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dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edward
dc.contributor.authorMirza, Zarak
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-02T08:37:12Z
dc.date.available2019-10-02T08:37:12Z
dc.date.issued2019-11
dc.identifier.citationCartwright, E. and Mirza, Z. (2019) Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount. Oxford Economic Papers,en
dc.identifier.issn0030-7653
dc.identifier.urihttps://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/18544
dc.descriptionThe file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version.en
dc.description.abstractIn some instances charities insist on donors giving more than some minimum amount. In many other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen
dc.subjectcharityen
dc.subjectwarm glowen
dc.subjectminimum donationen
dc.subjectexperimenten
dc.titleCharitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amounten
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpz063
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.funderNo external funderen
dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NCen
dc.date.acceptance2019-09-20
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)en


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