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dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.contributor.authorStepanova, A.en
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-31T09:30:40Z
dc.date.available2018-10-31T09:30:40Z
dc.date.issued2015-06-11
dc.identifier.citationCartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2015) The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games. Economics Letters, 134, pp. 29-33en
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2086/16919
dc.descriptionAlso available on KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/51216/ The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.en
dc.description.abstractWe revisit the question of whether a refund increases efficiency in threshold public good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the effect of endowment size. We demonstrate that a refund increases efficiency if and only if the endowment is small relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the effect of a refund. Specifically, we argue that a refund increases efficiency only if significantly many groups converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.titleThe consequences of a refund in threshold public good gamesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.funderNAen
dc.projectidNAen
dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NCen
dc.date.acceptance2015-05-29en
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)en


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