fans and because he conformed to the stereotype of a ‘good German’ as far as the English were concerned. His story, as Wagg points out, was – and is – used ‘as evidence of some special British capacity for forgiveness.’\(^{140}\) This, as we have seen, was not always evident in the sports pages of the popular press.

Two years after Trautmann had won his medal with Manchester City a tragedy involving Manchester’s other club provided another opportunity to nurture Anglo-German cultural relations. United, the first English club to play in the European Cup were returning from a quarter-final tie with Red Star Belgrade when their plane crashed in snow at Munich airport when it tried to take off after refuelling. Twenty-three people were killed including eight of the famous ‘Busby Babes’ – Geoff Bent, Roger Byrne, Eddie Colman, Duncan Edwards, Mark Jones.

\(^{139}\) Cited in Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 340.

David Pegg, Tommy Taylor and Bill Whelan. ‘A brilliantly promising team was destroyed’, wrote the football journalist Arthur Hopcraft. It was the loss of Duncan Edwards, who died a few weeks after his colleagues, that ‘gave the deepest, most lasting pain.’ \footnote{Hopcraft, A., \textit{The football man: People and passions in soccer} (London: Aurum, 2006), 67-68.} Among the football journalists who died were Frank Swift, former England and Manchester City goalkeeper, and Henry Rose, the opinionated but charismatic football writer for the Northern England edition of the \textit{Daily Express}, which was published in Manchester. After his death he was described as ‘the undisputed sports King of the North.’ \footnote{Dee, D., “‘Personality and colour into everything he does” – Henry Rose (1899 – 1958) journalist, celebrity and the forgotten man of the Munich disaster’, \textit{Journal of Sport History}, 41 (3), 2014, \textbf{425.445}.} Don (Donny’) Davies, who reported football for the \textit{Manchester Guardian} under the by-line ‘An Old International’ and regularly supplied match reports for BBC Radio’s iconic \textit{Sports Report} also died. ‘Old International’, according to his Guardian colleague, the distinguished cricket writer Neville Cardus, was ‘the first writer on Soccer to rise above the immediate and quickly perishable levels of his theme.’ \footnote{Cox, J., \textit{Don Davies. An Old International} (London: The Sportsman Book Club, 1963), 209-214.} It was a significant, high-profile tragedy but, as David Kynaston observes of the reaction in Manchester, ‘generally it seems to have been stoicism – the legacy of two world wars – that marked the next few days.’ This owed little to the press which exploited the human interest aspect of the story for weeks. \footnote{Kynaston, \textit{Modernity Britain}, 117.} Nevertheless, this sad event, simply because it happened in Germany and the survivors were cared for by German doctors and nurses in a Munich hospital, provided an opportunity
to heal some old wounds. It was Matt Busby, the Manchester United manager who, when reflecting on his time in Germany after the crash, stated that he had considered Germans to be ‘the enemy if you like’, but added that ‘you learn as you get older.’ Frank Taylor one of the journalists who survived claimed that he had learned to reject national stereotypes after the care he had received at the Rechts der Isar Hospital.

Professor Maurer and his staff received the warmest of receptions from United’s fans when they appeared at Old Trafford and the German national anthem was sung. Among the letters received by local newspapers in Manchester on the subject of how best to commemorate the event were many suggesting donations to the Munich hospital that had cared for the victims and travel scholarships for German nurses. The Professor was later awarded a CBE (Commander of the British Empire) by the Queen in recognition of his services. The citation read:

‘The honour which Her Majesty has conferred is intended to symbolise the appreciation and gratitude, not only of the injured, but of the many thousands of British people who have anxiously followed the progress of their recovery.’

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145 Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 341.
147 Manchester Guardian, 12 April 1958.
After decades of suspicion and hostility Munich 1958 provided a chance to rebuild trust and even friendship on a personal level, far more than any official programme or exchange could achieve. It is ironic that it was a tragedy that helped people from both countries to overcome the problems of national stereotyping and to see each other as human beings.

**Conclusion**

Considering that England and Germany had only recently emerged from a second devastating war within the living memory of many of their citizens, the first international football matches were passed off without endangering the fragile Anglo-German relationship unduly. Indeed, there were some reasons to feel optimistic about its future, especially towards the end of the 1950s by which time the two high-profile international matches were safely out of the way, Bert Trautmann had been adopted as an honorary Englishman and the English public had come to appreciate what Professor Maurer and his team at the Rechs der Isar Hospital in Munich had achieved. Though, in general, press reports and comments on Anglo-German football matches rarely referred to the sensitive subject of the war, there was an undercurrent of hostility that sometimes surfaced in the choice of metaphor (‘Blitzkrieg’, ‘Siegfried line’ etc.) and sometimes took a more overtly hostile form, especially in the populist *Daily Express* and *Daily Mirror*, whose journalists were expected to sensationalise the stories they reported. Desmond Hackett and Peter Wilson were certainly guilty on this count on occasions resorting to crude stereotypes. They did not claim to be impartial and it was made clear by the use of ‘we’ that it was England with whom they identified. Reporting
in *The Times* was rather more restrained though Green did use an extended military metaphor in his report of the 1956 match it was not a notable feature of his writing and might have been used in different circumstances, such as when reporting a domestic league match, with comment. Arguably, the oppositional nature of football invites this kind of approach. Significantly, just as concerns about relative decline were first becoming apparent in England, the achievements of the West German economic miracle were being recognised. Through the sports pages it was possible for English readers to grasp that Germany was modernising rapidly, not least because its training facilities were so new and advanced. By implication Germany was a country to emulate. As far as football was concerned, it was also a country to beat, especially after the World Cup victory in 1954. After England’s victory in Berlin in 1956 it was possible for England to look forward to the 1958 World Cup with optimism. ‘That victory over Germany, whose world title crown has been knocked badly askew since their triumph over the Hungarians at Berne in 1954 was “just the stuff to give the troops” in every sense of the phrase.’

148 Football, it seemed could provide cultural compensation even as the German economy steamed ahead.

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CHAPTER TWO: ‘Of course, a little chauvinism was in order’: England and Germany in the 1960s

After the match in Berlin in May 1956 it was nine years before England and West Germany met again at senior international level. This chapter is concerned initially with coverage of the matches played at Nuremberg in May 1965 and at Wembley in February 1966, which serve as a link with the generally benign state of Anglo-German cultural relations discussed in the previous chapter and also as a prelude to an account of coverage of the World Cup tournament of 1966 and the climactic final between England and West Germany, very much a turning point in the history of Anglo-German football.

There were significant political changes in both countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Britain, the Conservatives, led by Harold Macmillan, were re-elected in 1959, carried to victory on a wave of unprecedented affluence. After running into difficulties in the early 1960s and replacing Macmillan with Sir Alec Douglas-Home as leader, they were subsequently defeated after the general election of 1963 when Harold Wilson’s Labour Party won a narrow victory. This was confirmed when they won by a more comfortable margin in 1966, remaining in office until 1970. Wilson was determined to follow a modernizing agenda, especially in relation to the British economy. In terms of Anglo-German relations
there were difficulties and these were especially evident in the period before 1963 when Macmillan and Adenauer were in office in their respective countries. There were tensions linked to support for German reunification, German rearmament and the FRG’s financial contribution to the cost of maintaining the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). By this time, as John Ramsden observes, the West German economic miracle was ‘evoking both admiration and fear.’ In addition, when De Gaulle blocked Britain’s application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963, there were complaints that Germany had not been sufficiently supportive. As Ramsden notes: ‘The humiliation of this setback occasioned a good deal of indiscriminate chauvinism in Britain, but much was directed at Germany, for while French opposition had been anticipated, lack of German support had not.’

There were other factors, however, that were drawing Britain and West Germany closer together, notably the Cold War, especially after the East German government sealed West Berlin off from the surrounding countryside in August 1961 in an attempt to stop the outflow of its citizens to the West. Military co-operation saw German soldiers training in Pembrokeshire from 1961 despite some protests, reported by The Times under the heading ‘Call to keep out Panzers.’ Whereas Adenauer was seen as a cold and unfriendly figure, the President of the Federal Republic, Theodor Heuss, was more favourably regarded, especially after


a successful state visit to Britain in 1957, when he had presented money collected by churches in Germany for the rebuilding of Coventry Cathedral which had been badly damaged by the Luftwaffe during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{151} Eight years later, in 1965, just after the English football team played Germany in Nuremberg, Queen Elizabeth II embarked on a reciprocal visit to Germany, the preparations made by her hosts prompting the Daily Express to praise ‘the perfectionist Germans’ who were working hard to provide ‘the most expensive special train ever assembled, furnished and equipped in Germany’s history.’\textsuperscript{152} In a speech made just after arriving in Germany, the Queen spoke of the many historical links between the two countries which had so recently been enemies, reminding her audience that the British and German people had ‘for most of their history … been friends and often allies.’\textsuperscript{153} An editorial in the Sunday Times hoped that the visit was a sign ‘that this country has at last re-aligned its views about the Germans and accepts them genuinely as allies and fellow human beings.’ It pointed to West Germany’s military contribution to the Western Alliance and to the fact that the next Federal elections would see citizens born after the end of the war voting for the first time. ‘A new nation is forming, freed from, or at least not over-awed by, the legacies of the past, and it is a nation nurtured on democratic values.’\textsuperscript{154} Underlying this more positive outlook towards Germany was a realization that ‘even without reunification the Federal Republic [would] be economically the

\textsuperscript{151} Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 287-290.
\textsuperscript{152} Daily Express, 14 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{153} Daily Express, 19 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{154} Sunday Times, 16 May 1965.
strongest country in Europe.’ 155 This was important as British trade with the
Commonwealth was declining, while its trade with EEC was rising.

It is also important to note developments in European football that helped to
change attitudes in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The game had become more
thoroughly internationalized, not just through the World Cup, but through the
European Nations Championship, with a competition taking place every four
years after 1960, though England did not enter until the 1968 tournament. The
European Champion Clubs Cup, started in 1955 proved very popular and
Manchester United became the first English side to enter in 1956. The format was
so successful that a European Cup Winners Cup competition was introduced in
1961 and awareness in England was heightened when Tottenham Hotspur beat
Atletico Madrid to win in 1963 and especially when West Ham United beat TSV
Munich in the final staged at Wembley in 1965. 156 The Inter-Cities Fairs Cup,
which started in 1958, also attracted English interest with a team representing
London losing to Barcelona in the first final; Birmingham City also reached the
final in 1960 and 1961, losing to Barcelona and Roma respectively. It helped to
raise awareness that the finals of both major European club competitions were
staged at different venues each season. It certainly helped to make the competition
more popular in Britain that Real Madrid’s scintillating 7-3 win over Eintracht
Frankfurt in 1960 was played at Hampden Park, Glasgow, ‘under the noses of the

155 Macintyre, T., Anglo-German relations during the Labour governments 1964-197: NATO strategy, détente and European integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 22.
156 Tottenham Hotspur was the first club from either England or Germany to win a European
title. Dortmund was the first German club to win in Europe, winning the Cup Winners’ Cup in
1966.
British press, radio and television.’ It was also important that this was the first football match to be broadcast live across the entire continent of Europe.¹⁵⁷ For some it remains simply ‘the best game of all times.’¹⁵⁸ David Goldblatt has argued that football has had a unifying tendency in Europe, noting that UEFA, founded in 1954, had established a Europe-wide competition by 1955.¹⁵⁹ Tony Judt has made a similar point in arguing that it was football, assisted by satellite television, ‘that really united Europe’, while observing that no-one gave a thought to the Treaty of Rome when Germany played England.¹⁶⁰ All this testifies to the power of football in helping to create identity through collective memory. Indeed, Albrecht Sonntag has argued that it should be recognized as a European Lieux des Memoires.¹⁶¹

Clearly, for the English, the World Cup Final of 1966, played against West Germany at Wembley on 30 July 1966 falls into such a category which is why it has resonated so powerfully in English popular culture ever since. It is important to acknowledge, however, that this ‘memory’ has been subject from the outset to a process of mediation in which the sports pages have played a major part. James Walvin has noted: the 1966 final was ‘impossible to forget, not least because the

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¹⁵⁹ Goldblatt, The ball is round, 398-399.


media recycled the whole affair whenever it seemed appropriate – that is as often as possible.¹⁶²

The task of finding something new to say about the 1966 World Cup Final is daunting. So much has been written about this particular match. It is, without a doubt, one of the most talked and written-about matches in football history, if not the most written about. The essence of the match has been captured by Guardian journalist Simon Hattenstone:

‘In the final England eventually won with Geoff Hurst’s hat-trick and a goal from Martin Peters. It might not have been great football (the 1966 finals, unlike the finals in 1970, was not a competition for purists), but the drama was consummate. Germany take the lead. Hurst equalises with a header. Peters gives England the lead. Germany equalise in the final minutes. Extra time. Hurst blasts onto the bar and onto the goal line and possibly over. We’ll never know for sure, but it was good enough for the referee. And, in the final second, Hurst’s hat-trick screecher into the top corner.’¹⁶³

By this time, however, even the controversy regarding England’s third goal, known in Germany as Das Wembleytor, seemed to have been resolved. Research

by two Oxford University scientists using computer-generated images which allowed the trajectory of Hurst’s volley after it hit the crossbar to be traced, indicates that the whole of the ball could not have crossed the line and that the referee’s decision on the day was incorrect.\textsuperscript{164} As has been argued elsewhere the main effect of this research – which could not change the result – was ‘to take any heat that was left’ out of a debate that had been simmering for thirty years.\textsuperscript{165}

Historians have covered the 1966 tournament and final from many different angles. Martin Polley has set it firmly in the context of diplomatic history using British Foreign Office documentation and other official sources.\textsuperscript{166} Fabio Chisari began the exploration of the tournament and final as a media event, which allowed football to attract a new audience, including significant numbers of women viewers.\textsuperscript{167} Increasingly, however, the emphasis has been on how the event has been remembered and its place in the cultural history of late twentieth-century Britain. Richard Weight described the tournament as ‘a testament to how much the country had changed since the war’ and continued that ‘many still see it as part of the Golden Age of the 1960s – all the ebullient, meritocratic optimism of


the decade compressed into nineteen days of footballing action.'\textsuperscript{168} This has inevitably prompted historians to concern themselves with how the 1966 World Cup tournament and final was reported at the time and how the media has reflected on it since. Porter aimed ‘to explore the ways in which memories of 1966 have been constructed and to identify some of the processes through which they have been assimilated into England’s popular culture.’\textsuperscript{169} This approach is similar to that of Franz Josef Brüggemeier who has argued that Herbert Zimmermann’s famous radio commentary on the 1954 World Cup Final in Berne created a virtual community amongst German listeners, and generated a remembered experience that has helped to shape a modern sense of German national identity.\textsuperscript{170} The fact that this process is evident in both countries, however, does not necessarily bring the English and the Germans any closer in terms of how they perceive each other.\textsuperscript{171}

\textit{Prelude: Municipal Stadium, Nuremberg, 12 May 1965; Wembley Stadium, London, 23 February 1966}

Both the English and West German teams were under new management for this match. Walter Winterbottom’s confident hopes that England would make an impression in Sweden had been dashed by the Munich air crash and they had


underperformed in Chile. He had been replaced by one of his former players, Alf Ramsey, in 1963. Ramsey, who had won the English First Division with Ipswich Town, was determined that he alone would select the team. ‘The selection committee, as such, is finished’, the FA admitted. The new manager announced boldly that England would win the World Cup in 1966. Jonathan Wilson has noted that the match at Nuremberg was the first in which he adopted the 4-3-3 formation that was to bring England success three years later. His counterpart for the game in Nuremberg was Helmut Schön, who had in 1964 inherited a squad from Sepp Herberger that was about to blossom in the years to come. The start of the Bundesliga in 1963 had raised the level of domestic competition. Like Ramsey, he was determined to show his employers that he was in charge and did this by forcing the DFB to change its policy regarding the non-selection of Germans playing for clubs in other countries, such as Helmut Haller, Karl-Heinz Schnellinger and Horst Szymaniak, all of whom were playing in Italy.

‘It is fair to say’, wrote The Times ‘Special Correspondent’ in Nuremberg, ‘that if these two countries were engaged in a World Cup match tomorrow instead of a friendly international their teams would bear scant resemblance to the ones that will in fact play.’ With both squads depleted by injuries and players being called upon by clubs still involved in European competition much of the pre-match reporting was simply speculation regarding who was available and who

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would be picked. There were rumours that Brunnenmeier was being rested as he
would be playing for his club against West Ham in the European Cup Winners
Cup final at Wembley a week later. ‘If this is true, then the priorities here are
strange indeed’, it was observed.\textsuperscript{175} Desmond Hackett in the \textit{Express} predicted
that Ramsey would ‘put out a team of international infants to compete against
West Germany tomorrow night’, including three new caps. In the event only Mick
Jones and Derek Temple made their debuts. He anticipated ‘a rough
uncomfortable trial for England, but I feel they will emerge the victors.’\textsuperscript{176} This
proved to be correct, England winning 1-0.

There were some references in the reporting that might have been regarded
as insensitive. Frank McGhee, reporting for the \textit{Daily Mirror}, expected England
to face ‘another Nuremberg trial here tomorrow … at the stadium by the huge
Zeppelin Field, where Hitler used to hold his hysterical rallies.’\textsuperscript{177} Despite the fact
that this was a friendly match between two sides that were not at full strength
there was sufficient interest to attract a capacity crowd of 69,000. The press
reports for this match all commented on the behaviour of the German supporters.
In \textit{The Times}, the Germans had attacked in the second half ‘encouraged by the
howling of a 70,000 crowd’, though any negativity implied here was mitigated by
a reference to the generous applause given to England’s George Eastham at full

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{The Times}, 12 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Daily Express}, 12 May 1965.
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 12 May 1965.
time. Hackett was much less restrained when describing ‘the chanting, flag-waving Germans’.

‘The crowd howled their team into second-half action. I thought the furious fans would hurl themselves at the spiked-wire barriers when the referee refused to give a penalty for a rough-looking tackle. They screamed their hatred and rose in a frenzy of rage. Then they screamed their misery when Theilen was through and hit a post.’

England defended resiliently and counter-attacked effectively. They had also had some narrow escapes. This brought out the commonplace stereotypes. The Times praised ‘the character, the residence and efficiency’ shown by England in achieving victory and the Mirror’s headline emphasized ‘England’s courage.’ This drew on a discourse founded ‘on a simple set of beliefs about what it is to be English.’ It amounted to a positive affirmation of Englishness. McGhee’s match report opened with the words:

‘Germany, the nation that have (sic) never beaten England – at anything – must now be convinced that they never will.

178 The Times, 13 May 1965.

179 Daily Express, 13 May 1965.

Not after this. Not after hitting the post once, the bar once, having a shot cleared from the line and claims for two penalties from 70,000 screaming Teuton throats turned down.
Not after forcing England’s magnificent defence to the limits of its endurance on a day when the Germans turned this mighty match into a test of their skill and our courage … and courage won it.” ¹⁸¹

Unlike the two previous post-war encounters in 1954 and 1956 the match at Nuremberg was overshadowed by the prospect of the World Cup tournament to be held in England in 1966. For Hackett it had been ‘a great encouraging day.’ He had seen ‘material here that can be finally blended into a side that can earn England high honours in the World Cup next year.’ West Germany, he concluded, were only shadow of the team that had won the World Cup in 1954.¹⁸² The Times, more cautiously, merely suggested that England now had a good opportunity of finishing their summer tour unbeaten – they played and beat Sweden in Stockholm a few days later – thus providing ‘a most successful springboard into, perhaps, the most important year of English football.’ ¹⁸³

It is sometimes forgotten that England played Germany at Wembley twice in 1966. Indeed, the first match, a return friendly international on a cold February

¹⁸¹ Daily Mirror, 13 May 1965; Daily Express, 13 May 1965.
¹⁸² Daily Express, 13 May 1965.
¹⁸³ The Times, 13 May 1965.
evening, might easily be overlooked, though it generated sufficient interest to draw a crowd of 75,000 on the night. ‘With the World Cup now less than five months away’, David Downing has observed, ‘this match was inevitably deemed relatively unimportant in itself.’\footnote{184} Coverage in the English press on this occasion was far more restrained than when reporting from Nuremberg eight months earlier. Partly this was due to the nature of the match, which England won 1-0. The headline over Geoffrey Green’s match report in \textit{The Times} – ‘Unconvincing victory for England’ – seems to provide a suitable summary of the occasion.\footnote{185} Both managers had to choose their starting line-ups from squads depleted by injuries or because clubs were unwilling to release players. John Connelly pulled out of Ramsey’s squad because he had to stay at home to look after his two small children while his wife was in hospital about to give birth to a third. ‘There was a considerable chance he would have figured in an experimental forward line’, noted Desmond Hackett in an \textit{Express} story reporting predictably that the Manchester United winger had been left ‘holding the baby.’\footnote{186} The coverage – as far as England was concerned – was also much more critical, despite the victory. However, apart from a pre-match reference by Hackett to ‘the highly regimented German side’ the popular press seemed uninterested in England’s opponents on this occasion.\footnote{187} Green in \textit{The Times} also referred to the visitors only in passing acknowledging, in effect, that their strengths were very much like those usually attributed to the English.

\footnote{185}{\textit{The Times}, 24 February 1966.}
\footnote{186}{\textit{Daily Express}, 22 February 1966.}
\footnote{187}{\textit{Daily Express}, 23 February 1966.}
'Knowing the German fighting spirit, physical strength, stamina, and devotion to duty’, he argued, ‘it could be a test to reveal our abilities.'\textsuperscript{188}

Analysis of the content and language of the match reports reveals an emphasis on two significant linked themes; breaking with tradition and the Wembley crowd. Ramsey, who was inclined to take a long view, seized the opportunity to give first caps to Newton, Hunter and Hurst while giving midfielder Nobby Stiles the number 9 shirt, traditionally worn by the centre-forward. The tactically aware Ken Jones, covering the match for the \textit{Mirror} explained:

‘It may not confuse the disciplined Germans. But then it is not designed to. This is the age of all-purpose players who are required to fill out the framework of an all-purpose system. That is why Stiles is wearing No. 9. And it does not matter.’

As far as Ramsey was concerned the match provided an opportunity to see how players fitted with the 4-3-3 formation to which he now seemed committed. Critics of English football were inclined to argue that it often lagged behind the latest trends in coaching and tactics. Jones was able to point out that Ramsey was in line with new developments. ‘His faith in a 4-3-3 framework that is rapidly becoming world-wide in application is now carried into a third match.’\textsuperscript{189}

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{The Times}, 23 February 1966.
Dilwyn Porter has argued that Labour’s victory at the 1964 general election ‘suggested a quickening impulse to modernization and a willingness to look forward rather than back.’\footnote{Porter, D., “’Never-Never Land’: Britain under the Conservatives 1951-1964”, in N. Tiratsoo, (ed.), From Blitz to Blair: a new history of Britain since 1939 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), 131.} The narrow margin (0.7 per cent of the popular vote) by which Wilson’s party won, however, indicates that public opinion was not entirely comfortable with experimentation and radical change and that modernizing projects, such as that which Ramsey had embarked on in his role as manager of the English national side, were likely to encounter severe criticism if they did not produce results. In The Times, Green reported that it was a match ‘which ended largely in disappointment.’ He was ‘all in favour of free thinking and free movement’, but went on to point out that Ramsey’s ‘new methods, which [had] started so well in Madrid in December, seemed to get nowhere.’ Significantly, England’s performance left Green looking to the past rather than the present for inspiration: ‘… for much of the time one longed for something old fashioned – some fast movement along longitudinal rather than lateral lines; for the days when two passes would have done what it now takes five to achieve.’\footnote{The Times, 24 February 1966.} In the Express, Hackett took a similar view. Germany ‘always threatened with precise, fast moves’; England had ‘merely plodded ponderously forward, labouring over a plan which gave no scope to enterprise or imagination.’ Like Green he was inclined to look to the past, beyond the ‘tactical corset’ of 4-3-3: ‘The team cried aloud for wingers, for men who could hold the ball, draw the defence or sweep round in the majestic style we once saw from Matthews and Finney.’ Both Green and Hackett were agreed that the Germans had been denied ‘what looked like a
perfectly splendid goal’ when a linesman judged that the ball had gone out of play
before a cross to Heiss whose finish had been too good for Banks.\textsuperscript{192}

Jones, reporting in the \textit{Mirror}, was more realistic. ‘Certainly’, he conceded,
‘this was not the greatest of England performances but with a streak of experiment
running through the side, no one really expected it to be.’ Though more
sympathetic, he was not uncritical, admitting that 4-3-3 line-up had not allowed
England to play ‘with the freedom that Alf Ramsey seeks.’\textsuperscript{193} At the same time, he
was critical of the Wembley crowd which had given England the slow-handclap
towards the end of the game. An interview with Ramsey in an adjacent box on the
same page allowed the manager to voice his displeasure at this aspect of the match.
‘I thought it was very unfair of the crowd to boo’, Ramsey complained, ‘and it was
most extraordinary that they did so after a visiting team’s goal had been
disallowed.’\textsuperscript{194} Hackett, responding in the \textit{Express}, dismissed Ramsey’s remarks as
‘pathetic’. He explained; ‘I am bitterly against slow handclaps and jeers. But I am
equally opposed to unworthy cheers.’ He claimed that his view was in line with
that of dissatisfied England fans who had made ‘non-stop phone calls’ to the
\textit{Express}.\textsuperscript{195} A day later the sports page carried letters from readers which broadly
supported the line Hackett had taken. ‘The average soccer fan is fed up with
theories, plans, systems, call them what you will,’ claimed one reader. What he
wanted to see was ‘free-thinking, instinctive football by players operating in their

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Daily Express}, 24 February 1966.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 24 February 1966.
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 24 February 1966.
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Daily Express}, 25 February 1966.
normal club positions.\textsuperscript{196} It was clear that the modernization project which Ramsey had initiated was not universally popular at this stage.

\textbf{‘Tin soldiers’: the English press and the German team in 1966}

Coverage of Anglo-German football in 1966 has to take into account that the press was covering a tournament rather than a single match. No German team, either before or after the Second World War, had been required to stay in England for more than a few days and it is clear that manager Helmut Schön’s intention was that his players should make a good impression on and off the pitch. Having interviewed the German squad of 1966 to gather their recollections some thirty years after the event, Uli Hesse formed the view that Schön regarded this as being of paramount importance: ‘Again and again he drummed the idea into his players that the most important thing, more important than winning, was to behave like gentlemen and sportsmen.’\textsuperscript{197} In this they were generally successful. Their popularity was especially apparent at Ashbourne in Derbyshire where the squad was based for most of the tournament, the location being convenient for both Sheffield and Birmingham where group matches were to be played.

Drawing largely on reports in the local press, Peter Seddon has looked back to the summer of 1966 ‘when the Germans invaded Derbyshire’ and concluded that relations between the visitors and the locals were friendly. He observes: ‘Ashbourne residents do maintain fond memories of that “golden summer” of

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\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Daily Express}, 26 February 1966.

\textsuperscript{197} Hesse, U., Tor!, 183.
\end{flushleft}
1966 when Ashbourne became “Little Deutschland.” There were some who could not forget that Germany was the old enemy. One elderly resident, when asked if he was going to watch the squad train on the local field explained: ‘No, I’ve seen them on two fields already and that was quite enough for me.’ However, the younger generation took a different view, perhaps seduced by the glamour of their famous visitors. It was reported that ‘local schoolboys tag along their new track-suited heroes – men called Seeler and Tilkowski – whilst teenage girls hitherto immune to the subtle charms of football take a sudden interest in the silky skill of a handsome young blade named Franz.’ The leader of Ashbourne Urban District Council, Councillor Birch, wished the German team all the best, yet hoped they turned out to be runners up, ‘to England of course.’ As the tournament progressed and it became clear that England and Germany were likely to play against each other, the Ashbourne News Telegraph reported that ‘Ashbourne has taken [the] German team to its heart.’ It seemed that the only mistake made by the Germans was to leave Ashbourne for Welwyn Garden City so as to be closer to Wembley but even in the moment of departure the locals did not bear any grudges towards the Germans ‘as a large gathering bade them farewell’ and ‘schoolboys waved an ‘Auf Wiedersehen’ banner to wish them luck.’

Though this was heartening in that it demonstrated that old hostilities could be set aside, the reception accorded to the German team in the national press was less friendly. This culminated in Vincent Mulchrone’s notorious article in the Daily Mail on the morning of the final which reminded readers that ‘if Germany

beat us at Wembley this afternoon at our national sport, we can always point out to them that we have recently beaten them at theirs twice.’¹⁹⁹ It was journalism of this kind that led the West German television commentator Werner Schneider to complain after the tournament that English journalists were ‘tin soldiers’. The ex-
Luftwaffe pilot argued that the English press had gone further than simply supporting their team. Ulrich Kaiser of the Sports Information Agency in Dusseldorf was equally alarmed. Schneider explained:

‘Perhaps we have learned our lesson in World War Two. Perhaps we think more than other people how mad this thinking is. You would expect this from countries who have nothing else…but in England it is strange and sad.’

It should be recorded that Hugh McIlvanney of the Observer, a newspaper not associated with a jingoistic stance, thought that these anxieties were exaggerated:

‘Of course, a little chauvinism was in order. Reaching the final was in itself a good reason for celebration and it was hard to sympathise with the German broadcasters and journalists who claimed to be appalled by the intensity of English reactions to the team’s success.’

It was no consolation for the German visitors to be told that ‘their apprehensions were heightened by the experience of their own people,’ in other words, by their recollections of the Nazi propaganda machine.\textsuperscript{200}

Schön’s team had established themselves as serious contenders early in the tournament by sweeping Switzerland aside 5-0 in their first group stage match. ‘West Germany’s opening statement was the most impressive of the first week’, claimed Bob Ferrier in the \textit{Observer}.\textsuperscript{201} It was a performance that earned unreserved praise on the sports pages of both the quality and the popular press. On the previous evening England had been stifled by Uruguay’s retreating defence in a dull 0-0 draw at Wembley. As far as \textit{The Times} was concerned, Germany’s win at Sheffield had provided ‘a splendid evening’s entertainment.’ Green continued:

‘Strong, fast, stream-lined, and functional, they moved the ball swiftly and cleverly. There was a drive and power about their play and with it no little imagination. True, it was orthodox. But it was effective, infinitely enjoyable, and an open attacking game.’\textsuperscript{202}

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\textsuperscript{200} McIlvanney, H., (ed.), \textit{World Cup ’66} (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, (1966), 150; see also Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 353-354.
\textsuperscript{201} McIlvanney, \textit{World Cup ’66}, 51.
\textsuperscript{202} \textit{The Times}, 13 July 1966.
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Alan Thompson, writing in the Daily Express praised Germany’s ‘powerful but athletic men’ and his colleague Alan Williams saw them as ‘a potentially great side.’

Though West Germany had less reason to complain than, for example, Uruguay and Argentina, especially after the latter’s controversial quarter-final against England, press coverage of their matches became more negative as they progressed towards the final. ‘The Germans were tall, broad young men, exuding cheerful aggression,’ according to the Observer’s report of their group match against Argentina, but the military metaphor was never far from reach. ‘Heads high, chests out, the Germans tried to force their way forward like well-drilled militia’. They had been frustrated by ‘[the] Argentine guerrillas … with a splendid disregard for the Hague convention or the rules of soccer.’ In this match Albrecht of Argentina became the first of four players in the tournament to be sent off against Germany and though it was felt that he had little justification in complaining about this decision, his dismissal was soon being fitted into a developing theory centred on German gamesmanship. After two Uruguayans, Troche and Silva, had been sent off in the quarter-final the Observer’s match reporter accused the Germans of acting ‘theatrically’ when tackled. He explained: ‘In this as in most of their matches the Germans showed aptitude for the spectacular fall and a convulsive mime of agony and injury quite unreflected in the subsequent of their play.’ Helmut Haller, accused of being ‘leading actor’, had surprised McIlvanney by scoring Germany’s fourth goal ‘within minutes of

203 Daily Express, 13 July 1966.
204 McIlvanney, World Cup ’66, 59-62.
looking a complete cripple.'\textsuperscript{205} It was a view which found support elsewhere, notably in \textit{The Times} which observed that the Germans, ‘eager to assist Mr Finney (the referee) in his decisions, took some flamboyant tumbles.’\textsuperscript{206} Alan Thompson, in the \textit{Express}, joined the chorus of disapproval. They were ‘a fine side capable of winning the Cup’ but they deserved an Oscar for ‘their acting ability.’\textsuperscript{207}

This line of criticism resurfaced after Germany’s bruising semi-final against the Soviet Union, a highly physical encounter which provided reporters looking for negative stereotypes with an excuse to make use of them. It might be suggested that the Soviet team, given the political climate of the Cold War, were as likely to be characterised in this way as their opponents, especially in a right-wing newspaper such as the \textit{Express}. Clive Toye’s report did not hold back in this respect.

‘The brutish Germans helped by the lumbering Russians turned the game sour by heavy tackling and late lunging … They also played football that would turn away fans in droves from a domestic fixture. Football that would have been out of place in an English Fourth Division practice match.’\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{205} McIlvanney, \textit{World Cup ’66}, 118–122.
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{The Times}, 25 July 1966.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Daily Express}, 25 July 1966.
\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Daily Express}, 26 July 1966.
In *The Times*, Geoffrey Green reflected that there had been little artistry on display, aside from the ‘intelligent probing’ of Beckenbauer; ‘powerful order and cunning discipline’ had been the keynotes of the German performance. Moreover, as Chislenko of the Soviet Union had been sent off just before half-time, there was another opportunity to raise the questions implying cheating and gamesmanship that had first been raised seriously after the quarter-final with Uruguay. The Germans, it seemed, could not be trusted.

This was very clear in the way the *Daily Express* and the *Daily Mirror* dealt with the issue of the four players sent off against Germany. For the *Express*, it provided a pretext to remind readers of Germany’s recent history. The sports page was dominated by Desmond Hackett’s match report of England’s semi-final win against Portugal: ‘England made their history with courage, poise, effort, and a code of conduct that was admirably matched by Portugal.’ There was also space, however, for a report by Alan Williams on Helmut Schön’s angry reaction to the insinuations that his players had provoked opponents and over-reacted to physical contact. The way in which Schön’s words were framed would have left Germans in England – players, officials, journalists and supporters – in no doubt that the war had not been forgotten.

‘Helmut Schoen, West German team manager, advanced on London yesterday, “angry, upset and disillusioned.”

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Why? Because of suggestions that his *well-drilled soccer troops* had “provoked” opponents and “overacted” on their *march* to Saturday’s Wembley final.’ (author’s italics).  

Coming a few days before the final against England, it was a way of making the point that, as far as the *Express* was concerned, Germany was still on probation and that the players had yet to prove that they were ‘good’ (like Trautmann) rather than ‘bad’ Germans. The *Mirror*, while not resorting to military metaphors and reporting in full Schön’s denial of the accusation that his players were ‘the best actors outside the Royal Shakespeare Company’, nevertheless gave the oxygen of publicity to the insinuations generated by the four sendings-off. West Germany’s team manager was quoted thus:

‘To blame West Germany is a most unfair and unsporting way of interpreting the incidents. We are just as fair-minded as the English and can’t understand why such rumours are started against us. We don’t deserve the insinuations and I hope they are forgotten or the atmosphere of the final will be spoilt before the first ball is kicked.’  

The story came and went quickly but it is significant that it was given attention at all. It is clear that it made an impact on the German party. When, a day later, Franz Beckenbauer was cleared to play in the final after the second of two

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211 *Daily Express*, 27 July 1966. See also Porter and Wagner, ‘Over the line?’, 77.  
cautions he had picked up was not confirmed, the DFB’s Wilfried Gerhard went out of his way to suggest that the star midfielder was ‘an honest and frank person with a clear conscience.’

Wembley Stadium, London, 30 July 1966

England’s progress to the 1966 final was marked by a slow start but gathered momentum as they progressed. This was very much reflected in the press coverage, which became more supportive with each match. There was general agreement that the opening match against Uruguay had been a dull goalless draw, with England frustrated by their opponent’s determination not to concede at all costs. Once again, this provided an opportunity to express doubts about Ramsey’s methods. ‘England, after all these months, seasons even, of planning, plotting and training, last night found themselves frustrated’, observed Geoffrey Green in The Times.214 Desmond Hackett, in the Express, remained confident that England would be more successful when teams were forced to abandon caution in the knock-out stages but was still inclined to look backwards rather than forwards; he wanted England ‘to play English football.’

‘The present method of persisting in being “wingless wonders” cannot produce success against teams that do everything bar boarding up the goalmouth in their insistence on defence, defence, defence.

There were so many times when a well-lofted centre could have broken up the Uruguayan safe-deposit system.215

214 The Times, 13 July 1966.

The performances against Mexico and France, both 2-0 victories for the host nation, were better and it would have been difficult – not to mention unpatriotic – to criticise a team that was beginning to win its matches. Hackett captured the mood after the game with France, effectively reduced to ten men for most of the game after an injury to Herbin: ‘The progress is heartening but the manner of its achievement is depressing,’ he wrote.216

What was most significant in the press coverage of the match with France and immediately afterwards was the way in which the English newspapers rallied behind Nobby Stiles when he was cautioned by FIFA after a challenge on Jacky Simon just before England’s second goal.217 Stiles, it was later recalled, had ‘one of his least happy nights’; the referee took his name ‘for giving an opponent a running push in the back and eventually was guilty of a foul that cast doubt on England’s second goal’.218 In his autobiography, published in 2003, Stiles, a ferocious tackler, admitted that his tackle had been badly mistimed but claimed that he had intended to play the ball. ‘These things did, after all, happen from time to time in the football trenches,’ he rationalised.219 Though this brought severe criticism from the television football pundits – Manchester City manager Joe Mercer claiming that it was a foul ‘to shame English football’ – it passed almost without comment in some match reports. Green simply noted that England had


217 The tackle was on Simon, not Herbin, who had been injured earlier in the game. Porter and Wagner, ‘Over the line?’, 68, is misleading here.

218 McIlvanney, World Cup ’66, 47.

scored while ‘the brave Simon was laid low in midfield nursing the effects of a tackle.’ Hackett did not mention the incident. Ken Jones, in the *Daily Mirror*, however, did observe almost in passing that it had been ‘a tackle that was far too late to be excused by bad timing.’

Stiles, it should be noted, had not been reported by the referee for his mistimed tackle, but by a FIFA official from Brazil sitting in the stands. Following the match a FIFA disciplinary committee warned the FA, that ‘if Stiles was reported to the committee again either by a referee or an official observer, serious action will be taken.’ What seems a relatively mild rebuke in the circumstances prompted Ramsey, sensing that he was under pressure to drop Stiles from the team, to defend his player vehemently and in this he was supported by both the *Express* and the *Mirror*. In the *Express* Eric Cooper admitted that Stiles had a reputation as a hard player; his tackling had prompted ‘plenty of criticism from English clubs and players, as well as foreigners.’ But, he argued, it was not Stiles’ fault; ‘he has played the game according to instructions’ and it was unfair that he was now ‘a marked man with players, fans and referees.’ In the *Mirror* Ken Jones, who had criticised Stiles for his late tackle in his match report now backtracked, claiming that he had seen ‘far worse tackles in the other group games than the one with which he felled Simon.’ He also argued that Stiles had been unfairly treated; ‘If FIFA had felt that Stiles should be punished then they should have done so … and not branded him in public.’

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headed ‘Ramsey Defies the Stiles Witch Hunt’, Jones praised the England
manager for his decision to pick Stiles for the next match against Argentina.222
Schön and his team seem justified in their resentment of the accusations
subsequently made against them in the light of press coverage of this earlier
incident involving Stiles.

Thereafter England progressed to the final via a notorious quarter-final tie
against Argentina which had ended with Ramsey claiming that his opponents had
behaved like ‘animals’ and a semi-final victory against Portugal which justified
the praise with which it was received. At this point the press fell dutifully behind
Ramsey and the English team. Hackett, in his report of the match with Argentina,
observed:

‘Stiles had his best game of the series. Much as I resented the
high-handed action of FIFA at least it made Stiles realise he is a
great player without having to bend the laws of the game to
breaking point.’223

Argentina were routinely castigated for the negative way in which they were
perceived to have approached the game as well as for their ‘undisciplined, cynical
behaviour and flaunting of authority.’224 England had responded to provocation

with admirable restraint. As Hackett explained in the *Express*, ‘They kept their tempers. The Argentinians lost their heads – and inevitably the match.’ The statistics – out of 52 fouls in the match 33 were committed by the home team – suggest that the story may have been slightly more complicated, though the crowd and English press observers were convinced that ‘the calculated dirty play came from Argentina.’ England’s semi-final against Portugal was a totally different matter. As Hugh McIlvanney observed:

‘Perhaps exposure to the ruthless mentality that has become the norm in professional football has made cynics of us all, but most people were flabbergasted to find, at this tense stage of the World Cup, that 22 men were able to play with such combative brilliance and still remain paragons of sportsmanship. It was surely one of the most deeply satisfying matches ever seen in the competition.’

*The Times*, for once putting a brief report of a football match on its front page, noted with satisfaction: ‘Fouls were rare’.

The newspaper coverage ahead of the final was inevitably filled with expectation and optimism. This was a contrast to what had been appearing very

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228 *The Times*, 27 July 1966.
often on the front pages of British newspapers as the relative weakness of the
British economy led to pressure on the pound sterling in the summer of 1966. On
14 July the Mirror had carried banner headlines with the words ‘Britain is Deeper
in the Red’; two days later it was reporting ‘The World puts the £ under Siege’.
Front page headlines such as ‘Great! England’s Glory Boys’, on the day after
Portugal had been defeated, no doubt made a welcome change. The Express, on
the day before the final carried a front-page story about a briefing prepared for
American diplomats ahead of a visit by the Prime Minister to Washington which
made uncomfortable reading.

‘The report says flatly that devaluation of the £ has merely been
postponed by Mr Wilson’s latest austerity measures and must
still come probably within the next year.
It says that the really grave factor is the attitude and approach of
the British people as a whole.
They are, according to the American diplomatic assessment,
unwilling to roll up their sleeves and really work.
And a further criticism is the alleged disappearance, or at least
dwindling, of the old spirit of resolution in time of adversity.’

Responding to this criticism in its editorial comment column, the Express took the
view that ‘too much’ was heard about Britain’s failures and ‘too little’ about its

229 Daily Express, 29 July 1966.
achievements. It was ‘time to set the record straight.’\textsuperscript{230} The sports pages, full of positive stories about England’s footballers, pointed to Wembley Stadium as the place where this process might start.

On the day of the match the previews – apart from Mulchrone’s article in the \textit{Daily Mail} and a reference by Hackett in the \textit{Express} to ‘the Prussian army’ – were notable for the absence of military metaphors and references to the war. The only reference that Hackett made to recent history in his article for the \textit{Express} was to remind readers that Germany had come to Wembley as world champions in 1954 ‘and were whipped 3-1.’ He did not mention that Germany on that occasion had been forced to field a below strength side but confidently predicted that England would win the final by a similar score. The emphasis generally was on England and Germany as football rivals who played the game in a similar way. Hackett noted that ‘these two teams play almost identical games’; England would win ‘because they play it better.’\textsuperscript{231} An article attributed to Manchester United’s manager Matt Busby, presumably ghosted, that appeared on the same page, celebrated the final as a triumph for Anglo-Saxon methods. Busby, a Scot, was generous in his praise of the German team which included ‘four or five world class players.’ He continued: ‘That this final has materialised is a triumph of the Anglo-Saxon style over the Latin. The power play and a system of progression over skilful but less progressive football.’\textsuperscript{232}

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\textsuperscript{230} & \textit{Daily Express}, 29 July 1966. \\
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This theme was repeated with a slight variation in the *Mirror*, which observed that England and Germany had adopted the same approach in reaching the final ‘by working wisely with the same European techniques.’\(^{233}\) In *The Times*, Green also focused on what the two sides had in common: ‘Both believe in the hard tackle, both go for the ball fairly, and both will play until they drop.’\(^{234}\) By recognizing that Germany’s footballers had similar qualities to their English counterparts journalists were preparing the ground for labelling Schön’s team as worthy opponents, an important consideration whether England won or lost. The negativity that had characterized reports on Germany’s semi-final performance against the Soviet Union only a few days before, was no longer in evidence. Hackett tried to explain why Germany’s five goals against the Swiss and four against the Uruguayans should be discounted. Scoring five against ‘poor little Switzerland’ counted for little; scoring four against Uruguay, a team reduced to nine players by the end of the match, was similarly accounted as insignificant. He undermined his own case by forgetting that England had failed to score at all against Uruguay and that Germany had been 1-0 up even before two players had been sent off.\(^{235}\)

Similarly, any negativity regarding Ramsey and his ‘wingless wonders’ seemed to have disappeared. As Dave Bowen, the Welsh team manager had noted, Ramsey’s great contribution to the evolution of tactics was that he had

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\(^{233}\) *Daily Mirror*, 30 July 1966.

