The Deterrence Theory: A Case for Enhanced Enforcement of Directors' Duties
This article is concerned with providing a justification for effective enforcement of directors’ duties. It aims to consider whether enforcement of directors’ duties is necessary. It argues that enforcement of directors’ duties is crucial to effective corporate governance. Drawing on the deterrence theory, it argues that there is a clear link between increased enforcement and increased compliance. Consequently, enhanced and effective enforcement of directors’ duties is essential for securing compliance.
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link
Citation : Akanmidu, O. (2017) The deterrence theory: a case for enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties. Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review 1(1) pp. 25-31.
ISSN : 2521-1889
Research Institute : Institute for Evidence-Based Law Reform (IELR)
Peer Reviewed : Yes
- Department of Law