THE CASE FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: AN AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDY AND APPLICATION TO NIGERIA
Like many other common law countries, Nigeria imposes statutory duties on its companies’ directors. Breach of these duties are expected to be enforced ‘privately’ by the company, its shareholders or any other proper person. Despite this, evidence suggests that in Nigeria there has been very little enforcement of directors’ duties. Consequently, this paper examines whether there is a place for public enforcement of directors’ duties. It questions whether the failings of the private enforcement regime necessitate a complementary enforcement regime. To address this question, it draws on a theoretical framework, the deterrence theory, in exploring whether public enforcement offers superior deterrence over private enforcement. It also examines Australia’s civil penalty regime as a case study of a jurisdiction that has effectively used the public enforcement regime for breach of directors’ duties. Overall, then, it argues that to enhance enforcement, Nigeria ought to introduce a public enforcement regime for breach of directors’ duties.
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version.
Citation : Akanmidu, O. (2020) THE CASE FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: AN AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDY AND APPLICATION TO NIGERIA. Business Law Review,
Peer Reviewed : Yes
- Department of Law