\(^{234}\) *The Times*, 30 July 1966.

\(^{235}\) *Daily Express*, 30 July 1966.
recognized ‘that the traditional winger was dead.’

The *Daily Express*, often his severest critic when his new system failed to bring results, now went out of its way to point out England’s highly satisfactory record under his management. They had played 43 matches, won 28, drawn nine and lost only six, while scoring 102 goals and conceding 50. Significantly, on the Monday after the final, a leading article in the *Express* was to praise Ramsey for his ‘sheer professionalism’, observing that England’s victory ‘was no death-or-glory charge, but the culmination of a long and carefully prepared campaign.’

In the *Daily Mirror*, which had tended to be more supportive, any readers who still thought that England lined up in a traditional 2-3-5 formation were given a lesson in modern tactics.

‘From the start England have used only two real strikers and their job is to use the whole width of the pitch creating passing opportunities with strong diagonal runs. See how Geoff Hurst and Roger Hunt set off when England have possession seeking to pull defenders wide and opening up gaps for others … see how [Martin Peters] performs a double role of defender and attacker, coming late into the German penalty area and trying to finish with a header or a shot.’

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236 Wilson, *Inverting the pyramid*, 148.


238 *Daily Express*, 1 August 1966.
For Ken Jones, writing on the same page, there was no doubt that an England victory would prove ‘the wisdom of their ways and the shrewdness of their strategy.’ Moreover, this would allow English football to resume the position it once had held in world football by ‘assuming once more the mantle of teachers and leaving others to enlist among the learners.’

As many commentators noted at the time, ‘what made victory all the sweeter [for England and the English] was that it came after two months of terrible economic and political news culminating in Wilson’s drastic austerity package and the six-month wage freeze.’ That the victory was achieved against Germany, which seemed immune to such problems, was an additional cause for celebration. As John Ramsden has noted: ‘The fact that England reached that pinnacle of success by “beating Germany” in a battle watched by millions of viewers added a good deal of satisfaction to the process.’ The story of the final has been recounted in various forms in the media, in the autobiographies of the players involved, in popular football histories and, more recently, by cultural historians. This means that the details of the match can be covered briefly here. In front of a crowd of 93,000, Haller opened the scoring for Germany, Hurst replying for England before half-time. Towards the end of the second half Peters performed the task that Jones had mentioned in his Daily Mirror article on the morning of the match, joining the forwards to score from fairly close range. With

240 Sandbrook, White heat, 324.
241 Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 353.
242 See, for example, Weight, Patriots, 458-464; Sandbrook, White Heat, 318-322.
England seemingly set for victory, the referee awarded a controversial free kick to Germany in the last minute of the match and, amidst confusion in the England goalmouth, the ball ran to Weber who equalized, sending the match into extra time. As if this was not sufficiently dramatic England’s third goal scored by Hurst in the first half of extra time was only awarded after the Swiss referee had consulted the Russian linesman.\(^{243}\) Then, with time running out, Hurst scored a fourth to complete his hat-trick, while a handful of over-excited England fans had already entered the field of play to celebrate. England’s 4-2 victory generated a wave of patriotic sentiment and celebrations. Thus the world championship had been decided. Geoffrey Green concluded his match report in *The Times* thus:

‘The matter was decided, dismissed. England’s players had proved Ramsey right. The Cup belonged to them and later they belonged to the jubilant, chanting crowds of the capital on what was another VE night.’\(^{244}\)

Green was not alone in comparing the post-match celebrations to VE (Victory in Europe) night in 1945, though as McIlvanney pointed out, in the circumstances, ‘this was not the most tactful analogy.’\(^{245}\)

\(^{243}\) For the controversy surrounding this goal see Porter and Wagner, ‘Over the Line?’, 80-83.

\(^{244}\) *The Times*, 1 August 1966.

\(^{245}\) McIlvanney, *World Cup ’66*, 164.
Inevitably, the English press reflected the mood of euphoria. The main feature of the match reports was that England’s victory was instantly converted into a victory for Englishness; it had been achieved by players possessing qualities that the English liked to think characterised the English people.\footnote{Porter, ‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’, 42.} As Alan Hoby put it in his match report for the \textit{Sunday Express} on the day after the match: ‘But what they will tell their grandchildren in the years to come is that it was English nerve and English heart which finally overcame the tenacious resistance of Uwe Seeler and his white-shirted men.’\footnote{\textit{Sunday Express}, 31 July 1966.} Desmond Hackett, his counterpart in the \textit{Daily Express}, a day later, was to write of ‘the spirit of England and St George’ as he described how England fought back to equalize after Haller had given Germany the lead.\footnote{\textit{Daily Express}, 1 August 1966.} As for Ken Jones in the \textit{Mirror}, the fact that England were now world champions simply proved that ‘it was right to play to our strengths.’\footnote{\textit{Daily Mirror}, 1 August 1966.} In \textit{The Times}, Geoffrey Green, referred to anonymously in his by-line as ‘Our Football Correspondent’, put the emphasis on the physical qualities traditionally associated with English – and also German – football. Writing of the England team he observed: ‘How some of them found the resilience and the stamina finally to outstay a German side equally powerful physically, equally determined, equally battle-hardened, was beyond belief.’\footnote{\textit{The Times}, 1 August 1966.}
The English press could afford to be magnanimous towards Germany in victory, especially as their players had behaved so well. Some were even prepared to admit that they were unsure if the ball had crossed the line for England’s third goal. Schön’s determination that his team should behave well meant that they behaved with great restraint despite the doubts regarding Das Wembleytor. Only after the game, at the official banquet, did anyone question the referee’s decision. ‘What is perhaps not so well understood is that Germany did not hold a grudge about the outcome, and the controversial third goal in particular’, Uli Hesse has observed. He went on to explain that he had talked to many players in Schön’s squad ‘and their comments all struck similar notes’. This behaviour meant that they could justifiably be described by The Times as ‘honourable losers.’

Hackett in the Express, probably the most likely amongst any English football writers to play at being a ‘tin soldier’, was almost even-handed in his praise for the two rivals.

‘England have won the World Cup. After that there seems little else to say, apart from a few million words to emphasize that England are the greatest.'
The Germans were pretty good too. Their behaviour on the field and on the terraces made this game an example to the rest of the world.254

It was, of course, easy to praise Germany’s performance because it reflected favourably on England who had managed to beat them.

Inevitably, given the heroic quality of the match that had taken place, battle metaphors were not hard to find. Hurst’s ability in the air was a ‘weapon’; Hunt was ‘England’s spearhead’; but there is nothing there that would not be found in reports of almost any match. Eric Cooper in the Express, invented a striking image to describe England’s fourth goal. As Hurst ran towards goal and shot, it was ‘as if a conquering army, weary from their battle, had broken into a quick march to the strains of “When the Reds go marching in”.’255 Commenting on the English press coverage in the build-up to the final, Dominic Sandbrook, while quoting isolated examples, has noted that ‘there was little of the jingoistic baiting that would be associated with future Anglo-German encounters’.256 This rings even more true in relation to coverage after the final. Brian Glanville’s match report for the Sunday Times, however, was rather different in tone. The German supporters, who had behaved so well according to Hackett, were viewed differently by Glanville: ‘The noise from the terraces was like that of a small

254 Daily Express, 1 August 1966.
255 Daily Express, 1 August 1966.
256 Sandbrook, White heat, 316.
Nuremberg rally.’ He also made a point of complaining about ‘the displeasing nature of [Germany’s] equalizing goal’, claiming that Haller had handled before Weber scored. ‘Haller’, he reported, ‘… played the ball down blatantly and undeniably with his hand.’

Glanville later changed his mind about what he had seen; he blamed ‘a trompe-l’oeil that made me, from the press gallery, believe he had handled it.’ To be fair, Alan Hoby of the *Sunday Express* was similarly misled. Nevertheless, Glanville’s account of the match is notably less sympathetic towards England’s opponents than those in other newspapers.

Glanville also stands out in giving only reluctant praise to Ramsey. After commending the way that the England team had been prepared and organized, he added that: ‘This [credit], however much one may disagree with his basic philosophy of football, one gives most happily to Mr Alf Ramsey.’ Glanville was not impressed by Ramsey’s dour pragmatism. It is clear that he held Jimmy Greaves — ‘quintessentially Cockney, a “boy-wonder” still more remarkable than Charlton’ — in very high regard. ‘His turn of speed was extraordinary,’ Glanville observed, ‘his confidence more remarkable still, his left foot a hammer, his instinct for being in the right place near goal almost psychic.’ Yet Ramsey seemed to distrust Greaves’s talents preferring work-rate to flair. ‘He is suspicious of genius unless it comes drenched in sweat’, as McIlvanney noted. It was clear

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259 *Sunday Times*, 31 August 1966.


261 McIlvanney, *World Cup ’66*, 166.
even at this moment of triumph that Ramsey had great difficulty in dealing with the press. Geoffrey Green described him as ‘intractable’ and ‘withdrawn’; Clive Toye in the Express, after a press conference, observed that ‘Ramsey in victory was even less amiable than Ramsey in defeat.’

However, in the aftermath of the 1966 final and for some years afterwards it was difficult to criticize the man who had proved his critics wrong, stuck to the methods he believed in and delivered the World Cup to England. Danny Blanchflower, former Northern Ireland captain, writing in the Sunday Express, provided the most objective press account of the match to appear in the English press. England had won, he argued, ‘because more than anything else, they had home advantage.’ Germany had been the better team in the first half, ‘more tidy and efficient-looking all round’. In attack Ball and Hurst had put in outstanding performances that had effectively ‘won the game’, but England tended to favour ‘defensive methods rather than attacking ones.’ As David Downing has noted, Blanchflower was denounced as a ‘traitor’, even though his criticisms had appeared in an article headed ‘Now I must pay tribute to Alf Ramsey’. Blanchflower had not expected Ramsey’s England to advance beyond the quarter-finals and admitted that he had been proved wrong.

262 The Times, 1 August 1966; Daily Express, 1 August 1966; For Ramsey’s attitude to press criticism see Bowler, Winning isn’t everything, 207-208.

263 Sunday Express, 31 July 1966; Downing, Best of enemies, 117.
Generally, however, Ramsey could be sure of favourable treatment. ‘[He] does not have to answer to anybody. He did what he said he would do’, wrote McIlvanney just after the competition was over.\textsuperscript{264} As the \textit{Daily Mirror}'s Ken Jones observed:

‘The success of his side silences those who doubted the man and his ways of working. It does more. It boosts a country that is in need of it and a game that will gain much from it.’

In football, at least, Britain was ‘once more, among the advance guard, no longer in the wake of others.’\textsuperscript{265} Ramsey seems to have been very aware of the idea that England’s victory was reversing a historical trend. He admitted that England were unlikely to match the technique of some European and Latin American teams. ‘We Englishmen are built differently’, he explained, but ‘from the fact that we won the cup, it can be taken that we have caught up.’\textsuperscript{266} At a time when many feared that British power was diminishing and that its economy was falling behind this was a consolation.

It is also important to note what the press did not report on in any depth during the tournament itself and after England had won. There were controversies relating to the way in which the tournament had been staged and managed which

\textsuperscript{264} McIlvanney, \textit{World Cup ’66}, 167.

\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 1 August 1966.

\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Daily Express}, 1 August 1966.
prompted criticism in some countries who believed that the host nation had been given an advantage.\textsuperscript{267} England had played all their games at Wembley and thus avoided the inconveniences of travelling to various venues and having to change hotels and training camps. They were due to play their semi-final at Liverpool (Goodison Park) but the match was switched to Wembley leading to complaints that they had been helped. West Germany, for example, played matches in Sheffield, Birmingham and Liverpool, and then had to move their base from Derbyshire to Welwyn Garden City to be nearer London for the final. There was also much criticism, especially from South America, about the list of referees for the tournament in which Europe (especially Northern Europe) tended to be over-represented and which included four from England and one each from Scotland and Wales, as well as criticism of appointments to particular matches, though these were almost certainly ‘unwise rather than sinister.’\textsuperscript{268} With only four referees from South America (one each from Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay), Downing has concluded that the teams from Southern Europe and Latin America were ‘at a definite disadvantage.’\textsuperscript{269}

‘The controversial England-Argentina quarter-final – not so much a football match as an international incident’, according to McIlvanney – was the source of much discontent.\textsuperscript{270} As Brian Glanville later observed: ‘The Wembley match, or fiasco, would reverberate for years to come, would polarise European and South

\textsuperscript{267} Porter, ‘Egg and chips with the Connellys’, 534-535.

\textsuperscript{268} Wilson, \textit{Anatomy of England}, 122.

\textsuperscript{269} Downing, \textit{Best of enemies}, 107.

\textsuperscript{270} McIlvanney, \textit{World Cup ’66}, 111.
American football, evoking almost paranoid reactions from the River Plate.\textsuperscript{271} Though this was reported in the English newspapers it was inevitably a minor theme while the focus remained firmly on the progress of the national team. The \textit{Daily Mirror}, for example, informed its readers that ‘the angry men of South American soccer’ were ‘about to launch a counter-attack on the standard of World Cup refereeing.’ It also noted that newspapers in several countries had ‘attacked the choice of English and German referees for Saturday’s quarter-finals while England and Germany remained in the competition.’\textsuperscript{272} These details, however, were minor features of an article about possible disciplinary action against Ramsey for denouncing the Argentinians as ‘animals’ after the fiasco at Wembley. With the trophy secured, the \textit{Daily Express} published a collection of quotes from foreign newspapers praising England’s performance in the final under the heading ‘World Salute’, including one suspiciously unidentified quote from a German newspaper: ‘Bravo. The players from the Motherland have done it for the first time.’ ‘The Argentines’, it was noted, were ‘off key again’; they had denounced the English as ‘Lucky Pirates’.\textsuperscript{273}

While the mood of celebration reigned, English newspapers saw no reason to remind readers that football fans in other countries might look at events differently. The \textit{Sunday Express} front page headline on 31 July with reference to the post-match events was ‘It’s Jubilation Night.’\textsuperscript{274} \textit{The Times} was exceptional in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{271} Glanville, \textit{Story of the World Cup}, 147.
\item \textsuperscript{272} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 26 July 1966.
\item \textsuperscript{273} \textit{Daily Express}, 1 August 1966.
\item \textsuperscript{274} \textit{Sunday Express}, 31 July 1966.
\end{itemize}
this respect. Its first front page after the final featured a photograph of the German team’s parade through Frankfurt on their return from London and a report headed ‘Supporters claim “You won”.’ It also carried quotes from several German newspapers which effectively disputed England’s right to the title of world champions and questioned the validity of England’s third goal. *Bild am Sonntag* was cited – ‘prevailing opinion of all eye-witnesses: “no goal”’, describing *Das Wembleytor* as ‘the most discussed, most universally contested goal in the history of football.’ *Welt am Sonntag*’s match report headline, ‘Russian Linesman decides world championship’, was also mentioned.\(^{275}\) Fabio Chisari has suggested that this was an example of *The Times*’ ‘Olympian detachment’.\(^{276}\) However, it has to be remembered that, even though it was a newspaper of great political influence, it had a much smaller circulation (around 254,000 in 1965) than the *Express* (3.9 million) or the *Mirror* (5.1 million) and was less reflective of popular sentiment.\(^{277}\) Another aspect of the press coverage that merits attention is the assumption that people in all parts of the United Kingdom were fully behind England throughout the competition. London-based newspapers especially were inclined to underestimate regional and national differences. Yet there was huge disappointment in the North-West when England’s semi-final was moved to Wembley. ‘Liverpool as much as any competing nation had reason to resent the decision to play England’s semi-final at Wembley,’ claimed McIlvanney, writing

\(^{275}\) *The Times*, 1 August 1966; Porter and Wagner, ‘Over the line?’, 75-76.


soon after the event.’ Moreover, some Scots still regarded England as the ‘auld enemy’. Denis Law (Manchester United and Scotland) ‘refused to watch the match’ and played golf instead. When he heard the ‘great roar from the clubhouse’ he knew England had won: ‘It was the blackest day of my life.’ These complexities tended to get lost in the bigger story about how Alf Ramsey and his boys had restored national pride.

**England’s ‘fatal victory’: 1966 and all that**

The *Sunday Express* on the day following the final included a special four-page ‘World Cup Souvenir’ supplement, written from the perspective of 1986 and looking back on ‘The Day It Happened’. It included such items as Nobby Stiles, (‘I’m a grandpa now’) looking back on ‘The greatest day of my life’ and a full page on ‘That Swinging Summer’:

‘And so it was, as every middle-aged ex-mod or ex-dolly will cheerfully confirm. Either by coincidence or divine planning, England’s World Cup triumph came smack on time to crown an era. In the memory the images are all happily jumbled, just as the conquest of Everest and Roger Bannister’s four-minute mile

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278 McIlvanney, H., *World Cup ’66*, 129.

are forever linked in the mind with the celebration of the Coronation.\textsuperscript{280}

The \textit{Sunday Express} was correct in assuming that by 1986 ‘the boys of 1966’ and what they achieved would be deeply embedded in English popular culture.

The story of the final has been repeated so many times and in so many forms that it is familiar even to those not born at the time it happened. A statue of England captain Bobby Moore stands outside the new Wembley Stadium; an earlier statue of Moore, holding the trophy aloft with team-mates Geoff Hurst, Martin Peters and Ray Wilson, was erected outside West Ham United’s ground in the East End of London.\textsuperscript{281} The words with which BBC commentator Kenneth Wolstenholme described England’s fourth goal – ‘Some people are on the pitch. They think it’s all over. It is now!’ – have become so well-known that they are often repeated in affectionate remembrance or even parody. The BBC named a television panel show \textit{They Think It’s All Over} while a film entitled \textit{They Think It’s All Rovers} tells the story of Doncaster Rovers Football Club and its relegation from the Football League after 75 years in 1998.\textsuperscript{282} More recently, it has been used as the title of a blog aiming to ‘provide intelligent and reasoned discussion of all manner of topics in the football world.’\textsuperscript{283} As a story of English heroism it has become ‘in effect, a powerful self-sustaining myth that has been wired into the

\begin{itemize}
\item [280] \textit{Sunday Express}, 31 July 1966.
\item [281] \url{http://www.bobbymooreonline.co.uk/statues.html}; accessed 21 October 2014.
\item [282] \url{http://www.liontv.com/London/Productions/They-Think-It-s-All-Rovers}; accessed 2 March 2011.
\item [283] \url{http://theythinkitsallover.wordpress.com/}; accessed 2 March 2011.
\end{itemize}
nation’s collective consciousness.’\textsuperscript{284} The fact that the event was televised and watched, in black and white, by an estimated UK audience of over 30 million ensured that it was a widely-shared experience. ‘I roar in the living-room in Isleworth in front of the black-and-white TV’, remembers David Thomson in his book 4-2 which attempts to recapture the experience as it was at the time it happened for most English people.\textsuperscript{285}

Thomson also reflects on what the winning the World Cup meant for English football after 1966: ‘Let’s just say that there were ways in which England’s victory in 1966 victory made later defeats more likely.’\textsuperscript{286} In this he anticipated the observations of Downing and other football writers who have argued that ‘the real loser in 1966 was English football’ in that ‘Ramsey’s success reinforced English insularity and reduced what willingness there was to learn from abroad, thus condemning the national game to the status of a backwater.’\textsuperscript{287} Downing’s depiction of 1966 as ‘the fatal victory’, as Dilwyn Porter has argued, has parallels with much of the declinist history of post-war Britain appearing in the 1980s, such as Correlli Barnett’s Audit of War which blamed many of the problems of the British economy on the way in which victory over Germany had been achieved in 1945.\textsuperscript{288}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{284} Porter, D., ‘Egg and chips with the Connellys’, 519-522.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Thomson, D., 4-2 (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), 208.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Thomson, 4-2, 221.
\item \textsuperscript{287} Downing, Best of enemies, 118.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Porter, ‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’, 43.
\end{itemize}
Imagining the reaction after the final whistle had blown Thomson, in 1996 with the advantage of hindsight, writes:

"Well, that’s that,” said however many million people, settling into the rest of champions. And with it there must come a thought – we have won, we can relax, but if we ease off will we ever know how to win again?“

A polemicist, especially if they were from Germany, might point out that England are still enjoying their champion’s rest in that they could not repeat the success of 1966 in the years since. And if there was a chance, coincidentally there was always Germany in their way, either in open play as in 1970 and 2010 or a penalty shoot-out as in 1990. This suggests that English football, having enjoyed supremacy in international matches up to 1966, entered a period of relative decline in relation to Germany thereafter. Since 1966, teams representing West Germany/Germany have achieved considerable success in major international competitions, never failing to qualify for the final stages of the World Cup. England have reached the semi-finals once in 1990, the quarter-finals on five occasions (1970, 1982, 1986, 2002 and 2006) and the first knock-out stage twice (1998, 2010). In 1974, 1978 and 1994, England failed to even qualify for the finals. This pattern has been confirmed by Germany’s superior performances in the European championships. Yet Kuper and Szymanski, arguing from an economist’s perspective, observe that England are performing within their

289 Thomson, 4-2, 208.
abilities given the size of the population and the social composition of the national team. This helps to explain why, when writing about England’s victory in 1966, English historians tend to see it as marking the end of an era rather than the beginning. For Dominic Sandbrook, for example, it was ‘like the last day of a long, lazy summer about to be swept away by the winds of autumn.’

Chris Young has reflected on ‘Two World Wars and one World Cup’, a terrace chant much favoured by English fans at matches against Germany in the 1970s and 1980s when English football – along with much of British industry – seemed to be losing ground to foreign rivals.

‘What Ramsey, his team’s victory and the legacy of 1966 stood for in fact was not the beginning of anything but the end. In hindsight and over the years, it has come to stand not even for the end of a glorious past, but the end of believing there ever had been one.’

Thus it might be argued that the World Cup final of 1966 was an event that the English had to remember while in Germany, subsequent success made it relatively easy to forget. As a cultural reference point which both nations shared it helped to shape Anglo-German cultural relations in the thirty years that followed. If

290 Kuper, S. and Szymanski, S., Soccernomics: Why England loses, why Germany and Brazil win, and why the U.S., Japan, Australia, Turkey and even India are destined to become the kings of the world’s most popular sport (New York: Nation Books, 2009), 32-39.


England and Germany should ever find themselves at war again, Peter Beck has observed, it will be a case of ‘don’t mention the football.’

**Conclusion**

As Michael Billig has argued, the sports pages are where nationalism is found in its most banal form. It is there that flags are waved daily for ‘us’, and ‘our heroes’ and ‘our victories’ are celebrated. Football writers in the English press in 1966 undoubtedly got behind the home team and banal nationalism was evident in their representations of ‘our boys’. Desmond Hackett, to take the obvious example, made little effort to take an objective stance and there were elements of bias in what he did and did not write about in the *Daily Express*. It was, perhaps, excusable in the circumstances to be overcome by patriotic sentiment. The atmosphere at the final was a huge party with an English national subtext but the joyous eruption of feelings at the final whistle was understandable. Arthur Hopcraft, a seasoned football reporter but quite unlike Hackett in his approach, recalled that he had ‘shouted like everyone else, and congratulated myself on being English with all the acclamation at my command.’

Military metaphors were used as teams met on the battlefields of sport. However, though those German commentators who complained about Fleet Street’s ‘tin soldiers’ had some justification, especially after Germany’s semi-final win over the Soviet Union, they would have had little to complain about in the way the English press

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293 Beck, P., ‘The relevance of the “irrelevant”: football as a missing dimension in the study of British relations with Germany’, *International Affairs*, 79 (2), (2003), 408.


reported the final itself and in its aftermath, especially as they could agree that Schön’s team had been worthy opponents who had contributed to an exciting contest and behaved honourably in defeat. It was, of course, easier to write in this way in the light of an English victory. Also, given the nature of the competition, England was playing other countries as well as Germany and this may also have been a factor, deflecting attention from the old enemy and modulating the way in which it was represented. ‘The Argentines’, as the Express called them, had a much worse press.

‘On the whole, past events were kept in the background’, Downing has noted, though there were exceptions, such as when the Sun reminded readers that ‘England have never lost to Germany – at soccer either.’296 However, even if the war was rarely mentioned in sports coverage, it may have been an unspoken presence of which people hardly needed to be reminded. BBC journalist John Humphrys, a Welshman and not a soccer fan, recalled the 1966 final as the only game he had ever watched from beginning to end ‘because it had nothing to do with football and everything to do with the war. The Germans were still the enemy and we had beaten them again’.297 In their ghosted autobiographies some of the England players have made specific references to the war and how it entered their thoughts at the time. Jack Charlton, in his ghosted autobiography, published in 1996, recalled, simply:

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296 Downing, Best of enemies, 110.
297 Cited in Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 353.
‘I was quite confident that we could beat the Germans in the final. We had beaten them a couple of times in the previous year or so, and I saw no reason why we should not do it again. To be honest, I was glad that West Germany had beaten the Russians in the semis, because I felt that the Russians would have been more of a threat to us.’

He is, however, also quoted by Downing as reflecting: ‘we had waged a war for six years against Germany…and now we were preparing to do battle on the football pitch.’ So it is possible that he had more than football on his mind as he prepared for the match. Geoff Hurst recalled ‘a residue of bitterness towards the Germans.’ Martin Peters claims that the sufferings endured by his wife’s family through German bombs in the war made him feel that he had ‘an added responsibility.’ However, these memoirs were published many years after 1966 and it is possible that reflected what the authors or their ghost-writers thought they should say then rather than reflecting accurately their thoughts at the time. As Joyce Woolridge has observed of ghosted autobiographies, ‘ghost and footballer work [together] to produce a representation of the footballer’s image to be

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299 Downing, Best of enemies, 110. No source is given for the words attributed to Charlton here.


presented to the public.’

In short, in 1966, there were many reasons not to mention the war, even – perhaps especially – for those for whom it was a vivid memory. England goalkeeper Gordon Banks who had served in the British army in Germany during his period of national service and was married to a German woman was surely well aware of the complexities of the Anglo-German relationship. Ramsden concludes that the press was ‘less careful’ but restraint was in order, especially while Schön and his players were so determined to be good ambassadors for their country while in England. Thus the press reports and comment analysed suggests that, while there were occasions when German sensitivities were offended, this happened less frequently than might have been expected. Overtly anti-German attitudes were not often expressed and this applied especially in relation to the final, seen by some as a pretext to celebrate ‘Anglo-Saxon’ football. Downing has summed it up neatly:

‘Given the frenetic outpouring of nationalism and worse that had accompanied England’s progress to the final, the country could conceivably have witnessed an eruption of bad feelings towards the enemy of two world wars and a million comic strips. It didn’t happen. Perhaps the old illusion that politics and sport

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303 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 353.
belonged to separate universes still had influence; perhaps the last war was now a sufficiently distant memory. Or perhaps the Germans no longer made such good enemies as they once had: both their values and their football were too similar to England’s own – in the hot light of unreason it was easier to hate the Latin nations with their sensuous skills and their general untrustworthiness.\(^{304}\)

It is important, however, to keep the events of 1966 in perspective. Maybe Germany was not England’s real football enemy. Alf Ramsey is often quoted as saying: ‘I’d rather anybody beat us than the bloody Scots.’\(^{305}\)

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\(^{305}\) Bowler, *Winning isn’t everything*, 159.
CHAPTER THREE: ‘For the loser now will be later to win …’, 1968 – 1978

Having failed to secure a win against England in matches at international level up to and including the World Cup Final of 1966, Germany finally achieved victory in a friendly at Hanover on 1 June 1968. For Ramsey’s team the match was part of their preparations for the final stages of the European Nations Championship to be held in Italy a few days later where they first lost a semi-final to Yugoslavia – Alan Mullery becoming the first Englishman ever to be sent off while playing for his country – and then beat the Soviet Union to achieve third place. This was the last occasion before 2000 when England outperformed Germany in a major tournament. Thus, though the match itself was of little importance, it was later seen to mark the end of an era. As Brian Glanville observed, ‘Nevertheless, after sixty-seven years, a win was a win.’ Though the English could console themselves with the successes that its club sides enjoyed in Europe – Alex Stepney, Nobby Stiles and Bobby Charlton joined the England squad late having just helped Manchester United win the European Cup by beating Benfica at Wembley – the English national side performed badly over the next ten years, failing to qualify for the final stages of the 1974 and 1978 editions of the World Cup and making little impact in the European Nations Championships, failing to qualify for the final stages in 1976 and, though drawing

with Belgium and beating Spain, failing to progress beyond the group stage in the finals staged in Italy in 1980.

Meanwhile for West Germany, the 1970s marked the beginning of a run of unprecedented successes in major tournaments. Having beaten England in the quarter-final of the 1970 World Cup in Mexico, they went on to finish third in the tournament. Then, having beaten England again at the same stage of the European Nations Championship in 1972, they went on to win the competition. This success was followed by victory in the World Cup in 1974 and further success in the European Nations tournament, finishing second in 1976 and winning for a second time in 1980. As Uli Hesse, writing of the situation in the mid-1970s observes: ‘West Germany had lifted the World Cup for a second time, only two years after winning the European Championship. All seemed well.’

Though English clubs enjoyed great success in European competition, winning the European Champion Clubs Cup in five successive seasons before the UEFA ban following the Heysel Stadium tragedy in 1985, and also making a significant impact in the Cup-Winners’ Cup and the Inter-City Fairs/UEFA Cup, this did not easily translate into success for the national team. Apart from the argument – repeated with increasing frequency as the 1970s progressed – that the interests of the national team were being sacrificed in the interests of the Football League and its member

clubs – it has to be remembered that successful English club sides owed much to players from other countries, especially Scotland. The Leeds United team defeated by Bayern Munich in the 1975 European Cup Final comprised five Scots, one Welshman, one Irishman and only four Englishmen. Scotland, it might be noted, reached the finals of the World Cup in both 1974 and 1978 when England failed to qualify.

Anglo-German football relations in this period covered by this chapter were conducted in a different cultural climate from the 1960s. England had won the World Cup in 1966 and this momentous occasion was still fresh in people's memories. Inevitably, the England teams that followed stood in the shadow of their illustrious predecessors and what they had achieved. The 1966 team became, as James Walvin has argued, ‘a talisman against which all subsequent English teams have been compared – unfavourably.’\textsuperscript{309} It also meant that Germany’s subsequent achievements tended to accentuate the idea that England was now failing. The backdrop of a comparatively poor economic performance also remained in place, prompting one economic historian to claim that by the early 1980s, the only ‘miraculous’ aspect of post-war British history was the ‘failure to take part in the progress of the rest of the industrialised world.’\textsuperscript{310}

On a political level, however, Britain and the Federal Republic drew closer together. After being thwarted by De Gaulle in the 1960s, the British government

\textsuperscript{309} Walvin, J., \textit{The only game: Football in our times} (London: Longman, 2001), 143.

made a successful bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC). Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Brussels Treaty in 1972 bringing Britain into membership from 1 January 1973. Heath, a convinced Europhile, pursued a strategy which aimed ‘to get into the Community as soon as possible, and then solve any difficulties that remained, from the inside.’ British membership was confirmed when Harold Wilson, after Labour had returned to power in 1974 and negotiated some changes in the treaty, called a referendum in June 1975, mainly to resolve differences on the issue within his own party. Though the vote was strongly in favour of Britain staying in, there was little enthusiasm for ‘Europe’. The ‘Yes’ vote, as Sean Greenwood observed, signalled ‘essentially the approval of a confused and bored population voting for the status quo and taking their lead from the Government which, in March, had recommended them to do so.’ The British were ‘reluctant Europeans’ and have remained so ever since, whatever the formal state of inter-governmental relations.

As ‘Europeans’ the Germans had to learn to live with this problem. Moreover, whatever the state of the formal relationship between the two nation states, an undercurrent of anti-German hostility still existed, an opinion poll revealing in 1974 that the Germans ‘were among the British people’s least popular foreigners’, liked by only 13 per cent of those questioned. Such feelings were strongest among 18-24 year olds, a generation born after the war, but who had been exposed to negative stereotyping of Germans in children’s comics and British war films. Not surprisingly, they thought that Germans were ‘violent, lacking in tolerance and

311 George, S., Britain and European Integration since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 49.
unfriendly.’ It probably did not help that they now seemed to be better than the English at football with two World Cup wins to England’s one after 1974.

Remaining in membership of the EEC was probably a wise decision given the instability that followed the massive rise in world oil prices in 1973 which made it much more difficult for Britain to live with its long-term economic problems. After 1973 these presented themselves in the shape of high inflation, low productivity, rising unemployment and poor industrial relations. In each of these areas Britain’s economic performance continued to lag behind West Germany’s. For example, statistics published by the International Labour Office showed that the number of days lost to strikes per thousand employees averaged 585 in Britain between 1970 and 1974 compared to only 49 in the Federal Republic. Towards the end of the 1970s two of England’s best footballers, Kevin Keegan and Tony Woodcock, left to join SV Hamburg and FC Köln respectively. When they returned, their impressions of how things were done better in the Bundesliga than in the Football League helped in their own way to underline the differences between the Germans and the English. ‘Generally speaking’, notes David Downing, ‘… both Keegan and Woodcock seemed highly impressed and were eager to bring the lessons they’d learned home with them.’ German players, workers in its football industry, trained harder, had a higher level of technical ability and applied themselves more strategically; the approach in


West Germany was ‘generally more scientific’. In comparison, ‘[the] English game was still far too full of “good, honest players” who merely worked hard.’\textsuperscript{315}

To many economic commentators this summed up some of the key differences between the industries of the two countries and helped to explain why the Germans continued to forge ahead.

In these circumstances - and when the frustration generated by lack of success at international football is taken into account - it is not surprising to find a more hostile tone appearing in newspaper report and comment around the England-Germany matches of the 1970s. It is important, however, to keep a sense of perspective. While the problems that Britain faced in the 1970s are impossible to deny, it has been in the interest of both the Conservative right and the New Labour left to promote the idea that the 1970s were a total disaster, ignoring some of the more positive aspects of the decade. Dominic Sandbrook’s recent work is a sign that British historians are beginning to re-assess the 1970s and to challenge some of the myths that have entered popular discourse. ‘But we often forget’, he writes, ‘that most Britons, whether young or old, were not very interested in politics and continued to lead happy, prosperous lives, indifferent to the great public affairs of the day.’ He adds: ‘Even during the dreadful economic crisis of 1973-4, most still led relatively comfortable, affluent lives.’\textsuperscript{316} A survey conducted by the New Economics Foundation in 2004 which focused on


\textsuperscript{316} Sandbrook, D., \textit{State of emergency: the way we were: Britain, 1970-1974} (London: Allen Lane, 2010), 10-11.
measuring ‘domestic progress’ rather than economic performance concluded that ‘Britain was a happier country in 1976 than it had been in the thirty years since.’\textsuperscript{317} Perhaps this helps to explain why, though the tone of press coverage of Anglo-German football relations changed in the 1970s, it did not cause offence in the way that it did in the 1990s, for example. We should also be careful not to treat the 1970s as if each year were the same. The end of the long post-war boom in 1973 changed the outlook and justified the idea that Britain, along with many other countries was experiencing a crisis. However, even as early as 1978, as another revisionist notes, ‘it appeared as though perhaps the worst had passed for James Callaghan’s minority administration’, not least because inflation was coming down and the number of strikes was falling.\textsuperscript{318} It is against this background that England lost the ascendancy it had previously held over Germany in international football.

\textit{Niedersachsenstadion, Hanover, 1 June 1968}

It was inevitable that the shadow of the recent past should hover over the first meeting between England and West Germany since the 1966 World Cup Final with its controversial \textit{Wembleytor}, even though it was otherwise a rather meaningless fixture for both sides. Reporting from Hanover, two days before the match, Geoffrey Green in \textit{The Times}, noted that Germany will, of course, ‘wish revenge for that World Cup final and that debatable goal which is still talked about’. As for England, Ramsey’s priority was not the friendly with Germany but...


\textsuperscript{318} Turner, \textit{Crisis?}, 256.
the forthcoming European Nations Championship which he wanted to win ‘so that he can silence all the whispers about Wembley itself having won us the World Cup.’

‘1966’ was now routinely inserted into press discourse in relation to Anglo-German football, at least in English newspapers. Under the headline ‘Into Europe again: GERMANY NEXT LADS!’, which seemed to invoke the spirit of 1944, Desmond Hackett in the Daily Express, previewed the match as ‘a repeat of the World Cup Final’ and reported a day later that ‘England will field the smallest complement of World Cup players since the Wembley triumph over West Germany two years ago.’ Ken Jones, in the Mirror, having avoided references to 1966 in his pre-match dispatches from Hanover, claimed in his match report that it had been ‘[one] which the Germans eagerly billed as a repeat of the World Cup Final.’

However, even though it became clear that Ramsey was unlikely to select a full-strength side, the English press did not expect defeat. Hackett was especially confident that England would remain ‘the unbeatables of Europe.’ He was convinced that ‘England, as they always have done, will beat the Germans soundly and add to an unbeaten record in Europe which has extended over 16 internationals.’ Though Green in The Times and Jones in the Mirror were less bombastic, they were not anticipating defeat. Green previewed the match against a country that had only narrowly lost to England in a World Cup Final two years

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319 The Times, 1 June 1968.
320 Daily Express, 31 May, 1 June 1968.
321 Daily Mirror, 3 June 1968.
322 Daily Express, 1 June 1968.
earlier as ‘just the sort of pipe-opener needed by England’; Jones argued that England could approach ‘this prestige friendly with confidence that has grown out of an unbeaten run this season and a remarkable record abroad over the past few years.’ Perhaps it did not help to develop a more balanced view that the principal football journalists for the main newspapers were so embedded within the England squad when it travelled abroad. Significantly, Hackett referred to ‘Nobby’ and not ‘Stiles’, as if he was on friendly terms with him; he further underlined the impression that he was an insider when he described Ramsey’s reaction after learning that Ray Wilson was unfit: ‘the boss was annoyed.’

‘Football, too, has its non-events’, observed Brian Glanville in the *Sunday Times* on the day after West Germany had won, ‘and this match at Hanover was one of them.’ A day later, Green tried to enliven his report of a ‘boring’ match for the benefit of *Times* readers in typical fashion.

‘But basically here was a match of disarray, of thundery, draining heat, and of a soft, unruly ball. It quite failed the setting of a fine stadium, light-headed with flags. It offered neither the feeling of a deep note on the cello, nor the excitement of a climbing bird. It was flat.’

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323 *The Times, Daily Mirror*, 1 June 1968.
324 *Daily Express*, 1 June 1968.
325 *Sunday Times*, 2 June 1968.
He consoled his readers however, with the idea that, as defeat ‘had to happen sometime’, it was better that it had happened in a friendly when there was ‘nothing at stake beyond a reputation.’ He quoted Helmut Schön as if to underline the point that the result had not been especially significant. For Germany, the result had been better than the performance, but ‘we were below full strength, like you.’

For David Downing the occasion was notable for ‘England’s less than friendly approach to the game’. He mentions, in particular, a late tackle by Labone on Weber ‘and a gratuitously violent assault on Overath by Norman Hunter.’ Though there was some acknowledgement of this in the match reports carried by English newspapers it was put in perspective by complaints of German over-reaction, a theme that had been evident in coverage of Germany’s run to the final in 1966. As Ken Jones observed in the Mirror, ‘(the) Germans showed a talent for embellishing their pain with histrionics.’ Though, at least, this amounted to an admission that someone – presumably Labone and Hunter – had caused some pain. Jones was effectively taking his line from Ramsey who had raised the issue in his post-match press conference. It was to become a major theme for Jones after England’s European Nations matches in Italy when he argued that the Yugoslav team that played Italy in the final had been more inclined to stay on their feet after being tackled than they had when beating England in the semi-

326 The Times, 3 June 1968.
327 Downing, Best of enemies, 121.
328 Daily Mirror, 3 June 1968.
final. Jones suggested that, if Yugoslavia had been playing England, they would have behaved differently.\textsuperscript{329} ‘England’s opponents are now eager to find the floor,’ he claimed.

For Desmond Hackett in the \textit{Express}, however, England had failed against Germany – thus bringing to an end ‘a triumphant European invasion starting in 1963’ – because they had lacked the will to win. Under the dramatic headline ‘ENGLAND SURRENDER’, Hackett explained that it was the abject manner of England’s performance that was so disappointing.

‘But I was depressed by the thought it was not so much that England were beaten, more that they forlornly surrendered. The forwards had no urge, no passion, no patriotism. It appeared to them this was just another shirt, just another match.’

The idea of England ‘surrendering’ to Germany was clearly unappealing after two World Wars and one World Cup. It was typical however, that it was the absence of ‘passion’ and ‘patriotism’ that was to blame for England’s performance rather than any technical deficiencies. This could be partly explained by the busy schedule to which England’s players were being subjected at the end of a long season. He asked: ‘What WERE England doing there four days before the most important matches since the World Cup?’\textsuperscript{330} On the same page, a report by

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\item \textsuperscript{329} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 10 June 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{330} \textit{Daily Express}, 3 June, 1968.
\end{itemize}
Hackett’s colleague, Norman Giller, who had been assigned to England’s Under-23 international with Germany to be played at Kassel the following day, quoted Bill Nicholson, the Tottenham Hotspur manager who was in charge on the team, on the problems of getting the best out of his squad. ‘This is the penalty English football is paying for a season that is too long and packed with too many matches,’ Nicholson explained. Later, after England had lost their European Nations semi-final to Yugoslavia, Geoffrey Green in *The Times* offered the explanation that, for the players, it had followed ‘many long months of struggle at home.’ This theme, closely linked to the ongoing ‘club versus country’ debate, was to resurface many times over the next twenty years as England teams failed to repeat to the achievement of 1966.

In the circumstances – with important European Nations Championship matches immediately to follow – there was little time as well as little incentive for the English press to dwell on what had happened at Hanover. For Brian Glanville it underlined the fact that international ‘friendlies’ now counted for little ‘in these days of World Cups and Nation Cup’. He continued: ‘You could, if you wished try to breathe life into it in terms of spurious significance’, but the experimental team that Ramsey had picked surely obviated this, except for the most fervent German extremist. There was some consolation in the 1-0 victory achieved by ‘Young England’ in Kassel in front of a hostile crowd. ‘The fans did not like the

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331 *Daily Express*, 3 June 1968

332 *The Times*, 6 June 1968.

333 *The Times*, 3 June 1968.
taste of defeat’, noted Giller in the *Express*, who also passed on manager Nicholson’s complaint that the German team had indulged in ‘needless play acting’.334 Whether he and other English football writers would have taken the same view if the result had favoured England, is an open question. The match was probably regarded as more important in West Germany, not only because they were playing at home but because Schön’s players had something to prove after failing to qualify for the European Nations Cup semi-finals by failing to beat Albania. ‘While it had not been a performance to remember, an important psychological barrier had been broken,’ notes Downing. There was not much between the teams on the day and the winning goal was not one to remember. As Franz Beckenbauer later recalled:

‘Guess who scored the goal? Yes, I did. It was a real piledriver.

