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dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.contributor.authorStepanova, A.en
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-25T14:33:08Z
dc.date.available2018-10-25T14:33:08Z
dc.date.issued2017-03-04
dc.identifier.citationCartwright, E. and Stepanova, A. (2017) Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. International Journal of Game Theory, 46(4), pp.1163-1191.en
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.urihttps://kar.kent.ac.uk/59054/
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2086/16848
dc.descriptionopen access articleen
dc.description.abstractWe contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.subjectPublic gooden
dc.subjectthresholden
dc.subjectimpulse balance theoryen
dc.subjectquantal responseen
dc.subjectforced contributionen
dc.subjectordinal potentialen
dc.titleEfficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game'en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1
dc.peerreviewedYesen
dc.funderN/Aen
dc.projectidN/Aen
dc.cclicenceCC-BY-NCen
dc.date.acceptance2017-02-13en
dc.exception.reasonauthor was not DMU staff at time of publication. Available at Kent Uni repository.en
dc.researchinstituteInstitute for Applied Economics and Social Value (IAESV)en
dc.exception.ref2021codes254aen


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