No, come to think of it, it was a crappy deflected shot with my left foot.’335

However, ‘a win was a win’ and it was then that Beckenbauer and his colleagues realised we could really beat the English and lost some of the respect we had.’336

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334 *Daily Express*, 4 June 1968.


336 Hesse, *Tor!*, 186.
World Cup Quarter-final, León, Mexico, 14 June 1970

In England, the other big story in June 1970 was the general election, called by Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister, for Thursday June 18, the day after the World Cup semi-finals were to be played in Mexico. In 1966, Wilson had been keen to associate himself and his party with the heroes of Wembley, appearing on the hotel balcony with the team when they were being cheered by the London crowds on the evening after the match.\textsuperscript{337} He was famously quoted as saying that ‘England only wins the World Cup under Labour.’\textsuperscript{338} In 1970, Wilson hoped to benefit from any feel-good factor generated by World Cup success and confidently expected that Ramsey’s team would have successfully negotiated the group stage and the quarter-finals before the electorate cast their votes. It was a signifier of the extent to which the English football team and its fortunes in the World Cup were already deeply embedded in popular culture that Wilson was so concerned. As it transpired, England lost 3-2 to West Germany after extra time on 14 June, and Labour lost the general election. There were some parallels in their respective performances. England had been two goals up but had made mistakes and allowed Schön’s team to rally and equalize; they had then conceded a third goal in extra time to lose the match to the team they had defeated four years earlier. Labour had gained a commanding lead in the opinion polls and, on the eve of the election The Times declared that it was ‘a near-certainty’ that Wilson would win. These predictions underestimated concerns caused by the monthly trade

\textsuperscript{337} Sandbrook, D., State of emergency: the way we were: Britain 1970-1974 (London: Allen Lane, 2010), 543.

\textsuperscript{338} Turner, A., Crisis?, 4.
figures and there was a late swing to the Conservatives bringing them, the party that Labour had defeated in 1966, back into office.

A letter published by The Times on polling day had raised the possibility of defeat: ‘Thinking of strange reversals of fortune: Could it be that Harold Wilson is 2-0 up with 20 minutes to play?’339 This proved to be an accurate assessment of the situation. There was an ominous opinion poll which showed that about twenty per cent of the electorate – most of them Labour supporters – were more interested in the outcome of the World Cup than the result of the general election.340 As Fabio Chisari has argued, the 1966 World Cup was a breakthrough tournament as far as televised football was concerned. Not least it had engaged the attention of a large proportion of the population, male and female, young and old, working-class and middle-class, many of whom would never think of watching a match from the terraces or even the stands.341 By 1970 attendances at English Football League matches had resumed their long-term decline but access to television was almost universal and this trend had been progressively reinforced, especially where the English national team was – now champions of the world – was concerned.342 It seems unlikely that the defeat inflicted on England by West Germany in Mexico was a primary or even secondary cause of Labour’s defeat


but the fact that the idea was even taken seriously is significant. International football now mattered in a way that it had not done before and this was increasingly reflected in the way it was covered in the press.

The importance of television coverage was exaggerated in 1970 because of a strike of print workers in the newspaper industry during the course of the tournament. There were no newspapers from 9 June until 15 June, the day after the England-Germany quarter final. For this reason this section will largely focus on match reports and post-match analysis and comment. After England had been beaten in the European Nations Cup semi-finals two years earlier, Geoffrey Green had observed that ‘unfriendly critics who always pointed to Wembley as the reason for England’s global victory in 1966 are hugging themselves.’ At the same time, Ken Jones in the Mirror warned that England, as they prepared to defend the title they had won in 1966, would have to ‘walk alone through international football, ignoring the sinister campaign they firmly believe is being directed against them.’ This seemed to reflect Ramsey’s own paranoia regarding foreign referees being unsympathetic to the English style of play, foreign players feigning injury when tackled and the media demonization of Nobby Stiles. Ramsey was quoted as saying that Stiles ‘has been subjected to poisonous treatment since before the last World Cup.’ Downing has noted that the failure of England to win a major tournament since 1966 has meant that the English have become over-protective of their one great achievement in global football and that they have little or no idea that ‘few non-Englishmen see the events of 1966 in

343 The Times, 6 June 1968.
quite the same way.’ They learned in 1970 that England had made few friends for four years earlier and the English press coverage reflected the siege mentality that Ramsey and his squad developed. It did not help that Ramsey himself handled press and public relations so badly when abroad, treating Mexican journalists, for example, ‘with the unsympathetic zeal of a pest-control officer.’

If the English public had high expectations as England departed for Mexico in 1970 they were largely justified. England were the defending champions, their record suggested that they were still very hard to beat and they had played against Mexico, Uruguay and Brazil in a ‘goodwill tournament’ held in Mexico the previous summer where they had drawn with the hosts, beaten Uruguay and lost narrowly to Brazil. For many, the squad which Ramsey took to Mexico was actually stronger than the one which had won the World Cup four years previously, an assessment which still finds favour. As David Thomson puts it, ‘1970’s is the best team that England has ever had in a World Cup … this was a very skilled and experienced side.’ For Downing, it had been strengthened at full-back where Cohen and Wilson had been replaced by Newton and Cooper, and in midfield where Mullery was proving more constructive than Stiles, and in the forwards, where Lee had replaced Hunt. ‘It was slightly more attack-minded than its 1966 predecessor, or had the potential to be so.’ Despite the result in Hanover in 1968, Germany still regarded England as a serious threat. Uli Hesse

344 Downing, Best of enemies, 107.
345 Downing, Best of enemies, 125.
347 Downing, Best of enemies, 124.
has claimed, though without citing supporting evidence, that ‘some players were so fazed by the prospect of meeting their nemesis that they approached Schön and suggested that they should take it easy against Peru [in their last group-stage match] so that Germany could play Brazil rather than England.’

The story of the match is well known. England played brilliantly for the first hour and established a 2-0 lead. Then, with twenty-two minutes left and the match seemingly won, Ramsey decided to rest Bobby Charlton, allowing Franz Beckenbauer the freedom to move forward with decisive effect scoring with a weak shot that appeared to deceive Peter Bonetti, a late replacement for Gordon Banks in England’s goal after he had been taken ill. Seeler then equalized with ten minutes of normal time remaining, heading past the stationary Bonetti after the England defence had failed to clear a cross. Finally, Gerd Müller, scored from close range to win the match for Germany in the second-half of extra time. It was, observed The Times, which carried a summary of the match on page one along with a photograph of Müller’s winning goal, ‘a bitter setback for England’ who had confounded their critics with ‘a wealth of splendid football’. Two themes that were to dominate post-match analysis were also quickly identified by the anonymous ‘Staff Reporter’. Firstly, that the tactical decision to withdraw Charlton had been wrong. Secondly, that they had been handicapped by the absence of Banks who ‘might have prevented one or two goals.’

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348 Hesse, Tor!, 187.  
349 Sandbrook, White Heat, 777-779; Downing, Best of enemies, 126-131; Hesse, Tor!, 186-189.  
helped English morale when a Mexican newspaper headlined its match report ‘Blitzkrieg!’\textsuperscript{351}

Geoffrey Green’s match report on an inside page was notably even-handed: ‘it had been a battle royal under the mid-day sun which was finally a cruelty to man.’ It was clear that the summary report on the front page was following Green’s line for he also questioned Ramsey’s substitutions, which had conceded the centre of the field to Beckenbauer and Overath; ‘that was the heart and core of this extraordinary upheaval.’ The point about the goalkeeping was also reiterated: ‘I do feel that Gordon Banks, had he been under England’s crossbar, would not have come off his line to let Seeler’s header loop over him.’ Though there was a reference to German fans singing ‘Deutschland üer Alles’, Green’s historical references were to the recent past, to 1966 rather than 1945. Using, perhaps unconsciously, Kenneth Wolstenholme’s words from the Wembley final, he observed:

‘It looked all over. But it never is against these Germans. The day of settlement for that 1966 final had to come sometime and it came now …’

Exemplifying the Olympian detachment of which \textit{The Times} was still capable, Green argued that ‘West Germany were worthy winners’.\textsuperscript{352} He followed this up

\textsuperscript{351} Ramsden, \textit{Don’t mention the war}, 359.
the next day when previewing the semi-finals, declaring that the semi-finalists (Brazil, Uruguay, Italy and Germany) represented ‘the best that football has to offer at the moment.’

A few days later, another article in *The Times*, filed from Mexico City by Roger Macdonald, made the point that the German performance had been superior to England’s both on and off the pitch. At the start of the tournament, he claimed, the German squad had come very close to going on strike ‘so unhappy were they with Schön’s tactical disposition.’ They had, however, been pulled round by the example set by veteran Uwe Seeler, a player who ‘does not know the meaning of defeat’. Seeler, scorer of the second goal against England, ‘moves like an automaton, always capable of one more effort.’ These qualities explained why he had become ‘a German institution.’ West Germany had been just as impressive off the field, their goodwill initiatives ensuring that ‘the bulk of the crowd has been behind them in every match, as it had been when they played England. They had charmed Mexico by saying from the start that, as the hosts for the next tournament, they had come to learn ‘how it should be done’. There was clearly a lesson here for Ramsey and for his employers, as Macdonald was not slow to point out. Perhaps it was unfair to blame Ramsey entirely for failures in public relations, but it was an aspect of World Cup preparation that could have been better managed. Bobby Charlton recalled that it had been a disaster from the start:

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353 *The Times*, 16 June 1970.

'We] got off on the wrong foot and we were unpopular throughout the country. Nobody wanted us to win.'

In terms of how this match was represented in the press, the focus was more on analysing England’s defeat rather than explaining Germany’s victory. Brian Glanville later summed it up by saying that:

‘(…) it might be said, a little callously, that Bank’s place went to Peter Bonetti and the match to West Germany. That it was by no means so simple as this is shown by the controversy which has surrounded the game ever since; not the kind of controversy evoked by Hurst’s goal in the two teams’ previous World Cup meeting, but by the question of tactics, the question of Ramsey, the question of Bonetti’s fallability. Was it an oversimplification, too easy an escape for Ramsey, to say that had Banks played England would have won – or had his mistaken tactics, his ill-handed substitutions, been fundamentally responsible?’

It was certainly these two questions that dominated coverage of the match in the *Express* and the *Mirror*. The first question – about Banks and Bonetti – was unanswerable. The second was essentially about Ramsey, his management style and his tactics. In the *Express*, Desmond Hackett characteristically denounced

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356 Glanville, *Story of the World Cup*, 177.
those who were subjecting Ramsey to ‘over-hasty criticism’ before going on to join them. Ramsey’s handling of the media, he noted, echoing the point made by Macdonald in *The Times*, had been ‘unfortunate’ and had ensured that his team had always had to play in front of hostile crowds. More significantly, however, he had ‘stubbornly geared his thinking to the World Cup series of 1966.’ The implication was that England had stood still while the rest of the world had moved on. West Germany, for example, had learned to trust players with the kind of individual flair that could win matches. ‘But England would have none of this star system. It was play to the plan or get out – and in the end we got out.’

In the *Mirror*, Ken Jones, though more sympathetic to Ramsey took a similar line, raising the question of whether it had been wise in Mexican conditions to use a 4-4-2 formation, in which strikers could become isolated unless supported by runners from midfield. ‘Running has always been an essential feature of England’s football under Ramsey’, he observed, leaving readers to draw the obvious conclusion that Ramsey had been mistaken. The failure of British management to retain a competitive edge by sticking to outdated methods and not adapting to new circumstances was to become so commonplace in the ‘declinist’ literature in the years that followed that it became one of the stories that the English told about themselves.

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357 *Daily Express*, 16 June 1970.


All this introspection left little space to say very much about the Germans. However, it has to be acknowledged that what was written about them in 1970 was generally complimentary and contextualized with reference to recent football history rather than the perspectives derived from the First and Second World Wars. This seems surprising, considering the undercurrent of hostility that had been evident when England had played at Hanover and in reports relating to the under-23 match at Kassel played at around the same time. It might have been expected to be even more evident when the stakes were higher in Mexico two years later. As it happened, the English press were more inclined to focus their hostility in the weeks before the tournament on the Columbians, especially after England captain Bobby Moore had been arrested by the police in Bogotá and accused of stealing jewellery, and on the Mexicans, who had jeered when the Union Jack had been paraded at the opening ceremony. Reporting the opening match of the tournament (Mexico v the Soviet Union) for the Express, Norman Giller observed that the over-excited crowd had ‘filled the thin Mexican air with screeches and whistles [in a] volcanic display of hatred.’\textsuperscript{360} The short match report in the Express on Germany’s group stage victory over Bulgaria ran under the innocent headline ‘Gay Germans march on’ and noted that they had qualified for the quarter-finals ‘in style’.\textsuperscript{361} It was not until the group stages had been finalized that it became clear that England would have to play Germany and by then the printers were on strike. Neither the Express nor the Mirror went quite as far as The Times in declaring that Schön’s team had deserved their victory. However, Hackett praised them for their sporting behaviour.

\textsuperscript{360} Daily Express, 1 June 1970.  
\textsuperscript{361} Daily Express, 6 June 1970.
‘West Germany showed courage and gallantry against England. When they were in the shadows of defeat they were never unfair, and in the glory of victory they were almost movingly generous.’

Finally, as Germany approached their third-place play-off match against Uruguay, the Daily Mirror came down firmly on their side. ‘The Germans deserve to succeed, since they have played some of the World Cup’s most imaginative football.’

The European Championship quarter-final: London 29 April 1972; Berlin, 13 May 1972

At the beginning of the decade, even after England had returned defeated from Mexico, ‘life was good and all seemed far from lost…there was joy in the present, and hope for the future’. England’s players returned from Mexico frustrated at having thrown away a two goal lead against Germany. Martin Peters claimed in his autobiography that he was sent off a few weeks later – for the only time in his career – when he kicked Wolfgang Overath during a pre-season friendly between Tottenham Hotspur and Cologne. ‘I suppose I was still irritated and frustrated by our World Cup exit’, he explained. With the new English football season starting just two months after the defeat at León there was little time to take in any lessons that could have been learned. ‘The big football news as

363 Marwick, British Society since 1945, 147.
we prepared for the season to kick off was George Best’s decision to sign an eight-year contract with Manchester United’, Peters recalled.\textsuperscript{364} England had lost only narrowly to Germany and the idea that they could have won if only Ramsey had not made a wrong substitution and, especially, if only Gordon Banks had been playing instead of Bonetti, meant that a prolonged inquest was not necessary. ‘There was good reason to believe that Banks would have seen us through the crisis’, Bobby Charlton recalled years later.\textsuperscript{365} Or, as Jonathan Wilson has observed, there was a sense that ‘on another day, had a couple of key events gone the other way, the result might have been reversed.’\textsuperscript{366} For the English it has always been an integral part of the story of the match. Moreover, though England’s performances on their return from Mexico had not been outstanding, they were unbeaten until they played Germany again at Wembley in April 1972. On the eve of this match, as Downing has argued, ‘there was certainly no clear evidence that England had suffered a precipitate decline’.\textsuperscript{367}

As in 1970, the European Nations Championship quarter-final which brought England and Germany together again, was played out against a background of relative prosperity. Though there were some signs of the problems that were to be seen as symptoms of British decline a few years later, they were not necessarily visible to the general public in 1972. A survey conducted in 1972 revealed that nine out of ten people were either ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with

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\textsuperscript{365} Charlton, B., \textit{The autobiography: My England years} (London: Headline, 2008), 332.
\textsuperscript{366} Wilson, \textit{Anatomy of England}, 150.
\textsuperscript{367} Downing, \textit{Best of enemies}, 133.
\end{flushleft}
their jobs; eight out of ten were satisfied with their living conditions. ‘Bombs, strikes, riots, disasters’, the unhappy events that tend to dominate accounts of Britain in the 1970s, for most people, ‘happened offstage.’\(^{368}\) Only a month before the first of the two England-West Germany matches of 1972, Edward Heath’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, had cut taxes while at the same time increasing pensions and social security benefits in an effort to cut unemployment and boost economic growth. ‘To call it a giveaway budget was an understatement’, notes Sandbrook.\(^{369}\) Though this was to backfire on Heath’s government in spectacular fashion a year later, it would have contributed to the feel-good factor in April 1972. All this may have contributed to the relatively benign view of Germany and Germans on the sports pages which continued to regard them in a positive light within a framework that now took in 1970 as well as 1966, but left other, more serious aspects of Anglo-German rivalry unspoken.

In the *Daily Express* on the day before the match, Desmond Hackett reported that Geoff Hurst ‘will spearhead England’s attack against the team he destroyed with his 1966 World Cup Final hat-trick.’\(^{370}\) This was followed by a passing reference to ‘Alf’s Army’ relying on ‘the old brigade’ (Banks, Moore, Peters, Ball, Hurst) but, generally, the ‘tin soldiers’ of the English press were not much in evidence. Norman Giller’s account of Schön’s press conference, which appeared on the same page, stressed football values that the two countries shared, quoting the


\(^{370}\) *Daily Express*, 28 April 1972.
German team-manager’s remark that ‘[leading] nations like England and Germany have a duty to show good football to the world.’

In *The Times*, Geoffrey Green noted that there would be ‘few television screens up and down the country not alive to the action’ before going on to remind his readers that ‘since the World Cup final of 1966 the meetings of these two nations have carried Wagnerian undertones.’ This suggested that an operatic high drama was likely to ensue and a close contest was expected with England’s ‘old enemy’, as the *Daily Mirror* referred to Germany in passing. Historians of English football are in little doubt that it was this match that marked the end of English claims to supremacy. For Jonathan Wilson, it was only then

‘... that the fact that England were no longer best in the world became incontrovertible. What had happened in Mexico could be blamed on heat, foreign conditions, a stomach bug picked up by the goalkeeper; Wembley that April evening was cool and wet, and England were still outplayed.’

Downing makes the same point:

372  *The Times*, 29 April 1972.
373  *Daily Mirror*, 27 April 1972.
‘The West German triumph at Wembley in April 1972 was a real watershed for both the English national team and the expectations that surrounded it. It knocked the incipient cockiness out of English football. In future the predictions of three-goal victories would be confined to visits from Luxemburg and San Marino, and England managers would become accustomed to solemnly declaring, in the face of much evidence to the contrary, that there were no easy games in international football.’

The final score was only 3-1 in Germany’s favour. Moreover, though Germany had scored first, England had equalized with twenty minutes remaining and the two decisive, match-winning goals had only come late in the game which ‘taken in its entirety was not the humbling most pundits described.’ But there is no doubt that Germany were by far the better of the two teams and that the result and the way in which it was achieved administered a psychological shock. At the end of the match, Hackett noted in his match report for the Express, ‘German flags were flying in such numbers that it looked as if London belonged to Berlin.’

375 Downing, Best of enemies, 141.
376 Wilson, Anatomy of England, 149.
377 Daily Express, 1 May 1972.
For Germany, this was ‘the second most famous 90 minutes of its national team’s history, surpassed only by the 1954 final.’ It was quickly recognized as ‘an instant classic’ and the German performance, especially that of midfielder Günter Netzer, was described by *L’Equipe*, the French sports newspaper, as ‘football from the year 2000.’

Geoffrey Green in his match report for *The Times*, described the German performance as ‘fluent’ and went on to point out that:

‘They were the better technicians, an infinitely superior combination imaginatively. They hit England below the intellect. They were better in my opinion – even without the presence of the splendid Overath in midfield – than the side who beat England so dramatically at León in the Mexico World Cup two years ago.’

Identifying himself with the English team, Green concluded his report: ‘Not having beaten us for some 40 years, they have now won three times in succession. The boot is now on the other foot.’

Green’s match report contained a number of themes which are important in terms of representing both England and Germany and these were picked up by both Hackett in the *Express* and Ken Jones (‘The Voice of Football’) in the *Mirror*. The first was that there was no longer any pretence of parity between the

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378 Hesse, *Tor!*, 190-191.

379 *The Times*, 1 May 1972.
two nations. Green had argued that for England to reverse the Wembley result in the second leg in Berlin would require ‘a small miracle’, and this was echoed elsewhere. The second theme was that England’s management was at fault, not simply because Germany had been better organized but because Ramsey’s team was past its best. ‘Experience is valuable up to a point, but there is now the look of too solid flesh about one or two members of [the England side]’, with an average age of 29 compared to Germany’s 26. Hackett declared bluntly that ‘England could just as well stay at home if Ramsey continued to pick ‘outdated, outworn, old-fashioned players.’ Jones was equally critical in this respect arguing that Ramsey ‘was clearly out-thought by Schoen on the night and he may have over-assessed the loyalty and willingness of some players.’

So a consensus emerged around the idea that German management was superior, that its team had been better organized and worked to a better system, and that its workers were younger, fitter and better skilled than their English counterparts. All this was underlined in an adjacent column by Peter Wilson, (‘The man they can’t gag’), the Mirror’s flamboyant sports columnist, who claimed that some of Ramsey’s players – presumably those from 1966 to whom he remained loyal – were ‘as out-of-date as such footballing antiquities as centre-hair partings.’ England had won the World Cup once, he went on, ‘But that was back in 1966, and, as is so often the case in British sport, we have been content to dwell complacently on past triumph until events – and other nations – overtake and

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380 Daily Express, 1 May 1972.
381 Daily Mirror, 1 May 1972.
surpass us.’ As Dilwyn Porter has argued, this kind of analysis paralleled much that was being written about the British and West German economies at the time. Public opinion on Britain’s membership of the EEC, for example, continued to be driven by the idea that Britain was ‘Europe’s economic invalid.’

The two weeks before the second leg in Berlin provided ample opportunity for journalists to consider the implications of what they had seen at Wembley. Their reflections helped to shape a view of the English as complacent, backward-old-fashioned in outlook, and content to dwell on past glories. Much of the criticism focused on the club versus country issue. Ken Jones in the Mirror, on the day after the match at Wembley, had observed that the disappointing result was due, at least in part, to ‘a system which permits a match of this importance to be played within a web of critical domestic contests.’ At the England team’s hotel after the match:

‘… the player talk was of a League championship yet to be won, and not of the match which had just been lost.

It said something about the state of English football.’

The race for the English First Division title was reaching its climax and England squad players from Leeds United and Derby County had two vital matches to play

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383 Porter, D., ‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’, 44.

384 Daily Mirror, 1 May 1972.
before the match in Berlin. Moreover, on the Saturday falling between the two international fixtures, the players from Leeds would be back at Wembley for the FA Cup Final against Arsenal. There was also the first leg of the UEFA Cup Final to be fitted in involving two English First Division clubs – Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton Wanderers. The club versus country theme was taken up and developed further by *Daily Express* sports editor John Morgan in his column where he noted that two Derby County Players, Colin Todd and Roy McFarlane, who had been unavailable to play for England through injury, had somehow managed to play in a vital league match for their club two days later. England had lost because of the habit of putting club before country.

Morgan observed that other European countries arranged these things better than in England:

‘Throughout Europe, the League fixtures are cancelled, rearranged, suspended, altered, amended or whatever is necessary to ensure that nothing interferes with the availability of players for their country.’

A few days later, when it was announced that Francis Lee, who had played at Wembley, had been admitted to hospital and was in need of ‘complete rest’, Morgan used it as a pretext to argue that English club football expected too much of its top players. ‘Someone has got to cry “Stop” to this nonsense that demands

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in excess of 60 tension-packed games a season for the clubs that are expected to provide the players for England,’ he pleaded.\textsuperscript{386} The Football League, founded in 1888, had been a target for criticism from those who saw it as old-fashioned and outdated, a trade association which existed primarily to keep its inefficient member-clubs in business, since the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{387} Morgan’s take on this well-worn theme was to point out that England’s competitors in Europe all had much smaller top divisions – with only 16 clubs in Italy, for example, and 18 in West Germany, compared to England’s Football League with 22. The national team was underperforming because it had to rely on tired players drawn from a league where ‘the few successful clubs subsidise the many who can’t make ends meet.’\textsuperscript{388} It was a theme that the \textit{Express} returned to several times. A few days after the second leg in Berlin it featured Arsenal manager Bertie Mee’s ‘3-Year Plan’ to save English football; his major recommendation was a First Division reduced to 16 clubs.\textsuperscript{389} Geoffrey Green’s match report from Berlin for \textit{The Times} was headed ‘Selfish clubs cause England’s fall.’\textsuperscript{390} The failure to abandon old institutions that had once served the country well but were now holding it back, along with the failure to organise effectively in the national interest, were thus

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\item \textsuperscript{386} \textit{Daily Express}, 8 May 1972.
\item \textsuperscript{388} \textit{Daily Express}, 8 May 1972.
\item \textsuperscript{389} \textit{Daily Express}, 16 May 1972.
\item \textsuperscript{390} \textit{The Times}, 15 May 1972.
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very much on the agenda. These were recognizable symptoms of what economic and cultural commentators of the mid 1970s were calling ‘the English disease’.  

David Downing has argued that the shock administered to English football at Wembley in April 1972 was so much greater because it was administered by Germany. ‘England had been utterly outclassed by a nation who traditionally played English-style football … How had the Germans suddenly become so good?’ The post-match quotes attributed to Helmut Schön that appeared in most English newspapers after the game provided an explanation. Even in 1966, he suggested, it was apparent that it was necessary to raise skill levels. However, England’s ‘fatal victory’ (as Downing calls it), means that this problem had not been addressed. ‘They seem to have stood still in time’, Schön argued, whereas West Germany had learned from defeat and moved forward. Reflecting on the match, he observed that the English had put up a fight ‘but we were far superior technically.’ Downing cites, as supporting evidence, ‘a wonderfully perceptive article’ by Ian Wooldridge in the Daily Mail which ‘proved something of a turning point in Anglo-German relations.’ Later events, especially press coverage of England-Germany matches in the 1980s and 1990s, would cast doubt on this but Wooldridge had recognized that the manner of the German victory was all important. They had won by abandoning the Anglo-Saxon football that had got them to the final in 1966. ‘The Germans had played nothing like the brutal and humourless automatons of English legend, and they had accepted the victor’s laurels as graciously in 1972 as they had accepted defeat in 1966.’ The style of the

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German victory, symbolized especially by Netzer’s flair in midfield, ‘made nonsense of the pulp magazine conception of the German character and [would] make a few million adults realise that their prejudices are as obsolete as Bismarck’s spiked helmet.’

However, though England’s weaknesses had been exposed, it was difficult to shift entrenched attitudes. Norman Gilller, in the *Daily Express*, wrote in terms of Ramsey picking up the pieces and re-assembling his team for ‘a blitz on Berlin’. As the second leg approached Desmond Hackett, though his Wembley match report had suggested that he was well aware of what was wrong with the England team, urged them to ‘Give it a go’. There was still hope that England ‘with their typical battling spirit could yet revive and put up a shock score.’ Though, it became increasingly clear that Ramsey was more interested in damage limitation, this did not deter Frank Taylor in the *Daily Mirror* from referring to previous performances when English fighting spirit had allegedly been sufficient to win the day – Nat Lofthouse’s famous ‘Lion of Vienna’ goal in 1952 and Duncan Edward’s performance in Berlin in 1956. ‘Let’s have a blitz in Berlin!’, Taylor wrote. ‘That’s what 15,000,000 *Daily Mirror* readers are hoping to see in the famous Olympic Stadium today.’ However, these allusions to World War II, did not inspire Ramsey to change his mind and pick an attacking team. As Brian Glanville, who was covering the match for the *Sunday Times*, later recalled,

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392 Downing, *Best of enemies*, 142-143; for Netzer’s qualities see Hesse, *Tor!*, 174.
393 *Daily Express*, 3 May 1972.
England needed to win by at least two clear goals if they were to progress to the semi-finals.

‘But Ramsey, throwing in the towel, picked a team which had no hope of doing that; essentially a team of hard men. There was Peter Storey of Arsenal, Nobby Stiles, Norman Hunter of Leeds United and Mike Summerbee of Manchester City. It was a deadly goalless draw which did nothing for England. Günter Netzer came off the field to say, “The whole England team has autographed my leg.”’  

Glanville’s memory was faulty here. In fact, Stiles did not play in this match, but it is significant that Glanville thinks that he did. ‘I had to sort people out’, Stiles recalled of his own career, ‘I had to win the ball because without it, the greatest talent in the world couldn’t begin to operate.’ Ramsey’s team in Berlin, even though it did not include Stiles, was not short of ball-winners, but it was short of world-class talent.

On the morning of the match in Berlin, the *Daily Mirror* published a ghosted article by Alan Ball under the headline ‘We’re bidding for revenge.’ No doubt the intention was to raise the spirits of England supporters and to convince them that it was not ‘all over’ yet. However, the overall tone was very downbeat.

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The defeat at Wembley had turned England into ‘nobodies, failures, footballing has-beens.’ As world champions, ‘everywhere we went, we were guaranteed to be followed and feted.’ Now the team felt ‘snubbed.’ The airport had been ‘almost deserted’ on their arrival and they had felt only ‘emptiness’ and ‘loneliness’ on the pre-match visit to the stadium. Yet Ball reassured Mirror readers that the tie remained open; England would ‘pull out all the stops and force all Europe to start respecting us again.’ The impression that the players felt beleaguered was extended when Ball dismissed claims that England lacked skill ‘as a load of nonsense’, adding that there was more skill in the squad than ‘back in ‘66 when we were good enough to win the World Cup.’ These criticisms that had been directed at the team were frustrating but they were determined to ensure that ‘the snub rebounds straight into the face of the enemy.’\textsuperscript{398} Alas, it remained unclear who he thought the enemy was, the Germans or the English press, their football writers and their readers.

Just after the match at Wembley, Schön had predicted that England would ‘come to Berlin and fight, because that is their way’\textsuperscript{399}. However, given the defensive character of the team Ramsey chose on this occasion, the 0-0 draw that was achieved was probably as much as England could have expected. Ken Jones, who had a good understanding of Ramsey, had written a day previously: ‘The Germans know that Sir Alf Ramsey and his players are under enormous pressure of public opinion, and that two bad beatings in a fortnight could add up to a

\textsuperscript{398} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 13 May 1972.
\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 1 May 1972.
crippling psychological blow.’\textsuperscript{400} This Ramsey succeeded in avoiding. However, in the aftermath of the match, it was clear that the press’s patience with England’s manager and his team was running out, whatever he had achieved in 1966. Ken Jones observed that Ramsey had used the four days before the match ‘to raise the blazing morale which always has been such an essential feature of England teams.’ The effect of this had been evident mainly at the after-match reception when ‘players huddled in groups … belligerently daring anyone to come forward and criticise their performance.’\textsuperscript{401} This did not seem to have the desired effect as journalists were unanimous in condemning England’s performance.

Jones’s article appeared alongside an action photograph from the match showing Germany’s goalkeeper Sepp Maier keeping his eye on the ball while ‘ignoring the challenge of a high-flying, foot-first challenge at a corner kick from England’s Roy McFarland.’\textsuperscript{402} No performance by an England team has ever been subject to harsher criticism. Unusually, they were attacked because of the cynical physicality employed by Ramsey’s hard men. On its back page, the \textit{Mirror} allowed space for England players to defend themselves against this charge. Under the headline ‘CRY-BABIES: England hit at German play actors’, Bob Russell assembled quotes from various England players responding to Helmut Schön’s accusation that the England had ‘aimed at the bones’, when tackling. This was accompanied by two photographs – one showing a ‘dejected’ Netzer being helped to his feet and another showing Höttges rolling ‘in apparent agony.’ Colin

\textsuperscript{400} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 12 May 1972.
\textsuperscript{401} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 15 May 1972.
\textsuperscript{402} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 15 May 1972.
Bell claimed that it was ‘a hard game but never vicious’; Alan Ball was disappointed that the Germans acted like ‘cry-babies’ who had ‘tried to make villains of us’; finally ‘Leeds’ iron man’ Norman Hunter, added that it was ‘no more physical than the average English League game.’ There may have been an element of truth in Hunter’s statement that would have gone some way to explaining West Germany’s technical superiority but this passed without comment. However, these denials were effectively undermined by Frank Taylor’s column on the same page, which described the English players as looking ‘as cultured as a clog dancer in a ballet class.’ Moreover, Taylor complained vehemently about England’s lack of ambition and enterprise: ‘If this was a victory for tactics, give me the glory of adventurous defeat.’ He had watched the match on television hoping to see England attack, or ‘the lions rampant’, as he put it more colourfully. ‘Instead our forward line looked as fearsome as a rabbit dominating a lettuce.’

According to Desmond Hackett’s view in the *Express*, England had been reduced ‘to kicking at the Germans’, who had not retaliated. He had been appalled when Mike Summerbee ‘brought down Günter Netzer, the idol of Germany, and appeared to stamp on his hand.’ Urging Ramsey to ‘forget 1966 and all that’, he continued:

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‘When you are compelled to feel shame for an English international team, the situation has to be more than grim. It was. It was pathetic.

Twenty-for hours after the miserable and silent retreat from Berlin, I still writhe over the ignominy of once proud England being jeered off after a goalless draw.

The German newspapers, he had to confess, had told the truth with ‘jackboot brutality’: ‘A pity the former masters must return to school’, one had said.\textsuperscript{405}

In \textit{The Times} Geoffrey Green was more measured. He conceded that ‘a modicum of prestige was salvaged from what was a limited, face-saving operation, but even that had undertones’. England had been prepared ‘to aim for the body at times.’ For Green, this was ‘the least agreeable aspect of the English effort.’ He did not dispute that the traditional fighting qualities associated with Englishness had been displayed – ‘the heart, the courage and the will were all there.’ In the end, however, ‘a physical challenge cannot subdue a lively intelligence allied to artistry’ and that is what West Germany had possessed. ‘The unarguable fact remains’, he explained, ‘that the fluent Germans were the better footballers.’ They ‘boasted players who possessed a refined skill, an eye for the unexpected, and a style capable of challenging the New World.’ Turning to England, Green argued:

\textsuperscript{405} \textit{Daily Express}, 15 May 1972.
‘What matters most is England’s future. They need more adventure, a pair of real wingers for a change, and a chance for youth. But as much as anything, if we are to make any showing in the next World Cup, Sir Alf must receive more generous, honest help from the clubs. Too many are wearing parochial blinkers.’

If Green had turned to almost any other newspaper, he would have found an echo of his complaint about the clubs. There seemed no way out of this difficulty. Arsenal chairman Denis Hill-Wood was quoted in the Mirror a day later. ‘Of course, we all want England to succeed, but I can see no way of helping by cutting down domestic fixtures.’

The matches played in spring 1972 finally swung the pendulum towards Germany; especially during the game at Wembley it became clear that England and Germany were moving in very different directions. Though there were occasional allusions to ‘Blitzkrieg’ and even ‘jackboot brutality’, English newspaper reports and comment tended to take a positive view of the German side that Schön brought to Wembley, acknowledging that they were technically superior and pleasing to watch. If anything, there was a tendency to overstate the extent to which the Germans had dominated at Wembley where England had equalized in the 77th minute to make it 1-1 and Banks had come close to saving

406   The Times, 15 May 1972
Netzer’s crucial penalty which had restored Germany’s lead. In contrast, press coverage of England’s performance, especially in the second leg, was universally negative. As Downing has indicated, complaints about German ‘play acting’ went largely unsupported. Peter Batt in the *Sun* was more typical in contending that England had approached the game ‘cynically and, at times, viciously.’ West Germany had proved manifestly superior and could even claim the moral high ground as they had not retaliated when kicked in Berlin.

‘But somewhere England have lost their way. For thirty years and more they dominated world football and in 1966, when they won the World Cup, they were a great power again. Since then they have not improved. The national team is always an extension of a country’s football pattern. The pattern in England is all about speed, strength and aggression. There is no time, or little, for real skill.’

This was the verdict on English football attributed to former German coach Sepp Herberger after the two matches and widely publicised in the English press. In 1972 and for many years afterwards few in England would have disagreed with this negative representation of England and its national game. As Jonathan Wilson has observed, ‘there were no great howls about the unfairness of the result from

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players, fans or journalists.’ Indeed, most seemed ‘happy to salute West Germany’s achievement.’

‘Friendlies’: 12 March 1975; 22 February 1978

By the time that England and West Germany faced each other again, in a midweek friendly match at Wembley in February 1975, West Germany were the world champions, having both staged and won the tournament in 1974. England, meanwhile, had failed even to qualify for the final stages, having drawn with Poland at Wembley in a match they needed to win, thwarted principally by the heroics of a goalkeeper, Jan Tomaszewski, as England forced 26 corners on the night to Poland’s two. It marked the end of the Ramsey era – he was eventually sacked in March 1974 and replaced by Don Revie – whose Leeds United team were feared rather than admired. They were, according to the outspoken Brian Clough, who briefly succeeded him, ‘the dirtiest and most cynical team in the country.’ This was happening against an increasingly troubled economic background. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 had effectively brought the world economy’s long post-war boom to a sudden end; the cost of a barrel of oil rising from $2.40 in the spring of 1973 to $11.65 by the end of the year. In these conditions Britain’s long-term economic problems became increasingly visible as Edward Heath’s government struggled with rising unemployment, rising prices

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412 Turner, Crisis?, 99.
and strikes in major British industries as workers sought pay increases to keep up with the rising cost of living.413

A few weeks after England’s match with Poland, with Britain’s coal-miners ‘working to rule’, the government was forced to take the drastic step of introducing a three-day working week in an effort to conserve dwindling fuel supplies at the power stations. In Northern Ireland violence continued to escalate and by the end of 1974 the IRA had extended its bombing campaign to the British mainland, with especially devastating consequences for Birmingham where two pubs were attacked in one night, causing 21 deaths.414 In such desperate times the performance of the England team, especially failure to perform in line with expectations, became symbolically significant. As Dominic Sandbrook has argued:

‘Even in an autumn of inflation, bombings and strikes, there were few more compelling symbols of national decline than England’s failure against Poland. Just seven years after the golden victory that had supposedly capped the youthful optimism of Harold Wilson’s swinging Britain, England had failed even to reach the final stages of sport’s most lucrative tournament.’415


415 Sandbrook, State of Emergency, 540.
It did not help that English football was now burdened with the additional problem of hooliganism. There was, as Eric Dunning and others have pointed out, a long history of football-related violence and disorder, however it appeared to reach a new level at this time. By 1974 some newspapers were publishing statistics (a ‘Thug’s League’), which was supposed to shame clubs into taking measures to ensure that its supporters behaved themselves but this had no effect and may even have made the problem worse as rival football ‘firms’ battled for supremacy.\textsuperscript{416} Moreover, the English problem worsened as hooliganism began ‘to spill over into Europe’, notably when Tottenham fans caused mayhem in Rotterdam in May 1974 and Leeds fans rioted in Paris at the European Cup final a year later leading to the club being banned from European competition for four years.\textsuperscript{417} Writing about Britain in the mid 1970s, journalist Peter Jay identified a condition which he named ‘Englanditis’, describing the English – and the British in general – as ‘a confused and unhappy people’.\textsuperscript{418} For Scots – their national team qualified for the finals in both 1974 and 1978 – football could provide some consolation. This was not so for the English.

English press coverage of the final, in which Schön’s team beat the Netherlands 2-1, after going behind in the first minute to a penalty awarded by

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English referee Jack Taylor, continued in the broadly sympathetic vein that it had followed in 1972. England was not involved in the final stages of the tournament, having failed to qualify. This meant that it was easier for English journalists to take an objective view. The consensus of opinion was that both finalists were ‘teams of very high quality.’ ‘Both’, as Frank McGhee noted in the *Daily Mirror* on the day before the final, ‘are very much better, stronger and much more skilful than any side England could put into the field right now – but no better than England under Revie must become.’ Writing in the *Sunday Times* on the day of the final, Brian Glanville reminded readers of how West German football had developed under Schön since Wembley 1966. ‘Schoen it was, after all, who broke the mould dear to Herberger and the nation at large, substituting artists for warriors yet winning still.’ Having said that, there was agreement in the English press that what had seen West Germany through to victory in a final which most believed the Dutch should have won, was character. The Dutch had lost, according to David Miller in the *Daily Express*, because they had forgotten ‘that being the best team is not enough. You have to prove it.’ Thus, though acknowledging that if the Dutch had won, it would have represented ‘a triumph of pure skill’, there was much to be said for ‘Germany’s gritty but less-than-polished achievement.’ In *The Times*, Geoffrey Green, covering ‘my last World Cup final’, observed that the Germans were now a better side than they had been at Wembley in 1966 ‘but as always their greatest asset has been their untameable

420  *Sunday Times*, 7 July 1974.
spirit.’

What this suggests is that they were perceived as being, perhaps, not quite as good as the team of 1972, but still good enough to beat England comfortably.

As Green noted, when West Germany came to play England at Wembley in 1975, the situation was similar to when they had made their first post-war visit in 1954, ‘just three months after gaining the title and with only three of their side that had caused one of the greatest upheavals in history by beating the unbeatable Hungarians.’ In 1954, however, England had not just been knocked out of the World Cup. As in 1954, there was considerable interest in the match with a capacity crowd of 100,000 who would ‘demand victory, especially after what the Germans have done to us in the past five years – in the Mexico World Cup and at Wembley itself in the European Championship of 1972.’ Alan Ball, controversially appointed England captain for the first time – a Labour MP had urged Revie to reconsider on account of Ball’s disciplinary record – was said in the Express to be keen to gain revenge for the painful defeats inflicted by ‘the competitive Germans’ in 1970 and 1972. Though there was nothing at stake, Steve Curry in the Express went to some lengths to show that, for the Germans, a match against England was considered special and important; 3,500 German fans were travelling to Wembley and the match was being broadcast live on German television. A spokesman for the DFB was quoted as asking rhetorically: ‘How can

422 The Times, 8 July 1974.
423 The Times, 12 March 1975.
a match between England and West Germany now be called a friendly?’. This seemed to apply even though Schön was fielding only five of the team that had lifted the Jules Rimet Trophy in July 1974: some Bayern players were rested as they were said to have been overworked by European Cup duties. England had also been forced into late changes after four of the squad originally selected were required by their clubs for a replayed FA Cup match between Leeds and Ipswich.

Generally, in that coverage reflected the recent history of Anglo-German relations, the sports pages acknowledged only the framework provided by encounters on the field going back no further than 1966, or 1954 for Geoffrey Green. The war was only mentioned in the Daily Mirror and then only in passing. Two photographs – one showing Schön and Beckenbauer discussing ahead of the ‘tonight’s friendly battle’ and captioned ‘Target for tonight’ and another featuring Don Revie ordering England to ‘Open Fire!’ – consciously or unconsciously made the connection. The newspapers were happy to have some good news to report for a change and focused almost entirely on a comfortable and stylish 2-0 victory for the home team. ‘The West Germans had been beaten for the first time since 1966, England had looked good for the first time for many moons, and for a few weeks it was hard to resist a rare and heady sense of optimism’, as David Downing observes. It was very encouraging from an English point of view, though the celebratory tone of the reports was tempered with a sense of realism.


425 Daily Mirror, 12 March 1975. Target for Tonight was the title of a British propaganda film, made in 1941, about a raid by RAF Bomber Command on Germany.

426 Downing, Best of enemies, 151-152.
Frank McGhee, covering the match for the *Daily Mirror*, was typical. England ‘outclassed’ Germany on the night.

‘They cannot claim the world title because of that. But they can most definitely claim that they produced both the type of skilful player and the kind of accomplished, adventurous football needed to challenge for the most important Soccer prize of all.’

‘For the moment, then, the Germans are the dispossessed’, Geoffrey Green observed in *The Times*, before reminding his readers that ‘nothing hung upon this match.’ There were some aspects of their performance that were praised, ‘as always’ they were ‘neat and formal’ in midfield with Cullmann and Flohe ‘covering acres of the sodden pitch.’ These qualities, however, fitted with a pattern of football that Germany appeared to have abandoned in 1972, but this time Netzer was absent, watching from the stands. Beckenbauer was ‘still masterly in some of his touches’, but was not at his very best, having dived full length to handle the ball ‘just as Macdonald was about to break free for a probable third goal.’ Much was made of this incident because it seemed to exemplify the extent to which the world champions had been embarrassed by a relatively inexperienced and experimental England side. In the *Express*, David Miller reported that Beckenbauer had scrambled on his knees in the mud to halt

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428  *The Times*, 13 March 1975.
Macdonald – ‘with his hands.’ He also suggested that there had been an element of desperation of times. At one stage of the match ‘the Germans were surviving precariously with a profusion of sliding tackles exploiting the mud to take both man and ball.’ It was clearly not a vintage performance by the world champions.

Given the damage that Günter Netzer had inflicted on England 1972, there was great rejoicing because England seemed to have found an outstanding flair player with similar technical ability and vision in Alan Hudson, formerly of Chelsea but now at Stoke City, making his England debut. To make the point that England had discovered a midfield genius to match West Germany, the Express, the Mirror and The Times carried quotes from Netzer. In the Express it was:

‘HUDSON is the best English player I have ever seen. He has control and style and he can obviously affect a team. I think he will be one of the great players. – Günter Netzer’

The report went on to put Hudson on the same level as Raich Carter and Wilf Mannion, inside-forwards from what many readers would have regarded as a golden age of English football in the 1940s, and also with 1966 hero Martin Peters ‘at his peak.’ Frank McGhee in the Daily Mirror, was even more complimentary about Hudson’s ‘majestic’ performance. It had ‘the assurance, the elegance, the

429 Daily Express, 13 March 1975.
430 Daily Express, 13 March 1975.
efficiency of someone who was born to play at this level.’ McGhee went on: ‘He is here to stay – all the way to the 1978 World Cup.’\textsuperscript{431} Unfortunately England did not qualify for the finals in 1978 and Hudson was to gain only one more cap as his career faltered badly on account of injury and a rather wayward lifestyle.

The English press had much to be pleased about – a well-deserved victory against the world champions and a stunning debut by the stylish Hudson. It was not just the fans at Wembley who came away from the match with ‘a warm glow’; an additional 30,000 had watched the match ‘live’ in fourteen cinemas around the country.\textsuperscript{432} Moreover, as Green pointed out in the opening paragraph of his report, it was England’s ‘first win over their old opponents since beating them in the World Cup final of 1966.’\textsuperscript{433} The occasional military analogy surfaced – in the \textit{Mirror} England’s three ‘front-line troops’ (Keegan, Macdonald and Channon) had each been assigned ‘a sentry’ to mark them. There was also an obligatory reference to ‘Kaiser Franz’ (Beckenbauer).\textsuperscript{434} However, it was not overstated and seems to have been simply a variation on the kind of clichés that might be found in a tabloid newspaper report of almost any match. Two days after the match the \textit{Express} back page featured an interview with the Yugoslav coach Milan Miljanic, introduced to readers as ‘one of soccer’s top brains’, whose Red Star Belgrade team had knocked Liverpool out of the UEFA Cup a year previously. For the \textit{Express}, the most backward looking of England’s popular newspapers to seek out

\textsuperscript{431} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 13 March 1975.

\textsuperscript{432} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 13 March 1975.

\textsuperscript{433} \textit{The Times}, 13 March 1966.

\textsuperscript{434} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 13 March 1975.
foreign expertise in this way was a sign that attitudes were changing. He was reported as saying that ‘England’s victory over the world champions once again makes them the team everyone else in Europe wants to beat’. Yet Miljanic’s more critical insights were also reported. England had lacked width in attack as well as left-sided midfielders. Hudson was good but he was no ‘super player’; he gave England the ‘improvisation essential at this level’ but did not use his left foot enough.\textsuperscript{435} The tone of the writing was filled with hope for a brighter future for English football. The dark side covered in 1972 regarding the ‘greed’ in the English club game seemed to have been pushed aside by a national team that looked refreshed and more importantly, rejuvenated. However, also notable was the absence of the sort of reporting that accompanied English football during the 1950s and 1960s, which carried with it the notion of inherited superiority.

By the time that England and West Germany played again, in an international friendly in Munich in February 1978, the broad context of Anglo-German relations was probably better than it had been three years earlier. The March 1975 match had been played just after Prime Minister Harold Wilson had succeeded in renegotiating some of the terms of British membership of the EEC. This had at times involved a confrontational approach to Britain’s European partners ‘in order to convince the British people that the government was fighting vigorously on their behalf.’ This proved successful at home in that Wilson secured a two-thirds majority for continued membership of the EEC at the referendum held in June 1975, ‘a more convincing majority than any British government had

\textsuperscript{435} Daily Express, 14 March 1975; For Miljanic see Wilson, J., Inverting the pyramid; A history of football tactics (London: Orion, 2008), 277.
received in an election in the twentieth century. At the same time it seems clear that ‘the British over the years became faintly tiresome in the eyes of the continentals, what with their comings and goings and their insistence on renegotiating what had already been negotiated.’ More specifically, as far as British attitudes to Germany were concerned, television comedy may have been a more reliable guide to the persistence of underlying hostility. ‘All comedy series based on sketches, like The Dick Emery Show (1962-1981) and Morecambe and Wise (1961-83), had their moments in which humour relied on a spiked helmet, a German accent or a comedy Nazi’, as John Ramsden has pointed out. The famous ‘Don’t mention the war!’ episode in Fawlty Towers (1975-1979) was enormously popular. Not many viewers seemed to realise that John Cleese’s aim had been ‘to educate his audience by showing bigotry’s ugly face.’

As far as Anglo-German football relations were concerned the essential facts were that in February 1978 the West Germans were still the reigning world champions while England had failed to qualify for the final stages of the tournament, just as they had failed in 1974. The early promise at the start of the Revie’s period as manager had evaporated and the reputation that he had earned as manager of Leeds United – according to Brian Clough the Revie family was ‘closer to the Mafia than Mothercare’ – ensured that it was difficult to retain

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436 George, *Britain and European integration*, 76-77.
438 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 387-388.
public support when results were disappointing. In February 1977 England had lost 2-0 to the Netherlands at Wembley and ‘were given a footballing lesson by the Dutch which ranked alongside those previously inflicted by the Hungarians in 1953 and West Germans in 1972. According to Jeff Powell in the Daily Mail, England had been beaten so soundly that they ‘joined the rest of the second-raters in the gutter of world football last night.’ What made this seem worse was that the England manager appeared to conclude that he did not have the players capable of competing against the very best. Revie, as Alwyn Turner has observed, ‘admitted after that defeat as though commenting on Britain’s economic position relative to its rivals, ‘We just couldn’t cope.’ His tenure as England manager ended in acrimonious controversy six months later when he resigned during the course of an England tour to South America. Revie, fearing that his reputation as a manager was being damaged, had given up on England and secretly negotiated a much better contract for himself with the United Arab Emirates. Though it is questionable what kind of reputation he possessed at the time within the English game.

England’s fortunes revived under his successor Ron Greenwood. In the last match of their World Cup qualifying group in November 1977 they had secured a 2-0 victory over Italy which pointed to a brighter future. What is noticeable about the match previews in the press, however, is a more cautious, more realistic

439 Sandbrook, State of emergency, 548.
440 Downing, Best of enemies, 158.
442 Turner, Crisis?, 262–263.
approach than would once have been the case. ‘West Germany, the world
champions, are not usually too concerned about “friendly” matches’, observed
Norman Fox in his opening paragraph for *The Times*. They were likely to take
England seriously, however, simply because they were a team in transition. The
eleven that had won the World Cup in Munich four years previously had now
disintegrated and Helmut Schön was in the process of rebuilding, so players were
competing for World Cup places. However, though Fox did not discount the
possibility of an England victory altogether, especially if West Germany
underperformed, he made it clear that he did not expect it, not least because
Greenwood was only just beginning the difficult task of reversing several years of
stagnation and decline.

‘If West Germany’s attitude fails to do justice to the serious
expression Mr Schön presented this morning with his talk of the
many “classicals” between the countries since 1966, it would
not be a complete surprise, but for England this is the start of the
real Greenwood era. His previous work was little more than
salvaging the leaking craft he was asked to take over.’

Fox seemed to be very well aware of where England now stood in the hierarchy of
international football. He noted that Schön, at his press conference, had also
mentioned that for West Germany to play England was a way of preparing for a
possible meeting with Scotland in Argentina, Scotland having qualified. ‘If
England can play as well as Scotland of late, they will surprise even the polite Mr Schöen’, Fox added.443

Pre-match comment in both the *Express* and the *Mirror* was equally guarded about England’s prospects. This seems to have been very much in line with the views being expressed in the England camp which appear to have been deliberately low-key as Greenwood wisely sought to reduce the weight of expectation on his players. Kevin Keegan, who had been with Hamburg for the past six months and was, therefore, well aware of the nature of the challenge that lay ahead, was quoted in the *Mirror* as saying that England had ‘almost got it together again as a team …[but] we are not there yet’. He could not say that ‘England are a better team [than Germany]’ but they ‘could set them problems’.444 The *Express* reported Keegan as warning that ‘we should not go overboard about that result over Italy.’445 Greenwood himself took a similar line and this influenced the sympathetic match-day previews in the *Mirror* and the *Express*. In terms of relations with the media he was clearly a significant improvement on both Ramsey and Revie. Frank McGhee in the *Mirror* dutifully reported the England manager talking about ‘my old friend Helmut Schoen’ who had told him that he had been quite glad when Wales had achieved a draw in Dortmund recently ‘because it proved to the [West German] public that their team could not

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always win.’ Greenwood’s relaxed approach helped McGhee to take a realistic view of its likely outcome. When Greenwood suggested that he wanted ‘five or six captains on the field’, McGhee, ‘slightly cynically’, responded by saying that he preferred ‘Helmut Schoen’s ambition to have eleven players.’ McGhee concluded his match-day preview by observing that ‘The most I can hope for is a respectable result – a draw or a narrow defeat.’ In the Express, David Miller was more upbeat, though the old habit of predicting that England would win had clearly given way to the more modest suggestion that England could win. It was an ‘absurdity’ that England had failed to qualify for the finals when countries such as Iran and Tunisia would be there and this would be underlined if they managed to beat Germany. ‘Trevor Brooking and Butch Wilkins in midfield and Kevin Keegan up front, all world class players, can possibly achieve a result which will help force FIFA to reconsider the qualifying system’, Miller added hopefully.

It was clear, however, that the idea that England still lagged behind West Germany – and not just in terms of recent matches won and lost – was powerful. A ‘B’ international was played at Augsburg on the evening before the match in Munich, England winning 2-1. ‘This was Germany’s first defeat in eight matches at this level and it must give heart to every English soccer fan’, wrote Alan Thompson in the Express. Thompson’s article, however, ended on a different note. The match had been played despite adverse weather conditions.

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446 Greenwood did know Schön well having stayed with the West German squad at their camp in Mexico in 1970 as a FIFA representative. It was Greenwood who was responsible for Reinhard Libuda’s nickname ‘Stan’; he said that the German winger’s style reminded him of Stanley Matthews. See Hesse, Tor!, 184; The Times, 9 June 1970.


448 Daily Express, 22 February 1978.
‘The idle English clubs, who could not get their games played at home last night, might like to know that in Germany everything is possible with a little bit of effort.

For this game they took about 12 inches of snow from the pitch, rolled the remainder into a thin “carpet” – and got on with the game with red line-markings, fluorescent orange ball, and with some German players in ballet tights and wearing gloves.

Maybe one of these days we will catch up.’

This was hard on Third Division Bradford City and Fourth Division Huddersfield Town, the only two English clubs whose matches had been called off on the night in question. However, Norman Fox in The Times effectively endorsed this view when he reported of the B international, ‘That the game was played was remarkable by British standards.’ As if to underline the point, the Mirror carried a report on its sports pages detailing problems of fixture congestion facing Nottingham Forest.

As for the match itself, there was general agreement that England had stretched the world champions with ‘a performance of strong character and no little skill’ in which Keegan had been outstanding. Having taken the lead just

450 The Times, 22 February 1978.
452 The Times, 23 February 1978.
before half-time England were defeated by two late goals, the second a free kick by Bonhof taken while Wilkins was contesting the referee’s decision. As Alan Thompson noted in the *Express*, England had lost because of ‘[one] sad, mad moment of indiscipline that you can see every Saturday in our League soccer.’ Thus, what should have been a night for England’s players to remember ‘turned out to be yet another “lesson” in what international football is all about.’

Or yet another reminder that England were no longer the masters. There was general agreement, however, and much satisfaction in England running Germany so close and in the evident signs that they were improving under new management. The players, according to McGhee in the *Mirror*, could console themselves because ‘[they] know they stand well on the road to recovery.’

The *Express* was probably the least restrained in its praise of England’s performance with David Miller claiming in his match report that ‘Ron Greenwood’s squad put the clock back ten years to a time when England led Europe with pride and prestige.’

England, of course, had not led Europe ten years earlier, having finished third in the European Championship in 1968, but that inconvenient detail was overlooked. England’s attitude had been admirable; they had taken the game to their illustrious opponents. This led Alan Thompson to wonder,

‘… just where we would have been with this sort of attitude in the early games of the World Cup qualifying matches and it

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made me think regretfully of all those wasted years from
towards the end of the Ramsey regime and throughout the entire
disaster of Don Revie’s defensively neurotic influence.’

As Porter has argued, there was a tendency for narratives of decline relating
to English football to reinforce more general concerns regarding British economic
performance and its reduced standing in the world.\textsuperscript{457} Thompson’s critique, which
pointed to ‘wasted years’ and unimaginative management, provides an example of
how this might have worked.

\textit{Conclusion}

As Downing makes clear, it was possible to look at this match in a different
way. Greenwood was generally satisfied but was also aware that the German team
had shown greater technical ability. Some of their close combination work ‘was
breathtaking … and we would be foolish not to try and match it.’ As in many
other spheres this represented an acknowledgement that the West Germans were
superior and supplied a model which the English would do well to emulate. The
\textit{Daily Mail} bluntly reminded readers who might have been inclined to think that
all was well of the vast gap that had opened up over the years. It was ‘a measure
of the depths to which English football had sunk that Ron Greenwood’s travelling
circus flew home from Munich yesterday celebrating a defeat.’\textsuperscript{458} In general,
however, what is noticeable about the match reports and press commentary on the

\textsuperscript{456} \textit{Daily Express}, 23 February 1978.
\textsuperscript{457} Porter, ‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’, 36.
\textsuperscript{458} Downing, \textit{Best of enemies}, 159-160.
two friendly matches in 1975 and 1978 is the restrained tone of the English press, its acceptance of German superiority and the relative absence of anti-German sentiment. The focus was almost entirely on English football and the hope that the failings which had become apparent after 1972, in particular, would be addressed. The negative stereotyping of Germany and Germans which Ramsden suggests was a staple of British television comedy was noticeable by its absence on the sports pages of the newspapers surveyed here; there were very few allusions to the history of Anglo-German warfare and few military metaphors, mostly not specific to Germany. As the period progressed, references to England’s triumph of 1966 were also less frequent. Over the course of the ten years surveyed in this chapter England had gone from being world champions to being mere underperformers in relation to Germany, as the swing of the pendulum went against them after a long period of supremacy. Perhaps the disappointment was made more bearable by the new style which German teams demonstrated after 1972 which made it easier to express admiration of the old enemy. Perhaps the broader political climate which saw the British coming to terms with their new place in the world to some extent, as demonstrated by the large majority which voted to stay in the EEC in the referendum of 1975, was also a factor. Overall, however, the sports pages in this period tended to confirm a view of Germany as an efficient, modern, progressive country capable of abandoning old methods when they were not working and replacing them with something more effective. It seemed better equipped to achieve success in the modern world than Britain which increasingly saw itself as others were inclined to see it, as the ‘sick man of Europe’, badly led and managed and slow to change. The course of Anglo-German football history over this period
generated numerous opportunities for sports journalists to reinforce these impressions, especially when the superiority that England had achieved by winning the World Cup in 1966 was overturned and the methods by which it had been achieved were superseded, as Germany and other countries moved on.

In conclusion, it has to be stated that within ten years, England had fallen from the pinnacle of being world champions, to being beaten by Germany in 1968 and 1972, and then failing even to qualify for the World Cup finals in 1974 and 1976. In the 1970s the performances of the England team were characterised mainly by underachievement and failure. The reasons for this are manifold and would fill many pages and deliver material for lengthy discussions. The team who won in 1966 were a special blend of gifted footballers; though the team of 1970 was said to be better, other teams had changed, developed and progressed. England sought to recreate the 1966 model and realized too late that victory is but the first stage in the rebuilding of a team. For a short period it appeared as though England and Germany were on a par. This phase ended at León in 1970 when Ramsey’s team ‘surrendered a two goal lead’ only to go out after extra time. That the unthinkable might happen was made an established fact in 1972 when Germany not just beat but outplayed England at Wembley with a performance that many still consider the best ever by a German national team. After these two games in 1972 the fortunes of both teams changed dramatically. England, under Don Revie hoped to rebuild, only to be disappointing and disappointed once more as Revie was not able to replicate the success he enjoyed as manager of Leeds United; he left under a cloud in 1977, selling the story of his resignation to the
Daily Mail. Finally, Ron Greenwood took over and the spirit of the new flew through England. The contrast with Germany could not be stronger. The team had their most successful period under Helmut Schön winning the European Championship in 1972 and the World Cup in 1974. However, after the retirement of a number of key players in the mid to late 1970s staleness seemed to have set in. Germany were set to become the boring team of the 1980s, grinding out results with grim efficiency. Nevertheless, they continued to outperform England. These changes in the relative position of England and Germany as football powers helped to shape the way that matches were covered on the sports pages.
Chapter Four: ‘Let’s Blitz Fritz’: England versus Germany in the 1980s and 1990s

Referring to the 1990s, John Ramsden noted that ‘German newspapers now routinely commented in advance on their British counterparts’ entirely predictable coverage of football matches.’ These comments normally expressed dismay at the tone of the newspaper coverage before, during and after matches between England and West Germany/Germany and this undoubtedly underwent significant change in these years. As we have seen, in the post-war period through to 1966 a generally restrained and conciliatory tone prevailed which acknowledged the negative aspects of the Anglo-German relationship in the twentieth century mainly by not referring to them directly. In 1966, when the West German team made an extended visit to England for the campaign which took them to the final of the World Cup, English sports writers, especially in the middle-market and down-market newspapers, were more inclined to resort to militaristic metaphors and negative stereotyping, though this changed once the final was over and the German threat had been overcome, when Schön and his team suddenly became worthy and sportsmanlike opponents, a status which reflected well on England who had defeated them. In the 1970s, as the balance of success in the Anglo-German football relationship began to swing decisively in Germany’s favour, German teams were admired for the efficiency with which they achieved results in

tournaments for which England often failed to qualify and sometimes, as in 1972, for the style in which they played.

In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the way in which Anglo-German football rivalry was represented in the media underwent a major transformation. Negativity towards Germany and the Germans, always an undercurrent in public discourse but one that surfaced only occasionally, became more noticeable and more vehement, even if it sometimes presented itself in the form of a form of humour which Germans could not comprehend. In order to understand this shift it is important to locate it within the broader context of changes that were occurring in British political and media culture at the time. Politically, the 1979 general election saw the beginning of the end for the consensus politics that had predominated in post-1945 Britain where, despite approaching the political centre from different directions, Conservative and Labour governments framed their policies around a broad level of agreement in relation to maintaining a mixed economy, promoting full employment, and commitment to broadly progressive health and welfare policies. Under Margaret Thatcher between 1979 and 1990, Conservative governments took off in a different direction as they sought to shrink the public sector and liberate market forces in an effort to reverse British decline and make its economy more internationally competitive. As Paul Addison has observed, ‘By the time she was forced to resign from office in November 1990 she had carried through changes so far reaching as to amount, by British
This was combined with an assertive stance in foreign policy which took Britain into its first major overseas conflict since Suez in 1956 and caused friction with other EU states, including the Federal Republic of Germany. It is important to note that throughout this period ‘Euroscepticism’ was always stronger in England than in the other countries comprising the United Kingdom. As Richard Weight has noted, ‘like most postwar British nationalism, it was predominantly defined and expressed by the English.’\footnote{461} It could also provide opportunities for those who remained hostile and suspicious towards the old enemy of two world wars (and one World Cup) to express their views, especially when the reunification of Germany became a realistic prospect in 1989. Mrs Thatcher, a few months before her resignation, was forced to distance herself from her Secretary for Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, who in a press interview had described the European Union as ‘a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe.’ Referring to British sovereignty, he added: ‘You might as well give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly …’.\footnote{462} Ridley’s remarks forced Thatcher to sack him but it was clear that he represented a significant body of right-wing opinion – both inside and outside parliament – and it was widely believed that ‘he had spoken aloud the Prime Minister’s private thoughts.’\footnote{463}


\footnote{462} Weight, *Patriots*, 633; Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 405-406.

The centre of British politics moved to the right in this period. Two key events of the 1980s precipitated this shift, The Falklands War of 1982 and the Miners’ Strike of 1984-85. Sending a ‘Task Force’ of British troops to liberate the Falkland Islands, 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic, after the tiny British colony had been invaded by Argentina, whose military government disputed Britain’s claim to the Malvinas, provided a patriotic focus that saved the Thatcher revolution when the Conservatives appeared to be heading for certain defeat at the next general election. The military victory achieved by British armed forces – in retrospect sending them seems to have been a huge gamble that could very easily have been lost – provided an opportunity for an unrestrained outbreak of patriotic fervour as the nation was encouraged by the media to get behind ‘Our Boys’. Right-wing politician Enoch Powell detected national solidarity and seriousness of purpose which reminded him of the Second World War. ‘The tabloid press went overnight from bingo to jingo’, as Addison observes.\textsuperscript{464} Throughout the conflict the British government enjoyed uncritical backing from the Sun, owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News International, who signalled the direction in which tabloid journalism was moving with its front page banner headline exclaiming ‘GOTCHA!’ to celebrate the sinking by a British submarine of an Argentinian warship with the loss of many lives.\textsuperscript{465} Military success meant that Britain could

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\item \textsuperscript{464} Addison, No turning back, 387-388.
\item \textsuperscript{465} Sun, 4 May 1982; see Curran, J. and Seaton, J., (eds.) Power without responsibility. The Press and broadcasting in Britain (London: Routledge, 1997), 212.
\end{itemize}
enjoy another ‘finest hour’, though initially there had been fears of another Suez fiasco.\footnote{Vinen, R., \textit{Thatcher's Britain. The Political and Social Upheavals of the 1980s} (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 145.}

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Marwick has argued that it is important not to overstate the importance of ‘The Falklands factor’ at the 1983 general election as the Conservatives swept to a decisive victory over a divided Labour Party.\footnote{Marwick, A., \textit{British society since 1945} (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 240.} This prepared the political ground for taking on and defeating the National Union of Mineworkers, historically Britain’s most powerful trade union, when they struck over the government’s plans to close ‘uneconomic’ state-owned coal mines. Tony Judt has argued that once this victory had been achieved the Thatcher government was free to set about its ideologically-driven task of ensuring that ‘the public space became a market place.’\footnote{Judt, T., \textit{Postwar: a history of Europe since 1945} (London: Pimlico, 2007), 540–547.} Seumas Milne has recently argued that the real outcome of the Miners’ Strike has become visible 30 years later. The striking miners had envisioned a Britain ‘rooted in solidarity and collective action’ but their defeat paved the way for the deregulation of the labour market including ‘zero-hour contracts, falling real wages, payday loans and food banks we are living with today.’\footnote{Milne, S., \textit{The enemy within. The secret war against the miners.} (London: Verso, 2014), see also: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/12/miners-strike-gutting-unions-bob-crow; accessed 15 December 2014.}

The shift to the right in politics and the defeats suffered by Labour and the trade unions were reflected in changes occurring in the British national press in
this period. In the years after newspaper sales had peaked in the mid-1950s two long-term trends became evident. The first was that, in a segmented newspaper market, there was a gradual drift of readers to upmarket titles like *The Times*, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Guardian*. The second was that there were ferocious battles going on to dominate the middle-market, where the *Daily Express* was in competition with the *Daily Mail*, and the mass market, where the *Daily Mirror* found itself in competition with Rupert Murdoch’s revamped *Sun* after 1969. The *Mail* had adopted tabloid format in 1971; the *Express* in 1977. While the *Express* (daily circulation of around 2.2 million) led the *Mail* (1.9m) in 1980, the *Mail* (1.8m) was ahead of the *Express* (1.6m) by the end of the decade. In 1980, the *Mirror* (3.6m) had just been overhauled by the *Sun* (3.7m); by the end of the decade the *Mirror* (3.1m) was clearly in second place in its sector falling behind the *Sun* (4.2m). It was also facing competition from another downmarket tabloid, the *Daily Star* with sales of just under a million. The battles between these titles were especially intense because the total daily sales of both middle-market and mass-market newspapers was in long-term decline. Of these changes, the rise of the *Sun* was probably the most significant; by overtaking the *Mirror* it suggested that working-class readers and voters were moving to the right. Since it had been acquired by Rupert Murdoch in 1969 it ‘had risen from the bottom of the tabloid heap to the top, adding more than 3 million in sales. In so doing, it also irretrievably changed popular newspaper culture.’

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The Mirror, with its tradition of irreverent but informative popular journalism, was at first shocked by the Sun and the brash new populist tabloid style that it cultivated. After a leading article in the Sun accused the Mirror of having ‘no faith in its country and no respect for her people’, the Mirror accused it of falling ‘from the gutter into the sewer.’ That said it was popular with working-class readers and probably reflected their values rather more than the Mirror by the mid-1980s. In the longer term, however, the Mirror tried to protect and rebuild its market share by becoming more like the Sun in pushing the boundaries of taste and decency. It seemed at times as if the editors of the two papers were engaged in a journalistic duel to the death with sensationalism as their chosen weapon. In 1986, after Bild had attacked the behaviour of British holiday-makers in Majorca, the Sun retaliated:

‘It’s war folks! Your patriotic Sun was last night assembling a Wapping task force to invade Germany – and give those lout Krauts a lesson to remember.

We sprang into action after a blitzkrieg-attack on you by the vicious, heartless barons of Germany’s gutter press.

Their biggest-selling newspaper, Bild, branded fun-loving British tourists in Majorca drunken louts.

…So the Sun – which first highlighted the sinister, selfish antics of Germans on holiday in Tenerife – is mobilising a platoon of

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472 Chippendale, P. and Horrie, C., Stick it up your punter! The rise and fall of the Sun (London: Heinemann, 1990), 123-124.
Page Three girls and Sun journalists for Operation Klobber the Krauts.\textsuperscript{473}

It was in this media climate that the Mirror launched its notorious ‘war’ on Germany during the build-up to the EURO 96 semi-final between England and Germany at Wembley in 1996. Arguably, by then it had sunk to the low standard set by its principal rival. It should be noted that the only other tabloid with substantial sales, the Daily Star, launched in 1978, ‘rapidly acquired a reputation for making the Sun look classy.’\textsuperscript{474}

**World Cup, 29 June 1982, Estadio Santiago Bernabeu, Madrid**

The final stages of the World Cup in Spain in 1982 were held against the background of the Anglo-Argentine War over the Falklands/Malvinas which ended as England were preparing for the first group stage of the 24-team competition, just two days before their first match against France. Fortunately for FIFA, England and Argentina had been allocated to different groups and were destined not to meet in Spain. It had been suggested a few weeks previously that the British teams – Scotland and Northern Ireland had qualified as well as England – should withdraw but this drastic measure was avoided and the teams started the tournament only a day or so after the Daily Express ‘Falklands Victory Special Edition’ had appeared with a banner headline on its front page announcing ‘VF’ (Victory in the Falklands) Day. These patriotic sentiments framed front page

\textsuperscript{473} Sun, 11 April 1986, cited in Chippindale and Horrie, *Stick it up your punter!,* 217-218.

pictures of Her Majesty the Queen and Margaret Thatcher. Having been on a war footing for some time it was hardly surprising that the sports pages made connections between the England football team and the conflict which had just ended in the South Atlantic. Steve Curry, reporting for the *Express* from England’s training camp, was quickly off the mark in this respect.

‘England will spread the euphoria of victory to the sports arena where they launch their World Cup assault against France in Bilbao this afternoon.

The mood of celebration at home has been captured by the England team, even though they step into action with two reserves in key positions.

Ron Greenwood, commenting on the surrender of Argentina in the Falklands, said: “Our players along with the rest of the world, welcomes the news.”

It did not occur to either Greenwood or the *Daily Express* that others – especially in the Spanish-speaking world - might not see these events in the same way, despite the tank and armed guards placed outside England’s training camp as a precaution.

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Though the conditions were abnormal, much of the press coverage before, during and after the tournament would have seemed familiar to English readers, not least an article in *The Times* on the day of England’s opening match by the veteran football writer Geoffrey Green focused on 1966 and its legacy as far as English football was concerned. The victory, he observed:

‘… left English football in a state of euphoria for the following four years until the crown was taken from them in Mexico. By then, however, the world in general had come to consider our earlier triumphs as highly suspect, contrived, and a ‘fix’. Bobby Moore and his men had been required to play every match only at Wembley. There was something in what the world thought.’

Ramsey’s 4-3-3 formation with the emphasis on defence had been taken up by English clubs with unfortunate consequences. In the ten years after 1966, ‘the game sank into a desert of negative midfield stalemate,’ Green argued, and ‘a whole generation of footballers with individualism and flair’ had been lost.\(^{478}\)

Readings of 1966 as ‘a fatal victory’ had become more fashionable over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s and there was a note of realism as the start of the tournament drew near, even in the *Express*. England, managed by Ron Greenwood, had qualified for the finals for the first time since 1970. Their progress to the finals had not been especially convincing and Curry recalled that only a year earlier, after a demoralising away defeat in Switzerland, ‘you would

\(^{478}\) *The Times*, 16 June 1982.
not have given a peseta for England’s chances.’ Curry’s assessment was upbeat but also realistic. England were improving, yet he did not think they could win the World Cup. The ‘magicians from Brazil’ and ‘the disciplined but talented West Germans’ were likely to be too strong for them.\(^{479}\) In \textit{The Times} a few days earlier, Nicholas Keith took much the same view, naming Brazil and West Germany as favourites to reach the final with Peru the best of the outsiders. ‘England has run into a decent patch of form at the right time’, he noted, before adding the reservation, ‘if only the players could believe in themselves.’\(^{480}\)

Having progressed through the first group stage with three consecutive victories, despite the absence through injury of both Keegan and Brooking, England found themselves in the same group as West Germany and Spain when they reached the last twelve. Once it became clear that battle would be resumed with the Germans, the tone of the coverage, especially in the tabloids, became significantly sharper and more jingoistic. The \textit{Sun}, still basking in post-Falklands War glory, set the tone with a veiled reference to the two world wars, noting that England had ‘beaten the Germans at most things. But not in the 1982 World Cup. Not yet.’ On the morning of the match it ran with the headline ‘ACHTUNG STATIONS’, as David Downing observed, ‘a depressing foretaste of the coming decade.’\(^{481}\) However, at this point, the \textit{Sun’s} headline writers seemed out of line with the sports pages in the \textit{Daily Mirror}, where a more balanced approach


\(^{480}\) \textit{The Times}, 12 June 1982.

prevailed. After winning their matches against France, Czechoslovakia and Kuwait it was understandable that the mood within the English squad was upbeat. Harry Miller, having interviewed Captain Mick Mills and Bryan Robson, sensed that ‘revenge is about to arrive for the defeat in 1970’ and predicted a 1-0 win for England. His colleague Frank McGhee was more cautious, drawing attention to Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, who had ‘stormed in’ with three goals against Chile thus achieving ‘lift-off’ for Germany’s World Cup hopes. There was also new ‘attacking sensation’ Pierre Littbarski who moved ‘like lightning.’ McGhee reported that Germany were said to be nervous while England were confident, although he himself would ‘quite happily settle for a draw.’

English newspaper readers were left in no doubt of the historic importance of an England-West Germany World Cup match and the forthcoming encounter was set within the framework of recent (i.e. since 1966) England-Germany matches. Steve Curry in the Daily Express predicted ‘a repeat of the 1966 final and quarter-final of 1970.’ Stuart Jones in The Times quoted England manager Ron Greenwood who had observed that this match represented the start of the ‘real competition.’ West Germany, Jones, observed, had not lost to European opposition since Derwall had taken over from Schön in 1978 and England’s defence would find itself under sustained pressure for the first time in the tournament. Like Miller in the Mirror, Jones emphasized the threat posed by Rummenigge and also mentioned Briegel and Kaltz, ‘who look and even sound

482 Daily Mirror, 29 June 1982.

like tanks.’ His concluding remarks again framed the match within the context of recent Anglo-German football history. Everything had gone England’s way ‘on that ‘famous afternoon in 1966’ but, he reminded his readers, ‘all went wrong against West Germany in 1970.’ In the Mirror, DFB spokesman Wilfried Gerhardt was quoted in order to point out that the fixture held a special significance for England’s opponents. For Germany, he claimed, a match against England ‘is always special.’

Of the three English newspapers which this thesis has tracked from the mid-1950s, it was the Daily Express which appeared to be most hostile towards West Germany. It might be speculated that this reflected the desperate determination of the Express to fight off the challenge from its main middle-market rival the Daily Mail. In the early 1980s, ‘the Mail was barely 50,000 behind its old rival, which was often selling no more than 1.8 million.’ The Express was represented in Spain by David Miller, Steve Curry and Jimmy Armfield, a former England captain and a member of Ramsey’s squad in 1966 who subsequently made a career as a football broadcaster and journalist. In the days before the match West Germany received a bad press after the 1-0 win over Austria in their final group match; a result which had the appearance of a ‘fix’, allowing both teams to advance to the next round at the expense of Algeria. The Express reported this match under the headline ‘Algeria storms – ‘It’s a fix’ and gave details of

484 The Times, 29 June 1982.
486 Greenslade, Press gang, 404.
incidents suggesting that Germany’s own supporters had been appalled by what they had seen.\footnote{218} David Miller returned to this story two days before the England-Germany match.

‘Germany are less than confident following the abuse rained upon them for their part in the “arranged” 1-0 win over Austria. Manager Jupp Derwall’s head is being demanded at home in some quarters, especially by those supporters who flew by charter for just one match against Austria. “Greetings from Fraud City”, one fan began his postcard home.’

Miller’s story undoubtedly reflected negatively on West Germany though they had made few friends by their performance against Austria and it could be argued that he was merely expressing a consensus view. He was, for example, able to quote from a Swiss and a Brazilian newspaper to support his case. Miller was also careful to direct some of the blame at FIFA for failing to schedule the final group matches to be played simultaneously as in previous tournaments.\footnote{488} The Express journalists seem to have had a reasonable working relationship with the German squad who were staying at the same hotel in Madrid. Jimmy Armfield recalled, ‘Access to the players and coaching staff couldn’t have been easier and we had everything first hand all the way to the final.’\footnote{489} He was able to file a well-

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\item \footnote{218} Daily Express, 26 June 1982.
\item \footnote{488} Daily Express, 28 June 1982.
\item \footnote{489} Armfield, J., Right back to the beginning: The autobiography (London: headline, 2004), 254.
\end{itemize}
informed article from Madrid on the day of the match reporting on the fitness of various German players and speculating on the tactical changes that Derwall would make to his line-up. ‘West Germany admitted they have not played well in the World Cup so far’, Armfield noted, but Derwall was confident that they would find their form against England. Armfield’s well-balanced report featured on an inside page whereas Steve Curry’s report headed ‘Bulldogs will put the bite on Germany’ appeared on the back page (the main sports page) and was far more aggressive in tone. Ron Greenwood’s respect for the opposition was duly signalled: ‘they are very good tactically and technically and their organisation has always been of the highest quality.’ The main theme of the article, however, was revenge and the tone was aggressive. Curry’s opened with the sentence, ‘Ron Greenwood’s English bulldogs tonight bare their teeth at the arrogant Germans as they seek World Cup revenge for 1970.’ He concluded by waving the flag in patriotic fashion and predicting that ‘these supercharged England stars are tonight going to give England her finest football moment since we beat the Germans in 1966.’

The match is remembered as a dull and uninspiring goalless draw even by those who played in it. England full-back Kenny Sansom recalled in his ghosted autobiography: ‘Unfortunately the play didn’t match the splendour of the arena. The Germans were determined not to lose against us and played boring, defensive

490 Daily Express, 29 June 1982.

491 Daily Express, 29 June 1982.
football. We weren’t much better …’ According to the Daily Mirror, a match that had promised to be a ‘fire-works party’ turned out to be ‘a damp squib in Madrid.’ Frank McGhee found some consolation in the fact that West Germany were ‘world class opposition’ and that England had ‘more than matched’ them. He conceded that Rummenigge looked ‘strangely lethargic and not fully fit’ but he had almost won the game for West Germany with a shot that hit the crossbar five minutes from time. Using a metaphor derived from the trenches of the First World War he observed that the Germans would not ‘go over the top and attack.’ Though England and West Germany remained in the tournament at this stage as both had yet to play Spain, it seems that the imperative for both sides was to avoid defeat and this made for a dreary spectacle. Summing up the match for The Times, Stuart Jones concluded:

‘As fascinating to watch as chess, it was also, for the most part, as ponderous. No blood flowed but enough sweat was poured out during the sultry evening to satisfy all those who admire work-rate. It needed just a drop of inspiration, just a moment of enlightenment.’

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492 Samson, K. (with Wright, R.), To cap it all...My story (London: John Blake, 2008), 83.
494 The Times, 30 June 1982.
However, such moments had not been provided. ‘The format of the tournament had invited both managers to be cautious, and they had duly obliged’, as Downing has observed.\footnote{Downing, \textit{Best of enemies}, 169.}

According to Brian Glanville, it had been ‘a dreary game’ and a ‘sterile evening’.\footnote{Glanville, B., \textit{The story of the World Cup} (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), 248.} England’s forwards had failed to adjust to West Germany’s use of a sweeper to which they were not accustomed. However, as far as the \textit{Daily Express} was concerned the blame for the dismal spectacle lay entirely with Derwall and his team. Steve Curry’s match report was unequivocal: ‘And if the game turned into a nothing match, then I condemn the Germans for their over-cautious, catch-us-if-you-can approach.’ If West Germany had won, it would have been ‘an inglorious victory.’ In an adjacent column headed ‘Insulting way to send us to sleep’, David Miller, though not uncritical of England, was scathing about Germany, arguing that their performance in Madrid was in line with what had gone before.

‘This goalless draw was only marginally less cynical than the “agreed” victory of Germany’s with Austria and was an insult to the 90,000 who whistled them off at the end. Germany played like frightened sheep and England had not the inventiveness and sharpness to shear them naked as they deserved.'
… Ron Greenwood, not unfairly, put the blame squarely on Germany, saying, “If one side doesn’t want to come at you, it’s difficult.”

This analysis took some of the pressure off Greenwood and his players but the Express was quite clear that the blame for the disappointing spectacle lay with ‘the frightened Germans.’\footnote{Daily Express, 30 June 1982.} It was a viewpoint subsequently endorsed by The Times where Stuart Jones made it clear that he believed that Derwall had picked a team to avoid defeat.\footnote{The Times, 1 July 1982.}

It seems significant that this negativity followed West Germany through the rest of the tournament all the way to the final against Italy, which they lost. David Miller, two days after the match, accused sweeper Uli Stielike of ‘calculated obstruction and tripping every time he was threatened’.\footnote{Daily Express 1 July 1982.} When, with the outcome of the group undecided, it was reported that FIFA was considering drawing lots to decide which team should progress to the semi-finals – Greenwood had been under the impression that England’s superior goal difference in the first group stage would count – the Express implied that a malign Teutonic influence was at work. The issue had been raised only ‘after the issue became of importance to West Germany after the first match draw with England.’\footnote{Daily Express, 2 July 1982.} It was easy for the Express to join the almost universal chorus of disapproval after
goalkeeper Schumacher’s ‘grotesquely unfair forearm smash’ on Battiston as West Germany defeated France in the semi-finals.\textsuperscript{501} Moreover, for Steve Curry, there was no doubt regarding which of the two finalists deserved to win the tournament. Italy, he claimed, had ‘earned the right’ to be in the final but that could not be said of West Germany:

‘… punished for their arrogance in their first match by losing 2-1 to no-hopers Algeria.

Then came the match against Austria, which left a nasty taste. Even the committed suggested that it was a manipulated result to ensure that both participants got safely through the first phase. From that suspicious platform they took on England with a defensive side and a cowardly approach, achieving a 0-0 draw …

And in the semi-final their tactics against France were straight from the dirty tricks department. There was not an unbiased voice around that didn’t suggest it was an injustice to the French that they lost in a sudden death penalty shoot-out.’\textsuperscript{502}

The Italy–Germany final was covered for the \textit{Express} by David Miller who welcomed the result for two reasons – ‘the appalling unpunished foul by West Germany’s goalkeeper Harald Schumacher against heroic France … and Italy’s

\textsuperscript{501} \textit{Daily Express}, 9 July 1982
\textsuperscript{502} \textit{Daily Express}, 10 July 1982.
obvious superiority on the night and over the last three matches. It is important to remember the context. By 1982, as Uli Hesse has pointed out, the flair players that had made West Germany so popular in the 1970s had departed, ‘to be replaced by the sort of players who would garner West Germany a very bad name indeed during the 1982 and 1986 World Cups.’ Even so, there had not been a more sustained assault on the German national team in the English press since the controversial semi-final win over the Soviet Union in 1966. The Express was not the only newspaper to take this line. On the day of the final the Sun ran with the headline ‘THESE GERMAN CHEATS MUST NOT WIN.’ In The Times, under the same ownership as the Sun since 1981, Stuart Jones, was more even-handed in that he thought that both Italy and West Germany had brought the game into disrepute; both were ‘unsporting and physical, almost to the point of being thugs.’ However, of the two, it is clear that he believed that Derwall’s team were the worst offenders. ‘But Italy and, particularly, West Germany’, he wrote, ‘are not worthy of either the prize or the title. For all that they deserve, the trophy might as well be a battered tin pot.’

**Football in the Dark Ages: England v Germany in the 1980s**

In his study of German football, Uli Hesse assigns the label ‘the Dark Ages’ to the 1980s on account of the football hooliganism that plagued the game at this time and also because of the joyless, pragmatic style adopted by the West German

503 Daily Express, 12 July 1982.


505 Downing, *Best of enemies*, 171.

506 The Times, 10 July 1982.
team. He added, ‘The main problem with this sort of football was that it proved successful. West Germany reached two World Cup finals in a row’ (1982 and 1986).\textsuperscript{507} For England the 1980s were even darker in that football had to deal with a problem of hooliganism so serious that, after the Heysel Stadium disaster of 1985, English club sides were banned from the European competitions, at first indefinitely but later reduced to five years. At the same time, the national team, though qualifying for the World Cup finals in 1982 and 1986 did not advance beyond the quarter-finals and continued to be outperformed by the Germans. Paul Addison argues that the successful intervention in the Falklands plus an economic revival that began at about the same time ‘drew a line under ‘the thesis that the British were forever sliding downhill and would never achieve anything of significance again.’\textsuperscript{508} However, there were frequent reminders that the Germans were more successful – and not just at football. \textit{Auf Wiedersehen, Pet}, a highly popular television series which started in 1983, traced the story of seven construction workers, mainly from North-East of England, who had been forced to go to the Federal Republic to find work that was not available at home. As one of the exiles explains bitterly to an uncomprehending German, unemployment was one of England’s great success stories: ‘We’ve managed to put more people out of work than any of our European counterparts.’\textsuperscript{509} As Downing observes, the Second World War was now forty years in the past, ‘though its representation in the media often gave new life to those negative images of Germany most

\textsuperscript{507} Hesse, \textit{Tor!}, 208.

\textsuperscript{508} Addison, \textit{No turning back}, 388.

\textsuperscript{509} Turner, \textit{Rejoice! Rejoice!}, 11.
associated with it."\textsuperscript{510} Representations of post-war German success were also frequent feeding into a new stereotype of the Germans that could be admired or despised depending on the occasion.

Press coverage of the three friendly matches played by England and West Germany in the 1980s – the first in October 1982 at Wembley, the second in May 1985 at Mexico City, and the third in September 1987 at Dusseldorf – was less intensive than if they had been World Cup or European Nations Championship matches. For the first of these fixtures, there was an element of negativity in the pre-match coverage that was carried over from the World Cup finals a few months earlier. Harald (‘Toni’) Schumacher arrived in England as ‘current public enemy number one’, according to Tony Stenson in the \textit{Daily Mirror}, though it was pointed out that West Germany’s goalkeeper was anxious to lose his reputation as ‘an assassin’ and had made peace with the unfortunate Battiston. Schumacher was quoted, however, as complaining that others had ‘broken players’ legs without as much fuss,’ which tended to suggest that he was looking for sympathy that was not likely to be forthcoming at Wembley or anywhere else. There was evidence of a minor German charm offensive. Derwall admitted that his team had contributed to the dull game in Madrid – though he blamed FIFA for creating the situation in which it had occurred – and promised ‘to be more open’ in order to woo fans back to the game. Frank McGhee noted that both England and West Germany were in ‘approximately the same stage of rebuilding’, resorting to stereotyping only with a passing reference to the ‘Teutonic thoroughness’ with which Derwall had

\textsuperscript{510} Downing, \textit{Best of enemies}, 171.
prepared. This had included asking the stadium officials to play a recording of the Wembley roar at full blast when his players visited before the match. This was hardly necessary as tickets had not been selling fast and only 68,000 attended on the night, well below Wembley’s capacity.

In the end West Germany won 2-1 against a young and experimental England side which, according to Steve Curry in the *Daily Express*, had shown ‘encouraging signs of enterprise’ and thus justified new manager Bobby Robson’s selection policy. The headline over his match report – ‘German lesson’ – merely underlined what had long been apparent, that England’s footballers are no longer capable of teaching their German rivals very much. There were no references to 1966 and 1970 and few references to the war, though Frank McGhee’s match report in the *Mirror* was headlined ‘Blitz of the Blond Bomber’ and claimed that in the first half the visitors had needed ‘barbed wire and bayonets in their defensive work to survive.’ Rummenigge, scorer of both West Germany’s goals had ‘shot England down’ with ‘bullets supplied by the amazing Pierre Littbarski.’ However, though the *Express* -along with *The Times* – avoided military metaphors in its match report, an element of hostility surfaced on the day after the match when David Miller used his column to resume the attacks on Derwall’s team which had been such an important feature of the *Daily Express’s*

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coverage of the 1982 World Cup finals. The Germans, he claimed, ‘continued where they left off in that deplorable World Cup final against Italy in which there were 20 bookable fouls in the first half hour’. Referring to a domestic initiative to reduce the number of professional fouls, Miller went on to claim that German cynicism might even have cost England a victory. ‘If Football League regulations had applied at Wembley, Wolfgang Dremmler would have been sent off long before the end and Alan Devonshire, not Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, might have won the match.’

The second of the three England-West Germany friendly matches in the 1980s was played in Mexico City in May 1985. For England it was the third match in a ‘mini-tournament’ involving Mexico and Italy, as well as West Germany, and the main purpose of the trip was to give players experience of the high-altitude, high-temperature conditions that they would meet in the 1986 World Cup finals. England, who had been in Mexico for 12 days whereas their opponents had only recently arrived, had clearly had an opportunity to acclimatize, despite losing their previous matches against Mexico and Italy. As Stuart Jones observed in The Times, ‘England, who had not lost to Germany until 1968, have not beaten them since. This afternoon clearly represents their best chance.’ This proved to be a correct assessment as England won 3-0, ‘a marked and encouraging’ improvement on England’s recent form, though Jones had to point out that ‘the fitness of the Germans has to be taken into account.’

516 The Times, 12 June 1985.
517 The Times, 13 June 1985.
Curry’s match report for the *Daily Express* was a little sharper in tone and implied that the West Germans had only themselves to blame for their biggest defeat by England in thirteen matches.

‘The Germans believed that 48 hours at 7,000 feet above sea level would be preparation enough for a match against one of their oldest enemies. How wrong they were. For England’s two weeks acclimatisation here in Mexico City gave them a clear advantage in lung capacity.’

There was a hint at German arrogance here but it was not overtly stated. A victory, however, was encouraging and the *Daily Mirror* concluded that ‘England do not have to be scared by anyone from Europe’ as Bobby Robson’s team had ‘put the Germans on the run.’

However, on this occasion – probably because of the remote location and a realization that it was a match of little consequence in terms of a result – press coverage was minimal and restrained. It has to be remembered that this particular England end-of-season tour was overshadowed by the continuing fall-out from the disaster on the final Saturday of the English League season when 56 lives had been lost in a fire at Bradford City and the even more recent tragedy at Heysel Stadium. The same issue of the *Express* that carried the match report also carried

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news of a proposal that all football fans should be required to have ID cards which could be checked before going to a match and that a ‘Downing Street summit on hooliganism’ would be held shortly.\textsuperscript{520} Bradford and Heysel had prompted much soul-searching within and around British football. ‘Heysel was a horrible, horrible shock,’ observed England manager Bobby Robson. ‘You felt ashamed.’\textsuperscript{521} \textit{Daily Mirror} columnist Keith Waterhouse argued that ‘soccer thugs’ were merely symptoms of an age of ‘brutalism’ which was ‘gradually corroding our national fabric.’ He blamed, among other features of modern life, junk food (‘the brutalizer of appetite’), tower blocks (‘the brutalization of architecture’), violent picket lines (‘the brutalization of trade unionism’), the \textit{Sun} newspaper (‘the brutalization of journalism’) and, finally, Thatcherism (‘the brutalization of life itself’). Former trade union leader Jimmy Reid argued that the ‘bully boys in politics are in no position to lecture the bully boys of football. They set the pattern.’\textsuperscript{522} In these circumstances there were other priorities, even for the tabloids, than an England victory over West Germany in a non-competitive fixture in distant Mexico. The coverage for once was minimal and restrained.

The third and final meeting in this sequence of friendly matches was at Dusseldorf in September 1987. On this occasion it is clear that the English tabloid press was beginning to shed the inhibitions which had characterized reporting from the match in Mexico two years earlier. The \textit{Sun} used the headline ‘BATTLE

\textsuperscript{520} The Times, 13 June 1985.

\textsuperscript{521} Turner, \textit{Rejoice! Rejoice!}, 135-136.

\textsuperscript{522} Daily Mirror, 1, 3 June 1985.
OF THE KRAUTS’ for one of its articles before the match; for Downing this was an early indication that the word had been resurrected.\footnote{523} It was a sign of the times that the pre-match coverage was concerned as much as what would happen off the field as what would happen on it. FA Chairman Bert Millichip was widely quoted regarding fears that English hooligans would cause major problems:

‘What is at stake is our European future. We might be out of European football at club and international level for the foreseeable future if there is any hooliganism involving England supporters.

We could be thrown out of the European championships next summer, assuming we qualify. It is our greatest test since the Heysel Stadium disaster.’\footnote{524}

Given recent history, Millichip’s fears were justified and they were echoed elsewhere on the sports pages. Stuart Jones in The Times, for example, feared that English football fans ‘will live up to their own foul name.’ He observed that the Rhein-Stadion stadium, where the match was to be played, resembled ‘a huge zoo’ which for some ‘may feel appropriate’ as the ‘behaviour of the English louts in the past has been animalistic and there was little or no reason to expect it to have improved.’\footnote{525} Aside from these anxieties, there was the prospect of playing a

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\footnote{523}{Downing, Best of enemies, 178.}
\footnote{524}{Daily Express, 8 September 1987.}
\footnote{525}{The Times, 9 September 1987.}
\end{flushright}
German team which could still be regarded as one of the strongest in the world. As the *Daily Express* observed, ‘The game is a searching test for England in the Fatherland where we have not won since 1965.’

England striker Gary Lineker, interviewed by the *Daily Mirror*, underlined the point and was quoted as saying that matches between the two countries have ‘always been a big game, whether it is a friendly or otherwise.’ Franz Beckenbauer, now in charge of the German national side, had responded politely before the match, claiming that he had sought this fixture because ‘I need to know how good my side is.’ This persuaded Steve Curry in the *Express* to claim that the match would be ‘another classic encounter between the two nations.’

As Simon Kuper has observed, ‘Professional footballers are always polite about their opponents, because they know that they will run into them again somewhere.’ For the Germans, however, it seems certain that by 1987 a match with the Dutch was considered of more importance than a match with the English, whatever Beckenbauer might have said to the English press.

After Germany had won 3-1 the quality newspapers, though critical of some aspects of England’s performance, were also generous in praise of Beckenbauer’s newly-assembled side. They emphasised the gap in quality between the two sides. ‘England were well behind the West Germans in terms of sure first touch on the

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ball, combined with imaginative running and breathtaking changes of pace,’ according to the *Guardian*.\(^{530}\) For Stuart Jones in *The Times*, Germany’s newly assembled side were ‘more efficient, technically more gifted and particularly more organized in defence’ than Robson’s comparatively settled formation.\(^{531}\) In an article written after the match Jones was inclined to praise Germany rather than to criticize England as the side ‘reassembled by Franz Beckenbauer has already developed into one of the best in the world and must be considered overwhelming favourites to be the next European champions.’ Bobby Robson had argued that ‘only Argentina and Brazil could compete with them (West Germany)’, to which Jones added that even they might ‘struggle to break down their defence or contain their attack.’\(^{532}\) The tabloids did not disagree with the verdict of the broadsheets. England’s performance was not without merit though, as Nigel Clarke observed in the *Daily Mirror*, they had come close to ‘being outplayed.’ Perhaps the best news from England’s point of view was that the fans had behaved well. ‘[T]hey can be trusted again’, Harry Harris noted with some relief in the *Mirror*, though this was probably an over-optimistic judgement.\(^{533}\) The *Express*, on an inside news page, noted that thirty English fans, including twenty BAOR soldiers, had been arrested, ‘mainly for drunken brawling.’ An English fan had been stabbed. As a spokesman for the British consulate in Dusseldorf had observed, ‘By football standards, it was not bad at all.’\(^{534}\)

\(^{530}\) Cited in Downing, *Best of enemies*, 178.

\(^{531}\) *The Times*, 10 September 1987.

\(^{532}\) *The Times*, 11 September 1987.

\(^{533}\) *Daily Mirror*, 10 September 1987.

‘Significantly, the headline over the Mirror’s match report was ‘Blitzed! Robson’s men really kaput,’ signalling the result in terms that could have been understood by anyone familiar with the comic-strip papers read by English schoolboys.535 Close reading of the Daily Express, in particular, suggests that it was more willing to resort to a form of discourse which was characterized by frequent references to the war and German aggression. The main headline for Steve Curry’s match report was ‘Shilton is caught in crossfire’ – England’s veteran goalkeeper had not been at his best – but the sub-heading was ‘Germans shoot down England.’ There was praise for West Germany’s performance; they were ‘the new pride of the Fatherland’ and superior to all other European national sides. ‘What this prestige match illustrated,’ Curry observed, ‘is the enormity of the task facing the seven nations who will be trying to prevent Germany winning next summer’s European championship.’ However, when describing the sheer power with which West Germany had played, there were references to ‘Franz Beckenbauer’s new panzer unit’ and the England back four being ‘under the blitz from strikers Rudi Voeller and Klaus Allofs.’ England’s best moment – a goal from Gary Linker – had temporarily ‘killed Germany’s arrogance.’536 After a pause, it seemed that Fleet Street’s tin soldiers were re-emerging, perhaps sensing that opportunities to attack the old enemy would be forthcoming at EURO 88, to be held in West Germany, for which England looked likely to qualify.

536 Daily Express, 10 September 1987.
Analysis of the English press representation surrounding Anglo-German encounters in the 1980s suggests initially that traditional antagonism towards Germany was fading. It was very evident in 1982 during and after the World Cup finals, especially in the right-wing *Daily Express*, but was framed with reference to contemporary football history – the ‘fixed’ result against Austria and Schumacher’s assault on Battiston, for example – rather than the First and Second World Wars, though occasional references did occur. Similarly, there were relatively few references to West Germany seeking revenge for 1966 or England for 1970. It helped, perhaps, that England had performed better in the 1986 finals than had been expected and that the Falklands War had provided another convenient target for the English press. The fact that there was no competitive match involving England and West Germany between 1982 and 1990 was also a factor as the international friendly had now been devalued. Indeed, especially in the mid-1980s, there was little evidence of anti-German discourse in match reports and sports-page comment. Compared to what came later the tone of reporting was restrained, even in 1982 when, as Downing observed, ‘at least they were still called Germans.’

What the sports pages did provide, however, were reminders of German superiority in football which, for much of the 1980s, reflected perceived German superiority in other areas and which underpinned the long-standing stereotype of German arrogance to which many English people, including their Prime Minister, still clung tenaciously.

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537  Downing, *Best of enemies*, 171.

538  Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 402-406.
World Cup Semi-Final, Turin, Italy, 4 July 1990

England’s next competitive encounter with Germany, in the semi-finals of the World Cup in 1990, occurred at point when Anglo-German relations were entering a particularly difficult phase. The confidence that had fed into a surge of British/English nationalism in the early and mid-1980s, after military victory in the Falklands and a period of economic recovery, was fading. The stock market crash of October 1987 burst the economic bubble and two years later interest rates had risen to 15 per cent. As Alwyn Turner observes, ‘There had been an economic boom that was supposed to have heralded a rebirth of the nation and yet, as the signs appeared of an incipient new recession, it seemed that much had been left undone in the good years’. As the government struggled on into 1990 it might have seemed that it would benefit from the feel good factor generated by an England team performing unexpectedly well and reaching the last four but Mrs Thatcher was unable to benefit from this ‘for she had already made clear that she viewed all football fans as potential hooligans. In terms of Anglo-German relations the end of communism and the dismantling of the border between West and East Germany created a new context which, as we have seen, many in Britain, especially those who were Eurosceptics, found disturbing. A leading article in The Times, still regarded in other countries as the voice of the British government, which warned that ‘the Fourth Reich, if it comes, will have a natural tendency to resemble its predecessor’, had caused

539 Turner, Rejoice! Rejoice!, 269-270.
540 Turner, Rejoice! Rejoice!, 360.
outrage in the German press. Though it was difficult not to respond positively to the euphoria that greeted the destruction of the Berlin Wall, there were early signs that it was creating a situation which would be a source of anxiety. As the Daily Express – in a leading article headed ‘A great day for freedom’ – noted at the time, ‘The reunification of Germany is now on the cards, whether non-Germans want it or not.’ It argued that ‘joy must be tempered with realism and caution.’ This was very much Mrs Thatcher’s position and that of many of those who were close to her as she struggled to obstruct or delay German reunification using the argument that it was ‘simply too big an issue to be decided by Germans for themselves.’ It did not help that British opposition to important European initiatives, like the Social Charter guaranteeing basic rights for workers, left her government without allies in Brussels, Strasbourg and elsewhere. ‘Battle lines were drawn up last night for another clash between Mrs Thatcher and the other 11 Common Market members this time over the social charter’, the Express had reported a few days earlier. It was by now a familiar story and it highlighted another area where Anglo-German political interests differed.

England’s performances in the two years before the tournament did not suggest that they were likely to be among the more successful teams playing in Italia 90. As Jonathan Wilson has observed, the disaster of Euro 88 ‘left an undertone of embarrassment that, intensified by the optimism with which they had

541 The Times, 31 October 1989, cited in Downing, Best of enemies, 181.
543 Ramsden, Don’t mention the war, 404.

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gone into the tournament, had never quite gone away.’ The two-year build-up to the World Cup finals ‘had been characterised by gloom.’

Little was expected and it was a great surprise when Robson’s team reached the semi-final. One result of this was that the prospect of England meeting West Germany did not materialize until the tournament was well under way and this may have moderated press coverage of their opponents, who were among the favourites to win. In general, Beckenbauer and his team were highly regarded and much admired as they made their way to the last four while England were, at times, heavily criticized, especially after their opening match against Ireland, a 1-1 draw which appeared to showcase all that was worse in English football. ‘We are a bankrupt soccer nation without inspiration, method and scarcely an inkling of how the game is now being played across the wider world’, observed James Lawton in the Express. He continued his attack a day later, claiming that English soccer ‘which used to demand universal affection, then grudging respect for its strength, is now openly despised.’

Previewing the final, The Times headline – ‘England totter into the last four’ – was hardly an expression of confidence in Robson and his team. Stuart Jones, reporting England’s quarter-final victory over Cameroon, complained that they had been ‘unimaginative and pedestrian’ and predicted that they would be no match for Germany in Turin. In the same issue Clive White reported West Germany’s 1-0 quarter-final victory over Czechoslovakia, describing it as ‘awesome’ and one which would reverberate ‘all the way to


Daily Express, 12 June 1990.

Daily Express, 13 June 1990.
Rome.’ David Miller claimed that Italy and Germany had brought ‘real style’ to the World Cup, a quality which most observers thought England lacked. Germany played attractive football characterized by ‘assertive pace and power rather than fantasy.’

Coverage in the *Daily Express*, not noted for its admiration of Germany and its people, was notably favourable towards England’s semi-final opponents. There were occasional references that seemed to indicate that the tin soldiers were at work once more. For example, even before the tournament began, the headline after a warm-up game against Egypt – ‘Bobby’s Desert Rats lead march on Italy’ – was an uncomfortable reminder of the Second World War. However, as Beckenbauer’s team progressed through the tournament, they were not only praised in match reports but in features on the sports pages. John Giles (‘The man the players read’) wrote in praise of Lothar Matthaeus, ‘an outstanding footballer’. Giles could not see anyone else ‘lifting the trophy on July 5, because the Germans have also built a fabulous side around their skipper.’ James Lawton wrote in praise of Franz Beckenbauer (‘Kaiser Franz’), who had announced that he would be leaving his position as coach to the national team after the tournament.

‘If they had a scrap of imagination the FA (Football Association) would try to lure him to England rather than haggle

548  *The Times*, 2 July 1990.
549  *Daily Express*, 1 June 1990.
with Aston Villa’s Doug Ellis over the services of Graham Taylor. Taylor … is not in the same league as the man who seems to hold the World Cup in the palm of his hand."

For the FA to have appointed a German to coach England’s national side in 1990 would have been revolutionary and that Lawton should make the suggestion was an indication of the extent to which England and its unimaginative governing body had fallen behind the rest of the world. In the context of football, it was an oblique reference to relative national decline.

Moreover, Lawton, when reporting West Germany’s victory over Holland, praised their performance extravagantly and clearly believed that they were likely to win against England in the semi-final at Turin.

‘The Dutch came to make war, a petty, hacking, vicious little war but the Germans came to play football. They did – beautifully, swiftly, powerfully as they shrugged off the 20th minute dismissal of their brilliant striker Rudi Voeller. … There can rarely have been worthier favourites for the game’s supreme title and England – scheduled to meet them in the semi-final – can only tremble at the prospect of colliding with quality players like Matthaus, Klinsmann and Brehme.’

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Having made his admiration for West Germany clear, Lawton could be forgiven the clichéd military metaphor used in his final paragraph when he noted that they would ‘march on stronger for this performance.’\(^{552}\) In contrast, he argued a few days later, England had reached the semi-final through a combination of good fortune and dogged determination, or ‘True Brit Grit’ as Manager Bobby Robson had called it after the extra-time win over Cameroon.\(^{553}\) Lawton was certainly not alone in his assessment of England. David Miller in *The Times* argued that England had been ‘lucky’ in their quarter-final when it had been necessary to do ‘the Dunkirk bit’ and observed that Robson’s claim that ‘we’re in the top four of the world’ could not be taken seriously.\(^{554}\) England’s supporters were reported to be realistic, which meant that they recognized that Germany were superior but also that there was just a chance that England might win. It was ‘good to be in the semi-finals’ [but] if it wasn’t for Gascoigne, we’d have been out in the first or second round.’ Miracles were possible, as in the 1988 FA Cup Final when Wimbledon had beaten Liverpool: ‘If Wimbledon win the FA Cup and the ball is round, England can win the World Cup.’\(^{555}\) However, no-one really expected this to happen.

Reading the English sports pages before the semi-final it seems as if many journalists were finding it difficult to find any reasons to dislike the German team.

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\(^{553}\) *Daily Express*, 2 July 1990.

\(^{554}\) *The Times*, 2 July 1990.

\(^{555}\) *The Times*, 3 July 1990.
Simon Barnes in *The Times* made no secret of wanting Italy and Germany to progress to the final and wanting Italy to win. ‘For an Englishman it is hard to love the German football team’, he observed, hastily adding that this attitude was not a product of sports history or even ‘real history’, but it was simply that ‘German football teams do not stir English blood.’ Unlike Brazil, for example, they offered no ‘relief from the humdrum;’ ‘they are like us, only better,’ Barnes concluded. Thus they were a team that ‘inspires respect rather than affection.’

World Cup football had moved from the back to the front pages of newspapers as England had progressed to the semi-final and it was reported that a television audience of 30 million would watch the match at home. In these circumstances it was not surprising that the *Daily Express* should publish a war cry on the morning of the match, though it chose Nelson’s ‘England Expects!’ from the now ancient war against France for its front-page banner headline rather than one of the familiar Churchill quotes from the Second World War.

Growing excitement, however, as England crept through each round on the way to Turin did provide newspapers at the bottom end of the market with an excuse to indulge in ‘sales-boosting rants’ as the match hit the front pages. This was especially evident in the *Sun*, weakened by ten years of self-vulgarisation’, and the *Star*, which had never set its sights very high in that respect. In the *Sun* there were numerous pathetic puns based on the words ‘Hun’ and ‘Kraut’ and a whole page outlining changes in Germany since 1966. As Downing notes, ‘These generally boiled down to the

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556  *The Times*, 4 July 1990.
558  Downing, *Best of enemies*, 185; Greenslade, *Press gang*, 323. The *Daily Star’s* first editor had been quoted as saying: ‘Sex sells – that goes for pictures and words. So the *Star* will have its daily quota.’
Germans getting richer, though space was saved for the illuminating information that the average German bust-size was thirty-eight inches.’ Its rallying cry was less sensitive than that used by the Express: ‘We beat them in ’45, we beat them in ’66, now the battle of ‘90. This was picked up by the Star which ran a number of puerile features under the headline ‘Now for the Krauts.’

As on the occasion of previous significant Anglo-German football encounters there was a tendency to frame the match in the context of recent football history. As ever for the English, 1966 and 1970 loomed large. Even before the tournament began the Express had asked three heroes of the 1966 team – Bobby Moore, Geoff Hurst and Bobby Charlton – to assess current members of Robson’s squad, Bryan Robson, Gary Lineker and Paul Gascoigne respectively.’ ‘The years’, it was noted, ‘have hardly touched Bobby Moore, ‘as if sunlight still falls on him from that Wembley afternoon when he captained England to the World Cup itself.’ Two days before the match Gary Lineker provided a human interest angle recalling that he had shed tears as a nine-year-old boy watching on television as England lost to West Germany in León. ‘Twenty years is a long time, but I still have that World Cup quarter-final in Mexico vividly in my mind,’ the England striker explained. Naturally, the Express concluded that England ‘look for their revenge tomorrow night with a record of only two wins against the Germans in 10 games since the 1966 World Cup triumph.’ By this stage the historical record had turned decisively in Germany’s favour and it was this that

559 Sun, Daily Star, 3 July 1990, cited in Downing, Best of enemies, 185.
560 Daily Express, 8 June 1990.
561 Daily Express, 3 July 1990.
weighed most heavily with Stuart Jones in *The Times*. Beckenbauer was quoted as saying that Germany v England was ‘a classic’ but, for Jones, the German record – six semi-final appearances in the last seven tournaments – simply underlined the gap between the two teams. Once England had been ‘the masters’ and Germany had been ‘the students’. However, roles had now been reversed and now it was ‘the masters (Germany) against the novices (England), the efficient against the spirited, the practised against the spontaneous.’ However, it was possible that the unlikely could happen. BBC television’s coverage of the match began by juxtaposing a clip of Ramsey predicting victory in 1966 with a clip of Robson saying ‘it would be lovely to win.’

Jones predicted that the match would be close, not least because of England’s team spirit and new self-belief. In the *Express*, Bobby Robson explained ‘that his team’s greatest incentive was to stuff it up your (the media’s) nostrils.’ As James Lawton noted, ‘There have been more uplifting battle cries’; it simply emphasized the overwhelming conviction in the English press that whereas West Germany had a right to be in the semi-final, England had ridden their luck. As it transpired it was close and England defied their critics. Hesse has summarized succinctly:

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562 *The Times*, 4 July 1990.
564 *Daily Express*, 3 July 1990.
'It was 1-1 after extra time between West Germany and England in the 1990 World Cup semi-final, and penalties now had to determine who was to meet Argentina in the final. The match was the closest and most evenly fought that West Germany would play in the tournament, the two sides matching each other strike for strike, tackle for tackle. They even both hit the post once, but thanks to misses from Chris Waddle and Stuart Pearce in the shoot-out, it was the Germans who went through.'

On the night 80,000 spectators in the Stade delle Alpi in Turin and 26.3 million viewers, at least half the population of England, watched Robson’s team lose from the penalty spot. Predictably some of those watching at home responded badly to the defeat and there were disturbances in many towns and cities; three people died and about 600 were injured. In Eltham, South-East London, German-made cars were attacked; in Woking a Scotsman wearing Germany’s colours had his ribs broken; in Brighton a mob chased German students through the streets.

There was some post-match violence in Turin, yet, though this spasm of violence was regretfully noted, the reports were generous in praising England’s performance against the tournament favourites. *The Times* headlined its match report ‘England pay a cruel penalty’ and emphasized how close they had come to beating West Germany who had never looked like ‘the masters’ and were never in complete control of events until after Pearce had missed his penalty in the shoot-

out. In the *Daily Express*, Steve Curry’s report concluded positively, with just a faint echo of 1966: ‘It was all over. The feeling of deflation was awful. But at least we have a team that can hold its head up high today and we should applaud them.’ This positive view tended to prevail. After a horrible decade that had seen football reported negatively on the front pages on account of the rise of hooliganism, Robson’s team managed to unite the nation behind them, ‘returning the game to the fans rather than the hooligans.’ It could be argued that this was the bigger prize that they brought back from Italy, more important even than a World Cup win.

As Wilson notes, ‘there was a great dislocation in perception between journalists in Italy who had endured a month of negative, grinding football and regular violence, and those swept along by the mass hysteria at home.’ This may explain why football journalists were happy to praise England’s performance, ‘but not to the skies.’ Curry’s colleague at the *Express*, James Lawton, was realistic in his assessment, ‘We were not good enough to win even this World Cup lacking evidence of true greatness.’ On the night England had played well but ‘West Germany were the better team’ with ‘more shape, deeper talent, greater reserves of concentration.’ What England had offered in their gallant defeat was some hope for the future based on a performance that had

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567 The Times, 5 July 1990.  
568 Daily Express, 5 July 1990.  
demonstrated ‘old English values … Values of heart and cussed belief that something stirs in the nation, something that forbids any easy bending of the knee.’\footnote{Daily Express, 5 July 1990.} When Luton Airport had become a ‘venue for national euphoria’ as vast crowds gathered to greet the returning heroes, it is clear that the emphasis on ‘heart’ struck a powerful emotional chord with the English football public ‘but let’s try, for once, to keep matters in proper perspective’, urged ex-Leeds United and Ireland midfielder John Giles in his column for the \textit{Express}.\footnote{Daily Express, 9, 10 July 1990.} Elsewhere, veteran sports journalist Hugh McIlvaney reminded readers that England had prospered in a tournament which had been characterized by a disappointing standard of football. ‘If the 1970 World Cup finals were the finest of the seven this reporter has covered since 1966’, he wrote, ‘these have been very much the poorest.’\footnote{Cited in Wilson, \textit{Anatomy of England}, 256.}

If the pantomime antics of the \textit{Sun} and the \textit{Star} are discounted, the West German team had been treated with respect by the English press as they made their way to the final against Argentina. Steve Curry, in his match report of the semi-final maintained that ‘there is little doubt that Germany will win this World Cup.’\footnote{Daily Express, 5 July 1990.} It was unfortunate, perhaps, that Beckenbauer’s players then found themselves having to take some of the blame for what Brian Glanville described as ‘probably the worst, most tedious, bad-tempered Final in the history of the
Curry’s match report of the final did not exempt the German team from criticism, raising once again the familiar accusations of ‘Oscar-winning behaviour’ which the *Express* had first mentioned during the 1966 tournament. Readers were left in no doubt, however, that the Argentinians (‘Negative, nasty and Neanderthal’) had been largely to blame: ‘West Germany, who had brought style and sophistication to the earlier rounds of this competition, found themselves enmeshed in a brawling, untidy game.’ It was clear that Germany had deserved to win the tournament and relief that the trophy had ended up in the right hands. Yet, within a few days of the final, a political development occurred which suggested that British public opinion still contained an element that was hostile and suspicious towards Germany however much the West German team was admired. Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley’s tirade against the ‘Fourth Reich’ caused embarrassment to Mrs Thatcher and her government and led quickly to his resignation but not before the *Daily Express* had received 15,498 phone calls from readers backing his ‘anti-German outburst’. Here was evidence, as John Ramsden has observed, of ‘an early flowering of the xenophobia that would flourish during the Maastricht debates and in the UK Independence Party as an electoral force.’ This puts football journalism and any positive impact it might have had into perspective.

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579 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 406.
‘Within two years, though, the optimism would be gone’, writes Jonathan Wilson, reflecting on press coverage of England’s Italia 90 campaign. The hopes that a platform had been provided which would allow England to become a major power in international football again quickly evaporated. This became very evident after England’s first match with the world champions, now representing a re-united Germany, a friendly at Wembley in September 1991, which the visitors won 1-0. In the pre-match coverage, much was made of an interview with Andreas Brehme who was very dismissive of England’s chances.

‘Technically we are a much better side – and our individuals are better than the English. There will be nothing new from England. They will just play the long-ball game with great physical commitment … They have some new players, so do we, but we should win.’

Commenting on Brehme’s remarks, Jim Holden in the Daily Express observed that ‘German arrogance is definitely back in town, diluted only slightly by soft-spoken coach Bertie Vogts’, who had been rather more diplomatic in his comments on the England team that new manager Graham Taylor had assembled. The Daily Mirror’s version of Brehme’s interview claimed that he had said that England were ‘boring and predictable’ and it seems likely that the less abrasive remarks attributed to Germany’s coach had been designed to achieve damage limitation. He stressed that England v Germany was ‘a classic’, recalled

580 Wilson, Anatomy of England, 256.
that the two teams had produced ‘the best match’ in Italia 90, and made it clear that ‘we don’t like to lose to England.’

Steve Curry’s match report for the *Express* also found cause to mention the negative characteristic for which Germans were often stereotyped in English newspapers. After Karl-Heinz Riedle had scored, ‘the Germans showed all their old arrogance and commanded much of the second half.’ Brehme may have been arrogant but the result suggested that he had been correct in his pre-match analysis. The principal consolation for Taylor was that he would have time to heal England’s wounds before getting down to ‘the serious business of European qualification next month.’ There was some consolation now in being able to discount international ‘friendlies’, no matter how prestigious the opposition. England had started the game with only three of the side that had played in Turin and Taylor’s response to the defeat was to point out that the German goalkeeper had been forced to make some excellent saves and to argue that England had lost owing to a minute’s lack of concentration. This prompted a vigorous response from James Lawton who poured scorn on England’s obsession with the long ball.

‘We can point to the brilliant reflexes of German goalkeeper Bodo Illgner and march on believing we really are serious contenders for the big prizes.

Or we can say it will take a lot more than hope and hard running to remove an unpalatable fact exposed by Germany. We have to

re-think our football. We have to wipe away the years not the minute of madness.’

The headline assigned to Lawton’s article – ‘Just a minute, Taylor. We are years behind’ – signified the familiar story of relative decline and German superiority built on technical efficiency. Germany’s victory at Wembley suggested that the critics who had warned against reading too much into what had been achieved in Italy had been correct. It had been an aberration or, as Lawson put it, ‘a freakish over-achievement partly inspired by the rare creativity of Paul Gascoigne.’

This message was re-affirmed when England and Germany met again, in quite different conditions, indoors at the Pontiac Silverdrome in Detroit, in June 1993. In preparing for this encounter, the final match for both sides in a four-team tournament designed to familiarize potential finalists with the kind of conditions they might meet in the World Cup finals to be held in the USA a year later, England – and especially manager Graham Taylor – were under more pressure than Germany. They had yet to qualify for the World Cup finals and recent performances had suggested that this was becoming increasingly unlikely. Having lost to both the USA and Brazil, a good performance against Bertie Vogt’s team was seen as critical. ‘Success against Germany would go a long way to re-establishing lost credibility’, observed Steve Curry in the Daily Express, ‘It has never been more necessary.’ It was as if Germany, already qualified for the World Cup finals as holders, now provided the standard against which England

584 Daily Express, 19 June 1993.
teams were to be measured. If this was so, England fell short, as they had been doing consistently since 1966. England, for whom this was the seventh game without a win, the worst run of its kind since 1958 when Walter Winterbottom’s team had been coping with the aftermath of the Munich disaster and the loss of Edwards, Byrne and Tommy Taylor. They were not disgraced by losing 2-1 to the current world champions but ‘the technical gulf between Germans and Englishmen was there for all to see’, according to Rob Hughes in *The Times*, a view that was endorsed by other English reporters at the match.\(^585\) He went on to argue that the disappointing performances of England’s national football and cricket teams in international competition stemmed from the systematic failure of governments to invest in school sport. The DFB had approached the US tournament in a competitive spirit and a huge bonus was to be paid to the players if they won. Thus they were ‘out to win this tournament’, meaningless though it was, while Taylor was ‘again opting for experimentation.’ As Bertie Vogts explained, ‘We are at our best in competitive games and that is why this competition is so important to us.’\(^586\) Thus the sports pages again confirmed the view that Germany was better organized to succeed in a competitive modern world than England. This applied to football just as much as it did to industry.

**European Championship Semi-Final, 26 June 1996, Wembley**

It was fitting that England was able to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of winning the World Cup in 1966 by hosting a major international tournament, the European Nations Championship in 1996. It was also fitting, perhaps, that

\(^{585}\) Downing, *Best of enemies*, 198.

\(^{586}\) *The Times*, 20 June 1993.
England should play Germany at Wembley in the semi-finals, a match which went into extra time and then was decided by penalties. In the thirty years since 1966, much had changed, not least the extent of media coverage, both in the press and on television. Even more important, from the point of view of this thesis, was the change that made was most evident in the flags waved at Wembley whenever the England team played there. As Richard Weight has argued in his study of national identity in Britain in the second half of the twentieth century, the English patriotism generated by the national football team in 1966 – and even as late as 1990 – was ‘contained within a British identity.’ By 1996 this was beginning to break down as a new sense of a separate English identity began to emerge. English fans in 1996 now waved the English flag (the red cross of St George) rather than the British flag (the Union Jack) that they had waved in 1966.

‘Wembley was a sea of St George’s crosses and red-and-white painted faces. There is no more potent symbol of how the English shed their Britishness than the comparison between the flags waved in 1966 and those waved in 1996.’

Downing does not seek to explain it but observes that ‘the flag of St George was everywhere.’ It helped to distinguish the English from the Scots, who had also reached the tournament finals, and making this distinction was increasingly important as the political cultures of the two largest countries in the United


588 Downing, Best of enemies, 202.
Kingdom began to drift way from each other. The favoured anthem for the tournament was not ‘God save the Queen’ but the song ‘Football’s coming home’, and the implication was that it was coming home to England.\textsuperscript{589}

These changes relating to national identity were important in providing a context for the press coverage relating to Euro 96 and Anglo-German football rivalry in particular. As we have seen, coverage of the World Cup in 1990 was relatively restrained in relation to Germany apart from in the \textit{Sun} and the \textit{Star}. In 1996, the tone adopted towards Germany was generally much more aggressive. As Downing observes, ‘the infantile xenophobia which had marred the tabloids coverage of the 1990 World Cup was back in force.’\textsuperscript{590} It should be noted also that Euro 96 was staged at a time when Britain’s relationship with the European Union was especially difficult on account of the so-called ‘Beef War’ which had begun in March 1996 when the British government announced a possible link between BSE (‘Mad Cow Disease’) and CJD (Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease), a fatal brain condition in humans. This led to the European Union imposing a ban on exports of beef and beef products from Britain. John Major’s government responded to this move, which was seen as an over-reaction, by pursuing a policy of non-cooperation, holding up the routine business of the European Union by blocking the decision-making machinery at Brussels. As an American observer noted:


\textsuperscript{590} Downing, \textit{Best of enemies}, 266; see also Weight, \textit{Patriots}, 709-710; Greenslade, \textit{Press gang}, 656-657.
‘It did not help from a British perspective that the arch-enemy in the whole drama was its old wartime foe, Germany. German politicians, quick to respond to the concerns of a health-conscious public and the power of state governments to regulate health matters, fought the hardest to maintain the European Union ban on British beef.’

Thus as the Beef War ran its course it fuelled Eurosceptic tendencies in the press. Even though an agreement was eventually reached a few days before the England-Germany semi-final, relations between the two countries had been soured by the affair. The *Daily Express* made a very explicit link between these events and football, publishing a report by Ross Benson from Munich, the political base of Horst Seehofer, the German Health Minister: ‘a hardline right winger like most Bavarian politicians, he orchestrated a campaign against British beef which took no account of facts.’ In these circumstances, Benson reported, ‘there is nothing they (the Germans) would like more than to see England humbled.’ Unlike reports from the Federal Republic in earlier years which emphasized German prosperity and success, Benson reported that the ‘much-vaunted post-war “economic miracle” has slowed.’ The end of the Cold War and subsequent problems arising from reunification had ‘left the country sloughed in self-doubt.’ However, alluding to fears regarding the ambitions of the united Germany which had first surfaced at the end of the 1980s, Benson warned that football was less important than another game being played by Chancellor Kohl and his government: ‘… a

football match is over in an evening, Germany is also playing another, longer
game. It is this one they are truly determined to win. It was difficult for those
who shared these anxieties to separate football from politics. On match day The
Times gave Conservative Eurosceptic John Redwood space to remind readers that
the German question had ‘bedevilled the 20th century’. The forthcoming semi-
final ‘stirred deep feelings’ and Redwood urged Britain to ‘stand up to Germany,
on and off the field.’

In its matchday issue, the Express used a leading article in its editorial
column to respond to eleven questions posed by Bild in response to the Daily
Mirror which had emerged as Fleet Street’s principal tin soldier in a journalistic
pantomime war against the Germans as the semi-final clash approached. Under
the heading ‘The spirit of being English’, the Express answered such delicate
questions as ‘Why do you drive on the wrong side of the road?’, ‘Why can’t you
beat your former colonies at cricket?’ and ‘Why are you the only people who still
think the Wembley goal went in?’ The Express acknowledged that Bild was trying
to be funny, ‘displaying what actually appears to be a sense of humour. For
Germans.’ It replied in the same fashion, treading clumsily through the minefield
of Anglo-German relations.

‘We drive on the wrong side to make it more difficult for our
soldiers to invade other countries. We were never European

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592 Daily Express, 26 June 1996.
593 The Times, 26 June 1996.
594 See Chapter Five.
champions because we are an outward-looking nation that doesn’t think Europe is the centre of the universe; we were quite happy with the World Cup.

We are sorry that you do not understand that proper beer is served warm: why don’t you wear proper trousers? We wear bathing trunks in the sauna, because we’re not a boastful people …

At least our former colonies still want to play our national sport with us. Do any of your ex-colonies want to play yours with you? Come to think of it, what is your national sport?

We won the 1990 semi-final in spirit. You just scored more penalties, that’s all …

As for THAT GOAL, we simply abided by the referee’s decision …’

Perhaps this can be best classified as ‘blokey nationalism’ or ‘the jokey jingoism of the press.’

In 1996 it was the Daily Mirror that pursued this to a new level, prompting a barrage of criticism and complaints to the Press Complaints Commission. ‘Reducing the noble art of journalism to a few rancid puns and clichés had paid off for the Sun, and for once the Mirror was determined not to be left behind,’

595 Daily Express, 26 June 1996.

596 Weight, Patriots, 709-710.
Editor Piers Morgan led from the front on 24 June, two days before the match, with an editorial that parodied the well-known words of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s broadcast to the nation announcing the outbreak of war in 1939.

‘I am writing to you from the Editor’s office at Canary Wharf, London. Last night the Daily Mirror’s ambassador in Berlin handed the German government a final note saying that unless we heard from them by 11 o’clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their team from Wembley, a state of soccer war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received and that consequently we are at soccer war with Germany.’

Though this was in questionable taste and unlikely to improve the dismal state of Anglo-German relations with the Beef War controversy fresh in the minds of his readers, it could be defended as an example of the irreverence for which the Mirror had once been famous. However, Morgan’s editorial has to be seen in the context of the features that surrounded it, starting with the infamous front page carrying the headline ‘ACHTUNG! SURRENDER! FOR YOU FRITZ, ZE 1996 EURO CHAMPIONSHIP IS OVER’ and pictures of England players Paul Gascoigne and Stuart Pearce wearing World War II army helmets. Pages 2 and 3 carried a feature headed ‘The Mirror invades Berlin’ written by a reporter sent to

597 Downing, Best of enemies, 202.

598 Daily Mirror, 24 June 1996; cited in Weight, Patriots, 709-710.
spy on the ‘filthy hun’; the Reichstag was described as burned out ‘a bit like the German soccer squad’. Pages 4 and 5 were ostensibly devoted to Jürgen Klinsmann and his injury, though the Mirror had ‘invaded’ the hotel where the German squad were staying and left towels and notes reading ‘Auf Wiedersehen’ on the sunbeds by the pool. These pages were framed by a repetitive mantra saying ‘Germany’s going home’ and ‘They’re going home’, parodying the England football anthem (‘Football’s coming home’). On page 6 a famous First World War recruiting poster is referenced with a small boy asking his father ‘What did you do in 1996, Daddy?’ The broader context of current Anglo-German relations is then featured on page 7 with Prime Minister John Major criticized for failing to defend British beef; he had given in ‘without a fight’. Finally, Tony Parsons supplied an article praising ‘the new England’ which Euro 96 had awoken, which pointed out that ‘to be English is to feel nostalgic – be they on the field of battle in 1942 or the field of dreams in 1966.’

Parsons concluded his article on the state of the English nation in 1996 by claiming that ‘Football couldn’t be coming home to a better place’, not least because it was a country where there was ‘no place for racism.’ However, the extensive use of racial stereotyping in the English tabloid press suggested that this assessment was too optimistic. As Hesse has pointed out, ‘Their prevalent usage of war imagery, to be found in tasteless headlines full of words, such as “Blitzkrieg”, and “Kraut” and “tanks”, at first deeply irritated the Germans.’

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599 Daily Mirror, 24 June 1996.
600 Hesse, Tor!, 267.
this occasion, the Daily Mirror had taken the lead but it was not alone with headlines in the Sun (‘BRING ON THE KRAUTS’) and the Star (‘LET’S BLITZ FRITZ’) adding fuel to the flames. Piers Morgan was inundated with letters of protest and concerns were raised elsewhere in the press. On the day after the infamous ‘ACHTUNG!’ front page, letters to The Times included one from Sigmund Sternberg of London which conceded that the ‘joyous display of patriotism’ in relation to international sport was perfectly acceptable but that ‘manifestations of xenophobia, racial hatred and the near incitement to violence’ which amounted to an attempt to ‘whip up anti-German fervour’ were not. Regretfully a major sporting event had been appropriated for ‘crude racial ends.’ Another letter from Mr. A.P. Millard, headmaster of Giggleswick School in North Yorkshire, expressed similar concerns about the use of ‘warlike terminology’, fearing that it could lead to violence and calling for the press to show moral responsibility.

Morgan, who had embarked on this campaign of stunt journalism as part of a marketing strategy that was intended to outmanoeuvre the Sun and the Star, was forced to climb down. The Mirror’s management became very anxious about the negative publicity it was generating, especially when motor manufacturers Vauxhall announced that it was withdrawing its advertisements; it was important, according to the firm’s marketing communications director, Wolfgang Schubert, ‘not to offend anyone’ and the Mirror and other newspapers had clearly gone too

601 Weight, Patriots, 709.
602 The Times, 25 June 1996.
Moreover, it allowed other newspapers – even the *Sun* – to claim that they were more responsible than Morgan’s *Mirror*. It congratulated itself on maintaining ‘a jingoistic approach rather than a xenophobic one.’ Morgan had an uncomfortable few days ‘worried that there might be violence for which the *Mirror* could be blamed’, according to Ramsden. The *Daily Express*, anxious to put a respectable distance between itself and the redtop tabloids, recruited ‘Britain’s leading philosophers’ to explain the significance of the England-Germany match and the furore that it had aroused. Asked to ‘contemplate the true meaning of tonight’s result’, Dr Gordon Reddiford of the University of Bristol, pointed out that, ‘National hopes and stereotypes are centred on the game – and players have acquired a moral status as ambassadors for a nation’s view of itself.’ Professor Brenda Almond of Hull University addressed the issues raised by the tabloid’s hostility towards Germany more directly: ‘it is one thing to call on the national pride evoked by key international matches, another to foment racial hatred,’ she argued.

According to Richard Weight, ‘The national football team had become steadily more important to the English since 1954’ and this was very evident in the extensive press coverage of Euro 96. Much of the journalism that prompted English embarrassment and German irritation appeared on the front pages and in

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603 *The Times*, 26 June 1996.
605 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 401-402.
606 *Daily Express*, 26 June 1996.
special features rather than on the sports pages where writers simply continued to use the style they had developed over many years, as we have seen. Germany’s footballers were to be admired, but also feared. After their first match against Czech Republic, Matt Dickinson, who covered Germany’s progress for the Express, claimed that Vogts’s team had ‘mugged the frail Czechs’ with ‘intimidating force’ at Old Trafford in a performance that displayed their ‘traditional Teutonic virtues of planning and precision’ but also a ‘frightening power.’ Germany, he observed, ‘do not even have to be at their peak to be too good for anyone else.’

‘Herr we go again!’ ran the headline in the Daily Mirror over the match report of the Germany-Croatia quarter final, a very physical encounter. Metaphors invoking battles and wars proved hard to resist. Steve Curry’s match-day preview was headlined ‘Ince sounds the battle cry’ and supported by allusions to trench warfare in which the England captain was said to excel. How much the climate of jingoism had poisoned the coverage became clear when Oliver Holt wrote in The Times of ‘a plot by the Germans’ who claimed that they were struggling to ensure that Jürgen Klinsmann would be fit to play. According to Holt, Klinsmann was ‘indulging in some intricate subterfuge’ and only pretending to have a torn calf muscle. The implication here was that the Germans could not be trusted, though in the end Klinsmann was unfit and did not play.

608 Daily Express, 10 June 1996.
610 Daily Express, 26 June 1996.
611 The Times, 25 June 1996.
The *Daily Mirror* became less offensive to Germany as the match drew nearer, though Kevin Keegan, who had played in Germany and was quoted as predicting a victory for Germany, was advised that he was ‘Kraut of order.’ On its sports pages the emphasis was on football history rather than the First and Second World Wars. Inevitably this began with 1966 and an interview with Sir Alf Ramsey who compared his team with the team that Terry Venables was likely to field against England’s old rivals. He expected Paul Ince to ‘do a Nobby’ on Matthias Sammer. Kenneth Wolstenholme, the commentator whose words as Hurst scored England’s fourth goal in 1966 had become a kind of patriotic mantra, ‘as well known as Churchill’s most famous speeches’, reminded readers that there was ‘no escaping the past.’ England midfielder Paul Ince was quoted as saying that England had the necessary ‘battling qualities’ to overcome ‘the ghosts’ of 1970, 1972 and 1990. Thus, as we have seen in relation to previous big matches between England and Germany, a historical framework relating to football was one of the devices employed to give the match meaning. Germans, as Hesse has noted, found this English obsession very strange: playing England was like playing Italy or Brazil – prestigious high-profile games, but nothing to get all fired up about.

The match itself was a stirring contest between two evenly-matched teams which Germany eventually won via a penalty shoot-out. The match was watched

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613 *Daily Mirror*, 25, 26 June 1996.
614 Hesse, *Tor!,* 268.
by 26.2 million people, the highest-ever audience for a sports broadcast in Britain. ‘Given that most of these people were English, that audience represents a significant proportion of England’s 49 million inhabitants’, Weight observes. Coverage of the match and its aftermath in the Express captured the drama of the occasion and how much it meant to the home team and their supporters. ‘This was Turin revisited’, observed Steve Curry. Yet there were compensations, not least that England were now ‘a side that played in the modern way, far removed from domestic football.’ There were reasons, therefore, to be proud and hopeful. As for Germany: ‘They are not like anyone else in football.’ Vogts’s team was not especially outstanding but possessed ‘the old identity tags of technical ease and a composure which, at times, seems to belong to another world, such was their proficiency in the penalty shoot-out which finally brought down England.’

Meanwhile on its first three pages, the Express covered the public disorder that had broken out in London and elsewhere after the match. Reporting from Trafalgar Square it was claimed that, ‘Screaming “We hate Germans!”’ the thugs clambered over the square’s fountains and lions.’ It provided a sour footnote to the tournament and baffled German supporters who had gone to the West End hoping to celebrate peacefully. Despite the violence, Piers Morgan and the Mirror were not held to account. Once the initial embarrassment had passed Morgan seemed unrepentant, especially after the Press Complaints Commission had ruled that his attempts at humour were ‘part of a proud British tradition. It

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615 Weight, Patriots, 710.
616 Daily Express, 27 June 1996.
617 Daily Express, 27 June 1996.
was ‘a matter of taste’ and they refused to make a judgement.\textsuperscript{618} It seemed, as Ramsden observes, that Morgan believed that ‘the Germans were too stupid even to understand why others disliked them.’\textsuperscript{619} If this was so he had no excuse for, two days after the match, the \textit{Mirror} had published a message it had received from the \textit{Express} newspaper in Cologne: ‘Sorry, you dear English. Of course we were happy when Southgate missed [his penalty] but we felt for your players and fans.’ It praised England’s ‘magic’ performance and even had a kind word for the ‘drunkard Gazza,’ by now an English folk hero, before signing off ‘See you at the World Cup in 1998! Yours, the Krauts.’\textsuperscript{620}

\textbf{Conclusion}

After the disappointments and under-achievement of the 1970s England regained international credibility in the 1980s. Hopes raised by three wins in the first group stage in Spain in 1982 were not justified but Ron Greenwood’s team came home undefeated. England was unlucky to lose to Argentina in 1986 under controversial circumstances and to Germany in a penalty shoot-out in the semi-final in 1990. West Germany continued to achieve at a very high level throughout, reaching three consecutive World Cup finals, losing in 1982 and 1986, and winning in 1990. Overall, in terms of Anglo-German football rivalry, the 1980s and 1990s were a continuation of a pattern that had been established in the 1970s. This helped to reinforce representations of England and West Germany in the English press that had been evident since at least 1966: the English were seen as

\textsuperscript{618} Weight, \textit{Patriots}, 710; Greenslade, \textit{Press gang}, 657.

\textsuperscript{619} Ramsden, \textit{Don’t mention the war}, 402.

\textsuperscript{620} \textit{Daily Mirror}, 28 June 1996.
technically inferior to the Germans, relying heavily on traditional virtues of powerful running and team spirit; the Germans were highly skilled, well-organized and efficient. The German capacity for outperforming the English became part of the national stereotype, as represented on the sports pages. This meant that they were often depicted as being arrogant, another convenient negative stereotype.

Press coverage in the 1980s was shaped partly by what happened on the field, partly by the broader context of Anglo-German history and ongoing political and cultural relations. When there was negative comment – as, for example, in 1982 – it tended to be prompted primarily by what happened on the field of play. Thus aspects of West Germany’s performances were heavily criticized – the cynical ‘fix’ in the match against Austria and the unpunished foul on Battiston against France though, as we shall see, these incidents were criticized in Germany itself as well as in England and elsewhere. For the most part, however, accounts of Anglo-German football in the English press were framed within the immediate context of football history, with England characteristically seen as seeking ‘revenge’ for 1970 and 1972, and West Germany seeking to put right the perceived injustice of England’s third goal not having crossed the line at Wembley in 1966. There were sometimes allusions to the First and Second World Wars but for the most part the incidence of war metaphors did not exceed those which might be found in reporting of other football matches.
However, a new context emerged at the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s as the prospect of German reunification and then its actual realization began to make an impact on British politics, where prevailing sentiment had moved sharply to the right after the Conservative Party, led by Mrs Thatcher, returned to power in 1979. Moreover, after victory in the Falklands War in 1982, there was a sense of restored national pride which nurtured British/English nationalism. This impacted negatively on relations with the European Union in general and Germany in particular. It did not help that Britain’s political leaders, especially Mrs Thatcher and her closest political allies, regarded Germany and the German people with distrust, perhaps because their formative political experiences had been within the context of the Second World War. The various experts called by Mrs Thatcher to Chequers in 1990 to advise her on ‘the German question’ formed the view that she was imprisoned by a view of history that led her to instinctively distrust the new Germany and its ambitions in Europe. Germans might be ‘disciplined and hard-working’ but they were also ‘dangerous by nature.’ Timothy Garton-Ash reported that various negative attributes (angst, aggressiveness and bullying among them) had been mentioned at the meeting as being ‘an abiding part of the German character.’

All this betrayed a high level of anxiety about Germany in 1990 which was confirmed when Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley revealed strong animosity towards a united Germany during the course of an interview with the

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Spectator magazine in June 1990. The idea that surrendering British sovereignty to the European Community would be tantamount to surrendering to Hitler seemed to find significant levels of support amongst the British public and encouraged a more hostile approach in the popular press when England played Germany at Italia 90. The Daily Express quoted Otto Graf Lambsdorff as saying that Ridley was either drunk or had not got over England’s defeat during the World Cup. Another German commentator, Klaus Daweke suggested that Ridley’s words amounted to a verbal declaration of war.622 Timothy Garton-Ash, however, was inclined to take a broader view of these events, making the observation that Anglo-German relations suffered a ‘little shake’ as a result.623 Nevertheless, it did seem to have the effect of encouraging the Sun, famous for its ‘GOTCHA!’ front page after the Argentinian warship Belgrano had been torpedoed by the British navy during the Falklands War, to push the boundaries of public taste still further in its football coverage with its references to ‘Huns’ and ‘Krauts’ in the build-up to the 1990 semi-final.624

For Euro 96, press coverage was more extensive even than 1966, the last time that England had hosted a football tournament. Though Mrs Thatcher had resigned from office in 1990, a Conservative government remained in office, supported by a party with a strong Eurosceptic wing, and relations with the European Union and with Germany were still difficult. Just before the tournament

622 Daily Express, 13 July 1990.


624 Downing, Best of enemies, 185.
took place, exports of English beef had been banned with a view to preventing the spread of CJD, leading to the so-called ‘Beef War’ in which British and German interests were opposed. Thus, with England and Germany coming together in the semi-final, the conditions were very similar to those which had provoked the *Sun’s* outburst of anti-German hostility in 1990. On this occasion, however, the *Daily Mirror*, which had once dominated the market for tabloid newspapers but had by now been overtaken by the *Sun*, adopted a similar approach to its rival in an effort to win back readers. John Garland and Mike Rowe have argued that ‘the discourse of warfare now tends to inform popular representations of sport’ and this was very apparent in the *Mirror’s* now infamous ‘ACHTUNG! SURRENDER!’ edition of 24 June 1996.\(^{625}\) As Euro 96 coverage spread from the back pages to the front and the middle, it has been argued, it promoted ‘an agenda based on nostalgia and ethnic assertiveness/defensiveness on the part of the English press with reference to the Second World War and the World Cup victory of 1966.’\(^{626}\)

Though there had been strong indications that the nature of the coverage of Anglo-German football rivalry had been changing in 1990, the transformation, at least in the tabloids, was much more evident in 1996. Since the 1970s the English popular press tended to depict the Germans as having better players and a better team but with a tendency to histrionics. In 1996 this was replaced by jingoism that


bordered on xenophobia – especially in the mass-circulation tabloids. As Garland and Rowe have argued, ‘the xenophobia that was in abundant evidence cannot be understood in isolation from broader social and political trends.’627 A newly-resurgent English nationalism was asserting itself against the team that had replaced Scotland as England’s major football rival, against the economic foe of the Beef War, and against the enemy of two world wars and one World Cup. The coverage also laid bare issues and attitudes that the English held and possibly still hold towards ‘Europe’

627 Garland and Rowe, ‘War minus the shooting?’, 80-95.
CHAPTER FIVE: The German Response

As the introduction to this thesis pointed out, comparative research in this area is conspicuous by its absence. The aim of this chapter is to provide a comparative perspective on press representations of Anglo-German football rivalry. Research focusing on sports journalism in Germany has expanded significantly over the past decade. This in itself recognizes that the news value attached to sport and the status attached to those who write about it have both been transformed. Writing in 1999 about sports journalism in the English-speaking world, David Rowe observed that:

‘… sports journalists do not have a standing in their professions which corresponds to the size of their readership or their pay packets, with the old saying (now reaching the status of a cliché) that sport is “the toy department of the media” still readily to hand as a dismissal of what sports journalists do.’\(^{628}\)

At the time that Rowe was writing, sports journalists in Germany were subject to similar prejudices but research indicates their status has been transformed over the

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\(^{628}\) Rowe, D., *Sport, culture and the media: the unruly trinity* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 36.
last decade or so as the ‘outsiders of the sports desk’ have become ‘the stars of the news room.’

A major factor underpinning this change was a change in attitude towards sport itself which has come to be regarded as a subject to be taken seriously. An anonymous Australian sports journalist had complained to Rowe that there was an assumption among fellow professionals ‘that it’s much easier than other forms of journalism, and because it’s sport, it’s a physical activity, that there’s nothing intellectual about it.’ Similarly, Weischenberg contends that sports journalism was long considered ‘an unsound object of research’ in Germany, a view based on the idea that sport was less important than politics, economics or literature, resulting in a negative attitude prevailing amongst journalists with more ‘serious’ interests. It did not help that so many sports journalists were recruited from the ranks of former athletes or even fans so that they often had lower educational qualifications than their colleagues, little formal training in journalism and tended to lack objectivity. Schaffrath has argued that this situation has changed dramatically over the last forty years as sport has been seen as increasingly more important, a development that has resulted in wider coverage and more opportunities for sports journalists as their field of work has expanded. This chapter surveys the coverage of Anglo-German international football in German

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630 Rowe, *Sport, culture and the media*, 51.


632 Schaffrath, *Das sportjournalistische Interview*, 8; see also Meyer, *Sportjournalistenausbildung*, 11.
newspapers in the thirty-year period from the 1966 World Cup final through to Euro ‘96. During this period not only did the status of football journalism begin to change but also German newspapers were able to discard some of the inhibitions which were a legacy of the immediate post-war years when effectively they operated under license and were subject to surveillance by the occupying powers.

Before embarking on a detailed analysis of coverage of key England-Germany internationals in the Bild, Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung it is important to understand something of the cultural context in which the German press operated from the 1960s onwards. In West Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the ‘Sixties’ are often associated with the idea of a cultural revolution and, while this should not be overstated, it has to be taken seriously. One year in particular, 1968, has been singled out in German historical writing as being of particular importance, though it was preceded by about ten years of growing unrest, especially among the youth of the country. Awareness of the importance of 1968 has permeated accounts of German history post-1945 for many years and continues to do so. Norbert Frei has argued that it is still almost impossible to define ‘1968’. It is associated with student rebellion, social protest and generational conflict as well as the idea of a cultural revolution. In Germany, ‘1968’ is often used to signify the social unrest and cultural change associated with the 1960s as a whole; to be a ‘68er’ means to talk about it relentlessly thus

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questioning the results of everything said and done before 1968.\textsuperscript{634} In as far as it impacted on the German press, it was because the right-wing Springer newspapers (\textit{Bild, Die Welt}) were solidly behind those elements in the Federal Republic that were determined to resist change and gave uncritical support to the forces of law and order, even when these became hard to defend.

In Germany, the events of 1968 climaxed in the days after the attempted assassination of the radical student leader Rudi Dutschke when the headquarters of the Springer publishing group in West Berlin were set ablaze by protesters. Kruip has described Springer as an ‘ideological arsonist’, arguing that the editorial directives given to his newspapers effectively provoked this angry response.\textsuperscript{635} Though, as in the revolution of 1848, the revolt of 1968 quickly lost momentum, it generated two factions that were to have a major impact on the FRG for many years. One, the more radical wing, was the RAF, the \textit{Rote Armee Fraktion}, which was prepared to use violence to bring about revolutionary change. The other, more moderate wing of the 68 movement began what has been called ‘the long walk through the institutions’ that helped to shape Germany in the ensuing decades.\textsuperscript{636}

It might be argued that ‘1968’ impacted on football by initiating a more critical approach to ideas of what constituted culture, thus making it possible for sport, as a form of popular culture, to be discussed seriously though it was some years


before this development became evident. When West Germany played England at Wembley in July 1966, football journalists – and the sports media generally – lacked the status that they were later to achieve. Moreover, however popular football was with the German public, it did not carry the ‘serious’ news value that it later acquired. These factors have to be kept in mind when considering Wembley 1966 and the subsequent controversy surrounding Das Wembleytor.
1966: ‘Welcome them like World Champions!’

The West German national team had performed creditably since winning the World Cup in 1954, reaching the quarter-finals in Sweden in 1958 and Chile in 1962. Reaching the final in 1966, however, was widely regarded as a significant achievement that could be explained by the way in which the structures of the domestic game had been modernized in the intervening period and especially by the introduction of the Bundesliga for the 1963/64 season. For the first time in German football history, there was a unified league playing over a 9 or 10 month period to decide the national champions. There were some problems associated with this development. With the DFB remaining committed to the ideal of amateurism at this stage, the advent of the Bundesliga simply encouraged a shadow economy to develop based on under-the-counter payments. As Uli Hesse points out, ‘backhanders’ were the norm as ambitious clubs sought to establish competitive advantage.637 In 1965 Der Spiegel revealed that Hertha BSC had flouted the regulations by engaging in black market transfer deals and paying wages to its supposedly amateur players, and the club was punished by expulsion from the top tier. Hertha refused to accept the guilty verdict and accused other clubs of operating in the same way.638 Though this did not reflect well on the new league it was clear that internal competition had been enhanced and that this was underpinning improved performances in international competition. By 1966 this was especially evident in the newly-established European Cup-Winners Cup with

TSV 1860 Munich finishing runners-up to West Ham United in 1965 and Borussia Dortmund beating Liverpool to win the final in 1966. These performances and those of the national team against England in 1965 and 1966 indicated that West German football was improving and suggested that there were good reasons to be optimistic about the World Cup finals in England. In these circumstances it was not surprising that interest in the competition was high and the German press responded accordingly. For Bild alone there were nine writers covering the event, including Fritz Walter, captain of the 1954 team, who ghosted a column. The other Springer-owned paper, Die Welt, had three writers at the tournament while the upmarket FAZ sent two journalists to England.

As the day of the final approached German coverage was generally upbeat, taking a positive view of the national team’s chances. Fritz Wirth, writing for Die Welt’s middle-market readership, observed that ‘the football world will have a new king at 4:45pm on Saturday.’ Noting that the television audience in Britain was likely to exceed the record established by coverage of Sir Winston Churchill’s funeral in 1965, Wirth neatly observed that the final would in effect become another funeral broadcast if England should lose, though he also recognized that few in England believed that this would happen, especially after Germany’s unconvincing performance in the semi-final against the Soviet Union. Wirth reminded his readers that there would be an ‘uneven match’ at Wembley in that 12,000 German supporters would be outnumbered by 88,000 home fans but he maintained throughout his report that Helmut Schön’s team was capable of achieving a victory that would confound the expectations of the English press, or
at least a draw. England had not played well against Uruguay, Mexico or Argentina; moreover, the organizers had prudently printed tickets for a replay the following Tuesday. Though he avoided any references to the longer history of Anglo-German conflict in the twentieth century, Wirth could not resist reminding his readers of more recent events in economic history which reflected well on the FRG and badly on England. If Germany should win, he argued, the value of English football would ‘plummet deeper than pound sterling’, thus reminding his readers of the problems that Wilson’s government had encountered in defending the value of Britain’s currency on the foreign exchange markets.639

Die Welt also carried an interview with Sepp Herberger, who had coached the West German team to success in 1954, which also provided some reasons to approach the match hopefully. Herberger dismissed the idea that an England victory was inevitable, explaining quite reasonably that ‘English confidence was a little exaggerated as their best match was against Portugal; their previous games were not convincing.’640 Even against Portugal, he had noticed weaknesses in their play: ‘they were not able to keep their high tempo for ninety minutes which allowed Portugal to come back.’ Herberger identified Bobby Charlton as the main threat; he was England’s outstanding player, the one ‘who cannot be replaced equally’; he was more dangerous than Eusebio because he possessed a ‘better motor activity’ and was difficult to stop once he was ‘running on full throttle.’ Someone, he added, would have ‘to stand on his feet, literally.’ The tone of this was realistic and professional; it gave German readers reasonable cause for

639 Die Welt, 30 July 1966.
optimism while showing England – Charlton in particular – the respect due to
opponents who were not without flaws but would be difficult to beat. Thus the
pre-match coverage was relatively restrained when compared, for example, to Die
Welt’s English middle-market equivalents, the Daily Express which had published
negative comments on German ‘play-acting’, and the Daily Mail, with
Mulchrone’s notorious match-day remarks implying that war was Germany’s
‘national game’.

In the upmarket FAZ the tone was characterised to an even greater degree by
restraint. Karlheinz Vogel’s match preview seems to have been much influenced
by Schön’s determination to leave England having made a good impression. It
featured quotes from the German camp observing that there was much satisfaction
to be gained from having already secured second place in the tournament. This led
Vogel to ask rhetorically: ‘who is surrendering after five games when they were
merely 90 minutes away from the ultimate prize?’ Like Wirth in Die Welt, Vogel
pointed out that England’s performances on the road to the final had not always
been convincing, though he balanced this by arguing that West Germany had
enjoyed a fair share of luck in the tournament to date. For Vogel, England were
favourites, not least because they were playing at Wembley, a talismanic venue
for the home team where foreign opponents were usually defeated. Moreover,
England’s record against Germany had to be taken into account. Germany had
failed to secure a victory in the seven international matches played between the
two countries since 1930, so history was on England’s side. He also contradicted
Herberger by suggesting that Ramsey’s team did have the capacity to play at a
high tempo for ninety minutes. Overall, Vogel appeared to be satisfied with what had already been achieved, arguing that the German public should be content even if their team should lose. Though he claimed that he would be glad to see Germany win another world title, he tempered this statement by adding that he hoped that it would not be accompanied by the excessive media hype of 1954.641

Vogel did make some comments that were critical of the way in which the tournament had been organized. Football-mad cities like Liverpool had been snubbed in favour of London where England had played all their matches at Wembley in front of a patriotic crowd which encouraged the team with chanting and flag-waving. The English press, he noted, had described Germany’s supporters as ‘a bawling and fanatical pack’ and even worse when they showed similar enthusiasm for their team. Nevertheless, having raised these issues, he adopted a conciliatory tone by implying that criticism in the English press relating to the number of opposition players who had been sent off playing against Germany had to be taken seriously. Schön, it should be remembered, had complained that these criticisms were unjustified and that they had poisoned the atmosphere in the days between the semi-final and the final. By indicating that the time had come for the German players to prove that the charges that had been levelled against them were unjustified Vogel suggested that he believed that there was some justification in what Fleet Street’s ‘tin soldiers’ had written. England, Vogel observed, played football that was hard, fast and courageous. It was Zweckfußball ‘where the end justified the means’. Thus winning was more

641 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 July 1966
important than playing in an attractive style. This could hardly be described as a criticism of England and English football because Vogel made it clear that Germany had the same approach.\footnote{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 July 1966.}

In contrast, Bild’s tone was both, less deferential and more populist. In the match previews there was much emphasis on the ‘human interest’ angle. Thus it was significant that Martin Peters and Wolfgang Overath would be lining up against each other just as they had done in a youth international seven years earlier. Master chef Hans-Georg Damker answered questions about what the team should eat at the post-match banquet: ‘Champions or not, the lads deserve a nice dinner.’ German hockey internationals Klaus Greinert and Christian Roder sent a telegram to Alf Ramsey in which they congratulated him in advance for finishing second and referred to the ‘arrogance of the English.’ It was reported that Cassius Clay, in England to prepare for his fight with Brian London, would be attending the match and that Jack Charlton’s wife was expected to give birth to their third child at any time. The uncommunicative Alf Ramsey was criticized by Karl Walther who suggested that ‘a walk in the woods was more useful and more interesting than a talk with this man’, a comment with which most English football journalists would probably have agreed. All this pointed in the direction in which popular journalism was developing in both England and Germany.\footnote{Bild, 30 July 1966.}

So, too, did the use of ‘quotes’. Kurt Hamrin, scorer of a famous goal for Sweden against West Germany in the 1958 finals, explained that being favourites...
may not be beneficial for the home team; he considered Germany’s defence to be ‘smarter than the English.’ Mário Esteves Coluna, captain of the Portuguese side defeated by England in the semi-final claimed that if Germany ‘play like Borussia Dortmund’ they would win the match. The great Eusebio added that ‘we’ll cross our fingers for the Germans.’ Fritz Walter, captain of the team that had pulled off ‘the miracle of Berne’ in 1954, offered his advice: ‘play your game and stick to it’; ‘play hard but play fair’; ‘ignore the “England, England” chants and imagine that the crowd are shouting “Deutschland, Deutschland’”; and finally, ‘play as a team – camaraderie can change the game.’ Whatever happened the German people were proud of the team’s success so far and would greet them thankfully and cheerfully.\(^6\) In the light of these routine platitudes it was not surprising that \textit{Bild} reported the results of a survey indicating that 89 per cent of all Germans over the age of 16 believed that their team would win the final, with only seven per cent predicting an England victory.\(^7\) \textit{Bild}’s sports pages exuded confidence and optimism. It was noted that hardly anyone in England shared this view though George Raynor, the Englishman who managed the Swedish team that reached the 1958 final, was quoted as saying that Franz Beckenbauer could unlock defences ‘like no other’ and that he ‘could not foresee anyone stopping him.’ This blended with assistant coach Dettmar Cramer’s view that the Germany’s players were technically and tactically superior and the best prepared of any in the competition.
Avoiding obvious war metaphors Jürgen Juckel and Horst Frese predicted in Bild that ‘[the] English will surge forward like a spring flood and it is the question if our dam holds.’

However, Bild am Sonntag’s match report referred to goalkeeper Hans Tilkowski palming ‘Ball’s bomb’ over the crossbar and ‘Charlton’s grenade’ hitting a post. In Beckenbauer, Germany had possessed a ‘weapon’ capable of winning the match but by using him to thwart the threat of Bobby Charlton, they had effectively defeated themselves. This was later paralleled by the English press in explaining how England had lost to Germany in the 1970 quarter-final in Mexico. The main theme, however, was the controversy surrounding England’s third goal. The headline on Bild am Sonntag’s front page urged its readers to ‘Welcome them like world champions!’ This was followed by a sub-heading expressing the collective view of the team that ‘The third goal was no goal.’ The players were praised for their sporting behaviour which had been officially acknowledged by Federal President Heinrich Lübke who had announced that he would award the highest honours at his disposal to the team. It was noted in passing that the best team had won though home advantage had been critical.

The front page of Welt am Sonntag echoed much of this: the German team had ‘fought brilliantly’ and England’s third goal had been ‘highly disputable’, providing the ‘only discord in an otherwise splendid final’. It would prove to be ‘a point of discussion for years to come’, Welt am Sonntag predicted, rather an understatement as it transpired. Adjacent reports alluded to Britain’s economic problems – the government was considering a wage freeze and considering reducing the number of British troops in Germany if the FRG did not increase its

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646  Bild, 30 July 1966.
contribution to the costs. There was perhaps some comfort for German readers in this.\textsuperscript{647}

On the sports pages, however, Fritz Wirth’s match report developed an interesting theme in a way which allowed Germany to share England’s glory. These echoed the idea that some English newspapers had floated that the 1966 competition represented some kind of triumph for the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ over the ‘Latin’.\textsuperscript{648} Summing up his experience of the tournament, Wirth concluded: ‘At the end one felt as to have witnessed a revolution: ‘the game of the South Americans, the game of the jugglers and magicians experienced its darkest hour since 1954.’ He argued that England and Germany, having been among the leading football nations for decades had now modernized the game: the final, was a triumph for ‘calculated football artistry’ where teams ‘are drilled perfectly for success.’ Football has made a step forward from its ‘playful baroque past into the sober era of rocket science.’ The German team, often stereotyped simply as ‘physical footballers’, deserved special praise for their part in this transition. For Wirth, the final had been ‘a battle’, contested even more fiercely than the final in 1954. It had also provided drama and suspense which not even Alfred Hitchcock could have scripted and there was some credit to be derived from this. UEFA president Gustav Wiederkehr was quoted as saying that neither England nor West Germany were ‘wonder teams’, but ‘this was not necessary as the game was thrilling nonetheless.’

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\textsuperscript{647} Bild am Sonntag, 31 July 1966.
\textsuperscript{648} See for example, Matt Busby’s pre-match comments in the Daily Express, 30 July 1966.
\end{flushright}
The dispute over England’s third goal could not, of course, be ignored but even here there was some credit to be gained from the way in which Schön’s team had reacted. Hans Passlack, secretary-general of the DFB, opined that there would have been a lot more fuss, if not trouble, had a South American team been at the receiving end of such a decision. As we have already seen, the idea of leaving a good impression was very important to Schön and his squad. That they behaved as they did allowed them to share England’s moral victory over the South Americans. Wirth underlined this view in the next day’s edition of Die Welt where he noted that more than artistry was required to win World Cup finals. The Brazilians had demonstrated artistry but had been unsuccessful. Team spirit and physical and psychological strength – qualities which England and West Germany had in common – were also of critical importance. These were the qualities that Schön had cultivated as his team had progressed towards the final which had confirmed that West Germany possessed the physical prowess needed to be successful in modern international football.

The upmarket FAZ headlined in the sports pages ‘After a great fight, an honourable defeat’. The World Cup has witnessed a ‘grand finale’, a contest in which ‘the English had to offer all their ability, all their power to win 4-2’. Karlheinz Vogel argued that England had deserved to win but could not explain exactly why this was so: ‘Was it their will to win? Their precise passing?’ Even though Vogel’s account of the match seemed to strive self-consciously to be

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649  Welt am Sonntag, 31 July 1966.
650  Hesse, U., Tor!, 183.
651  Die Welt, 1 August 1966.
impartial, he could not avoid the controversial question of England’s third goal – there had been a moment of weakness on the part of the referee which led him to rely on his linesman – which had a crucial impact on the outcome of the match. It had taken ‘the wind out of Germany’s sails’, leaving them short of the mental and physical strength required to make a comeback. However, as Vogel also noted, England’s fourth goal had been scored after the Germans had pushed forward in search of an equalizer which seemed to contradict the idea that they were incapable of responding to the challenge. As far as the football itself was concerned, Vogel’s judgements seem a little eccentric. For example, he argued that Alan Ball had proved himself the rightful successor to Jimmy Greaves though these players had quite different roles in the England team. However, his comments were in line with those of Fritz Wirth in Bild when he noted that the final had been contested by ‘two excellent and athletic teams in the most modern style of football.’ He reminded his readers that no-one had expected West Germany to reach the final and for that reason the players deserved high praise for their efforts. Moreover, by their demeanour in defeat, the team had improved the image of German sport to a greater extent than they could have done if they had actually won the match.652

The tone of German newspaper reports in 1966 is clearly very different from that of their English counterparts. Whereas Desmond Hackett in the Daily Express, especially in the period between the semi-finals and the final, resorted to military metaphors that reminded readers of Germany’s part in two world wars,

652 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 August 1966.
German journalists were careful to avoid such language. The war was never mentioned or even referred to indirectly. For Schön’s team, it was leaving a good impression that mattered most. The German press coverage of the tournament appears to have been motivated by the same feelings. After the final, though there was disappointment and a sense that England had been fortunate to win by a disputed goal, one does not sense any serious anti-English animosity, despite the provocation by the ‘tin soldiers’ of Fleet Street, who were now falling over themselves to proclaim West Germany as honourable opponents, whereas in the build-up they had been critical of ‘play-acting’ and ‘histrionics’, effectively accusing them of cheating.

Perhaps the key test of German attitudes lies in the way that England’s contentious third goal has been reported and discussed. It is clear that the German team at the time were convinced that the whole of the ball had not crossed the line. However, it seems that the players have mellowed over the years. Thirty years or so after the event, Uli Hesse interviewed them and concluded that they were generally relaxed in their attitude to the incident. ‘What is perhaps not so well understood’, he observed, ‘is that Germany did not hold a grudge about the outcome, and the controversial third goal in particular.’ Only goalkeeper Hans Tilkoswki, who was closest to the incident, maintained vehemently that the goal should not have been allowed. Explaining the way that the team had responded Wolfgang Overath explained: ‘England had a great side. We accepted this defeat, and I hope our conduct brought credit to the German team.’ Inevitably, the

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653 Hesse, U., Tor!, 185-186.
German press took up the case immediately after the final with *Bild am Sonntag* pointing out that most eye-witnesses were convinced that the ball had not crossed the line and arguing that the match had been lost on account of ‘the most discussed, and most universally contested goal in the history of football.’ Indeed, the goal itself was to become the subject of debate for years to come, perhaps surprisingly considering the success that the national team was to enjoy over the years. The discussion generated many rather unpleasant comments involving national stereotypes and xenophobia. However, as far as press comment in 1966 was concerned, this focused on the Swiss referee and the Russian linesman rather than on Hurst and the other English players.

A short but nonetheless excellent little volume of writing on this topic, is *Drin oder Linie? Alles übers dritte Tor*, compiled by Gerhard Henschel and Günther Willen thirty years after the event in 1996. It comprises a collection of views from the German press, mostly dating from after 1966. One of the leading sports journalists of the 1970s, Ulfert Schröder, reminded his readers of ‘the injustice’ suffered by the German team in 1966 at the hands of a ‘cowardly postman’ (Dienst, the Swiss referee) and a ‘hapless physics teacher from Baku’ (Bakhramov, the Russian linesman) whom Schröder accused of being distracted by ‘all the nice things in England.’ Ludger Schulze, who later became sports editor at *Süddeutsche Zeitung* claimed that both, Dienst and Bakhramov had been ‘gutless’. This view was echoed by Roland Eitel who argued that Dienst had ‘shied away from taking responsibility.’ Some journalists, like Herbert Meisel and

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*654  Bild am Sonntag, 31 July 1966.*
Hans-J. Winkler, have attempted to put the decision into perspective by reminding readers that Germany’s late equalizer in the last minutes of normal time followed the award of a controversial free kick and urged Germans to accept ‘the flipside of the coin.’ For others, however, such as Peter Berger, the final would always be ‘stained by this goal’. Significantly, the East German journalist, Günter Simon, was critical of his colleagues and the way that they constantly returned to this moment in football history; he accused them of creating ‘the back stabbing legend of 1966.’

Though convinced that the ball had not crossed the line, the German press reaction in 1966 was muted, focusing on what Schön’s team had achieved and expressing pride in the sportsmanship that had been displayed. Even though some of the complaints in Germany about the attitude of the English press before the final were probably justified, coverage in German newspapers was relatively restrained, despite the injustice of England’s third goal. Rudi Michel, the match commentator for German television, was later asked to explain his reaction to West Germany’s first goal scored by Helmut Haller. He had exclaimed ‘Goal!’ but then had remained silent for half a minute. ‘We were the first post-war generation’, Michel observed. ‘We knew what radio reports have caused in the Third Reich. This was scaring us.’ It was considered inappropriate to celebrate excessively in and against England; any hint of Goebbelschnauze was to be avoided. Thus, when Hurst scored his disputed goal, Michel simply observed:

‘There will be discussions about this.’ Just like Schön and his players, German journalists covering the tournament in England were determined to behave well and this probably tempered their reactions. The reaction came later and, when it came, was directed exclusively at Dienst and Bakhramov rather than at the English whose players were never criticized. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the events of 1966 provided a way in which the German press could frame Anglo-German football encounters thereafter. By 1970, when England and West Germany faced each other once again in a competitive match, the English record of victories had been broken in the friendly at Hanover in 1968. Welt am Sonntag, previewing the World Cup quarter-final match in Mexico, wrote of Germany seeking ‘revenge for 1966’ on its front page.657

The ‘miracle’ of León, 14 June 1970

The 1970 World Cup was awarded to Mexico during the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo, Mexico City having previously won the contest to stage the 1968 Olympics. The decision was controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was clear that teams might experience problems in adjusting to the altitude and the heat; the final was to be played at noon in order to guarantee that television audiences in Europe could watch the match at prime time.658 Secondly, in relation

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657 Welt am Sonntag, 14 June 1970.

to both the Olympic Games and the World Cup, there was a good deal of stereotyping of Mexico in the American and European press that reflected negatively on its capacity to organize a major sporting event of global significance. The fact that a student protest had been brutally suppressed by the authorities only ten days before the start of the Olympics in 1968 did not help to reassure those who had expressed doubts about Mexico’s political stability. As it transpired these issues did not cause problems during the 1970 World Cup which was generally regarded as a great success on all levels. It seemed that the problems some had foreseen had been grossly exaggerated. Brazil, with an ‘unambiguous record of adventure, attack and positive play’, won the tournament in a style guaranteed to please spectators and television viewers worldwide. This was in contrast to England’s victory in 1966 which had not been universally acclaimed and had been much resented in South America especially. English journalist Brian Glanville recorded that the 1970 tournament ‘was gloriously won by Brazil’; it was a victory ‘that raised new hope for attacking football.’

Unlike their English counterparts, the German football journalists present in Mexico were not affected by strike action at home where newspaper production was uninterrupted. The background to the tournament did provide an opportunity for the German press to depict England in a negative way, albeit indirectly. Martin Maier in *Welt am Sonntag* outlined the problems that England had experienced in


Guadalajara where they had played their group matches. Brazilian fans had played loud music at night outside England’s hotel and the crowd at the stadium had been against them. To some extent, however, they had brought these difficulties on themselves. Ramsey’s remarks in 1966, when he had labelled Argentina as ‘animals’, had not been forgotten. Moreover, English insularity led to misunderstandings; they had even brought their own team bus with them. Geoff Hurst found this reassuring: ‘it smells like England. Like Leather and pipe tobacco’, but their Mexican hosts were less impressed. It seemed to suggest that Ramsey and his players did not trust them. Paul Palmert in Bild enlightened readers about Mexican ‘England-Hate’. It seemed that Mexicans believed that their team had not been treated well in 1966 and now were seeking revenge. An assistant in the press centre was quoted: ‘the English are unpopular almost everywhere’. Oswaldo Martinolli, groundsman at León, was reported as saying that the Mexicans had not been prejudiced against the reigning world champions but were offended by their attitude towards the locals; the England squad were ‘arrogant and inaccessible.’ Team manager Sir Alf Ramsey was especially disliked for being rude and stubborn, an assessment with which many English journalists would have agreed. Meanwhile Helmut Schön and his squad ‘were charming the pants off the locals’, as Downing put it, a slightly unfortunate turn of phrase. This meant that when the match took place Germany ‘would enjoy as much “home advantage”’ as England had enjoyed so decisively at Wembley four

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662   Welt am Sonntag, 14 June 1970.

663   Bild, 13 June 1970.
years earlier. Gerhard Pietsch, writing in Bild a few days later, underlined the importance that the West German party attached to public relations, reporting a visit to a local village where Günter Netzer and other players gave footballs and toys to children and clothing to adults. ‘The contrast to living standards in Europe is staggering’, said Netzer. ‘They were so grateful.’ Twenty-five years after the end of the war Schön’s football ambassadors were keen to make a good impression. The Times, as we have seen, noted the success of this strategy and the extent to which it contributed to Germany’s victory.

For the German press, 1966 provided the key point of reference in the match previews. Interviewed by Gerhard Seehase for Welt am Sonntag, Hans Tilkowski, the German goalkeeper from 1966, once more repeated that Hurst’s second goal should not have been allowed. He anticipated a German victory because he believed that they had concluded that Germany had the better players but recognized that England would be difficult to beat, even if they were not playing particularly well. His colleague Gerhard Krug offered his thoughts about possible tactical switches for the game against England and the influence of Jupp Derwall, the German assistant coach, on team selection and tactics. The contest between Franz Beckenbauer and Bobby Charlton was regarded as critical with Krug arguing that whereas Beckenbauer had followed Charlton around at Wembley, the

666 The Times, 19 June 1970.
roles would be reversed in León.\textsuperscript{667} Once again, Wembley 1966 supplied the point of reference. It also informed pre-match coverage in the FAZ where Steffen Haffner’s article on the day of the match appeared under the headline ‘A strong wish to gain revenge for Wembley’ and, of course, mentioned England’s disputed third goal form 1966. Also in FAZ, Ulfert Schröder, though less impressed than Haffner by England’s performances in Mexico, argued that they were now a better side than they had been in 1966. Against Brazil, they had played ‘like Brazil’, a match they would have won ‘had their strikers kept their heads in front of goal.’ If England played in the same way in the quarter-final, no team would have a chance. Schröder believed that ‘time had left its mark on the World Champions’ but believed that ‘English bloody-mindedness’ allied to the team’s experience and tactical awareness meant that they posed a real threat.\textsuperscript{668} Perhaps he had been influenced by an earlier interview with Bobby Charlton, another link with Wembley 1966, who had claimed that the English and the Germans responded similarly in critical situations. ‘When we need to win, we’ll find the necessary reserves and turn into different persons overnight’, he had predicted confidently.\textsuperscript{669}

Quotes attributed to players were a prominent feature of the pre-match coverage in Bild where the emphasis was on personalities, especially the German forward Gerd Müller, though there was some attempt to balance English and German perspectives. Roman Köster, who claimed to be astounded by the level of

\textsuperscript{667} Welt am Sonntag, 14 June 1970.
\textsuperscript{668} Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 June 1970.
\textsuperscript{669} Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 June 1970.
confidence in the English camp, reported that its defenders were determined not to be ‘Mullered’. Full-back Keith Newton promised that he would not be allowed any space. ‘We’re not Morocco, Bulgaria or Peru’, he pointed out, naming the teams that West Germany had beaten on the way to the quarter-final. ‘Anyone can score goals against them.’ Centre-back Brian Labone, the ‘policeman’ assigned the task of taming Muller, affirmed this view, arguing that England’s defence was more solid than it had been in 1966. In an article written from the German perspective Klaus Müller (no relation) interviewed Gerd who expressed confidence and claimed that ‘the Tommies were shivering more than the Germans.’ He had already played against Manchester United and scored twice despite being marked by the ‘poisonous dwarf’ Nobby Stiles, another name that would remind German readers of 1966. In many respects this was all routine pre-match gossip but with Muller referring to the English as ‘Tommies’ and Bild referring to him as Der Bomber it was clear that passions on both sides were running high.670

Naturally, after Schön’s team had overturned England’s 2-0 lead to win 3-2 after extra time, the German press celebrated a great victory. Bild devoted almost half of its front page to the headline ‘3-2 Lads, you are the greatest!’ followed by a short summary of the match, setting it within the framework of recent football history. ‘Memories of 1966’ had overshadowed the event as Uwe Seeler and Bobby Moore, the same team captains as in Wembley four years earlier, shook hands before kick-off. This, however, was where the similarities with 1966 ended:

670 Bild, 13 June 1970.
there was ‘heat, thin air and a different continent’ to contend with – and, of course, a different result. Military metaphors were much in evidence. With England 2-0 up and apparently controlling the match from a defensive position there was no alternative for Germany but to begin ‘attacking England’s fortress relentlessly.’ It paid off as first Beckenbauer and then Seeler scored, the latter with a ‘wondergoal’ to make it 2-2 and once more taking the game into extra time, in which Müller scored the winner.\(^{671}\) \textit{Die Welt} described a ‘sensational come back.’ After Peters had scored England’s second goal it asked, ‘who would give Germany a chance?’ \(^{672}\) The German press tended to celebrate their team’s victory as if it was some kind of miracle, inevitably inviting comparisons with ‘the miracle of Berne’ in 1954. In the \textit{FAZ} Steffen Haffner pointed directly to the similarities between the two events. On both occasions the Germans had recovered after falling behind and had gone on to win the match. However, while it had rained during the match against Hungary, in León the heat had been ‘murderous.’ Moreover, the victory in 1954 might appear more miraculous than it actually was because Hungary had beaten a weakened German side 8-3 in a group match. Perhaps the triumph at León had the greater claim in that it was as if the German team had raised itself from the dead; Haffner wrote of ‘The Fallen’ continuing to fight despite the conditions. From this perspective ‘the turn from defeat to triumph appeared to be a wonder.’\(^{673}\) Even two days after the game, it

\(^{671}\) Bild, 15 June 1970.

\(^{672}\) Die Welt, 15 June 1970.

\(^{673}\) Heinrich, A., \textit{3:2 für Deutschland} (Göttingen: Werkstatt-Verlag, 2004), 38; Hesse, \textit{Tor!}, 123–124.
seemed that Gerhard Krug, writing in Die Welt, could hardly believe what he had witnessed. It was a success that ‘defies all logic.’

There were, of course, other ways in which Germany’s victory – and England’s defeat – could be explained, as Krug himself knew. He resorted to military metaphors to describe the strength of England’s defence. ‘They erected a fortress around their own [penalty] area, armed with wires, mines, trenches and stones’, he explained colourfully. When Germany broke through the England defence had responded ‘with the calmness of a Russian customs officer’ and appeared likely to see the match through safely. Beckenbauer and his team were paralysed in awe and submissiveness; it seemed that Germany could play until July without scoring. Yet, Krug reminded his readers that usually it is mistakes that decide games. Like Ramsey’s critics in the English press he argued that it had been a mistake to bring Bell on for Charlton, thinking that the game was won. This substitution had liberated Beckenbauer; now ‘Franz was ruling.’ Haffner in the FAZ had seen events in the same way. Ramsey’s substitution had changed the game in Germany’s favour. Bell did not know how to handle Beckenbauer who suddenly played as though ‘concrete blocks had been removed from his shoes.’ This was very much in line with the analysis provided by West Germany’s assistant coach, Dettmar Cramer, for Bild. The 1970 tournament was the first in which two substitutions were allowed and coaches had to adapt

\[674\] Die Welt, 14 June 1970.

\[675\] Die Welt, 16 June 1970.

\[676\] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 June 1970.
quickly, reading the game and learning how to use this rule effectively, as Schön had demonstrated when he had brought Grabowski on in the second half against Peru.\(^{677}\) The implication here was that Ramsey and England had made the wrong substitution, thus it could be argued once again that German management had adapted more successfully to modern conditions. That said, there was still something miraculous about Germany’s victory with Krug observing that it might take weeks to grasp what the team had achieved.\(^{678}\)

Reflecting on how the result had been received in England the impression given was that of a nation in a state of shock. This was especially evident in Fritz Wirth’s lengthy report for Die Welt which appeared under the headline ‘30 seconds that stunned the BBC.’ Apparently BBC match commentator, the talkative David Coleman, described as ‘a waterfall’ by Wirth, had been stunned into silence for 30 seconds when Müller had scored Germany’s winning goal. It was the biggest shock result since England had lost 1-0 to the United States in Brazil twenty years earlier.\(^{679}\) Before the match, Wirth reported, pubs had been empty and motorways were without traffic; there was more interest in the match than in the outcome of the general election due to take place in a few days and the Conservative and Labour campaigns had ground to a halt. ‘The fate of the nation was to be decided in León’, Wirth explained. TV pundit Pat Crerand, the

\(^{677}\) Bild, 15 June 1970.

\(^{678}\) Die Welt, 16 June 1970.

\(^{679}\) This result had been a shock but it did not make the same impact on the English public as the defeat by Germany in 1970. See Porter, D., “‘Your boys took one hell of a beating’: English football and British decline, c.1950-1980’, in Smith, A. and Porter, D., (eds.) Sport and national identity in the post-war world (London: Routledge, 2004), 38.
Manchester United and Scotland midfielder, had predicted before the game, ‘the Germans will win’ and at half-time ‘he was asked to eat his words’. At the end of the game he had been proved right and was declared a prophet by shocked colleagues in the studio. One of them, Malcolm Allison, the Manchester City coach, attacked Ramsey, the hero of 1966, claiming that he was ‘a good coach for weaker teams’ but ‘out of his depth with good teams.’ In 1966, Wirth concluded, England had ‘lost’ the World Cup but it had been retrieved by Pickles. The poor dog had now died so the rescue act could not be repeated. Instead ‘a truck load of daring and beautiful dreams was lost in León’.680

However, just as the English press had praised West Germany after the final in 1966, there were some words of consolation for the defeated world champions. Krug noted that England looked sharp and seemed well prepared to cope with the problems posed by the altitude and the heat. ‘A great team returns home’, was his assessment.681 Haffner in the FAZ was especially enthusiastic about England. ‘What an opponent!’ he declared, arguing that for most of the match they had been ‘superior in all departments.’ It had seemed like a game played by ‘professionals against good natured amateurs.’ England’s defence was an impenetrable ‘super wall’ and for them it was ‘nothing more than a training game.’ The unanimous opinion after the game: ‘the English have even become better. They are real world champions.’ It was only after Beckenbauer’s goal that


681 See Hesse, Tor!, 187.
‘the miracle began.’ Thereafter roles were reversed. Thus the English could have little to complain about regarding their treatment on the sports pages of the German press.

Haffner concluded his report by describing the party in the central square at León where the team, fans and locals had joined together after the match to create an atmosphere resembling a mix of the ‘Oktoberfest and the Carnival’. In Mexico, it seemed that ‘all Germans are football brothers.’ Die Welt was very happy in the circumstances to quote reports from foreign press sources which indicated that Germany’s victory had been popular around the world. The English press were convinced that the team had been handicapped by the absence of first-choice Gordon Banks and that Ramsey had been wrong to bring on Bell for Charlton. However, there were reports that Ursula Banks, Gordon’s German wife, had assured her compatriots that Germany would have won even if her husband had played. The Daily Mail, which had been rather unfriendly in 1966, had apparently now conceded that, if anyone was to beat the English, it was glad that it was the Germans. There were favourable quotes culled from La Notte and Gazzetta dello Sport and the French sports daily L’Equipe described Germany’s victory as ‘Fantastic! Unbelievable! Wonderful! Extra-ordinary!’ According to Bild, even the Pope had been supporting Germany and Sophia Loren was predicting that Germany would beat Italy in the semi-final. Moreover, there was no doubt that the Germans were popular winners in Mexico; their charm offensive had paid off

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and England had made little effort to make friends with their hosts. All the German match reports had noted that the crowd in the stadium had favoured their team, responding enthusiastically when Müller scored the winner. One Mexican newspaper had even reported the match under the headline ‘Blitzkrieg’. In 1966 West Germany had left a good impression and had lost to England; in 1970, they had made a good impression and beaten England. FAZ quoted one (unnamed) player after the game as saying that he would like to go home now as ‘it could not get any better.’ He was probably right, not least because the team’s achievement and the response to it suggested that Germany could now look the world in the face.

**The New Germany: Wembley 1972**

The win in León was the second in succession for Germany over England. The balance of power in the Anglo-German football relationship was beginning to shift, though not yet decisively. However, the short period before the two rivals were thrown together again in the two-leg quarter final of the European Nations Championship in the spring of 1972, proved to be immensely troubling. A few days after the ‘miracle of León’, Schön’s team had lost 4-3 to Italy in the World Cup semi-final in another match requiring extra time but they had returned from Mexico with much credit. At home they were regarded as ‘as unlucky losers, even

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the moral victors.\footnote{Hesse, Tor!, 189.} It seemed that the advent of the highly-competitive Bundesliga had provided the platform for West Germany to consolidate its position as a major power in international football. This achievement was jeopardized in 1971 when it was discovered that leading Bundesliga clubs had been involved in a major bribery and match-fixing scandal involving around 50 players as well as some coaches and managers. Reinhard Libuda and Klaus Fichtel, both of whom had played against England in León, were the most prominent players involved. Fortunately for Schön the players of Bayern Munich and Borussia Mönchengladbach – the two strongest Bundesliga clubs at the time – which provided the core of the national team, were not involved. It did not help either that his squad was ‘riven with disputes’. Sepp Maier had fallen out with Bayern team-mates Beckenbauer and Müller who blamed him for recent defeats. Five players had signed up with Puma and refused to honour the deal to wear Adidas boots like the rest of the squad.\footnote{Downing, Best of enemies, 134; Hesse, U., Tor!, 190; Wilson, J., The anatomy of England: a history in ten matches (London: Orion, 2010), 158.} This was unsettling and made it unnecessarily difficult for Schön as he assembled his squad. Also, as the match approached, it did not help that Vogts, Overath, Weber and Schnellinger, four important players, were injured. Consequently, it was something of a makeshift squad that arrived to play England at Wembley in April 1972.\footnote{Hesse, Tor!, 158–161; See also : \url{http://www.anoldinternational.co.uk/2012/11/bundesliga-50-the-1970s/}; accessed 4 March 2014.} ‘Under these circumstances no one could expect a victory’, was Die Welt’s pre-match assessment a few days before the match. It underlined this view on the day of the
match itself: ‘A narrow defeat would be a success, a draw a victory and a win would be like a triumph.’

Anxieties about foreign perceptions of Germany derived from recent history help to explain Schön’s obsessive concern with leaving a good impression in 1966 and the determined ‘charm offensive’ in Mexico four years later. It seemed at the start of 1972 that the Federal Republic was making progress in this direction. Firstly, the first generation of Germans to be born since the end of the Second World War were now reaching adulthood. Secondly, preparations were well in hand for the Olympic Games due to take place in Munich during the summer. When the Games had been awarded to Munich in 1966 it was regarded as an important step forward because it signalled international recognition that Germany had shaken off the negative legacy of the Nazi period. The Germans could now be entrusted with the responsibility of staging a major international sporting event. It provided, in the words of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, speaking in April 1972, ‘an historical opportunity to convey a desirable image of this state and the society which sustains it … to hundreds of thousands of international guests as well as millions of TV viewers, radio listeners and newspaper readers.’ Moreover, with the world economy yet to experience the downturn that began in 1973, there was no shortage of desirable images available for this purpose. ‘These were to be the “cheerful games” (heitere Spiele).’

Moreover, as Allen Guttmann observes:

690 Die Welt, 27, 29 April 1972.
‘The German organizers were rightly proud of the Olympic village, the futuristic stadium (which cost $45 million), and the other facilities constructed for the Games. Every visual detail, down to the choice of colors and the design of the logos for different sports, had been carefully planned by Otl Aicher. A new subway system [would whisk] athletes and spectators from downtown Munich to the site of the games.’

In April 1972 all was set to celebrate what West Germany had achieved since the war and to showcase a modern, efficient, stylish and progressive nation state. A successful national football team could only add to this positive image. It has to be remembered that the troubles associated with the world economic crisis and Arab terrorism at the Olympics were in the future when West Germany played England.

What becomes clear from reviewing the match previews in the German press is that the fixture with England was recognized as being of special significance for both sides. For German sports journalists the recent history of Anglo-German football matches provided the essential context, though Steffen Haffner in the FAZ went back further by recalling the fourteen England-Germany games since 1900 and pointing out that England had won ten of them. He also noted that England had been beaten at Wembley only by Hungary (1953), Sweden

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(1959) and Austria (1965) and never by Germany. For England, the unhappy memory of León was likely to be a motivating factor; Haffner predicted that ‘Sir Alf Ramsey will play the León card.’ Die Welt also looked at the match this way, claiming that ‘England have not forgotten the game in Mexico and were out for revenge.’ Bild underlined this point by publishing an interview with Alan Ball in which he explained how badly the England team had been hurt by the defeat they had suffered in Mexico. Interviewed by Paul Palmert, Ball explained:

‘… defeats are hard to take for me in football, but no tragedy. León was different. We were 2-0 up and still have lost. That has never happened to an England team before. The only souvenir from Mexico is a broken heart.’

However, as Haffner pointed out, Germany’s team could also draw on past experience for motivation. They had scores to settle from their previous two visits to Wembley, having been controversially denied a draw in February 1966 and suffered the injustice of ‘a goal that never was’ in the 1966 final. ‘The third goal is still haunting’, Haffner observed.

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693 This excluded wins by Scotland, such as that by the famous ‘Wembley wizards’ in 1928 when England had been beaten 5-1.

694 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 1972.

695 Die Welt, 27 April 1972.

696 Bild, 28 April 1972.

697 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 1972.
Though it was sensible to play down German expectations before the match – and in this the press was simply following the example sensibly set by Helmut Schön – justified pride was evident when reporting the respect with which English players now regarded their opponents. Die Welt, for example, quoted Bobby Charlton on his great rival Franz Beckenbauer: ‘Playing him in defence would certainly stabilize the German back four but it would be a waste of one of the greatest talents in football if Beckenbauer was not to play in midfield, where games are lost or won.’ Though Die Welt wondered if Charlton’s remarks were designed to influence Schön’s team selection, it also made it clear that he rated Beckenbauer very highly. Bild reported Alan Ball’s remark that Bertie Vogts was ‘the best defender in the world.’ At one time, Haffner observed in FAZ, all that would have been at stake was by how many goals ‘the masters of football’ would defeat their ‘German pupils’. However, German football was now respected. It used to be that Germany were to be found ‘trembling ahead of the games against England’ but this no longer applied, especially after León. Haffner clearly sensed that the balance of power in the football relationship between England and Germany was changing. Had Germany ‘almost caught up?’ Or were they now ‘level with England’? This would make the match a tense occasion. Yet Haffner still expected England to win on this occasion.

There was little evidence of hostility towards the English in the German newspapers. Sir Alf Ramsey, however, provided an easy target. He was already

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698 Die Welt, 27 April 1972.
699 Bild, 28 April 1972.
700 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 1972.
under pressure from critics for his ultra-cautious, defensive approach to the game. Malcolm Allison, the manager of Manchester City, had compared his attitude to that of ‘a savings bank manager’ and this was duly reported by Fritz Wirth in *Die Welt* on the morning of the match.\(^{701}\) Moreover, his lack of communication skills made him an easy target. Haffner, in *FAZ*, was irritated by his refusal to name his team on the day before the match, observing ironically that he expected Ramsey to release the details of his starting eleven ‘a day after the match, at the earliest.’\(^{702}\) Perhaps the most significance press comment, however, was Fritz Wirth’s review of the pre-match comment in the English newspapers where he detected some ‘sabre-rattling’ and noted the ‘Prussian element’ in characterizations of the German team. In the *Daily Express*, for example, the German defence was a ‘Siegfried Line’ and ‘Bomber’ Müller was a ‘V-weapon’. It was an indication of the importance with which the match was being viewed in England that the *Evening Standard* had published a 24-page special issue describing it as ‘a battle of giants.’ All this reflected well on West German football and showed that attitudes in England had ‘changed profoundly’, despite the tin soldiers in the *Express*.\(^{703}\) *Bild*, looking for a sensationalist angle, sent Paul Palmert to a ‘secret’ session in the England training camp where he uncovered no secrets, just ‘gymnastics and war talk.’ It provided, however, another opportunity

\(^{701}\) *Die Welt*, 29 April 1972.

\(^{702}\) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 April 1972.

\(^{703}\) *Die Welt*, 29 April 1972.
to make fun of the secretive and suspicious Alf Ramsey. Gordon Banks played along with this; ‘If I play, I will play as goalkeeper’, he confided.\textsuperscript{704}

Reports from the German camp made it clear that Schön and his players were respectful but not overawed. On the front page of \textit{Bild} the manager promised that his players were ready to fight ‘until they drop’; the team had no intention of being ‘a sacrificial lamb for the English.’ At a time when pride in the Federal Republic and its post-war achievements was very evident, it was to be expected that players should reflect this sentiment in the context of the forthcoming match and Gerd Müller did not disappoint \textit{Bild’s} readers back home. At Bayern Munich, he confessed, he was ‘earning good money’; when he played for his country he only received expenses. However, he gave three reasons why he was happy to play for his country without any reward. Firstly, the match was against England and ‘who doesn’t want to play against them?’ Secondly, it was ‘all about the European Championship’ and, thirdly, ‘England have not forgotten their defeat in León and thus it will be even harder for us.’\textsuperscript{705} He appeared to be proud, confident and eager to play his part in a serious international contest against Germany’s old rival. Schön could not have asked for more.

It is possible that the post-match accounts of West Germany’s 3-1 win exaggerated their superiority over England on the night. Though the visitors scored first and held a 1-0 lead at half-time, England equalized in the second-half and the outcome of the match was only decided in the last ten minutes. Under the

\textsuperscript{704} \textit{Bild}, 29 April 1972.

\textsuperscript{705} \textit{Bild}, 29 April 1972.
heading ‘Notes from Wembley’ *FAZ* supplied its readers with some basic facts. It was the third consecutive German win against England and the first in England after five defeats; it marked 100 victories for Germany in international matches since 1945, 200 in total; Gerd Müller equalled Uwe Seeler’s record of 43 goals in internationals. England had won 14 corners in the match; Germany only four; England had conceded eight free kicks and a penalty, Germany 18 free kicks; the average age of England’s starting line-up was 29 years, Germany’s 25.4 years. However, statistics do not tell the whole story. The victory may not have been as convincing as has sometimes been claimed but it was achieved in a style that ensured that Schön’s team were admired both at home and abroad, even in England. As Uli Hesse observes: ‘So thick came the showers of praise that one could be forgiven for thinking that those plaudits must have been aimed at a football side representing Brazil rather than Germany.’ For the English press it was especially perplexing to have seen the national side outclassed in this way by a team that traditionally played in the physical, hard-running English style. What they had seen was something quite different. ‘How had the Germans suddenly become so good?’

To be fair, the German press, though clearly delighted with the result and the performance, seemed equally surprised by what had been achieved. It was, as many of the post-match quotes from players observed, simply ‘unbelievable’ or ‘incomprehensible’ that Germany had played so well. ‘Was this victory a

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707 Hesse, *Tor!,* 189.
wonder?’, asked Gerhard Seehase in *Die Welt*, before answering his own question, ‘not at all.’ Over ninety minutes, he argued, West Germany had proved that a ‘fighting and hard-working team’ could be beaten by a more technically proficient and more intelligent team, even when playing at home and with the pre-match odds in their favour. In *FAZ*, Stefan Haffner reverted to the by now well-worn metaphor of ‘the miracle’, one with which his readers would be familiar. The ‘miracle of Berne’ and the ‘miracle of León’ were already part of modern German folklore. The ‘miracle of Wembley’ was now added to the list. All this fitted very nicely into a pattern for a country which was well-known for having experienced an ‘economic miracle’ in the years since the Second World War. Haffner reminded readers that Schön’s team had arrived in England while German football was still struggling with the Bundesliga match-fixing scandal; morale had been low and there was a long list of injured players. Yet, despite these ‘symptoms of sickness’, the performance and the result proved that German football ‘bristled with health.’ The patient had showed remarkable resilience and made a recovery that could be described as a miracle.

However, the miracle had to be explained and in this the match reports in *Bild*, *Die Welt* and *FAZ* followed a similar pattern. Indeed, they followed a pattern similar to that which was found in the post-match analysis in the English press as described in Chapter Three. England, according to Seehase in *Die Welt*, had been ‘pugnacious and passionate’ at the start but were ‘pugnacious, passionate and

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709  *Die Welt*, 1 May 1972.


depressing’ by the end. Seehase repeated questions about the state of the English game that he had been asked by English counterparts while in the press box at Wembley, such as ‘Is English football out-dated?’ At the time he had replied diplomatically that Ramsey had simply picked the wrong team but he made it clear that whereas West Germany had adapted and advanced since 1966, showing intelligence and a willingness to learn from others, the development of English football had been frozen in 1966 with disastrous consequences. It was partly a problem with management. Ramsey had been too loyal to the players who had brought him success six years ago and now had paid the price. He described England striker Martin Chivers as a *Landsturmmann*, a reservist in the Prussian and Imperial military, implying that he had been left behind by the march of progress. Chivers thus signified outdated methods and practice. It was necessary to learn, to be open to new ideas. This was how German football superiority over England had been established.712

This analysis was effectively endorsed by his colleague Fritz Wirth who argued that the manner of England’s ‘necessary’ defeat indicated that a period of reflection and radical change was required, similar to that which had followed the 6-3 home defeat by Hungary in 1953, an event described by Jeffrey Hill as ‘”a moment of modernity” from the neglected realm of sport.’713 England’s defeat was ‘not just a shock’, as in 1970, it ‘demanded internal analysis and self-

712 *Die Welt*, 1 May 1972.

Haffner drew all these strands together in FAZ. Football had developed since 1966 but England had been ‘by-passed’ and its players pressed into ‘a tactical straight-jacket’ by Ramsey which meant that they were unable to ‘express their individual abilities’. Alan Ball, at the time England’s most expensive footballer, had been exposed as ‘limited as a playmaker’ in midfield and was here compared unfavourably to Günter Netzer who had been allowed to express himself. England had ground to a halt in their football development. Ramsey’s loyalty to the heroes of 1966, especially Bobby Moore who had ‘lost form and become immobile’ and Geoff Hurst who had been outclassed by Horst-Dieter Höttges, was clearly misplaced and wrong-headed. Only when relative newcomer Rodney Marsh was brought on in place of Hurst had England improved. There were lessons to be learned here. West Germany had made ‘fantastic’ progress but, with a backward glance at the scandal that had recently embarrassed the Bundesliga, he warned that it could all go wrong if German football did not distance itself from corruption and materialism.

Both FAZ and Bild were delighted to make their readers aware of how West Germany’s triumph had been reported in other countries. There was a need still to reassure them regarding Germany’s position in the world. Though critical of the performance of their own team, English newspapers were generally warm in praising the Germans. The Sunday People had declared that Wembley was now ‘but a shadow of a proud English fortress’ and argued that Germany’s superior performance had consigned England to the third division of international football.

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714 Die Welt, 1 May 1972.
715 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 May 1972; Hesse, Tor!, 188.
The News of the World relied on old stereotypes to get its message across, pointing out that ‘a disciplined and efficient German machine’ had ‘made England look like a ‘team of Lilliputians.’ This was no doubt gratifying to some German newspaper readers even if it seemed to understate the creative influence of Beckenbauer and Netzer. Gerhard Pietsch’s analysis in Bild praised the discipline of Schön’s team, singling out Jürgen Grabowski who had abandoned his distinctive dribbling game in the interests of the team. The German Mannschaft, he claimed, ‘played for Germany, not for themselves’; in comparison English players cared only about their bank accounts. FAZ was on safer ground in relying on informed opinion from abroad rather than nationalistic stereotyping to explain the miracle of Wembley. Quotes from the Italian press proved especially useful in this respect, especially as both Corriere dello Sport and Gazetta dello Sport had pointed out that the historical teacher-pupil analogy which had once been used to characterize the Anglo-German football relationship now no longer applied. Giorno had praised Germany’s ‘textbook football.’ It wrote of an ‘illusion that has collapsed and another that has begun with Germany the teacher.’ In the context of 1972 it was important to note that newspapers in other countries, especially those in a significant football power like Italy, looked up to the West German national team. Effectively it endorsed the views expressed by Gerhard Pietsch in Bild that England, by adhering to a ‘physical style of football that they had played for a hundred years’ and failing to follow Germany’s

716 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 May 1972.
717 Bild, 2 May 1972.
718 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 May 1972.
example and improving their technique, had fallen behind. German football was now ‘the most modern in the world.’

In its obsessive search for the personal or human angle that would appeal to the widest possible number of readers Bild’s Paul Palmert and Werner Bremser had drawn attention to an incident involving Horst Höttges and Geoff Hurst. Höttges (‘Mr Iron Foot’) admitted that he had suffered from a ‘Hurst complex’ since the 1966 final when he had been assigned to mark the England forward but had failed to prevent him scoring a hat-trick. Six years later the German defender had clearly had the better of the duel and Hurst had been substituted after 58 minutes but he had refused to swap shirts. Bild alleged that Höttges had accused him of being ‘a bad loser.’ This may or may not have been so but England’s performance in the second leg of the quarter-final, played in Berlin on 13 May 1972, which Hurst missed, tended to underline the impression that it was not just that they had forgotten how to win, but that they had forgotten how to lose as well. The English press urged Ramsey to approach the second leg in an adventurous spirit in order to make up the two-goal lead which Germany had taken home from Wembley but he disappointed them by picking ball-winners rather than ball-players and seemed more anxious to avoid another embarrassing defeat than to take risks in pursuit of an admittedly unlikely victory. With Germany content to defend their lead and England ill-equipped to do anything but defend, the match degenerated and England were much criticized for ‘having

719 Bild, 2 May 1972.
720 Bild, 2 May 1972.
kicked their way to a goalless draw.\textsuperscript{721} Bobby Moore argued that ‘England have won back some respect with this result’ which, as Haffner observed, was a sign of how modest England’s ambitions had become. The match radiated only ‘cold light while all the world was waiting for blazing flames.’\textsuperscript{722} It was best forgotten but it was the impression left by Germany at Wembley that counted. In the year of the Munich Olympic Games and only two years before Germany was due to host the FIFA World Cup, its national team had projected a positive image. ‘Surely, a triumph over the world’s best teams was inevitable, barring unexpected developments.’\textsuperscript{723}

\textit{‘Rummenigge and ten robots’: World Cup 1982}

Though England and West Germany played two friendly matches between 1972 and 1982, each side winning at home, they did not engage competitively until the 1982 World Cup finals in Spain. This was the first tournament to involve 24 finalists, a concession made by Joao Havelange after he became president of FIFA in 1974 in order to meet the demand for more representation from Africa. For Glanville, the 1982 tournament was ‘beset by heat and by displeasing incidents’ and was ‘ill-organized by the hosts.’ There were no strong pre-tournament favourites ‘though West Germany looked good.’\textsuperscript{724} England, managed by Ron Greenwood, had failed to qualify for the finals in both 1974 and 1978 and

\textsuperscript{721} Wilson, \textit{Anatomy of England}, 181.

\textsuperscript{722} Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 May 1972.

\textsuperscript{723} Hesse, \textit{Tor!}, 191.

\textsuperscript{724} Glanville, \textit{Story of the World Cup}, 238.
was not considered a potent threat. This situation changed almost as soon as the
tournament got underway when West Germany, World Cup winners in 1974,
were beaten 2-1 by Algeria while England had looked enterprising in their 3-1
victory over France and went on to win their remaining two Stage One group
matches. Moreover, West Germany, by the time that they met England in Madrid
in the second group stage, had already lost much of whatever goodwill they were
entitled to after qualifying from the group at Algeria’s expense via a 1-0 win
against Austria which many observers saw as a cynical exercise in match-fixing,
Austria having already qualified. A Spanish newspaper labelled this match El
Anschluss and manager Jupp Derwall and his squad were heavily criticized by the
German media and fans. It did not help that the style which had won them
admiration at Wembley ten years earlier seemed to have been lost somewhere on
the way to Spain. Pelé famously described them as ‘Rummenigge plus ten
robots.’\(^\text{725}\) Despite reaching the final, where they were beaten by Italy, Derwall’s
squad – though technically proficient – did not inspire much affection and the
notorious match with Austria was too much for many. ‘This victory was worse
than a defeat’, was the verdict of a World Cup book published by one newspaper,
and worse was to follow for West Germany in the semi-final after Schumacher’s
notorious block on Battiston.\(^\text{726}\)

‘The 1982 World Cup made a large number of fans who were at an
impressionable age at the time lose interest in the national team and concentrate


\(^\text{726}\) Hesse, *Tor!*, 251-252.
completely on club football,’ Hesse has argued.\textsuperscript{727} To some extent this may have been underpinned by the German press at the time which was so critical of Derwall and his players that he accused them of running a campaign against them that amounted to treason. At this time the German press was undergoing a period of rapid reconstruction characterized as the \textit{Zeitungssterben}, the death of local newspapers. Whereas there had been 624 titles in 1954 this had been reduced to 460 by 1971 and the process was continuing, resulting in a loss of plurality in the expression of public opinion. At the same time the number of colour magazines increased and this prompted some commentators to ask if the population could handle the resulting ‘reading stress.’\textsuperscript{728} The greater concentration of the German press combined with a growing negativity towards the national team and its players, often depicted as being only interested in money, helped to breed disaffection towards a team that never excelled or played exciting football but was noted for its functionality and stubbornness. There were, of course, other reasons why football in West Germany suffered such a bad press at the time. It was at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s that the authorities found themselves grappling with ‘an entrenched hooligan culture.’ This prompted the Ministry of the Interior to issue a report in 1982 entitled \textit{Sport und Gewalt} (violence) and to introduce a package of measures designed to improve fan behaviour and public safety around football.\textsuperscript{729}

\textsuperscript{727} Hesse, \textit{Tor!} 254.

\textsuperscript{728} Pross, \textit{Zeitungsreport}, 213–218.

Hesse has discussed German football hooliganism in the wider socio-political context of the period arguing that ‘the rise of hooliganism fitted the general mood of existential angst.’\(^{730}\) When this is considered along with the problems already surrounding Derwall and his team after the fiasco of a ‘match’ with Austria, it is not surprising that the sports journalists covering the West Germany-England match tended to concentrate largely on what was wrong with the German team and German football generally. Spain had already been beaten in the first match of the three-team group by the time that Germany faced England so, for Derwall’s team, it was enough to avoid defeat, not a situation likely to generate an exciting contest, given that Germany, even without Bernd Schuster, would normally have been expected to beat England by this time, especially as both Kevin Keegan and Trevor Brooking were injured. The German press, nevertheless, tried to generate some enthusiasm in its pre-match coverage and it followed a formula that was by now familiar, stressing the historic football rivalry between the two countries. ‘England vs. Germany is not a normal game of football but a piece of sports history’, declared Die Welt on the morning of the match. Over the long run, the German record against England was still negative: four victories and three draws stood against eleven defeats with a goal difference of 22:49.\(^{731}\) However, it was made clear that it was the relatively short run that mattered. Derwall, who had played in the team that had been beaten at Wembley in 1954, was said to be looking to avenge that defeat; both Ramsey and Schön would be watching the game on television at their homes; one would fondly recall

\(^{730}\) Hesse, *Tor*, 207-208.
\(^{731}\) [http://observer.theguardian.com/englandfootball/story/0,9565,541582,00.html](http://observer.theguardian.com/englandfootball/story/0,9565,541582,00.html); accessed 14 April 2014.
1966, the other 1970 and 1972; for Franz Beckenbauer those three games had been ‘the highlights of his career’; for Bobby Charlton they had been matches in which ‘even the loser could leave the pitch with their head held high.’ There was also reference to very recent history – Aston Villa’s victory over Bayern Munich in the European Cup Final a few months earlier. For West Germany there was some recent history to forget as well as to remember. Derwall had told his players to ‘draw a line’ under the first group stage and ‘focus entirely on England and the other tasks ahead.’

The German press, as we have seen, tended to avoid references to the war and were relatively restrained in their coverage of the England team. FAZ noted that England manager Ron Greenwood thought that ‘Germany were overrated’, a view with which many of his readers would not have disagreed after the disappointments and scandals of the first group stage. Greenwood was portrayed as an intellectual; his coach, Don Howe, as a practical man, which summed up their respective qualities fairly. FAZ lurched into analogies with military rank to explain the division of labour within the English camp, betraying possibly a German fondness for order and uniforms. Thus Greenwood, with his ‘quiet authority’ was ‘the major’; Howe became ‘a sergeant when working with the substitutes’ and Geoff Hurst was ‘adjutant’ to them both. There was nothing here to cause anyone in England to be offended.

Oskar Schmidt in *FAZ* followed what was by now a journalistic convention by suggesting that England were out for revenge for their defeat in Mexico 1970 just like Germany were keen to win in 1970 as revenge for 1966. The most significant article to appear in *FAZ* in the build-up to the match, however, was a lengthy piece by Karl-Heinz Bohrer which indicated just how deeply the image of the national side had been damaged by its performance in the first group stage matches and by the ‘fix’ with Austria in particular. Using an appropriate Spanish metaphor he argued that the German national team now lacked *emocion*, a quality associated with bull-fighters. Something had been lost since the World Cup triumph of 1974. The team had become ‘mere administrators of results’; ‘boredom without the promise of technical efficiency … has taken hold of German football.’

He included club performances in the European Cup in his critique noting that German sides had not won any matches against English clubs since 1976, implying that the English, whatever their deficiencies, did play with passion (*emocion*). Professional footballers in Germany, he complained, had become simply interchangeable ‘spare parts’ in machines operated by ‘trainer-engineers’. Since the game had turned into work, ‘a golden age when football was not about money but about the emotion and the game’ has been lost. Its soul had been destroyed by ‘high payments for professional players’ and their aim to maximise gains with minimum effort. Bohrer invoked the ideal of *Furor Teutonicus* which he hoped would secure ‘Victory in the afternoon’ for Germany.\(^\text{734}\)

Bohrer’s colleague Oskar Schmidt previewed the match in a more conventional fashion, though it is clear that he shared many of his colleague’s doubts and reservations. He informed FAZ readers that English sports journalists thought that the German team was over-rated, had ‘no class’ and appeared to have ‘money on their minds exclusively.’ Schmidt balanced this, however, by pointing out that England ‘lacked intelligence’ with long balls and headers as their ‘default position’. He conceded that in midfield Greenwood had ‘some players with skills and tactical understanding usually not associated with the English style of play’ but the defence was weak. In view of these deficiencies on both sides and mindful of the way the group was positioned before kick-off, the drab 0-0 draw was not surprising. It was a satisfactory result from Germany’s perspective as it left them at the top of the group with England required to beat Spain by at least two goals in their final match to qualify. This, however, did not earn Derwall’s team a good press. Peter Stutzer’s match report in Die Welt headed ‘Zero Growth’ was followed by a sub-heading which added ‘zero goals, zero courage and zero self-confidence.’ The match had been ‘abject’ and ‘did not offer any positives.’ It had simply confirmed the view that Germany now played ‘destructive football and were avoiding attacking football.’ Ron Greenwood had to cope with criticisms of England’s unenterprising performance but could justify himself by referring to the absence of two key players and pointing out that ‘two teams were necessary to make a game of football.’ Germany had thwarted an England team on a run of nine consecutive victories but Stutzer remained unconvinced. If they had wanted to win why had Pierre Littbarski only been brought on as a substitute?

735 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 June 1982.
Kevin Keegan, who knew about German football from the inside, was quoted as saying that ‘Germany was a shadow of its former self.’

In 1982, the most important aspect of coverage in the German newspapers is what it tells us about attitudes towards their own team. Greenwood’s team attracted little attention but it is clear that English clubs, then enjoying more success than German clubs in European competition, were looked at positively, not least for the emocion or passion with which they played. Overall, the 1982 World Cup finals was a negative experience for West Germany, despite reaching the finals. The defeat by Algeria, the ‘fix’ against Austria and the boring draw against England were followed by the image problem arising from what David Downing describes as ‘Schumacher’s criminal – and criminally unpunished – assault on Battiston’ and his attitude afterwards. Kurt Röttgen in Die Welt claimed that the team, which in the early 1970s had been so much admired for its desire to attack and its flair players, had left a very bad impression and had lost credibility. They were now seen as Spaßbremsen (killjoys).

**World Cup Semi-Final 1990: ‘Dear Maggie …’**

The broad context of Anglo-German football rivalry was changed by the dramatic events that followed the collapse of the East German state (GDR) in the late 1980s. For Germans, the new world order was symbolized by the dismantling.
of the Berlin Wall, the most obvious physical legacy of the Cold War era. On 9 November 1989 Hans-Joachim Friedrichs, news anchorman for television channel ARD, marked the event with these words:

‘The handling of superlatives must be done with the greatest attention and care; they are used all too often. But tonight it is right to use them. This day, 9 November is a historical day: East Germany has opened the borders.’

On the same day VfB Stuttgart beat Bayern Munich in the German Cup but no one cared. Journalist Timothy Garton-Ash observed the revolution in Eastern Europe as an eye witness and was taken by surprise by the pace it gathered after 9 November, noting how quickly, in East Berlin and Leipzig, for example, thoughts turned from liberation and reforming the GDR to unifying the two German states. This proved more difficult and more contentious than many anticipated in the euphoria of 9 November.

There were problems in integrating East German and West German sport and football was not immune from these difficulties. On 15 November 1989, just six days after the Wall had come down, the GDR played an international match, a World Cup qualifier against Austria. Asked to explain the 3-0 defeat, coach Eduard Geyer reported that ‘the players were completely distracted, making

739 Der Tagesspiegel, 1 June 2013.
telephone calls like crazy and in fact only worried about finding other clubs.\textsuperscript{741} Many East German athletes were contracted to clubs or directly to the organizing bodies for sport which were in the process of dissolving themselves or disappearing. There was little to prevent a mass exodus of sporting talent to the West.\textsuperscript{742} East German football clubs were easy prey for the managers and scouts of West Germany and soon the migration of players commenced, Andreas Thom being the first Oberliga player to move, switching from BFC Dynamo to Bayer Leverkusen in December 1989.\textsuperscript{743} Footballers transferring from East to West were part of an exodus that included ‘almost the entire [GDR] national cycling team, sixty amateur boxers, and the men’s national handball squad.’\textsuperscript{744} In December 1990 Matthias Sammer and Andreas Thom became the first East Germans to play for a team representing re-unified Germany in a match against Switzerland but the one-way traffic in football talent and the resentment that it caused in the old GDR became one of the problems that German football had to deal with in the 1990s.

Re-unification caused problems in other ways that impacted not just on German football but indirectly on the Anglo-German football relationship. It caused alarm among that section of political opinion in Britain who feared a revival of German ambitions to dominate Europe. As John Ramsden has observed, ‘Britain experienced in the 1980s and 1990s more open anti-German prejudice among her rulers than at any time since 1945.’ This was particularly

\textsuperscript{741} Cited in McDougall, \textit{People’s Game}, 315.

\textsuperscript{742} \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 6 July 1990.

\textsuperscript{743} Leske, H., \textit{Enzyklopädie des DDR-Fußballs} (Göttingen: Werkstatt-Verlag, 2007), 249; 491.

\textsuperscript{744} McDougall, \textit{People’s Game}, 316.
evident around 1989 to 1992 and was evident at the highest levels. Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, according to Ramsden, ‘never got over the experience of being a civilian threatened by the Luftwaffe’ and surrounded herself with advisers who shared her Anti-German prejudices. Reminded in 1989 of Germany’s major contribution to the European Union’s finances she argued that ‘the Germans have been simply paying reparations for all the things they did during the war.’ This was not very reassuring from a German point of view and there was little comfort to be drawn from the assessment of one English journalist that Thatcher was not ‘subliminally anti-German’ but ‘typically English’ and ‘subliminally anti-European.’\(^745\) As we have seen, the British press was not slow in taking its cue from Thatcher and this provoked a response in Germany. The \textit{Sun} at times displayed overt anti-German sentiment in its pursuit of sales, often under the disguise of heavy-handed pantomime humour. A cartoon published before the semi-final in 1990 showed Adolf Hitler telling the German players that it was ‘Victory or the firing squad!’\(^746\)

Much of the pre-match coverage in German newspapers of the meeting between Germany and England in the 1990 World Cup semi-final followed a predictable pattern. However, there was, from the start of the tournament in Italy, a more aggressive and hostile tone. This was especially evident in the tabloid \textit{Bild} which seemed to be following the example now being set by the \textit{Sun} and the \textit{Mirror} in England. Germany, though its team had won few friends, had clearly outperformed England throughout the 1980s. Though England had reached the

\(^{745}\) Ramsden, J., \textit{Don’t mention the war}, 403-404.

\(^{746}\) Ramsden, J., \textit{Don’t mention the war}, 400-401.
quarter-finals of the 1986 World Cup in Mexico, West Germany had reached the final; more recently England had performed disastrously in UEFA 88, held in Germany, returning home with zero points after the group stage; West Germany had at least reached the semi-finals. Thus, when England, now managed by Bobby Robson, failed to impress in their opening match, a dull draw with Ireland, and complained that the German referee had failed to give them a penalty, it prompted a response in *Bild* in the form of an open letter supposedly written by Max Merkel, the recently retired coach of the Austrian national team, to Mrs Thatcher (‘Dear Maggie’), asking her to withdraw England (and Scotland) from the tournament.

‘Your compatriots with the iron feet have killed two footballs. One has been raped by the Scots against Costa Rica. The other has been destroyed by Lineker’s goal against Ireland. Another ball was tormented by an England butcher with the name Butcher. Is he related to Frankenstein? The England–Ireland match was a pure horror show! Dear Maggie this World Cup has been so nice, until your gerkhins came! I’ve never asked you a favour but now I do. It is an emergency. Deploy an airplane to get your footballers back. They disturb this tournament! The costs for this gerkhins’ transport are on me! Yours sourly, Max Merkel.’

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747 *Bild*, 13 June 1990.
This was very much in the style that English readers had come to expect from the *Sun* and its ‘red top’ companion, the *Daily Mirror*. Throughout the tournament *Bild* appeared to monitor the English tabloids closely and some of its features were adapted from originals, especially in the *Sun*. For example, it copied a chart featured in the *Sun* which had compared Bobby Robson and Franz Beckenbauer, but reversed the results so that Germany’s coach came out on top. The campaign was still going strong on the morning of the match which featured a patriotic quote from Rudi Völler, ‘Good Bye, England.’ All this was justified in terms of retaliation. The *Sun*, *Bild*’s readers were reminded, had used the rallying cry: ‘We beat them in 1945, we beat them in 1966. We’ll beat them in 1990.’

Elsewhere the coverage was more restrained in tone. *Die Welt* and *FAZ* took their lead from Beckenbauer who believed that his team would have to raise its game to a level they had not yet achieved in the tournament to beat England and reach the final. He was happy to meet England as ‘we know them very well’. The only history that seemed to matter was recent football history with *Die Welt* reciting the by-now familiar dates – Wembley 1966, León 1970, Wembley 1972 and now adding Madrid 1982. England versus Germany was ‘always a classic’, so there were good reasons to look forward to this semi-final. History, in the narrow football sense, was clearly important in providing once again the framework within which sports journalists could write about the match. On match

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748 *Bild*, 4 July 1990.


750 *Die Welt*, 3 July 1990.
day, 4 July, *Die Welt* reminded its readers that on 4 July 1954 Germany had achieved its great victory over Hungary at Berne, an event that was securely lodged in German popular consciousness.\textsuperscript{751}

Coverage in *FAZ* was also framed by football history. Hartmut Scherzer looked back and inevitably mentioned 1966 – the legendary match won by England in controversial circumstances – before moving on to 1970, 1972 and 1982. Overall, England still held the lead in terms of matches won but recent history suggested that Germany were a lot better than England and that their football was regarded more positively. Beckenbauer, however, was wisely cautious; England had played well in the friendly at Düsseldorf in 1987 and were not to be underestimated; they were ‘strong enough for another classic match.’ To some extent these remarks were qualified elsewhere in *FAZ* by reminding readers that the shadow of 1966 was fading and that Germany’s team included players like Thomas Häßler who had not been born in 1966 and for whom England’s historical superiority and football tradition meant nothing. The old idea of England as the teachers and Germany as the pupils would never cross his mind. In short, Germany had reason to approach the semi-final with confidence and there was also a sense that pride in the national team had been restored. Roland Zom was pleased to repeat Beckenbauer’s observation that ‘this team has done more for German football in seven weeks than previous ones have done in sixteen years since 1974.’ However, there was no sense of underestimating the challenge that England now posed. German arrogance was nowhere in sight.

\textsuperscript{751} *Die Welt*, 4 July 1990.
‘They know England but they are not sure if it’s useful. They talk as though about a well-known neighbour and have to ready themselves for new discoveries. They thoroughly list the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent and acknowledge the unpredictability of the apparently predictable adversary.’752

That said, Germany were expected to win. Moreover, according to Lothar Matthäus, quoted in Bild, they had a duty to win. One of the features of away matches played by West German national and club sides before 1989 had been the loyal support of fans from East Germany who had often travelled in great numbers to matches in Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. McDougall describes these as ‘pilgrimages to socialist countries.’753 Now it was time for the team to repay the debt owed to these pilgrims. ‘They’ve made the hard effort and travelled to our games in the Eastern bloc and often outnumbered West German fans’, Matthäus observed. ‘We have to give them something back in acknowledgement for this.’754

Both English and German fans had earned a reputation for hooliganism in the 1980s and there was some violence around the stadium in Turin. One German fan was reported to have been severely injured and was in hospital. An English

752 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July 1990.

753 McDougall, People’s game, 178.

fan replied to the attitude of the Italian police: ‘If you treat us like animals, we’ll behave like animals.’ Generally, however both German and English football emerged from this hard-fought match – a 1-1 draw after ninety minutes and extra time that was won by Germany after a penalty shoot-out – with honour intact and reputations raised. The sports pages of the German press were delighted that their team had reached the final but were also generous to England in defeat. Understandably, Bild was overjoyed, its headlines proclaiming ‘What a game! What a fight!’ Despite all the pre-match bluster it was conceded that the team once derided as ‘gherkins’ had played well, especially in the first half, and had made it difficult for Germany.\(^ {755}\)

In Die Welt Beckenbauer set the achievement of his team in a historical perspective. Since 1974, German football had presented a negative image. His team however, had taken only ‘8 weeks to alter the image of German football.’ In his own fashion, Beckenbauer cared as much about making a good impression as Helmut Schön. He may have been a little disappointed, therefore, in the foreign press ‘quotes’ collected by Die Welt. England had beaten Belgium on the way to the semi-final and Libre Belgique was disappointed with the outcome of the penalty shoot-out which had seen ‘the Germans running through the [back] door to the final.’ The view of the Italian newspaper Gazzetta dello Sport probably counted for more. ‘What a gigantic England team’, they concluded; over the course of the match they had played better than Germany. There was, however, satisfaction to be gained from it being recognized that Germany had been part of a

\(^ {755}\) Bild, 5 July 1990.
great match played in an excellent spirit. It had been ‘atomic football’, according
to Politica (Yugoslavia); ‘a fight of the titans’, according to Sport (Barcelona). El
Pais (Madrid) praised both teams and added that the result could be justified as
‘Germany were the most consistent team at this World Cup.’

Given the bad press that West German national sides had received in the
1980s, even in German newspapers, it was no doubt pleasing to find Roland Zorn
in FAZ reflecting positively on the respect the teams had shown for each other and
for sport. Germany had won but the real winner had been football. England had
exceeded all expectations and could return home with heads held high. In the first
thirty minutes they had subjected Germany to pressure that they had not
experienced previously in the tournament. But Germany had come through. The
‘quiet hero’ of the hour, according to Zom’s colleague Hartmut Scherzer, was the
German goalkeeper Bodo Illgner who had not overly celebrated the win but
merely threw his fist in the air. There was not a trace of arrogance. ‘True heroes
celebrate in style.’ Germany went on to win the final against Argentina and
Beckenbauer was quoted as saying that ‘Germany will be undefeatable for years
to come.’ By the time that England and Germany met again at EURO 96 this
seemed a prediction that was best forgotten.

756 Die Welt, 5 July 1990.
757 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 July 1990.
758 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 July 1990.
759 http://www.anoldinternational.co.uk/2013/04/bundesliga-50-the-1990s/; accessed 12
November 2014.
Rettungsgriff zum Teekessel: EURO 96 Semi-Final, Wembley

The finals of EURO 96 were to be played in England and provided an opportunity to measure how the English public would react to an extended stay in the country by their old football rivals. Having again failed to qualify for the World Cup finals in 1994 it was an eagerly anticipated event, despite some residual fears regarding hooliganism, which seemed to have receded since the disaster at Hillsborough in 1989 and the steps taken to modernize stadia and change the image of English football as ‘a slum sport, played in slum stadiums, and increasingly watched by slum people.’\textsuperscript{760} The mood was summed up by the popularity of the song entitled ‘Football’s Coming Home’, the very successful marketing slogan for the tournament, England’s unofficial anthem which reflected on the ‘thirty years of hurt’ since the hosts had won the World Cup in 1966.\textsuperscript{761} As Germany approached the tournament fans could take some consolation from the scientific research published by two Oxford University academics in 1995 which effectively proved that they had been correct in thinking that England’s third goal in 1966 had not crossed the line.\textsuperscript{762} This prompted considerable interest in Germany where television presenter Ulrich Wickert announced the findings on the late-night news with the words, ‘football history has to be rewritten.’ One newspaper demanded that the two scientists should be awarded professorships for


not allowing the love for their country to distort their scientific judgement.\textsuperscript{763}

Clearly history – even if it was only football history – still counted.

Anglo-German political relations had not improved enormously since 1990 despite the fact that ‘Maggie’ was no longer at Number 10 Downing Street. John Ramsden cites numerous instances of press hostility towards Germany in the 1990s, not all of it confined to the tabloid \textit{Sun}, \textit{Mirror} and \textit{Daily Star}. Even the \textit{Guardian} joined in on occasions. ‘Such hostile images’, he notes ‘appeared in all the British papers, and were picked up and reprinted in German papers as evidence of British attitudes.’\textsuperscript{764} The extent to which this impacted on public opinion might be judged from the 1995 survey which indicated that only 10 per cent of those polled trusted Germany ‘a good deal’, while 35 per cent trusted Germany ‘not at all.’\textsuperscript{765} Coverage of EURO 96 in the tabloids, especially as the semi-final between England and Germany approached, is unlikely to have changed these attitudes despite the attempt to pass it off as an English joke which the Germans did not understand. Indeed it could be argued that the way in which the tabloids used EURO 96 as an excuse for war talk and crude stereotyping generated almost as much coverage in the German newspapers as anything that happened on the field. All the English tabloids were guilty to some extent. The \textit{Sun} ran with ‘Let’s Blitz Fritz’; the \textit{Daily Star} with ‘Herr we go – Bring on the


\textsuperscript{764} Ramsden, \textit{Don’t mention the war}, 410.

\textsuperscript{765} Ramsden, \textit{Don’t mention the war}, 412.
Krauts’. However, it was the *Mirror*, engaged in a circulation battle with the *Sun*, which attracted the most criticism, both in Germany and at home. Its brash young editor, Piers Morgan, was convinced that the way to beat the *Sun* was to copy it, relying on the *Mirror’s* continuing attachment to Labour to provide the only real difference.’ Morgan later admitted that he had been wrong but, by then, the damage had been done.\(^766\) In outbreaks of violence that followed Germany’s victory on penalties after the scores were level at the end of extra time ‘foreigners were attacked on the pretext of being German.’\(^767\) Fortunately, Bernhard Heimrich of *FAZ* was on hand to put this in perspective for German readers. There was something ‘very British’ about the violent post-match reaction. But the huge power surge after the last penalty indicated that most English people who had watched the match on television went into the kitchen to put the kettle on – *Rettungsgriff zum Teekessel*, the kettle had come to the rescue.\(^768\)

Much of the pre-match coverage in the German press proceeded on familiar lines with assessments of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, their form in previous matches in the tournament and news of injured players. In this respect the approach of the German press was relatively low key. Expectations before the tournament were relatively low after an underwhelming performance by the national side in the 1994 World Cup. Germany had an experienced team without technical brilliance, though hopes were rising as

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\(^767\) Downing, *Best of enemies*, 208.

progress was made through the group matches against the Czech Republic (won 2-0), Russia (won 3-0) and Italy (0-0) and the quarter-final against Croatia (won 2-1). Berti Vogts, now coach of the national team, concentrated his efforts on building team morale, repeating his mantra, ‘There are no stars: the team is the star’. This proved very important in view of the injury crisis that beset his squad and appeared to give England an advantage as semi-final Saturday approached.\footnote{Hesse, Uli: \textit{Tor!}, 266.}

With Germany’s star striker out of the game Roland Zorn in \textit{FAZ} summarized England’s expectations ahead of the semi-final: ‘Klinsmann goes, Germany are coming, England are happy.’\footnote{\textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 25 June 1996.} But team spirit would see Germany through.

Veteran \textit{FAZ} journalist football writer Steffen Haffner described how it was possible to tell that an England versus Germany game was about to take place: ‘Suddenly there are German tanks re-appearing in English papers and Krauts are being bombed again.’ It was a fair observation, especially in the context of 1996. Haffner, however, preferred to adhere to the time-honoured framework of recent football history which had framed so many articles in the German and English press over the previous thirty years. His discussion centred on 1966, the third goal and the fact that British scientists had recently proved that it should not have been given. Yet, he reminded his readers that Germany had almost been beaten in normal time at Wembley in 1966 and had been rescued – albeit temporarily – by Weber’s equalizer only 15 seconds from time. Perhaps West Germany were not so unlucky after all? Generally, he rejoiced in the rich
history of Anglo-German international football, especially the ‘classic games’ of 1966, 1970 and 1972. Germans should not forget 1990 when England had surprised everyone, including Germany who had to play their best game of the tournament to get past them in the semi-final, and then only on penalties. England, ‘the cradle of modern football’, had come back impressively after failing to qualify for the 1994 World Cup finals and he predicted ‘a match full of tension – as usual.’

For Zorn, Haffner’s FAZ colleague, writing on the same day, the odds were in England’s favour. He could not resist quoting a DFB spokesman who had noted that it was a relief that this time there would be ‘no Russian linesman.’

What was especially remarkable about 1996 is the extent to which German newspaper coverage was concerned with the English tabloids, especially the Daily Mirror, rather than the match itself. Confronted by the Mirror’s notorious ‘ACHTUNG! SURRENDER!’ front page, featuring mock-up photographs of Paul Gascoigne and Stuart Pearce in instantly-recognizable Second World War British army helmets, Bertie Vogts tried to make the best of it:

‘We have always considered this kind of coverage as humour. Germans are used to being in the semi-final, therefore the emotions are running a bit high in the English media and among

771 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 1996.
772 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 1996.
the English players. For Germany this is a normal game like every other during Euro 96.\footnote{Daily Mirror, 24 June 1996; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 1996.}

It was important not to concede the psychological advantage to England while remaining good-humoured despite this provocation. Roland Zorn was particularly outraged by the Mirror’s less than subtle comparison of Germany’s progress in the tournament with Nazi conquests in Europe in World War II: ‘Germany had already overrun three countries and the meeting with England was their last chance to leave the Island without further consequences.’ Gina Thomas, also in FAZ, argued that newspaper editors in England, notably Piers Morgan, had miscalculated the effect of their front pages and headlines. ‘When xenophobia is displayed in such a manner, the feelings and thoughts of the readers are misrepresented’, she argued. Thomas noted that Morgan had attempted to deflect criticism by offering ‘‘peas in our time’, a feeble pun that had demonstrated that it was not just the Germans who lacked a sense of humour. Ironically, it was the right-wing Daily Mail that had complained about the Mirror’s campaign displaying the unacceptable face of patriotism.\footnote{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 1996.} Thomas’s analysis was endorsed elsewhere in the German press. Der Spiegel, focusing on the Mirror’s main competitor, observed that when compared to the Sun, Bild ‘is almost a herald of sophisticated disposition.’\footnote{Cited in Hesse, Tor!, 267.}
This provocation was enough for the normally moderate Roland Zorn in *FAZ* to demand: ‘Jungs, haut sie weg!’ (‘Lads!, hammer them!’).

Certainly the German press response was robust, notably from *Bild*, who replied to the *Daily Mirror* (‘the *Daily Terror*’) in kind. The German tabloid’s answer to ‘Achtung! Surrender!’ was a list eleven questions designed to irritate the English.

Why do you drive on the wrong side of the road?

Why, as the birth place of football, were you never European champions?

Why can’t you pull a decent pint of beer?

Why do you wear bathing trunks in the sauna?

Why do your electric locomotives still carry a fireman?

Why do you eat your pork chops with peppermint sauce?

Why can’t you beat your former colonies at cricket?

Why do you look like freshly-boiled lobsters after a sunny day on the beach?

Who won the World Cup semi-final in 1990, you or us?

When did an Englishman last win Wimbledon?

Why are you the only people who still think the Wembley goal (in the 1966 World Cup Final) went in?  

Not all of these questions would have seemed sensible to an Englishman – mint sauce goes with lamb, not pork – but the last one was particularly important.

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776 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 June 1996.
because it provided *Bild* with an opportunity to remind readers yet again of what was by now the oldest and most clichéd controversy arising from Anglo-German football encounters. Referee Dienst was quoted as saying, ‘I would do it again.’ Willi Schulz and Uwe Seeler, who admitted that he was still dreaming about it, claimed still to feel a sense of injustice. If, indeed, Schulz and Seeler were quoted correctly, this seems out of line with Hesse’s account of talking over the events of 1966 with Schön’s team in 1996 who, with the exception of Tilkowski, downplayed the controversy. ‘I talked to many members of the 1966 West German squad and their comments all struck similar notes’, he claimed.

To be fair, a very significant body of public opinion in England was highly embarrassed by the tabloid war on Germany. The Press Complaints Commission was ‘inundated with complaints’ though it took no action against the *Mirror.* One effect of these complaints and a thousand letters of protest, as John Ramsden notes, was to persuade Morgan to call off various stunts he had planned, including sending a Spitfire to ‘bomb’ Germans when training and parking a tank outside the offices of *Bild.* England manager Terry Venables was anxious to distance himself and the team from Fleet Street’s ‘tin soldiers.’ ‘It’s disgusting what the press were doing’, he told *Bild*, ‘We respect Germany for their international achievements. And we’ll shake hands with them, before and after the game.’ Bobby Charlton, respected hero of the 1966 and 1970 matches added, ‘This is a

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779 Hesse, *Tor!*, 185.


781 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 402.
disgrace for sport and for the nation that gave birth to sport and the idea of fair play.’ Miraculously, English tabloid coverage ensured that even the French sports daily *L’Equipe* took the German side. It suggested that German fans should go to Wembley wearing three stars on their shirts, one for each World Cup win (1954, 1974, 1990). This would remind the English of the facts.\footnote{Bild, 26 June 1996.} When it was all over, the fact was that Germany had won again, prompting Gary Lineker to produce his famous *bon mot* that football was a game played by twenty-two men that Germany always won. For England, observed Roland Zorn, ‘it could have been a midsummer night’s dream. But it wasn’t.’ The game had demanded character and the German team had shown enormous willpower to come through this match successfully. He concluded that ‘football history has once more been written at Wembley’, this time by Germany.\footnote{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 June 1996.} *Bild*’s match report was headlined: ‘England, the party is over!’ It conceded that there was English grace in defeat; Terry Venables had said, ‘Berti has a great team. I wish him best of luck for the final.’ Yet, if the English were heartbroken, it was their own fault, *Bild* claimed, because the English media had hyped this game beyond reason and had represented it as a war. Perhaps, *Bild* celebrated a little too much but it was understandable in the circumstances.\footnote{Bild, 28 June 1996.}

Of all the comment on the coverage of EURO 96 in English newspapers, the most important was delivered by Bernhard Heimrich in *FAZ*. He argued that much of the nationalistic hype could be explained by a British identity crisis arising
from the growing tensions within the United Kingdom between the English, the Scots and the Welsh which were then becoming apparent. Political evolution in the form of the Scottish parliament and the Welsh Assembly were only a few years away. As ideas of Britishness began to erode the English found themselves with a need to articulate a new identity and this was not always easy. Whereas Scotland and Wales each had an omnipresent patron saint, he argued, England had only the vague figure of St George but the appearance at Wembley of the English flag, the St George’s Cross rather than the Union Jack, suggested that football now provided a vehicle for ‘English super-nationalism’ which fed on Britain’s past glories. This was why press coverage of EURO 96 had often been about the Second World War rather than football. Heimrich blamed the Thatcher governments of 1979-1990 for this state of affairs. It was Thatcher who had taken the English/British foible for nostalgia and turned it into official policy. ‘It’s all the Conservatives fault.’

While careful to retain a sense of perspective – the post-match violence had been only a small footnote – he indicted the popular press as a malign and irresponsible influence supplying a daily fix of vulgar journalism for over ten million readers daily. He suggested that the Daily Mirror should be relabelled the Achtung Mirror and the Daily Express as the Daily Excess. The English tabloids, he argued, represented the lowest form of journalism in Europe and campaigns like that which the Mirror had just run were examples of a dinosaur form of nationalism. The kind of aggression released by ‘the chauvinistic witch hunt’ of

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785 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 June 1996.
1996 forced him to ask (and answer) some questions: ‘What has caused this stupidity among the youth?’ Was it the weekly war movie on television? Did parents force their children to watch goose-stepping Germans at home? Were the *Sun* and the *Daily Mirror* the only text books for history lessons?\(^{786}\) There was more in this argument than Heimrich may have realized at the time. One critic of History textbooks used by students in British schools after the Margaret Thatcher’s government had introduced the national curriculum in 1988 concluded that though there was ‘less unbridled patriotism … banal nationalism and xenophobia’ than had once been the case, they tended to underpin pride in being British and still left students with ‘negative stereotypes of Germans.’\(^{787}\)

**Conclusion**

In 1990, Franz Beckenbauer remarked that in England ‘war correspondents get their say whenever their team plays us.’\(^{788}\) There seems to be some justice in this claim though the tendency was less overt in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s than it became in the 1990s, and especially in 1996. In Germany the reverse was generally true and there were good reasons why the German press sought to avoid allusions to the First and Second World Wars, notably that expressions of nationalist sentiment were officially frowned upon. The desire to make a good impression and to show that the new post-war Federal Republic could be trusted

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787 Ramsden, *Don’t mention the war*, 397.

788 Hesse, *Tor!*, 267.
to make its way peacefully in the world was paramount. It was important for the West German government, the German football team and the German press. We should bear in mind here Michael Billig’s concept of ‘banal nationalism’ in which the sports pages of the daily papers ‘flag’ the idea of the nation daily, celebrating ‘our victories’ and mourning ‘our defeats’, all the time projecting an image of the nation to their readers. In the conditions prevailing for much of the period after 1945 this involved projecting an image of the German state and its people that would not cause alarm in other European countries or raise the spectre of pre-war Germany and Nazi ambitions to dominate Europe. As John Ardagh, in a book surveying contemporary German society for a mainly British audience, has observed, that the celebrations following Germany’s World Cup win in 1990 were ‘probably less fervent than they would have been in many countries, such as Britain.’ This element of restraint in modern German national culture becomes clear in the respect shown for English football and English footballers, not only for the success and the superiority they enjoyed over Germany in terms of matches won in the period up to the 1970s, when the balance began to shift decisively, but also as the founders of the modern game who had first taught the Germans how to play it.

However, though the burden of the past weighed heavily and influenced the writing of the German football journalists, they were not entirely submissive. There was much to be proud of in post-war West Germany and the national

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recovery which was widely recognized at home and abroad as an ‘economic miracle’ was echoed on the sports pages in the ‘miracles’ of Berne and León and the celebration of German technical superiority in football that first became apparent at Wembley in 1972 and was reinforced by a succession of German victories thereafter which seemed to suggest that Germans were able to abandon old methods and pick up new ones in a way that the English could not. Once the English had taught the Germans but from the 1970s it was for the Germans to teach England, ‘the sick man of Europe’ in more ways than one, how to survive and prosper in international competition. The longevity of the controversy surrounding England’s third goal in the World Cup final of 1966, revived so often in the German press that it was a journalistic cliché, suggests that the Germans knew that they had established technical superiority even in the mid 1960s and could be used to underpin ideas of where Germany stood in relation to England in post-1945 history. It also suggests a need to explain away the defeat of 1966 as an aberration, an event which did not fit into the dominant narrative of post-war recovery and success, by scapegoating the Swiss referee and the Russian linesman.

In the changed conditions after 1989-1990 the new re-unified Germany prompted a negative reaction in Britain and elsewhere that was reflected in the way that Germany and Germans were represented and this spread to the sports pages. It was naturally very evident at the time of the 1990 World Cup semi-final and the semi-final of EURO 1996 when England and Germany were thrown together in high profile international matches where national prestige was
perceived to be at stake. Whereas there had been fairly mild protestations in the German press about English ‘tin soldiers’ in 1966 there was a more robust response this time which reflected both the passing of time since 1945 and the surge of nationalistic sentiment following reunification in 1990. As the passing of time lifted the burden of war guilt from German shoulders, there was no longer any requirement to accept the negative stereotyping that featured so prominently in the *Daily Mirror*’s tasteless tabloid war on Germany. *Bild*, as we have seen, fought back using similar techniques. The more considered response by Bernhardt Heinrich in *FAZ* pointed to insularity and nostalgia as an explanation for the excesses of English newspapers, singling them out as the worst press in Europe, thus permitting even *Bild* to occupy the moral high ground. It was not just on the field of play that Germany could now claim superiority.

In his essay ‘Sports Chatter’, written in 1986, Umberto Eco observed of the sports pages:

‘This discussion is in the first place that of the sports press, but it generates in turn discussion on the sports press … The discussion on the sports press is discourse on a discourse about watching others’ sport as discourse.’

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Eco was criticizing a media apparatus that appeared to be obsessed with talking about itself. This could have been applied with justification to the German and English newspapers in the mid-1990s.
Conclusion

It is now 13 years since I first encountered English humour or banter in connection with football. While finishing this thesis, Europe commemorates the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War with memorial services and exhibitions. I find myself talking to British and German colleagues about the war, its causes and culprits, its aftermath. Of course, football also features in many discussions at work and at home. There has been much interest in the informal Christmas Truce of 1914 when some troops met in ‘no-man’s land’ and, according to an Imperial War Museum historian, ‘some played impromptu games of football.’\textsuperscript{792} It reminds us that football has the capacity to bring people of different nations closer together as well as dividing them. The same might be said of the banter between fans that surrounds the global game.

Since 2001 England and Germany have played against each other four times, once during the 2010 World Cup the South Africa, three times in international friendlies. The encounter in Bloemfontein became part of the Anglo-German football history as England scored a goal when a shot from Frank Lampard certainly crossed the line, yet the goal was disallowed. Once more, a referee and his assistant made a critical error in a very high-profile match. In that sense, nothing much has changed since 1966 except that fortune, which favoured England then, seems to have turned against them 44 years later. Many England

supporters were remarkably philosophical in responding to this misfortune. ‘As
regards to this ball over the line thing, the Germans will remember Geoff Hurst’s
goal in 1966 and smile,’ wrote a correspondent signing himself ‘John Bull’, on
Mail Online. ‘It is called Karma’, another added.\textsuperscript{793}

However, it seems possible that some things have changed or are changing
profoundly with regard to English attitudes to German football. The German
national team and the style in which it plays now seems almost unrecognizable
from previous incarnations of the \textit{Mannschaft} and has many English admirers. So
much so, that the \textit{Guardian} headlined a feature ahead of the 2014 World Cup
Final: ‘Whisper it softly: it’s OK to like Germany.’ According to journalist
Stewart Wood, ‘something strange’ was happening. References to ‘Krauts’ and
‘Panzers’, had been commonplace in English tabloids in 1996 and for a few years
afterwards but were now few and far between. Instead, he observed, with a
Germany versus Argentina final to come, he observed, ‘it seems pretty clear that,
for many of us, Germany is the team we will be cheering.’ Wood added that it had
been customary for the English to describe German teams by assigning to them
the same ‘begrudging virtues: “efficient”, “clinical”, “ruthless”’ used to refer to
‘well-functioning inanimate objects’, such as cars or dishwashers. Now, however,
Wood argued, ‘Germany is not just a country to be admired. It is a country that

\textsuperscript{793} Cited in Porter, D. and Wagner, C., ‘Over the line: England, Germany and Wembley
1966’, in A. Waine and K. Naglo (eds), \textit{On and off the field: Football culture in England and
Germany} (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014), 73.
should inspire us.'\(^{794}\) And not just on account of its football. The *Guardian* article confirms my own impressions and experiences of living and working in Bath and Leicester over a period of five years. Many people I have met liked Germany and had an opinion about its football but generally admired German efficiency in producing reliable cars. Quite incomprehensively, they all claimed that trains in Germany are on time, always. This aside, I cannot confirm from my own experience Joschka Fischer's statement that ‘people to people there is a problem.’\(^{795}\)

However, analysis of the way in which Anglo-German football rivalry has been represented in the English press over the period between 1954 and 1996 suggests that this has not always been so. This is evident in the large narratives that are embedded in match reports and other items relating to international matches which were seen to reoccur over time. Principally, these were based on the history of Anglo-German military and political conflict in the twentieth century and on a developing story derived from what happened on the field of play in which, for the English, 1966 featured heavily; in other words ‘two world wars and one World Cup.’ Both narratives provided the setting for extensive stereotyping which could be used positively and/or negatively. Another important narrative that framed the way that stories were written, especially in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, was linked to what has been called ‘declinism’, the British

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\(^{794}\) *Guardian*, 13 July 2014; the article attracted more than 1,000 comments; accessed 14 December 2014.

\(^{795}\) Ramsden, J., *Don’t mention the war: the British and the Germans since 1890* (London: Little Brown, 2006), 364
obsession with the problems – sometimes real, sometimes exaggerated – surrounding its economic performance which was manifestly inferior to that of the Federal Republic of Germany as it experienced its post-war ‘economic miracle’ and achieved growth rates higher than those achieved by Britain. This meant that sports page narratives also reflected a grudging admiration for the Germans and for German football at times. Thus the Germans might be described as ‘arrogant’, but they were also ‘efficient’ and ‘modern’ and superior in technique. The English were acknowledged to have big hearts and powerful legs but were hampered by their reluctance to abandon methods that had brought success in the past, resulting in them being overtaken by rivals in international competition. The story of Ramsey’s persistence for far too long with the players and the system that had won the World Cup in 1966 while West Germany moved on fits neatly into this pattern.

However, the way in which these stories were told and especially the extent to which they carried an overtly hostile anti-German message which drew on negative experiences, folk memories and prejudices, varied over time. Thus the context of the Anglo-German political, economic and cultural relationship as it evolved over a period of forty years is very important in explaining the nature of representation at any particular time. Change in the way in which sports news was presented in the press is another contextual factor that has to be taken into account. For example, football coverage in 1954 was comparatively thin compared to 1996. In part, this can be explained simply by problems regarding the availability of paper (newsprint) which was subject to rationing until 1955. When
previewing England-West Germany in 1954 for the *Daily Express*, Desmond Hackett’s football story had to share the available space with other popular sports such as boxing, dog racing and cricket. The inclusion of a column entitled ‘Soccer on the Inside’ ensured that football dominated the sports section, but that dominance was not so evident as would be the case forty years later when it could be spread over several of the sports pages and even, as with the *Daily Mirror* in 1996, take over the front pages too. Moreover, there were marked differences in style between newspapers which shaped the way in which matches were previewed, reported and analysed. In the *Daily Express* and the *Daily Mirror* the writers were expected to deliver sensationalist and highly opinionated reports. Their approach, what could be called as ‘we-coverage’, was generally quite different from that of *The Times* where the ‘Association Football Correspondent’ Geoffrey Green, was writing for a better educated, more literate audience. The headline given to a *Times* leading article, ‘Taking Stock of English Football,’ indicates a more measured and thoughtful approach.  

In general, press English coverage of Anglo-German football rivalry at international level suggests has been characterized by a persistent undercurrent of mistrust arising from the unhappy history of the twentieth century when the two nations found themselves engaged in two global military conflicts in which suffering was inflicted on and suffered by both sides. It is not uncommon for sports writers to use military terminology to describe team games based on attack and defence but the shared history of the First and Second World Wars means that

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*The Times*, 1 December 1954
such references are capable of carrying powerful reminders of the past when reporting England versus Germany. For most of the period 1954 to 1996, however, there was an element of restraint in reporting. This was especially evident in the 1950s, when memories of the Second World War were fresh in people’s memories and English newspapers were looking to reassure readers that their country was still a major power but had to build a new relationship with the ‘good Germans’ of the Federal Republic. In this context, it was reassuring to report that ‘we’ had beaten the new world champions at Wembley in 1954, even though the German side on the day was much changed from the one which had achieved ‘the miracle of Berne’ by beating Hungary a few months earlier. The honorary Englishman status accorded to Bert Trautmann and the positive publicity generated by the German doctors and nurses who cared for Manchester United players after the Munich air disaster meant that there were other positive stories to tell and overt hostility towards Germany and Germans was kept in check.

This pattern continued to prevail after 1966 though it was briefly interrupted as Helmut Schön’s team made its way – or rather ‘marched’ as some English newspapers described their progress – to the World Cup final against England at Wembley in 1966. There was some justification for the German accusation that some English football writers became ‘tin soldiers’, especially in the interlude between the semi-final and the final when they hinted that West Germany had feigned injury and provoked opponents into acts of retaliation that had led to them being sent off. If West Germany had won at Wembley in 1966 it is likely that this kind of criticism would have become more evident. However, England won,
assisted by a dubious refereeing decision to which Schön and his team responded with good grace, being determined above all else, to leave a good impression. This allowed English newspapers to praise their performance – it reflected well on England to have beaten such a good side – and also their sportsmanship. The triumph of European, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ football over Latin and Latin American football at the 1966 tournament also provided something that could be celebrated with Germany, thus keeping negativity in the background amidst the post-match euphoria.

It was not so easy for the English press to be so positive towards German football in the years that followed, the ‘thirty years of hurt’ which the Lightning Seeds, David Baddiel, Frank Skinner and thousands of England supporters were to sing about 1996.797 Though, in his own way, Ramsey with his ‘wingless wonders’, was tactically innovative, yet winning the World Cup in 1966 tended to reinforce conservatism in English football while West Germany and others proved more successful at modernization. The outlines of this story were shaped by the different trajectories taken by the British and West German economies. If anything, winning the Coupe Jules Rimet, like having first-mover advantage in industrialization, made it even more difficult for English football to move forward and open up to new ideas. It thus helped to explain the ensuing failures to renew and adapt to relative decline in terms of international competition. The circumstances in which West Germany defeated England at León in 1970 were

such that the press were able to tell a story of misfortune – Gordon Banks in goal would have made all the difference – ensuring that England returned home having performed creditably, though some were inclined to point the finger at a poor management decision, when Ramsey had decided to substitute Bobby Charlton, liberating Beckenbauer from his defensive duties. By this time, the fate of the English national football team had come to assume much more importance than it had at the start of our period, not least because of extensive live television coverage. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had claimed that ‘England always wins the World Cup under Labour’ was denied any positive impact that good news from Mexico would have provided and there were exaggerated claims that England’s defeat had cost Labour the 1970 general election.

Though it was not evident immediately, the 1970 match marked a turning point in the Anglo-German football relationship with the balance thereafter being very much in Germany’s favour. The defeat in León marked the beginning of a decline which saw England fail to qualify for the World Cup finals in 1974 (when West Germany won) and 1978 (when West Germany reached the quarter-final). It was the 3-1 defeat in the European nations Cup quarter-final at Wembley in 1972 – and the fluid style in which it was achieved that made it impossible to ignore how far West Germany had advanced and how far England had fallen behind. It was clear that the two countries had moved in diametrically opposite directions, an impression confirmed by Ramsey’s defensively-minded approach to the second leg in Berlin which seemed designed to ensure damage limitation and simply confirmed that England were now incapable of mounting a serious threat to a
technically-proficient and attractive German team. At a time when commentators were beginning to suggest that Britain was ‘the sick man of Europe’ and ‘declinism’ had set in, there was an inevitable tendency for journalists to glance admiringly towards the successful West Germans before subjecting English football and those that ran it to severe criticism. Ken Jones in the *Daily Mirror*, for example, attacked ‘a system which permits a match of this importance to be played within a web of critical domestic contests.’\(^798\) The Germans, in contrast, had different priorities and were represented as having adjusted successfully to the new world of highly-competitive international football and would never have allowed this to happen.

England’s performances improved in the 1980s, to some extent adding substance to the Thatcherite claim that victory in the Falklands War in 1982 and economic prosperity had reversed years of British decline. When England qualified for the World Cup finals in Spain in 1982, drawing 0-0 against West Germany in the second group stage, there was disappointment and much criticism of an opponent that no longer played with the flair associated with German teams of the 1970s. The German capacity for organising teams that were hard to beat but unattractive to watch in this period meant that much of the coverage they were given in English newspapers was negative, though this could be excused by the fact that the West German press and public were, if anything, even more critical, especially after the element of cynicism that was exposed when the ‘arranged’ 1-0 win over Austria ensured progression at the expense of Algeria. With its club

\(^798\) *Daily Mirror*, 1 May 1972
sides banned from European competition after Heysel in 1985 and a persistent hooliganism problem ensuring a bad press for the game at home, the unexpected progress of the England team at the 1990 World Cup, where they met West Germany in the semi-final, generated enormous interest and enthusiasm. It could be argued that England benefited from being regarded now as the underdogs when they played Germany in that the role meant that there was less pressure on them from the press or the fans.

Coverage of Italia 90 saw the appearance of a much more virulent anti-Germany tone in the tabloid press, especially in the *Sun* and the *Daily Star*. There were more English journalists playing ‘tin soldiers’ than at any time since 1966. However, it is important to remember the political context when referring to this change of tone towards the ‘Krauts’, as the *Sun* liked to refer to Germans. It has to be set against the British reaction to German reunification which was regarded unfavourably by Prime Minister Thatcher and her closest political allies, especially Nicholas Ridley, her Trade and Industry Secretary whose overt hostility as revealed in an interview with the *Spectator* was so evident that it was no longer possible for him to remain in the government without causing embarrassment. Opinion poll evidence suggested that a large number of people shared his distrust of Germany and its alleged ambitions in Europe and that many still did remember the war, among them was Bobby Robson who opened his team-talk before the 1990 semi-final with the words: ‘Don’t forget the war, lads.’

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For the England team, as they prepared to meet Germany in the semi-final, it was football history that mattered. Stuart Pearce, for example, ‘felt we owed them one for 1990’, when Germany had won on penalties. Paul Gascoigne – perhaps not the most reliable of sources – recalled in his ghosted memoirs that ‘The gaffer (Terry Venables) was brilliant at encouraging us and building out confidence. There was never any of the “Remember the war” crap. It was all about how we were better than them, how we could beat them …’ 800 However, the match took place against the backdrop of continuing difficulties between Britain and the European Union during the period of Conservative government under John Major from 1990 to 1997, culminating in the so called ‘Beef War’ of 1996 in which Germany played a major part in securing a ban on British beef exports. This incident was very much at the forefront of the news agenda as Euro 96, the first major football tournament to be held in England since 1966, accompanied by massive exposure on television and in the press. ‘Football’s coming home’ was the slogan of Euro 96, yet foreign journalists and fans alike could only have been alarmed by the xenophobic tone of the English popular press which was hardly welcoming and took on warlike characteristics.

In the tabloid press the kind of coverage that had characterised the period from 1966 up to the end of the 1980s was submerged by aggressive reporting that bordered on open racism. Ironically, it was the *Daily Mirror*, once the popular

newspaper most closely identified with the political left in England that led the way as it borrowed from the agenda set by its red-top rival the Sun in an attempt to win back readers with a sensationalist approach which exploited negative stereotyping at every opportunity. Piers Morgan, the Mirror’s editor, declared ‘football war’ on Germany, prompting Bild to respond, which only made matters worse by providing an excuse to prolong the campaign still further. Christopher Young has suggested that much of the material that many Germans and some English people found embarrassing and offensive owed much to the pantomime tradition which required a villain, a ‘blacketer-than-black baddie’ for the ‘humour’ to work. It was, he claims, aimed not just at Germany but at the ‘sanctimonious quality press’ who tended to look down on Morgan and the kind of journalism popularized by the Daily Mirror. The Germans, he notes, served this purpose, and as they could be negatively stereotyped so conveniently, were able to serve it again and again. ‘The baddie functions and is loved as a stereotype within a hermetically sealed world of humour’, Young observes.  

This may be so but it was not surprising that the Germans did not want to be reminded of some of the darker aspects of their past or to be confronted with stereotypes derived almost entirely from the era of Nazism and the Second World War as seen by the English. Though these developments in the 1990s took xenophobia and stereotyping to a new extreme, there had always been an undercurrent evident, often evident in the choice of language or metaphor in sports reporting, which suggested that the English had not – perhaps could not –  

801 Young, ‘Two world wars and one World Cup’, 10-14.
forget about the war. The German sports press covered the games in an entirely different way. The tone was less militaristic in the choice of words though a fondness for military uniforms and ranks sometimes broke through. The reasons for this more sober approach to Anglo-German football are purely historical in their origin. The press in the various German states and empires had never been free; instead it was strictly censored and controlled. Worst, between 1933 and 1945, the press was used to serve the purposes of national socialism. It was only after 1945, therefore, that the press in the Federal Republic was free. However, the aftermath of the Nazi period was palpable. Though the papers were free by and large, they were inhibited by the legacy of the past and were less inclined to sensationalism and tended to avoid football-as-war metaphors, and focusing more closely on an agenda shaped by events in and around the matches that were played. West German athletes were regarded as having an important part to play in rehabilitating Germany in the eyes of the post-war world. They were ‘diplomats in track suits’.

Helmut Schön’s teams fitted this description and the German media also played its part, protesting only mildly about the ‘tin soldiers’ of Fleet Street in 1966 and responding only under extreme provocation in 1996. Meanwhile, for a time at least, the English press seemed to have shifted into new territory as the rival tabloids fought each other for a share of the market that was actually in decline. Coverage of the 2002 World Cup, Jon Garland has argued, saw many of the themes that had been noticeable in 1996 re-emerge, ‘such as the

use of military metaphors, antagonism and hostility towards “Traditional enemies”.

This thesis has investigated an enormous amount of football coverage in the press in England and Germany between 1954 and 1996. Further, it has stopped short of England’s biggest success since 1966: beating Germany twice in 2000 and 2001, the latter being the reference point for my relationship with England, English football and identity. Arguably, press reaction to England’s 5-1 victory in Munich in 2001 merits further attention and analysis given the outburst of patriotic euphoria that it caused in England and the soul-searching that went on in Germany. Moreover, the political context of Anglo-German relations within the wider European Union has continued to evolve. After 2006, matches between the two sides have mostly been regarded as amicable affairs as public opinion in England became more accustomed to reunified Germany, though anxieties recently prompted by the extent to which Germany drives EU economic policy and the rise of UKIP (the United Kingdom Independence Party) suggest that the Anglo-German relationship may be entering troubled waters yet again. If this is so, it is likely to be reflected on the sports pages as in other parts of the media. Any researcher taking this area of study further would have to take into account that the media since 1996 have changed dramatically and would need to investigate online news sites, blogs and social media as well as the conventional printed sources which have been the principal focus of this study.

Finally, it is important to reflect on the ways in which the account of media representations generated by Anglo-German football rivalry presented here differs from those already available to us. In any historical work, periodization is significant and there are certain advantages in taking a long view. Much of the academic interest in football-related representations of Germany and Germans dates from the mid to late 1990s and was clearly prompted by a perceived need to explain the nature of the coverage of EURO 96 and subsequent major tournaments in the English tabloid press. The work of Maguire, Poulton and Possamai (1999), Garland and Rowe (1999), Crolley and Hand (2002) and Garland (2004) might be bracketed together in this way. While these are insightful and informative in terms of media representations arising from EURO 96 and the 2002 World Cup, it could be argued that they focus quite narrowly on episodes when tabloid representations of Anglo-German football were manifesting themselves in forms that had not been seen before. It is important to be able to remind ourselves that what happened in 1996 was specific to 1996 and that, though there were some similarities, the Mirror’s pantomime warfare – and Bild’s response - was quite different from the kind of coverage typical of the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. It also has to be said that the focus in much recent literature in this area has been largely on the mass-market tabloids. We have been careful here to pay as much attention to upmarket The Times and the middlemarket Daily Express as the downmarket Daily Mirror. If, to use Ramsden’s phrase, there was a persistent ‘people to people’ problem between the English and the German people in the second half of the twentieth century, football writers did not always help, though
Peter Wilson and Desmond Hackett were more open to criticism than Geoffrey Green in this respect.

The title of Garland’s 2004 article – ‘The same old story’ – implies that it is possible to read backwards from coverage of the 2002 World Cup, but investigating a longer series of representations dating back to the mid 1950s makes it clear that this could be misleading. Various histories have to be taken into account, notably the history of Anglo-German relations and the history of the mass media. The relationship between Britain and the FRG in the 1950s was quite different from that which existed between Britain and re-unified Germany in the 1990s. The highly-segmented market for newspapers in Britain in the 1950s saw the Mirror without a serious rival in the popular mass circulation sector but by the 1990s it was engaged in and losing a circulation battle with the Sun, conditions which prompted editor Piers Morgan to push boundaries of good taste and sensationalism in a way that would have occurred to his predecessors in the 1950s, 1960s or 1970s. Young (2007) – with its emphasis on the ‘two World Wars and one World Cup’ meta-narrative and the Mirror’s invocation of traditional English pantomime humour – effectively underlined the importance of seeing particular representations in a longer historical perspective. Thus by investigating the history of football-related representations over a forty-year period it is possible to identify both a persistent undercurrent of hostility and mistrust and also the particular historical conditions which have caused this to vary in intensity and to manifest itself in different ways over the years. Looking back from 2002 to 1996, it might be possible to read ‘the same old story’. But ‘the story’ of 1996 is
very different from that of 1972 or 1966 or 1954; moreover, it was told in quite different ways, depending on both the outcome of matches and the wider context. Thus victories for England in 1954 and 1966 could be used to tell a reassuring success story at a time when Britain’s role as a world power was diminishing; defeat for England in 1972 could be used to warn of the dangers of failing to modernize as rapidly as rival industrial nations, an issue with which the British media was increasingly preoccupied at the time.

The other feature of this thesis that makes it distinctive in its field is that some attempt has been made to provide an account of representations of Anglo-German football rivalry in the German press, enabling some tentative comparisons to be drawn. As we have seen, the German press – whether upmarket FAZ, middlemarket Die Welt or the downmarket Bild - reported international football from a very different perspective. Any tendency to represent England and the English negatively was inhibited in the first instance by the need to draw a line under the Nazi past and a determination to avoid controversy. There was a greater anxiety than in England to show that German football was well-regarded in other countries, most notably in Mexico in 1970. Moreover, the higher proportion of subscription as opposed to direct sales via newsagents and street vendors meant that the tendency towards sensationalism in journalism was kept in check. What is particularly interesting here is the increasing evidence of concern regarding the way in which Germany and German football were represented in England. When Fleet Street’s soldiers put their ‘tin hats’ on 1966 there was dismay, though mildly expressed. By the 1990s Germany’s own tabloid press was
inclined to respond directly to the campaigns waged by its counterparts in England with Bild trading national stereotypes and mock outrage with the Daily Mirror. It is hoped that Chapter Five of this thesis will provide some kind of launching pad for further comparative studies of the British and German media.
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